While not patent law, this holding in copyright law is significant.
I copy the most relevant paragraphs below.
At issue here is the mandatory deposit requirement found in
Section 407 of the Copyright Act. Id. § 407. That provision states
that “the owner of copyright or of the exclusive right of
publication in a work published in the United States shall deposit,
within three months after the date of such publication . . . two
complete copies of the best edition” of the work. Id. § 407(a)(1).
The “required copies . . . shall be deposited in the Copyright
Office for the use or disposition of the Library of Congress.” Id. §
407(b). Because the deposit requirement is triggered upon
“publication,” id. § 407(a), unpublished works are not subject to
it. For most literary works, the Copyright Office’s regulations
presently require deposit of only a single copy rather than two
copies, although the Office reserves the right to request a second
copy. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(d)(2)(ix). [Alancourt Books, LLC v.
Garland, 21-5203 (D.C. Cir. 8/29/2023).]
To enforce the mandatory deposit requirement, the Copyright
Office “may make written demand for the required deposit on any of
the persons obligated to make the deposit under [Section 407(a)].”
17 U.S.C. § 407(d). If a copyright owner fails to make the “required
deposit” within three months of a demand, she becomes liable for a
“fine of not more than $250 for each work” in addition to “the total
retail price of the copies or phonorecords demanded” (or, “if no
retail price has been fixed, the reasonable cost to the Library of
Congress of acquiring” those works). Id. § 407(d)(1)–(2). And if the
copyright owner “willfully or repeatedly fails or refuses to comply
with such a demand,” she becomes liable for an additional $2,500
fine. Id. § 407(d)(3). As an indication of the scale of Section
407’s operation, from fiscal year 2013 through the first quarter of
fiscal year 2019, the Copyright Office demanded 27,847 titles under
the provision’s mandatory deposit requirement. [Alancourt Books, LLC
v. Garland, 21-5203 (D.C. Cir. 8/29/2023).]
We conclude that Section 407, as applied by the Copyright
Office in this case,
worked an
unconstitutional taking of Valancourt’s property. The Office
demanded that Valancourt relinquish property (physical copies of
copyrighted books) on the pain of fines. And because the
requirement to turn over copies of the works is not a condition of
attaining (or retaining) copyright protection in them, the demand
to forfeit property cannot be justified as the conferral of a
benefit—i.e., copyright protection—in exchange for property.
Our holding relates solely to the Office’s demand for physical
copies of Valancourt’s copyrighted works: we have no occasion to
assess the Office’s offer during the litigation to accept electronic
copies in lieu of physical copies. [Alancourt Books, LLC v. Garland,
21-5203 (D.C. Cir. 8/29/2023).]
The bit about
"And because the requirement to turn over copies
of the works is not a condition of attaining (or retaining)
copyright protection in them" is built into the
statute. Specifically, 17 USC 407(a), last sentence, states "Neither
the deposit requirements of this subsection nor the acquisition
provisions of subsection (e) are conditions of copyright
protection."
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