TPQs (10/17) Group 2 Posts, Group 3 Repsonds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[afin...@lclark.edu]

Through this argument, Kant establishes why being immoral is also being irrational: 

"1. If you are rational, then you are consistent . 

2. If you are consistent, then you obey the principle of universalizability. 

3. If you obey the principle of universalizability, then you act morally . 

4. Therefore, if you are rational, then you act morally . 

5. Therefore, if you act immorally, then you are irrational." 

Because of this, Kant believes that every form of immorality is a form of irrationality, because acting immorally means the agent is making mistaken assumptions and reasoning poorly. Are there examples of irrational behavior that isn't immoral? Schafer-Landau gives us the example of a contracted serial killer who knows what they are doing and the results of their actions. Even though most of us would see him as immoral, can we claim he's irrational? 

[rh...@lclark.edu]

O'Neill brings up the point of coercion, and how according to Kantian reasoning coercing someone is using them as a mere means.  She gives an example of something that is not coercion on page 167, a person using a teller to cash a check, and on the next page an example of coercion, a rich person threatening someone with bankruptcy unless "he or she joins their scheme."  Do you believe these are really all that different?  Surely the teller would face repercussions for refusing to serve customers, and the customer is by no means assured to view the teller as anything more than a tool.  While they both enter the situation voluntarily, so do the debtor and rich person.  In the debt example we assume the debtor was not coerced into debt but voluntarily took it on with full knowledge that the rich person had the power to bankrupt him or her.  What are the meaningful differences, if any, in these situations?  Are they enough to justify treating them differently morally speaking?  Why or why not?

Can you think of any response to Shafer-Landau's argument against Kant's universalization test?  Do you believe that it is correct or not?  If you do, explain why, if not, explain how this affects the usefulness of Kant's moral theory as a whole.

[sluh...@lclark.edu]

We can claim he is irrational based upon the criteria that are given in the argument capitulated below. If we recall that Kant also includes in morality the self/agent who is acting (and in this we mean a rational self-considering/other considering morality). Therefore, the serial killer would not plausibly be fulfilling premise 2 (consistency-->universality) and is, therefore, acting irrationally.

Shaun

[ega...@lclark.edu]

Fairness and Justice: This chapter eventually establishes that the issue with Universalizability is that the motives of people are sometimes universalizable by Kant's standards, but are not logically thought to be moral.  While I agree with this, I was wondering about a second objection to the universilazablilty standard of Kantian theory, which is, does this standard fall prey to the same Partial Compliance Objection that Standard Rule Utilitarianism did? If not, why?

Kant on Treating People as Ends...: O'Neill states that the line between treating people as means and treating them as mere means is reliant upon the consent of both individuals in the part that they play.  But where does that leave situations where a customer might be very rude to the cashier or ignore them completely, but still pay for their purchase.  Both actors consented in their parts, as the cashier was getting paid for dealing with the customer, and the customer got their purchase, but it does not seem morally right to treat other people in a rude and dismissive way, regardless of whether or not they are both compliant in their roles. Can a situation like this be answered using Kant's logic? Or is it not even considered an issue of morality?

[leep...@lclark.edu]

The principle of universalizibility probably does not fall victim to the partial compliance objection because they operate in two different ways. The utilitarian is concerned with the outcomes of the agents actions, while the Kantian is caught up on the motives behind these ideas. The end is not that people will all act according to the maxim that you adopt when you make a moral decision, the end is whether or not your motives for acting are universalizable, in that they do not counteract what you are trying to accomplish. Additionally, it seems that the test of whether or not an action is universalizable only seeks to see if an action is consistent. Like Schafer-Landau says, there can be consistent Nazis. Universalizability does not prove an action right or wrong, it just tests consistency.

[eh...@lclark.edu]

Kant claims that any act in which one uses another as mere means is an immoral act.  This seems like such a black and white claim.  We have all "taken advantage of the system," whether it be a lying promise to get ahead in a situation, or coerced someone to do something they normally wouldn't have thought of doing. We have all acted immorally according to Kant. Is this such a bad thing?  Most of the time we aren't doing any harm to any person.  And the reasoning we have behind our actions usually involves the fact that NOT everyone is doing it because we know that our action will then not be effective.  Is taking advantage of the system as immoral as an act that harms a specific individual?  Is the grey area in immorality?

[sretzlaff]

According to O'Neill's, "Kant on Treating People as Ends in Themselves," she states that "our intentions reflect what we expect the immediate results of an action to be."  What is one example where people have to test their proposals by Kantian arguments?  What is another example when Kantians have have to work out whether they will be doing wrong by some act even though they know their foresight is limited?