TPQs (11/26) Group 1 Posts, Group 2 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[mblak...@lclark.edu]

Thomas Nagel writes, in regards to the truck driver who accidentally runs over a child, "The driver, if he is entirely without fault, will feel terrible about his role in the event, but will not have to reproach himself. Therefore this example of agent-regret is not yet a case of moral bad luck. However, if the driver was guilty of even a minor degree of negligence-failing to have his brakes checked recently, for example--then if that negligence contributes to the death of the child, he will not merely feel terrible. He will blame himself for the death" (Nagel 56). That such a minor flaw as not checking the brakes makes the difference between regret and blame is interesting to me. Where do we draw the line between negligence and non-negligence? How does demandingness factor into moral luck in regards to negligence? Is it possible that with the constant, exponential growth of technology, our ability to avoid negligence is growing slimmer and thus predisposing us to almost always being at moral fault? 

[eh...@lclark.edu]

I find this very interesting. I've been seeing a lot of car commercials lately where the newest technology will alert you if you are about to hit something backing up or something might jump out in front of your car.  If the car takes over and stops automatically without the driver realizing the situation, is it right for him to feel terrible about what "could have" or would have happened?  Or will the driver feel comfortable with this technology enough to feel as though it is an extension of his own perception and nothing serious happened that warrants more attention? In this case, what is to happen if the technology fails who is the negligible one: the driver or the engineer who designed it?

[vmco...@lclark.edu]

Nagel's "Moral Luck" piece was intriguing to say the least. He poses the audience with different scenarios of how people can either be morally responsible or morally not responsible. He notes how much a person's negligence can influence whether or not they should feel guilty for what they did. This article, in relation to our upcoming paper topic, made me think about how utilitarians would approach this same problem. Many of the times in Nagel's scenarios, there is a similar outcome (i.e. a dead child from getting hit by a truck). Therefore, would utilitarians just completely omit the concept of being morally guilty?

[beaub]

Nagel claims that, despite some of our intuitions, "ultimately nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control" (26). There is also a distinction, many believe, between someone being careless and being a murderer. In Nagel's example of the baby in the bathtub, "if the baby has drowned one has done something awful, whereas if it has not one has merely been careless" (31). Nagel also highlights the difference between passing moral judgement on someone for who they are versus what they actually do. "We are not thinking just that it would be better if he were different, or did not exist, or had not done some of the things he has done, We are judging him, rather than his existence or characteristics" (36). It would be interesting to compare Nagel's ideas in this essay to our current judicial system, which, as he mentions, punishes people based on their actual actions, which are often (if not always) influenced by external factors, such as the drunk driver who happens to hit a stray person on the sidewalk. It is not the driver's fault that the person was on the sidewalk, but it is his fault that he is driving drunk. And our judicial system would only be able to punish the driver who struck a pedestrian because the driver who hit nobody and made it home does so undetected. Why do we allow a judicial system that punishes people only for acts that occur because of factors outside of their control? Could we even have it any other way? To what extent do you think we can truly claim responsibility for our actions versus blaming others for their role in our wrongdoing? Do you agree with Nagel's closing statement that "everything we do belongs to a world that we have not created" (38)?

[sbea...@lclark.edu]

According to Nagel, our beliefs are always, ultimately, due to factors outside our control, and it is impossible to be conscious of everything that created those factors. This inability to base our moral attitudes towards ourselves and others on these conditions leads us to doubt whether we know anything at all.  He continues by explaining that our intuitive moral attitudes are not necessarily determined by actuality. "It looks as though, if any of our beliefs are true, it is pure biological luck rather than knowledge" (Nagel, 27). The fact that we can see and hear does not imply that what we see and here exists in actuality, though our perceptions allow us to interact with and survive in our supposed environment.  Our sensory perceptions may very well be illusions, so who's to say a tree is more real than the shadow it casts?

 

[rh...@lclark.edu]

I suppose that depends on what one means by "real."  A tree and shadow are things we can identify and one is not considered to be more of an illusion than the other.  Anyone could make the make the argument about the reality of trees and shadows, but according to Nagel "biological luck" would determine the correctness of the person.  Unless we have a way of identifying who has the greatest biological luck there's no really good way of identifying these people.

[Lisa Bell]

Nagel goes into detail about “cases of decision under uncertainty”. He says that despite peoples good intentions, they can still be held morally accountable for decisions that they made; both in cases that ended well or poorly. This is still the case in situations that ended badly; even if one made decisions with the best aims at the time. Nagel says that “If the American Revolution had been a bloody failure resulting in greater repression, then Jefferson, Franklin and Washington would still have made a noble attempt, and might not even have regretted it on their way to the scaffold, but they would also have had to blame themselves for what they had helped to bring on their compatriots.” I wonder if it is realistic to entertain this idea? Are certain people in power automatically accountable for others decisions and the consequences from said decisions just because they hold specific positions? Aren't people capable of making their own choices and there for responsible for the outcomes?  

[hdon...@lclark.edu]

Nagel writes, "The inclusion of consequences in the conception of what we have done is an acknowledgment that we are parts of the world, but the paradoxical character of moral luck which emerges from this acknowledgment shows that we are unable to operate with

such a view, for it leaves us with no one to be" (38). I find the way that he addresses consequences very interesting, for his point that accepting consequences acknowledges us as a part of the world is puzzling. What would a Kantian say to this idea? Kantian views focus solely on intentions, where consequences are not considered when determining whether something is morally right or morally wrong. Would Kantians accept Nagel's opinions, or would they argue something different?

[afin...@lclark.edu]

For me, I think this form of technology should be considered an extension (and possibly a more effective extension) of human reflexes. Can we really say that technology  is a moral agent? I can't imagine it feeling regret or relief for any negligence. So if we can't hold the technology morally responsible and chalk it working/not working up to moral luck, the moral responsibility falls to the driver once more, as they're the one using the technology. (This makes me think of the saying "Guns don't kill people; people kill people"). Because of this, I'd say that it's right for the driver to feel something regarding what could/would have happened. Even though I see it as an extension of a person's reflexes or perception, I think that's still not a reason to be comfortable dismissing what could have happened with minor acknowledgement. 

However, when it comes to the technology failing, I'm inclined to say the driver is still culpable. Expecting something human-made to be infallible is unreasonable, and so in choosing to trust that particular type of technology, I think people are still responsible for their actions and the actions of the technology. Even though it would be possible to put blame on the engineer, I think that just sounds like a bad lawsuit. If a driver is relying exclusively on that technology to prevent accidents, that's a form of reckless driving in that they're not taking all the necessary precautions (like using their brakes) to prevent hitting something.  

[Ian Dechow]

Over and over again the text calls our judgments irrational. If this is the case which I believe it is, then it is not in our best interest to judge at all.  It seems to be human judgement leads to most of the hurt and destruction in the world.  Does it also lead to the good? If so, how? If we could eliminate chance and luck should we?

[sretzlaff]

I believe that it is realistic to entertain the idea that Washington, Jefferson, and Franklin should blame themselves for greater repression brought upon their compatriots.  They were the leaders of the Revolution and thus were representatives of the people.  I believe that the people in power are not responsible for indirect actions of their followers, but they are representing the views of the people.  If they were to fail, then they could possibly blame themselves for what ultimately happens to their compatriots.  I agree that people are capable of making their own decisions and should take responsibility of their own actions, but when dealing with a large case such as a Revolution, it takes a collective effort to accomplish that goal and if it were to fail, those involved are to suffer the consequences. One of the main causes of failure could be the actions of the leader and therefore she should blame herself for the suffering she brought upon her followers.