IRAQ: Shi'ite fight shows other side of the counter-insurgency - Asia Times

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Shi'ite fight shows other side of the COIN
By Ehsan M Ahrari
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JD01Ak03.html

The current battle between Iraqi forces and Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaish
al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army or JAM) has raised the level of instability and
uncertainty in Iraq by several notches. The fact that the Iraqi
forces fighting the JAM are Shi'ites is a wrinkle that is pitting
family members against each other. This is a Shi'ite versus Shi'ite
struggle, and no one knows how bad it will get before it improves,
if it ever does.

The fighting has been limited, but it's been enough to draw in the
US Air Force. And although the tension eased on Sunday when Muqtada
said he had told his militia to lay down its weapons, he demanded
that officials stop raids on his men, especially in the southern
city of Basa and in Sadr City in Baghdad. At any moment, violence
could break out again.

Since the United States has attached so much significance to its
new counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN) in Iraq, the Shi'ite battle
deserves serious examination in order to understand the continued,
albeit arguable, success of that campaign in stabilizing Iraq and
eventually in bringing about the redeployment of most American
troops.

The US's claims about the success of the COIN in Iraq are based on
Sunni cooperation, which, in turn, is related to the "al-Anbar
Awakening" in which Sunnis have been armed by the US to fight
against al-Qaeda.

The number of casualties in Iraq had gone down over the past few
months, but recently it has gone up again. At the same time, a
number of independent reporters and Iraqi bloggers are raising
concerns that, by heavily relying on Sunni fighting groups, the US
is presiding over the making of Sunni militias, which might be as
anti-Shi'ite in its ways of dealing the Shi'ite sector of the
populace as the Shi'ite militias have been in their treatment of the
Sunnis.

One of the unstated, but highly crucial, reasons underlying the
effective implementation of the "surge" strategy was that neither
the US nor the Iraqi security forces had to fight the Shi'ites. Even
though, at least for now, the Iraqi forces are largely confronting
the JAM, their chances of gaining an upper hand against the JAM
fighters is contingent on the absence of a serious confrontation
from the Sunni side. More to the point, in this latest fight with
the JAM, the Iraqi security forces must pay special attention to not
alienating the Shi'ites in the south.

An extremely important basis for the success of the COIN doctrine -
as is also true about the success of any counterinsurgency warfare -
is that the populace has to support the fighting forces. One of the
major reasons that the Sunni insurgency became so deadly was that it
was supported by the Sunni population of Iraq, which envisaged
itself as marginalized in the aftermath of the toppling of the
regime of Saddam Hussein.

The US military was slow to understand the depth of alienation that
it was facing from the Sunni side. That slowness, in turn, stemmed
from the fact that the top US military leaders in Iraq - and the
former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld - were unwilling to
recognize the emergence of insurgency between 2002 and 2005. The
recognition was a vital precondition for implementing a new doctrine
of fighting them.

However, once such recognition materialized, the US military got
busy in implementing the new COIN doctrine. But the essence of any
successful COIN doctrine was support from the Sunni groups. That is
where al-Qaeda in Iraq became America's unwitting "ally". By letting
loose a bloody war against "collaborators", it murdered hundreds of
Sunnis, thereby transforming its core of support into newly sworn
enemies. The United States deftly exploited that phenomenon by
implementing its COIN doctrine in a comprehensive manner.

The essence of that doctrine was clearing up al-Qaeda's strongholds,
maintaining the long-term presence of American and Iraqi forces in
those regions, while conducting a systematic process of "nation-
building" (the "clear, hold, and build" strategy). The nation-
building part of the COIN was also about increasing the capabilities
of the Iraqi police force, registration of local residents, and
counterintelligence with a view to eradicating all political and
sleeper cells.

The "surge" also became effective because the Iraqi and US forces
were not fighting another insurgency in the Shi'ite south. But that
situation might be changing.

In the meantime, insufficient attention was paid to the fact that
the success of the COIN in Iraq amounted to applying balm to a
serious wound, which might require either serious treatment or even
major surgery. What is missing in Iraq is the legitimacy of the
government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, which is perceived as
highly inept and equally corrupt. That legitimacy can only be
obtained and expanded by making and implementing comprehensive
policies that are aimed at raising the level of comfort and standard
of living of the Iraqi people.

It is possible that Maliki has decided to acquire that legitimacy by
confronting the JAM-related groups, which have been involved in
increasing amounts of lawlessness and thuggery in the south. Whether
that is the right decision has a lot to do with who persuaded him to
arrive at that decision.

If the Americans have persuaded or forced him to confront Muqtada,
then Maliki is really involved in the proverbial high-wire act. The
timing of his decision is highly questionable. Besides, an argument
can be made that, while Muqtada has recently extended his ceasefire
by a period of six months, Maliki could have used that opportunity
to negotiate the disarming of the JAM. In his current high-wire act,
Maliki is faced with the options of success or a fatal fall. There
is no going back.

However, from the perspectives of the COIN, Maliki is also facing a
serious gamble. If this battle were to raise the misery index in
southern Iraq, then his government is doomed by its very chief
constituency. If he is conscious of that reality, then Maliki will
have to look for peace signals from Muqtada and opt to negotiate. At
the same time, he will continue to face the uncertainty about how
serious Muqtada really is in making peace offerings. The Americans
in Iraq also know this conundrum, but they are just as uncertain
about solving it as Maliki.

Therefore, the least risky option for Maliki would be to accept the
current peace offerings from Muqtada, stop military actions long
enough to see how serious he really is, and seek a political
compromise instead of seeking a Pyrrhic military victory. If Muqtada
is indulging in delaying tactics, then Maliki might wish to consider
the use of force. Even then, he has to be fully cognizant of the
risks associated with alienating the Shi'ite populace.

Another serious problem that Maliki is encountering in southern Iraq
is that - unlike the strategy of al-Qaeda that relied so heavily on
killing anyone who disagreed with its interpretation of "jihad" in
the Sunni sectors of Iraq and thereby alienating the Sunnis -
Muqtada enjoys a considerable amount of popularity and support.

By unleashing the Iraqi security forces without serious forethought
regarding its long-term implications, Maliki might also face the
kind of unpopularity in the Shi'ite sectors of Iraq that al-Qaeda is
encountering in the Sunni region. Maliki is well advised to avoid
that path in every way he can.

Ehsan Ahrari is professor of Security Studies (Counterterrorism) at
the Asia-Pacific Center of Security Studies. Views expressed in this
essay are strictly private and do not reflect those of the APCSS,
the United States Pacific Command, or any other agency of the US
government.