Fwd: Mozambique 672 - Venancio Mondlane treason trial, IMF, cashew - 9Sep26
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Joao Felizardo
Sep 9, 2026, 8:39:19 AMSep 9
to overlan...@googlegroups.com
Herein finally in english the issue of the upcoming Mondlane's trial in mozambique .
Rgds
Joao F
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672 – 9 September 2026
=========
Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.ha...@open.ac.uk)
This is a personal project of Dr Joseph Hanlon, with no funding from any agency.
To subscribe or unsubscribe: https://bit.ly/Moz-sub Previous newsletters: http://bit.ly/Mozamb
Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.
===========================
This newsletter in pdf is on https://bit.ly/Moz-672
J Hanlon's new book "Moçambique recolonizado através da corrupção" free on https://bit.ly/MozRecol (Portuguese only)
Other J Hanlon free downloadable books: https://bit.ly/HanlonBooks
=============================
In this issue
+ Venãncio Mondlane treason trial
+ IMF arrives
+ Cashew decision 30 years ago resurfaces
+ Chickens
=============================
Opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane to be tried for treason 6 October
Venâncio Mondlane has been charged with treason for his role in the demonstrations November 2024-March 2025 protesting the fraudulent elections of 9 October 2024. More than 350 demonstrators were killed by police, who have not been charged. More than 1000 demonstrators are improperly still being held in jail without trial.
Mondlane says he is accused of committing the crimes of publicly condoning a crime; publicly instigating a crime; inciting collective disobedience; instigating terrorism; and inciting terrorism. He is accused of committing these crimes during the post-election protests. (Carta de Moçambique 24 July)
Because Mondlane officially came second in the presidential elections, he is automatically a member of the Council of State, with immunity. The Council lifted his immunity on 10 June at a meeting Mondlane did not attend, but this was kept secret until 25 August. But because of his membership of the Council of State, he will be tried by five members of the Supreme Court.
By law, Mozambican justice is politicised. The president and vice-president of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo, TS) are named by President of Mozambique and the 11 judges are nominated by parties in parliament in proportion to their seats (subject to qualifications criteria), which gives Frelimo overwhelming control of he Supreme Court and the judicial system.
Savana (4 September) gave detailed profiles of the five judges in the Venâncio Mondlane case. (Two judges are also named Mondlane, a common name in southern Mozambique.) Luís Mondlane and António Paulo Namburete are the two leading judges for the trial. Luís Mondlane earlier was named president of the Constitutional Council (CC) by President Armando Guebuza, but resigned in 2011 when he was accused of misusing $400,000 for personal expenses, and returned his previous post on the TS.
Namburete was named Attorney General by President Joaquim Chissano in 1998. Chissano dismissed Namburete and six of his deputies in 2000 after they were accused of not investigating the $14mn thefts from Banco Commercial de Moçambique (BCM). (Moçambique recolonizado através da corrupção, pp 162-3). Investigative Journalist Carlos Cardoso was assassinated in November 2000 while he was investigating the BCM case and the seeming protection of the culprits. In 2012 Namburete was made a member of TS.
Isabel Rupia was named a Deputy Attorney General by Chissano in 2000 as part of replacing the dismissed group, and concentrated on corruption. But she was dismissed in 2005 by Attorney General Joaquim Madeira; Savana says she has been investigating high figures in the nomenklatura and in Frelimo. In 2009 she was proposed by Renamo for the CC, but this was blocked by Frelimo. She was named to the TS in 2024.
João Beirão was a member of the National Elections Commission 2013-5. He was named vice president of the TS in 2015 by President Filipe Nyusi and after 10 years stepped down to be an ordinary TS judge.
Carlos Mondlane was a member of the Standing Committee of the Superior Council of the Judiciary 2019–2024, and was named to the TS in 2025. Savana says that Isable Rupia and Carlos Mondlane are considered ‘the most level-headed judges in this group’.
But the real issue of this trial will be Frelimo using the law for overtly political processes, against people of whom it is frightened. In the case of Venâncio Mondlane, he was first prevented from standing for parliament when the his party Democratic Alliance Coalition (CAD) had its registration revoked after it was too late to stand for another party. He could stand for President because under the constitution all presidential candidates stand as individuals. That election was so corrupt that no one knows who really won, but Mondlane was officially second. He is clearly the most important opposition figure, but he was then banned from participating in the ongoing ‘National Dialogue’ because it was restricted to parties having seats in national or provincial parliaments. The move to try him for treason is seen as an attempt to prevent him standing in the next elections, by jailing him or forcing him to flee from Mozambique. But many civil society leaders argue that organising legal protests against manifestly corrupt elections cannot be seen as treason.
The prosecution will use videos of his speeches and social media broadcasts to try to show that in promoting demonstrations he was ‘inciting collective disobedience’ and violence. The defence will be that his political statements and the civic protests were legitimate and within constitutional rights, and that he repeatedly opposed violence in his broadcasts. (Evidências 8 Sep)
It has already been decided that the trial will be in a small room without space for many press and public, according to Raul Sende and Cleto Duarte of Savana. Civil Society is pressing for the trial to be broadcast on TV, and the decision is up to the two trial leaders, Luís Mondlane and Namburete.
IMF in town
An IMF teams arrives in Maputo today (9 Sep) to begin technical negotiations lasting until 18 September for a potential new programme and loan under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF).
According to the statement from the Ministry of Finance yesterday by media head Emílio Fuel, cooperation with the IMF is of paramount importance for improving macro-fiscal management and for opening up new sources of funding.
Mozambique is under IMF pressure to stop running up unsustainable debt and to cut its salary bill. Government admitted two weeks ago that it owes $1.3 billion to suppliers, particularly contractors for infrastructure projects.
The wage bill for the 370,000 civil servants fell by 4% in the first half of the year (compared to the first half of 2025) but at $1.7 bn for the half year was still above budget. And government yesterday confirmed it is resuming promotions which were stopped in 2022; this will increase the wage bill. Mozambique’s number of civil servants is similar to other countries, but the amount paid to them is relatively high. (Diário Económico,24, 27, 28 Aug; MediaFax 31 Aug, 9 Sep)
Mozambique has just raised its civil service retirement age from 60 to 65, and 70 for diplomats, university lecturers and assistants, specialist doctors, magistrates, and researchers.
Destruction of cashew industry 30 years ago back in the news
The cashew industry was abruptly shut down by the World Bank in 1996, putting 10,000 women out of work and ending an important export. Suddenly that grim tale is back in the news. Ex IMF man José Sulemanesays Mozambique should have refused and economist Roberto Tibana has found a World Bank ulterior motive.
José Sulemane was a national director in the Mozambique Ministry of Planning 2000-2005 and then spent 20 years in the IMF. In a talk at Universidade Pedagógica in Maputo (31 August 2026, O Pais 1 Sept) he demonstrated the IMF skill of telling Mozambique what it should have done. But as is so often the case, certain relevant facts are forgotten or never known.
O Pais reports ‘For Sulemane, dependence on external funding can lead governments to accept certain proposals without properly assessing their economic and social consequences. … As an example, the economist referred to the reforms in the cashew nut sector, arguing that, at the time [1995], there had been a lack of sufficiently in-depth national analysis of the effects of the proposed measures. “We forgot that it employed at least 30,000 people, if I am not mistaken, at the time,” he said. The economist considered that the case demonstrates the importance of the State carrying out prior studies to understand the consequences of a given policy, particularly when sectors with a significant impact on the economy and employment are at stake.’
What actually happened was that Mozambique had a successful cashew industry and had a good plan for expansion, which the World Bank totally opposed. Mozambique did not forget the workers, and stressed them to the Bank in negotiations. The Country Assistance Strategy contained several ‘necessary conditions’ – a phase never used before or since. If they were not accepted, the World Bank would not have a Mozambique plan and all aid would stop. ‘Your children will starve’, Mozambican ministers were reminded. Two of the conditions were destruction of the cashew industry and the disastrous privatisation of two banks.
Just to remind Dr Sulemane, Mozambique did ‘properly assess the economic and social consequences’ of the World Bank’s cashew demand. But it also assessed the cost – the end of a World Bank programme and all aid. Perhaps Mozambique could have refused, but in 1995 it was a newly elected government and this was its first big negotiation. With his two decades of IMF experience Sulemane knows now that the World Bank would have had to back down and withdraw the ‘necessary conditions’. But cashew remains one of the best examples of the unchecked power of the Bretton Woods Institutions. (See Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) free only in Portuguese.)
At the Sulemane talk were three key figures present at the time, Roberto Tibana, Tomaz Salomão and Abdul Carimo, who painted a different picture (MediaFax 3 September 2026). ‘The problem does not end with our technical ability to negotiate,’ Tibana said. The problem ‘begins with the asymmetrical power that international institutions hold over countries’.
‘What happened was that the World Bank lent money to India to develop the cashew industry, starting with the farms and moving on to the factories,’ Tibana said. ‘But the project had been poorly designed. The factories had reached the stage where they were starting to produce, but the farms were not yet supplying the cashew nuts. … India needed to start servicing the debt.’ So, Mozambique was forced to supply cheap raw materials to Indian industry precisely to make a World Bank project viable which would otherwise have defaulted.’ Tanzânia and Guiné-Bissau also had to close cashew factories to supply India. ‘I was there from the start. I heard about the plan to close the factories,’ Tibana said. Only now is the World Bank releasing the key secret documents.
What they don’t tell us, because it tells the wrong story
State support and family farmers behind the global chicken boom
The Financial Times (26 Aug 2026) started a multi-article series ‘How chicken conquered the world’, and how Brazil is the largest exporter of chicken. In both Brazil and the US half of chickens are grown by family farmers. But the 40-year Brazilian story of how it leaped ahead of the US is the story that is not told by the World Bank and IMF.
The Brazilian government decided to reduce local protein costs and support family farmers with a huge programme through the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), which is larger than the World Bank. It was a four-way collaboration of the private sector, government, BNDES, and farmers. BNDES funded years of research on farming and feeding methods to reduce cost and raise quality. It also funded small farmers and co-operatives. A key part in the value chain is that big companies supply the day old chicks and process, freeze and market the fully grown chickens. And BNDES investment made it an important investor in the Brazilian chicken companies, including holding 18% of the largest meat processing enterprise in the world, JBS. Finally, the state does the health inspection and quality control.
The Brazilian state development bank has part ownership of companies also owned by local oligarchs, and attracted foreign investment, while also promoting rural development and supporting family commercial farmers. One might expect widespread support for development that would support both family farmers and Frelimo oligarchs, and draw in foreign investment not linked to resource extraction.
So in his 2004 presidential election campaign, Armando Guebuza promised to set up a development bank (and he had the backing of BNDES). Donors were outraged and said they would not accept it. The idea had to be dropped. The IMF has historically and publicly opposed BNDES. Brazil is too big for the Fund to do anything – but for two decades the IMF and donors had the power to block similar actions in Mozambique.
We raised the issue again in 2014 in our book Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique in English on https://bit.ly/Chickens-Beer and in an Oxfam blog in 2016. It was again ignored. And today the priority is still foreign controlled resource extraction. But it is still possible to promote locally organised rural development and a linked processing industry.
There is again a push for chicken production in Mozambique, but always based on big companies. In April this year Mozambique agreed a chicken factory in the Moamba special economic zone to produce 1.2 million chickens per month. But the lesson of Brazil is a mixed value chain. The big companies provide training, feed, medicines and day old chicks to peasant farmers. Then they guarantee to buy the grown chickens, which they process in big factories. It is an outgrower system which stimulates the family economy. But no one mentions this in Mozambique. jh
---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Joseph.Hanlon <00006d0ffa4a3d0...@jiscmail.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 9 Sept 2026 at 14:22
Subject: Mozambique 672 - Venancio Mondlane treason trial, IMF, cashew - 9Sep26
To: <DEV-MOZ...@jiscmail.ac.uk>
From: Joseph.Hanlon <00006d0ffa4a3d0...@jiscmail.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 9 Sept 2026 at 14:22
Subject: Mozambique 672 - Venancio Mondlane treason trial, IMF, cashew - 9Sep26
To: <DEV-MOZ...@jiscmail.ac.uk>
672 – 9 September 2026
=========
Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.ha...@open.ac.uk)
This is a personal project of Dr Joseph Hanlon, with no funding from any agency.
To subscribe or unsubscribe: https://bit.ly/Moz-sub Previous newsletters: http://bit.ly/Mozamb
Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.
===========================
This newsletter in pdf is on https://bit.ly/Moz-672
J Hanlon's new book "Moçambique recolonizado através da corrupção" free on https://bit.ly/MozRecol (Portuguese only)
Other J Hanlon free downloadable books: https://bit.ly/HanlonBooks
=============================
In this issue
+ Venãncio Mondlane treason trial
+ IMF arrives
+ Cashew decision 30 years ago resurfaces
+ Chickens
=============================
Opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane to be tried for treason 6 October
Venâncio Mondlane has been charged with treason for his role in the demonstrations November 2024-March 2025 protesting the fraudulent elections of 9 October 2024. More than 350 demonstrators were killed by police, who have not been charged. More than 1000 demonstrators are improperly still being held in jail without trial.
Mondlane says he is accused of committing the crimes of publicly condoning a crime; publicly instigating a crime; inciting collective disobedience; instigating terrorism; and inciting terrorism. He is accused of committing these crimes during the post-election protests. (Carta de Moçambique 24 July)
Because Mondlane officially came second in the presidential elections, he is automatically a member of the Council of State, with immunity. The Council lifted his immunity on 10 June at a meeting Mondlane did not attend, but this was kept secret until 25 August. But because of his membership of the Council of State, he will be tried by five members of the Supreme Court.
By law, Mozambican justice is politicised. The president and vice-president of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo, TS) are named by President of Mozambique and the 11 judges are nominated by parties in parliament in proportion to their seats (subject to qualifications criteria), which gives Frelimo overwhelming control of he Supreme Court and the judicial system.
Savana (4 September) gave detailed profiles of the five judges in the Venâncio Mondlane case. (Two judges are also named Mondlane, a common name in southern Mozambique.) Luís Mondlane and António Paulo Namburete are the two leading judges for the trial. Luís Mondlane earlier was named president of the Constitutional Council (CC) by President Armando Guebuza, but resigned in 2011 when he was accused of misusing $400,000 for personal expenses, and returned his previous post on the TS.
Namburete was named Attorney General by President Joaquim Chissano in 1998. Chissano dismissed Namburete and six of his deputies in 2000 after they were accused of not investigating the $14mn thefts from Banco Commercial de Moçambique (BCM). (Moçambique recolonizado através da corrupção, pp 162-3). Investigative Journalist Carlos Cardoso was assassinated in November 2000 while he was investigating the BCM case and the seeming protection of the culprits. In 2012 Namburete was made a member of TS.
Isabel Rupia was named a Deputy Attorney General by Chissano in 2000 as part of replacing the dismissed group, and concentrated on corruption. But she was dismissed in 2005 by Attorney General Joaquim Madeira; Savana says she has been investigating high figures in the nomenklatura and in Frelimo. In 2009 she was proposed by Renamo for the CC, but this was blocked by Frelimo. She was named to the TS in 2024.
João Beirão was a member of the National Elections Commission 2013-5. He was named vice president of the TS in 2015 by President Filipe Nyusi and after 10 years stepped down to be an ordinary TS judge.
Carlos Mondlane was a member of the Standing Committee of the Superior Council of the Judiciary 2019–2024, and was named to the TS in 2025. Savana says that Isable Rupia and Carlos Mondlane are considered ‘the most level-headed judges in this group’.
But the real issue of this trial will be Frelimo using the law for overtly political processes, against people of whom it is frightened. In the case of Venâncio Mondlane, he was first prevented from standing for parliament when the his party Democratic Alliance Coalition (CAD) had its registration revoked after it was too late to stand for another party. He could stand for President because under the constitution all presidential candidates stand as individuals. That election was so corrupt that no one knows who really won, but Mondlane was officially second. He is clearly the most important opposition figure, but he was then banned from participating in the ongoing ‘National Dialogue’ because it was restricted to parties having seats in national or provincial parliaments. The move to try him for treason is seen as an attempt to prevent him standing in the next elections, by jailing him or forcing him to flee from Mozambique. But many civil society leaders argue that organising legal protests against manifestly corrupt elections cannot be seen as treason.
The prosecution will use videos of his speeches and social media broadcasts to try to show that in promoting demonstrations he was ‘inciting collective disobedience’ and violence. The defence will be that his political statements and the civic protests were legitimate and within constitutional rights, and that he repeatedly opposed violence in his broadcasts. (Evidências 8 Sep)
It has already been decided that the trial will be in a small room without space for many press and public, according to Raul Sende and Cleto Duarte of Savana. Civil Society is pressing for the trial to be broadcast on TV, and the decision is up to the two trial leaders, Luís Mondlane and Namburete.
IMF in town
An IMF teams arrives in Maputo today (9 Sep) to begin technical negotiations lasting until 18 September for a potential new programme and loan under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF).
According to the statement from the Ministry of Finance yesterday by media head Emílio Fuel, cooperation with the IMF is of paramount importance for improving macro-fiscal management and for opening up new sources of funding.
Mozambique is under IMF pressure to stop running up unsustainable debt and to cut its salary bill. Government admitted two weeks ago that it owes $1.3 billion to suppliers, particularly contractors for infrastructure projects.
The wage bill for the 370,000 civil servants fell by 4% in the first half of the year (compared to the first half of 2025) but at $1.7 bn for the half year was still above budget. And government yesterday confirmed it is resuming promotions which were stopped in 2022; this will increase the wage bill. Mozambique’s number of civil servants is similar to other countries, but the amount paid to them is relatively high. (Diário Económico,24, 27, 28 Aug; MediaFax 31 Aug, 9 Sep)
Mozambique has just raised its civil service retirement age from 60 to 65, and 70 for diplomats, university lecturers and assistants, specialist doctors, magistrates, and researchers.
Destruction of cashew industry 30 years ago back in the news
The cashew industry was abruptly shut down by the World Bank in 1996, putting 10,000 women out of work and ending an important export. Suddenly that grim tale is back in the news. Ex IMF man José Sulemanesays Mozambique should have refused and economist Roberto Tibana has found a World Bank ulterior motive.
José Sulemane was a national director in the Mozambique Ministry of Planning 2000-2005 and then spent 20 years in the IMF. In a talk at Universidade Pedagógica in Maputo (31 August 2026, O Pais 1 Sept) he demonstrated the IMF skill of telling Mozambique what it should have done. But as is so often the case, certain relevant facts are forgotten or never known.
O Pais reports ‘For Sulemane, dependence on external funding can lead governments to accept certain proposals without properly assessing their economic and social consequences. … As an example, the economist referred to the reforms in the cashew nut sector, arguing that, at the time [1995], there had been a lack of sufficiently in-depth national analysis of the effects of the proposed measures. “We forgot that it employed at least 30,000 people, if I am not mistaken, at the time,” he said. The economist considered that the case demonstrates the importance of the State carrying out prior studies to understand the consequences of a given policy, particularly when sectors with a significant impact on the economy and employment are at stake.’
What actually happened was that Mozambique had a successful cashew industry and had a good plan for expansion, which the World Bank totally opposed. Mozambique did not forget the workers, and stressed them to the Bank in negotiations. The Country Assistance Strategy contained several ‘necessary conditions’ – a phase never used before or since. If they were not accepted, the World Bank would not have a Mozambique plan and all aid would stop. ‘Your children will starve’, Mozambican ministers were reminded. Two of the conditions were destruction of the cashew industry and the disastrous privatisation of two banks.
Just to remind Dr Sulemane, Mozambique did ‘properly assess the economic and social consequences’ of the World Bank’s cashew demand. But it also assessed the cost – the end of a World Bank programme and all aid. Perhaps Mozambique could have refused, but in 1995 it was a newly elected government and this was its first big negotiation. With his two decades of IMF experience Sulemane knows now that the World Bank would have had to back down and withdraw the ‘necessary conditions’. But cashew remains one of the best examples of the unchecked power of the Bretton Woods Institutions. (See Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) free only in Portuguese.)
At the Sulemane talk were three key figures present at the time, Roberto Tibana, Tomaz Salomão and Abdul Carimo, who painted a different picture (MediaFax 3 September 2026). ‘The problem does not end with our technical ability to negotiate,’ Tibana said. The problem ‘begins with the asymmetrical power that international institutions hold over countries’.
‘What happened was that the World Bank lent money to India to develop the cashew industry, starting with the farms and moving on to the factories,’ Tibana said. ‘But the project had been poorly designed. The factories had reached the stage where they were starting to produce, but the farms were not yet supplying the cashew nuts. … India needed to start servicing the debt.’ So, Mozambique was forced to supply cheap raw materials to Indian industry precisely to make a World Bank project viable which would otherwise have defaulted.’ Tanzânia and Guiné-Bissau also had to close cashew factories to supply India. ‘I was there from the start. I heard about the plan to close the factories,’ Tibana said. Only now is the World Bank releasing the key secret documents.
What they don’t tell us, because it tells the wrong story
State support and family farmers behind the global chicken boom
The Financial Times (26 Aug 2026) started a multi-article series ‘How chicken conquered the world’, and how Brazil is the largest exporter of chicken. In both Brazil and the US half of chickens are grown by family farmers. But the 40-year Brazilian story of how it leaped ahead of the US is the story that is not told by the World Bank and IMF.
The Brazilian government decided to reduce local protein costs and support family farmers with a huge programme through the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), which is larger than the World Bank. It was a four-way collaboration of the private sector, government, BNDES, and farmers. BNDES funded years of research on farming and feeding methods to reduce cost and raise quality. It also funded small farmers and co-operatives. A key part in the value chain is that big companies supply the day old chicks and process, freeze and market the fully grown chickens. And BNDES investment made it an important investor in the Brazilian chicken companies, including holding 18% of the largest meat processing enterprise in the world, JBS. Finally, the state does the health inspection and quality control.
The Brazilian state development bank has part ownership of companies also owned by local oligarchs, and attracted foreign investment, while also promoting rural development and supporting family commercial farmers. One might expect widespread support for development that would support both family farmers and Frelimo oligarchs, and draw in foreign investment not linked to resource extraction.
So in his 2004 presidential election campaign, Armando Guebuza promised to set up a development bank (and he had the backing of BNDES). Donors were outraged and said they would not accept it. The idea had to be dropped. The IMF has historically and publicly opposed BNDES. Brazil is too big for the Fund to do anything – but for two decades the IMF and donors had the power to block similar actions in Mozambique.
We raised the issue again in 2014 in our book Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique in English on https://bit.ly/Chickens-Beer and in an Oxfam blog in 2016. It was again ignored. And today the priority is still foreign controlled resource extraction. But it is still possible to promote locally organised rural development and a linked processing industry.
There is again a push for chicken production in Mozambique, but always based on big companies. In April this year Mozambique agreed a chicken factory in the Moamba special economic zone to produce 1.2 million chickens per month. But the lesson of Brazil is a mixed value chain. The big companies provide training, feed, medicines and day old chicks to peasant farmers. Then they guarantee to buy the grown chickens, which they process in big factories. It is an outgrower system which stimulates the family economy. But no one mentions this in Mozambique. jh
Correction: Some versions of the 27 July 2026 newsletter and the short-link were numbered incorrectly
as 701. The correct number is 671. Apologies.
=========================================
To subscribe or unsubscribe: https://bit.ly/Moz-sub
This newsletter is distributed on DEV-MOZ...@jiscmail.ac.uk.
=========================================
Important external links
J Hanlon free downloadable books: https://bit.ly/HanlonBooks
"Moçambique recolonizado através da corrupção" (Portuguese only) https://bit.ly/MozRecol
"Zimbabwe takes back its land": https://bit.ly/Zim-takes-land
"Chickens & Beer: A recipe for agricultural Growth": https://bit.ly/Chickens-Beer free Portuguese download http://bit.ly/Mais-bicicleta
"Civil War Civil Peace": https://bit.ly/Civil-War-Civil-Peace
8 other books by Joseph Hanlon free on: https://bit.ly/HanlonBooks
Two LSE working papers - World Bank questions its Mozambique 'success' while oligarchs have brought high inequality, poverty and corruption - https://bit.ly/Moz-LSE-208c and How the IMF and World Bank caused a resource curse and civil war in Mozambique - https://bit.ly/Moz-LSE-209
Cyclone trackers, https://www.cyclocane.com/ and https://www.metoc.navy.mil/jtwc/jtwc.html
Cabo Delgado civil war:
Cabo Ligado weekly report https://www.caboligado.com/
War reports, detailed maps, census data - http://bit.ly/Moz-CDg
Book 'Civil War Civil Peace': https://bit.ly/Civil-War-Civil-Peace
=========================================
To subscribe or unsubscribe: https://bit.ly/Moz-sub
This newsletter is distributed on DEV-MOZ...@jiscmail.ac.uk.
=========================================
Important external links
J Hanlon free downloadable books: https://bit.ly/HanlonBooks
"Moçambique recolonizado através da corrupção" (Portuguese only) https://bit.ly/MozRecol
"Zimbabwe takes back its land": https://bit.ly/Zim-takes-land
"Chickens & Beer: A recipe for agricultural Growth": https://bit.ly/Chickens-Beer free Portuguese download http://bit.ly/Mais-bicicleta
"Civil War Civil Peace": https://bit.ly/Civil-War-Civil-Peace
8 other books by Joseph Hanlon free on: https://bit.ly/HanlonBooks
Two LSE working papers - World Bank questions its Mozambique 'success' while oligarchs have brought high inequality, poverty and corruption - https://bit.ly/Moz-LSE-208c and How the IMF and World Bank caused a resource curse and civil war in Mozambique - https://bit.ly/Moz-LSE-209
Cyclone trackers, https://www.cyclocane.com/ and https://www.metoc.navy.mil/jtwc/jtwc.html
Cabo Delgado civil war:
Cabo Ligado weekly report https://www.caboligado.com/
War reports, detailed maps, census data - http://bit.ly/Moz-CDg
Book 'Civil War Civil Peace': https://bit.ly/Civil-War-Civil-Peace
Minimum wage & exchange rate charts, tables 1996-2022 https://bit.ly/MozMinWage2022
Debt trial press clippings in English: https://bit.ly/Moz-Debt-Map-Trial.
Data on all Mozambique elections: http://bit.ly/MozElData
Previous editions of this newsletter, in pdf: https://bit.ly/MozNews2022 and http://bit.ly/MozNews2021 which contain many more links
=========================================
ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are in my archive on http://bit.ly/Mozamb
=========================================
If you have received this you, have voluntarily subscribed to either dev-mozambique list or dev-mozambiquebulletin list at the Open University (before 1 April 2021) or at JISC: We hold only your e-mail address and never share our subscription list with anyone.
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Debt trial press clippings in English: https://bit.ly/Moz-Debt-Map-Trial.
Data on all Mozambique elections: http://bit.ly/MozElData
Previous editions of this newsletter, in pdf: https://bit.ly/MozNews2022 and http://bit.ly/MozNews2021 which contain many more links
=========================================
ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are in my archive on http://bit.ly/Mozamb
=========================================
If you have received this you, have voluntarily subscribed to either dev-mozambique list or dev-mozambiquebulletin list at the Open University (before 1 April 2021) or at JISC: We hold only your e-mail address and never share our subscription list with anyone.
To unsubscribe from the DEV-MOZAMBIQUE list, click the following link:
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