The Moon for Its Citizens: Sexual Vices Ed.
Jeff Rubard
Of natural conscience, and the moral sense.
There is yet another disposition or principle, of great importance,
natural to mankind; which, if we consider the consistence and harmony
of nature’s laws, may also be looked upon as, in some sort, arising
from self-love, or self-union; and that is, a disposition in man to be
uneasy in a consciousness of being inconsistent with himself, and as
it were against himself in his own actions. This appears particularly
in the inclination of the mind to be uneasy in the consciousness of
doing that to others, which he should be angry with them for doing to
him, if they were in his case, and he in theirs; or of forbearing to
do that to them, which he would be displeased with them for neglecting
to do to him.
I have observed, from time to time, that in pure love to others, i.e.
love not arising from self-love, there is an union of the heart with
others; a kind of enlargement of the mind, whereby it so extends
itself as to take others into a man’s self: and therefore it implies a
disposition to feel, to desire, and to act as though others were one
with ourselves. So, self-love implies an inclination to feel and act
as one with ourselves; which naturally renders a sensible
inconsistence with ourselves, and self-opposition in what we ourselves
choose and do, to be uneasy to the mind: which will cause uneasiness
of mind to be the consequence of a malevolent and unjust behaviour
towards others, and a kind of disapprobation of acts of this nature,
and an approbation of the contrary. To do that to another, which we
should be angry with him for doing to us, and to hate a person for
doing that to us, which we should incline to and insist on doing to
him, if we were exactly in the same case, is to disagree with
ourselves, and contradict ourselves. It would be for ourselves both to
choose and adhere to, and yet to refuse and utterly reject, the very
same thing. No wonder this is contrary to nature. No wonder, that such
a self-opposition, and inward war with a man’s self, naturally begets
unquietness, and raises disturbance in his mind.
Thus approving of actions, because we therein act as in agreement with
ourselves; and thus disapproving, and being uneasy in the
consciousness of disagreeing with ourselves, in what we do, is quite a
different thing from approving or disapproving actions because in them
we are united with being in general: which is loving or hating actions
from a sense of the primary beauty of true virtue, and of the
odiousness of sin. The former of these principles is private; the
latter is public, and truly benevolent in the highest sense. The former
—an inclination to agree with ourselves—is a natural principle: but
the latter—an agreement or union of heart to the great system, and to
God the head of it, who is all and all in it—is a divine principle.
In that uneasiness now mentioned, consists very much of that inward
trouble men have from reflections of conscience: and when they are
free from this uneasiness, and are conscious to themselves, that in
what they have acted towards others, they have done the same which
they should have expected from them in the same case, then they have
what is called peace of conscience, with respect to these actions. And
there is also an approbation of conscience, respecting the conduct of
others towards ourselves. As when we are blamed, condemned, or
punished by them, and are conscious to ourselves that if we were in
their case, and they in ours, we should in like manner blame, condemn,
and punish them. And thus men’s consciences may justify God’s anger
and condemnation. When they have the ideas of God’s greatness, their
relation to him, the benefits they have received from him, the
manifestations he has made of his will to them, &c. strongly impressed
on their minds, a consciousness is excited within them of those
resentments, which would be occasioned in themselves by an injurious
treatment in any wise parallel.
There certainly is such a consciousness as this oftentimes within men,
implied in the thoughts and views of the mind, of which, perhaps on
reflection, they could hardly give an account. Unless men’s
consciences are greatly stupified, it is naturally and necessarily
suggested; and habitually, spontaneously, instantaneously, and, as it
were, insensibly, arises in the mind. And the more so for this reason,
that we have no other way to conceive of any thing which other persons
act or suffer, but by recalling and exciting the ideas of what we
ourselves are conscious we have found in our own minds; and by putting
the ideas which we obtain by this means in the place of another; or,
as it were, substituting ourselves in their place. Thus we have no
conception, what understanding, perception, love, pleasure, pain, or
desire are in others; but by putting ourselves as it were in their
stead, or transferring the ideas we obtain of such things in our own
minds by consciousness in their place; making such an alteration, as
to degree and circumstances, as what we observe of them requires. It
is thus in all moral things that we conceive of in others; and indeed
in every thing we conceive of, belonging to others, more than shape,
size, complexion, situation, and motion of their bodies. And this is
the only way that we come to be capable of having ideas of any
perception or act even of the Godhead. We never could have any notion
what understanding or volition, love or hatred are, either in created
spirits or in God, if we had never experienced what understanding and
volition, love and hatred, are in our own minds. Knowing what they are
by consciousness, we can deny limits, and remove changeableness and
other imperfections, and ascribe them to God.
But though men in thinking of others do as it were put themselves in
their place, they do it so habitually, instantaneously, and without
set purpose, that they can scarce give any account of it, and many
would think it strange if they were told of it. In all a man’s
thoughts of another person, in whatever he apprehends of his moral
conduct to others or to himself, if it be in loving or hating him,
approving or condemning him, rewarding or punishing him, he
necessarily, as it were, puts himself in his stead; and therefore the
more naturally, easily, and quietly sees whether he, being in his
place, should approve or condemn, be angry or pleased as he is.
----
Jonathan Edwards, *Nature of True Virtue*/1765
Jeff Rubard
Morals and manners:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GerCGcnP2rI
Jeff Rubard
Old Time Hour:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uI17PD2Z6OA
