IRAQ: Moqtada al-Sadr’s Religious Strategy Complicates Jaysh al-Mahdi Ceasefire - Jamestown

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Jamestown Terorism Focus
March 25, 2008 – Volume 5, Issue 12

Moqtada al-Sadr’s Religious Strategy Complicates Jaysh al-Mahdi
Ceasefire

As smoke billows from Baghdad’s U.S.-controlled “Green Zone” following
a series of rocket and mortar attacks thought to have been carried out
by members of Moqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JaM) movement last
weekend, important questions have been raised concerning the direction
of the movement as its leader becomes increasingly reclusive.

The young Iraqi firebrand and Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, recently
tried to put to rest the confusion and rumors circulating around his
withdrawal from the Iraqi political scene. In a statement posted on
the Sadrist al-Amarah website, al-Sadr declared that his absence was
due to a decision to pursue religious studies in Qom and Najaf—a path
intended to lead to Ayatollah status within Shiite Islam (Gulf News,
March 10). Though al-Sadr extended the self-imposed ceasefire on his
forces last February, his absence poses serious questions regarding
the status of his JaM militia.

On February 22, al-Sadr announced the extension of the JaM ceasefire
for an additional six months—a critical linchpin in the decline of
violence complementing the U.S. “surge” strategy. But the recent
decision to extend JaM’s inactivity has cost al-Sadr by permitting
further fragmentation of his militia. The initiation of the ceasefire
in August 2007 was a strategy designed to rein in rogue elements of
the JaM—essentially sorting through and identifying those that were
not abiding al-Sadr’s authority (Voices of Iraq, March 10).

But many Sadrists were hoping that their leader would lift the
ceasefire. During JaM’s operational shutdown, their rival Shiite
militia—the Badr Brigades—gained much ground at their expense. The
rise of the largely Sunni-based “Awakening Councils” across Iraq has
also led to anxieties within JaM, pressuring members to break away
from al-Sadr’s control. One Sadrist cleric, Shaykh Hassan al-Mayahi,
warned about the perception JaM members had of Awakening fighters,
claiming that they cannot be distinguished from the insurgents. Many
Sadrists claim the U.S. troops and Iraqi security forces are
purposefully targeting their members, leading to arrests and legal
difficulties (al-Ahram Weekly, March 13-19).

The absence of al-Sadr is likely to exacerbate the internal power
conflict between his commanders, resulting in a loosely-affiliated and
decentralized network that is more difficult to control. Reports
throughout Iraq show evidence of JaM factionalization. The expulsion
of Iraqi police from Kut by JaM fighters is one example of independent
action being taken regardless of the ceasefire. An Iraqi newspaper
declared the incident “the first breach of the six-month truce”
between al-Sadr and the U.S. military (Azzaman, March 13). Though
refusing to use the term “split,” Shaykh Liwaa Smeisam, the Sadrist
bloc’s political board chief, claimed that “the exit of some leading
members….means a sorting out of certain parties in the bloc who prefer
their personal gains” (Voices of Iraq, March 10). Al-Sadr himself
admitted to the fragmentation of his militia: “Many of my close
companions have departed for worldly reasons, some of them want to be
independent.” The JaM leader added: “The fact that many are meddling
in political lives while we thought they were loyal has made me
isolate myself” (AFP, March 11).

While Sadrist officials repeatedly and publicly declare that Moqtada
al-Sadr is still in overall charge, day-to-day control of the movement
has been handed down to a group rather than to one individual.
According to Baha al-A’raji, a member of al-Sadr’s political bloc:
“The brothers who are close to His Eminence [al-Sadr], specifically at
the Martyr al-Sadr Office in al-Najaf, have adequate experience to
manage such affairs.” A’raji claims that al-Sadr had not formed “these
committees” which would manage operations, but rather that they had
already existed in a structure in which al-Sadr was “at the top of the
administrative echelon” and had given the “green light to these
brothers to manage administrative affairs” (Al-Jazeera, March 12).
With a power-enhanced oligarchy in control of Sadrist operations,
vulnerability exists in the power structure, with members having a
possible tendency toward alliance formations in seeking quasi-
leadership. Such proclivities are intense when demands for action
increase—a prospect that Sadrists will face this year.

Without the central arbiter figure in Moqtada al-Sadr, the Jaysh al-
Mahdi is likely to further fragment as deeper splits are created
within the ranks. Al-Sadr’s absence leaves a power vacuum susceptible
to being filled by informal players. According to an Iraqi
intelligence report, Iran is one of the main beneficiaries of al-
Sadr’s new religious ploy (Gulf News, March 10). The Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) holds great influence within a large
faction of the JaM. With al-Sadr’s temporary absence, Iran may be
inclined to sway JaM commanders to opt out of the ceasefire to
confront Awakening Council fighters and/or U.S. troops. As an
insurance policy in gaining a greater share in JaM policy, Iran may
decide to further infiltrate and seek influence over militia commanders
—redefining local Shiite loyalties.

External factors have much influence on what becomes of JaM. One such
variable is the Awakening movement, which has developed into a militia
that arguably surpasses and threatens JaM supremacy. The rise of
Awakening power has contributed to obvious splits within JaM. Targeted
assassinations against Awakening members have been blamed on a growing
number of splintered factions from the Shiite militia. According to
intelligence corroborated by sources belonging to the Awakening
councils, rogue elements of the JaM have been sponsored by the Iranian
Qods Force in starting “armed activities” against Awakening members
(Al-Sharqiyah TV, January 28).

Another variable is the potential disintegration—rather than rise—of
the Awakening councils (see Terrorism Monitor, February 22). Awakening
commanders are threatening to rejoin the Sunni insurgency and back al-
Qaeda if Iraq’s central government does not integrate their fighters
as part of the country’s security forces with permanent payrolls.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government is resisting that call,
claiming that the movement is largely made up of yesterday’s
terrorists. An increase in the number of Sunni insurgents would compel
Shiite militiamen to break away from al-Sadr, simultaneously
pressuring al-Sadr to lift the ceasefire—a prospect leading back to
sectarianism.

Shiite rivalry is another factor that may hinder the Jaysh al-Mahdi
from sustaining its current composure (Voices of Iraq, March 21). With
federal regions and provincial elections scheduled later this year,
Sadrists will be competing with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
(SIIC) and their Badr militia for political power. SIIC leader Abdul
Aziz al-Hakim plans to gain political leverage at the expense of a
passive al-Sadr since his ranking as an Ayatollah would surpass al-
Hakim’s mid-level Hojatoleslam clerical status (Gulf News, March 10).
With many JaM fighters displeased with their current inactivity, a
political threat coming from the SIIC and the Badr Brigades is very
likely to splinter the JaM. The threat of losing control of JaM may
actually incline Moqtada al-Sadr to end his passive commitments in
order to save face and preserve his own credibility as a Shiite
leader.

Ramzy Mardini was Special Assistant on Iranian Studies at the Center
for Strategic Studies in Amman, Jordan and a former Iraq Desk Officer
for Political Affairs at the Department of State.