𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗡𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘁 (𝟮𝟴 𝗢𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟱): "Why Turkey Can’t Bring Peace to Gaza" + 𝗡𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗝𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗻𝗮𝗹 (𝟮𝟴 𝗢𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟱): "Turkey’s Gulf Tour And Erdogan’s Gaza Ambitions are Dangerous"
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EMI P
Oct 29, 2025, 8:54:55 AM (3 days ago) Oct 29
to acao.az...@gmail.com, FloridaliTurkler, Özgür Gündem, paxturcica, Turkishforum
More pro-Israel / anti-Türkiye propaganda by Sinan Ciddi and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD):
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Why Turkey Can’t Bring Peace to Gaza
Ankara’s pro-Hamas rhetoric makes it unfit to help police the Gaza Strip.
Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan seeks to co-broker the Gaza peace process for his own prestige, to Hamas’s benefit, and at Israel’s expense.
Since the first stage of the Gaza Peace Plan went into effect on October 10, Erdogan has launched his plans to carve out a place for Ankara in the process. Between pushing Hamas to agree to US president Donald Trump’s “20-Point Plan” and deploying cleanup crews to the Gaza Strip, Erdogan envisions Turkey side-by-side with the United States at the head of the mediation game. For the Turkish president, it is not a matter of good intentions or moral example—it’s part of his quest to cement Ankara’s status as a regional Islamic power.
Turkey was the first Muslim-majority state to establish formal relations with Israel in 1949. But Erdogan has made it his personal mission to disparage the Jewish state and praise terrorists who murder Israeli and Gazan civilians alike as “the resistance.”
And yet his government now reaps praise from all corners of the earth, from the Hamas leadership to the United States. One need not look far to find that this fanfare is certainly undue.
Erdogan’s “Special Relationship” With Hamas
The glaring problem with Erdogan’s dream of making Turkey a regional peace guarantor is his unflinching sympathy for and sponsorship of Hamas. Turkey does not consider Hamas a terrorist group and, if anything, sits on the bleachers with Iran and Qatar in sponsoring the organization’s activities.
Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and National Intelligence Director Ibrahim Kalin flew all the way to Doha to chat with Hamas’s top brass, known as the Shura Council, on October 21. But lest we forget, they’ve got Hamas at home. The United States sanctioned several key Hamas militant leaders and financiers living in Turkey last November. These unsavory figures include Abd al-Rahman Ghanimat, a top organizer for Hamas’s West Bank units, and money launderer and convicted murderer Musa Daud Muhammad Akari.
Erdogan himself has a long and close relationship with Hamas’s leadership, a “familiarity” he proudly touts. In 2006, the terror group’s erstwhile Political Bureau chief, Khaled Mashal, happily accepted Erdogan’s invitation to visit Turkey. There is a fine line between criticism of the Israeli government’s policies and espousing terrorist sympathies and hatred towards all of Israel. Since the October 7 attacks, Erdogan has not even attempted to toe that line. Within weeks of Hamas’s massacre of 1,200 civilians in southern Israel—which he never condemned—Erdogan openly praised the terror group, stylizing them as “liberators.”
Ankara’s Shoe-In Strategy in Gaza
For all of Erdogan’s hypocritical moralizing, preventing further loss of life is low on the Ankara government’s list of priorities. In fact, Turkey gaining a foothold in Gaza, be it diplomatic or even military, serves as a regional power play reminiscent of neo-Ottomanism.
At this point, Turkey has worked to establish a ground presence and a diplomatic stake in Gaza after taking up the mantle of the “Hamas Whisperer.” The Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), an organization with links to the Muslim Brotherhood, began cleanup operations in Gaza on October 18. And ahead of proposals to establish an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to keep the peace in Gaza, Ankara has expressed interest in sending troops to the Strip.
Since meeting with Trump at the White House on September 25, Erdogan appears to have rekindled his interest in exploiting ties with Washington for his own gain. Trump has since continued to express satisfaction with Erdogan, referring to him as a “gentleman” and a “reliable ally.” Keeping relations warm with the United States keeps Erdogan’s foot in the door of the Gaza process and gives him room to push for his long-sought-after F-35 deal.
So what does Erdogan want in Gaza, if not simply the betterment of all mankind? Simply put, he and his cronies want another satellite in which to place troops and political capital, all to become the Middle East’s Sunni Islamist power. Fidan pointed to this in a recent interview with pro-government Turkish media, claiming that Turkey is preparing to become Gaza’s security “guarantor” as it is for Northern Cyprus. Crossing the Turkish military occupation in Cyprus with Erdogan’s vitriol against Israel spells trouble for hopes of keeping Hamas down and out.
The realistic extent to which Erdogan can pursue his ambition of a Turkish quasi-protectorate in Gaza is dubious. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu strongly hinted at his vehement objection to any Turkish force presence, even among the ISF. This should be little surprise given Erdogan’s attitude towards the Jewish state. Yet,\ in the diplomatic arena, Ankara continues to gain traction.
Turkey Must Disown Hamas if it Wants Lasting Peace
Erdogan must remember that Hamas is a terrorist organization, not a legitimate representative of Gazan civilians. Washington should remember this as Erdogan continues to push his way into the peace process, and as Hamas executes political opponents in the streets of Gaza.
Israeli officials distrust Erdogan on account of his Hamas-philic tendencies, and that should give Washington pause, too. The United States should condition Turkey’s role in the Gaza peace process on two trust-building measures. First, Erdogan must arrest or expel all Hamas operatives in Turkey—the group deserves no leverage or haven in Ankara. Second, the Turkish government should immediately designate Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization. The Gaza peace process ought to be in the hands of policymakers who know and condemn terrorism when they see it.
Nevertheless, the United States should not advocate for Turkey as a security guarantor in the proposed ISF. The presence of armed Turkish forces in Gaza increases the likelihood of weapons and cash flowing into Hamas’s arms once more. Even Turkish aid organizations, given their ideological inclinations, ought to be subject to international supervision.
Erdogan’s bargaining chip is that he can talk to Hamas, and they will listen. But that is, after all, the kind of leverage seen in friends of terrorists.
About the Authors: Sinan Ciddi and William Doran
Sinan Ciddi is a Senior Fellow on Turkey at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, DC.
William Doran is a student at Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service and a research intern at the Turkey Program at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.
Image: Sasa Dzambic Photography / Shutterstock.com.
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My posted reader's comment:
- 4 minutes agoAnother article by author Sinan Ciddi along the same lines was published the other day in the National Security Journal under the heading "Turkey’s Gulf Tour and Erdogan’s Gaza Ambitions are Dangerous". Sinan Ciddi has a long record of articles always critical of Türkiye. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) itself is a pro-Israel lobby group. So much so that in 2018, Sima Vaknin-Gil, director general of Israel's Ministry of Strategic Affairs, had stated that the FDD works in conjunction with the Israeli government including the ministry. FDD's Executive Director, Jonathan Schanzer, is himself a graduate from Hebrew University of Jerusalem and former Director of Policy of the Jewish Policy Center, a think tank tied to the Republican Jewish Coalition. As a matter of fact, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Political Action Committee, "FDD Action" officially registered as an anti-Türkiye lobby organization on 1 October 2019 with both the U.S. House of Representatives as well as the U.S. Senate. What is alleged in these articles with an agenda should be taken with more than just one grain of salt, knowing which nation is behind them.
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Turkey’s Gulf Tour And Erdogan’s Gaza Ambitions are Dangerous
Published
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Image Credit: Creative Commons.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues his campaign to expand Turkey’s influence across the Middle East.
Last week, he wrapped up a rapid tour of Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman, aiming to secure trade, investment, energy, and defense deals.
But beyond commercial agreements, Erdogan’s top priority was to rally Arab backing for his proposal to deploy Turkish troops as part of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza—an initiative tied to the peace process that followed the recent Hamas–Israel ceasefire.
Pro-Hamas
Since Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel in 2023, Erdogan has sought to position himself as the Muslim world’s loudest critic of Israel. What began as a condemnation of Israel’s actions soon evolved into a full-throated defense of Hamas.
Unlike most Arab and Western states, Erdogan openly refused to denounce the October 7 massacres and has portrayed Hamas as the “Mujahideen” fighting for liberation.
In doing so, Turkey stands alone within NATO as the only member to openly embrace a US- and EU-designated terrorist organization.
Ankara’s patronage of Hamas is well documented: offering sanctuary to its leaders, granting diplomatic access, and allowing the group to fundraise, recruit, and plot attacks from Turkish soil—including an attempted assassination of an Israeli cabinet minister. Despite this record, Erdogan now insists on deploying Turkish troops to Gaza under a US-led stabilization plan and demands that Turkey be designated as a “guarantor” for the Palestinians in any two-state framework.
Pushing a Two-State Agenda
Erdogan’s Gulf trip was meant to gather support from smaller Arab states for these ambitions.
Qatar, a long-time partner and fellow Hamas backer, remains central to Ankara’s plans. Doha hosts Hamas’s external leadership and continues to claim that this arrangement facilitates mediation rather than sponsorship. In Oman—Erdogan’s final stop—both sides reaffirmed their commitment to a two-state solution.
Yet Erdogan’s maneuvering is unlikely to succeed. Israel has made clear that Turkish troops will not be allowed into Gaza under any circumstances. Even the Turkish NGO already operating there—the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH)—faces controversy due to its links to Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated and sanctioned jihadist networks.
Other Arab powers, namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, wary of Erdogan’s agenda, also oppose any Turkish role in Gaza.
Israel’s Stance
Israel’s concerns are straightforward: if Hamas refuses to disarm, Turkish forces could effectively protect and rearm the terrorist group, ensuring Hamas’s continued control of the enclave. Erdogan’s record of embracing Hamas, combined with his bid to insert Turkish forces into Gaza, makes his “peace” plan less a stabilizing effort than an attempt to legitimize a terrorist client under the guise of diplomacy.
Harboring Terrorist Leaders
Oman is also no impartial actor. Muscat portrays itself as a neutral actor and consistently reminds US officials of its role in hosting secret nuclear talks and brokering back-channel diplomacy. At the same time, it provides sanctuary to the Houthis, a US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, by hosting their chief negotiator and de facto Foreign Minister, Mohammed Abdul Salam.
American policymakers have repeatedly pressed Oman to expel Houthi leaders, arguing that their presence serves as a critical pillar of Iran’s regional strategy. The Houthi HQ in Muscat has become a hub for meetings with Iranian officials and for planning military operations in Yemen.
The Houthi presence in Oman has facilitated the smuggling of weapons, finances, and illicit goods to sustain Houthi operations. Since 2015, Oman has served as a key transit hub for Iranian arms shipments to the Houthis. A 2016 Reuters investigation detailed the use of Omani land routes—including the Dhofar province and its islands—as conduits for Iranian weapon shipments. The Houthis have further established financial footholds in Oman, with investments exceeding $1 billion, including a $400 million stake in an investment bank in Muscat.
Oman has played the mediator card to justify the Houthis’ presence on their soil, but the Houthis have leveraged their office in Muscat to expand their military capabilities. Emerging as the first terrorist group to wield ballistic missile power. The consequences have been dire, with an escalation of instability in the Red Sea and a direct challenge to US security.
Indeed, a country that has enabled a terrorist organization responsible for repeated attacks on Israel and US interests should have no role in discussions about post-war Gaza. Omani officials have previously expressed support for Hamas, a sentiment that the terrorist group reciprocated by displaying the Omani flag during a hostage release ceremony in February 2025. Suppose there is to be a path to a credible peace process.
In that case, the United States, which took the initiative in drafting the proposed roadmap, should make a point of including states that have not exclusively coddled terrorist actors and exacerbate the continuity of conflict in the region.
About the Authors:
Sinan Ciddi is senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington D.C., where Ahmad Sharawi is a research analyst.
You can follow Sinan on X at @SinanCiddi and Ahmad at @ AhmadA_Sharawi.
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My posted reader's comment:
12 hours ago
The author, Sinan Ciddi, fails to mention that of the 193 countries that are member states of the UN, 154 nations recognize Hamas. Only Israel, US, Australia, Canada, UK and the EU have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. Japan and New Zealand have designated just the military wing of Hamas, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (which carried out the October 7 attack on Israel) as a terrorist entity. That the political wing of Hamas which Türkiye maintains relations with was and still is, at least for the time being, the legal government of Gaza, having been democratically elected in the 2006 elections.
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