Download !NEW! Special Force Rush
Erinn Hickel
U.S. Marines with Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response-Africa and U.S. Army Special Forces operators rush a simulated casualty to an extraction point during a joint training mission in Baumholder, Germany, March 11, 2015. The Marines trained side by side with Special Forces personnel for more than a week to develop a close working relationship for potential future missions. (U.S. Marine Corps photo illustration by Sgt. Paul Peterson/Released)
Yuri introduced himself and told her about how they are the new special defense force for Hekseville, as the police were overwhelmed and could not deal with the Nevi outbreak. Yuri, looking to strengthen the special defense force, then tried to encourage her to enlist with them, claiming how they have a common enemy, and that if she joined, she would be placed under his command; however, she did not like the sound of that nor the claim of putting innocent lives in danger, so she left.
In general, Jellyfish guards can be identified by their green uniforms. These uniforms consist of long jackets with the Jellyfish insignia on the sleeves, heavy boots, and typically carrying firearms; the type depends on the officer's rank. Some carry assault rifles, while some officers like Syd carry pistols. Special members of the force wear different attire, the colour of which depends on the officer; for example, Yunica wears a green and white uniform, while Kat's uniform is pink and white.
While their main objective is to protect the citizens of Hekseville, their mission is always the force's top priority, no matter what. It doesn't matter if one of their own goes down during a mission, the mission comes first in their eyes. They also have a strict code of conduct; the leader, Yuri Gerneaux, doesn't take kindly to his subordinates defying orders, or leaving their post. Given Kat's nature to help people in need on impulse, these ideals clash, and caused her to resign.
State police and Central forces have launched a special security system at Sabarimala on Saturday afternoon in the backdrop of the 17th anniversary of Babri Masjid demolition in Ayodhya that falls on Sunday.
However, the holy hillock witnessed heavy rush as devotees consider Saturday as an auspicious day for worship at Sastha temples. The queue for holy darshan was extended beyond Marakkoottom on the traditional trekking path, two-and-a-half kilometers away from the Sannidhanam on Saturday evening. Each pilgrim was subjected to thorough security check-up before permitting to ascend the holy 18-steps.
The Special Commissioner told The Hindu that the State Police as well as the Central forces have taken every humanly possible measures to ensure the safety of the pilgrims and security of the temple. Police personnel from the neighbouring States of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh have been deployed as spotters in different parts of the pilgrim centre.
We begin our analysis with the Seventh Circuit's conclusions regarding state action in this case. The majority on appeal concluded that "for purposes of determining whether [the hospital guards] could be state actors in this case, no legal difference exists between a privately employed special officer with full police powers and a regular Chicago police officer." Payton, 184 F.3d at 630. That statement, made in the context of the appellate court's review of the district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss does not, however, require a finding of state action at this point in the litigation, when we are considering a motion for summary judgment. As Judge Ripple pointed out in his concurrence, "Further development of the record might well establish ... that the guards' responsibilities were significantly circumscribed by their employer and that they performed well-defined functions quite narrow in scope duties that cannot be considered an integral aspect of the exercise of a function that has been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state." Id. at 634 (Ripple, J., concurring). Thus, if Rush sufficiently circumscribed the security guards' police powers, these defendants may not be state actors.
The defendants, however, have not presented evidence that Rush circumscribed the guards' powers. Instead, the defendants point to the guards' specific actions being challenged in this lawsuit: "The record shows that Freeman and Murray were not exercising the full range of police power delegated to them under the Ordinance, but that they merely stopped and held Payton pending arrival by the Chicago Police who formally arrested him." (R. 35, Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.) The argument shows a misunderstanding of the Seventh Circuit opinion. In its consideration of state action, the Seventh Circuit relied on cases that analyze the extent of the powers conferred on the defendants, not the defendants' actual actions. For example, in Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902 (7th Cir.1996), the court considered the extent of the defendant-guards' authority to act. Specifically, the guards, who were posted at Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA") residences, had the authority to carry a handgun, arrest people for criminal trespass pending the arrival of the police, and use deadly force only in self-defense. The court noted, however, that the CHA strictly circumscribed the area in which the guards could perform their responsibilities, i.e. only in the lobby of CHA properties. Moreover, the guards could not participate in "sweep" searches of CHA residential units conducted by the CHA police department. Because the court found that the powers of the guards were "local in nature and limited in scope," it held that there was no state action. Id. at 904, 907.
The Seventh Circuit opinion also considered United States v. Hoffman, 498 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.1974), which held that the defendants, who were both privately employed railroad policemen and Chicago special police officers, had acted under color of state law when they brutally beat vagrant trespassers. In reaching its conclusion, Hoffman relied on the fact that "the defendants were granted all of the same powers and duties as regular city police officers by the relevant authorizing legislation," and that the defendants were acting under a "continuing delegation of police power." Payton, 184 F.3d at 628 (citing Hoffman, 498 F.2d at 881). Although recognizing that Hoffman relied on the defendants' designation as railroad police officers (previously defined as state actors), the Payton court still found that Hoffman weighed heavily in Payton's favor, because the Payton guards "appear to have roughly the same power as [the] railroad police" in Hoffman. Payton, 184 F.3d at 629. Again, the court focused on *905 the powers and duties granted to the guards, not on the guards' actions.
The defendant-guards in this case have not offered any evidence that their authority as "special police," with all "the powers of the regular police patrol" at their assigned location, were circumscribed. Special Policeman and Security Guards Ordinance of the City of Chicago ("Ordinance") 4-340-010 & 100. The excerpts of Rush's policies for its security guards provided to us by the parties do not indicate that the guards' authority to act was significantly circumscribed.[3] Indeed, the policies submitted to the Court indicate that the guards' responsibilities were not circumscribed at all by Rush. Thus, the defendants have not presented evidence that the guards are not state actors and summary judgment is denied on this issue.
We begin our analysis of qualified immunity with a brief description of the parties in this case. Rush Medical Center is a non-profit hospital which employs private security personnel, including the individual defendants in this case, Freeman and Murray. Under a Chicago Ordinance, these security guards must be licensed as "special police" and are subject to all the rules and regulations governing City of Chicago police officers. Ordinance 4-340-010 & 100. The Supreme Court, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982), established that government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from damages as long as their conduct did not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" when they acted. When the defendant is a private actor, however, a court must first determine whether qualified immunity is even available to the defendant. Whether a private actor is entitled to assert qualified immunity is governed by the two-part test articulated in Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 138 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1997). Richardson held that prison guards working for a private contractor engaged by Tennessee state to manage its prisons were not entitled to claim qualified immunity. Under Richardson, to determine whether a defendant has immunity, courts should consider (1) whether history reveals a "firmly rooted" tradition of immunity for the type of private actors in the case; and (2) whether the qualified immunity doctrine's purposes warrant immunity for this type of private actor. Id. at 404, 117 S. Ct. 2100.
Payton first argues that private police historically could not assert immunity. Evidence regarding private police, however, *906 does not address whether the "special police" in this case have immunity because the special police in this case represent a hybrid public/private police force. To generalize the rule regarding private police to special police simply because they perform the same work, would be to take a "functional approach" to the immunity question. But, a "purely functional approach bristles with difficulty, particularly since, in many areas, government and private industry may engage in fundamentally similar activities." Id. at 409, 117 S. Ct. 2100. For their part, the defendants ignored the Seventh Circuit's instructions to "brief the factors the Richardson Court used in its inquiry whether a history of immunity for private actors exists, and the public policy considerations to answer whether or not assertion of immunity may stand." Payton, 184 F.3d at 631. Because neither party has provided any relevant historical evidence regarding immunity conferred on special police, and our own analysis has not uncovered any, we go on to consider the second Richardson factor, policy.
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