TPQs (12/3) Group 3 Posts, Group 4 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[sluh...@lclark.edu]

"What is wrong is to forget that these practices, and their reception, the reactions to them, really are expressions of our moral attitudes and not merely devices we calculatingly employ for regulative purposes. Our practices do not merely exploit our natures, they express them. Indeed the very understanding of the kind of efficacy these expressions of our attitudes have turns on our remembering this."

Condemnation, resentment, blame, and guilt are a few of the moral attitudes the author examines and more specifically how we go about employing these expressions as a way to regulate behavior. The authors argues that we need to see these against seeing these things as mere devices for regulatory purposes. Instead, we must not forget that they are also moral attitudes. What purpose does this simultaneous recognition serve? How does having this explicit relationship clarified in the moral agent allow them to employ condemnation, resentment, blame and guilt more effectively as devices for regulative behavior?

[co...@lclark.edu]

The belief that morals are regulative mechanisms seems to be diametrically opposed to the belief that morals are a genuine expression of something human. By pointing out this tension, I think the author is trying to do something similar to what Nagel did in his moral luck piece. ie. We cant just believe that moral luck removes all moral responsibility/ morals are just a means of regulating behavior. Because if we believe that these are the best descriptive explanations of the world, by focusing on just that aspect we miss out on something.

I think this relates to what we were talking about at the start of class the other day. Most things are "social" constructs. But that doesnt mean they dont exist. So, by thinking about them as only social constructs, we miss out on understanding them fully.

[hwhi...@lclark.edu]

In terms of these categories' (moral attitudes vs. regulatory devices) relations with determinism, we must examine how exactly the existence of determinism affects their use. In other words how is the rationality of a reaction (guilt, shame, resentment) as a moral attitude altered by the existence of determinism, and how as a regulative device it affected by determinism? If in fact agency is made ineffective by determinism, it seems a reaction as moral attitude is irrational and that as a regulative behavior will be rendered ineffective and thus too irrational. However, Strawson generates, in his preliminary discussion of the argument between the optimist and the pessimist, an image of determinism as a sense of freedom still existing but in a negative sense. If this to be taken as true it logically follows that the regulations formed by our reactions serve to shape the boundaries of this "negative freedom". In regards to the posed question here, it can only be accepted that regulative behaviors are appropriate if they are the logical application of our moral attitudes. Furthermore, moral attitudes can be accepted as logically existing within determinism as reactions to moral situations because they are the root of the moral guidelines employed to shape the "negative freedom" that exists within determinism.

[estanbro]

I like the link to Nagel's "Moral Luck." I too think that like Nagel said, if we remove responsibility from morality then morality no longer exists. That is, we can't allow moral luck to remove responsibility from our lives. Moral luck only plays a part. Another large part is intention, which is a major point brought out in this article. The author points out the importance in the intentions of our actions. Accidentally stepping on someone's foot is much different than purposefully stomping on someone's foot. Yet, either way, you are doing the exact same action. So why is there a difference? If we removed intention then there would not be a difference, you would simply be stepping on someone's foot. But when you factor in intention, I think morality is back in the equation. You certainly would not be mad at someone for accidentally stepping on your foot (or probably not mad), but if they purposefully stomped on your foot, you might get a little angry. Thus, you are responsible for your intentions, which allow us to feel resentment, blame, guilt, etc.

[nse...@lclark.edu]

It is important to recognize that reactive attitudes are critical in regarding other beings as beings that also possess moral agency. But it is also important to recognize that there are some beings who do not deserve said reactive attitudes because they lack moral agency for whatever reason. For example, though one might harbor resentment toward someone who punched her in the face with the intention of causing her harm, it would not be fair to harbor resentment toward someone who has some physical impairment that prevents him from controlling his bodily movements. In this sense, that being lacks the agency to control whether or not they injure someone else and should not be resented for it, as it is something beyond his control. Recognizing this distinction allows us to have empathy for those whose agency allows them to be seen as existing within the bounds of the moral sphere as well as for those who cannot be a part of it for reasons beyond their control.