TURKEY/A'STAN: Turkey Unwilling to Commit to Expanded Military Mission in Afghanistan - Jamestown

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Jamestown Terorism Focus
March 25, 2008 – Volume 5, Issue 12

Turkey Unwilling to Commit to Expanded Military Mission in Afghanistan

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Turkey was the first Muslim
country to join the United States in the global war on terrorism. As a
NATO ally, Turkey first sent troops to Afghanistan in 2002 to join the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which came under NATO
command the following year (Turkish Daily News, January 8, 2002).
Under the ISAF framework, Turkey currently has about 1,200 troops in
Afghanistan. Most of the Turkish force is deployed in the Kabul area,
where it provides local security as well as logistical and
communications services. There is also a provincial reconstruction
team working in Wardak province. Now, as a response to increased
attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan, the United States is
asking its NATO allies, including Turkey, for a greater commitment in
troops (Milliyet, March 20).

As was expected, the March 24 visit of Vice President Dick Cheney to
the Turkish capital of Ankara produced no immediate commitment on the
part of the Turks to an expanded military presence in Afghanistan. The
vice president attended meetings with Turkish President Abdullah Gul,
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Chief of the Turkish General
Staff General Yasar Buyukanit. Following these gatherings a U.S.
official conceded only that the Turkish leaders were willing to look
at the possibility of sending more troops, but offered “no immediate
short-term commitments” (Hurriyet, March 24).

Last week, at the end of a meeting with his Afghan counterpart, Dr.
Rengin Dadfar Spanta, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said only
that “the government will make decisions in regard to dispatch of
troops to Afghanistan in the next few days” (New Anatolian, March 20;
Today’s Zaman, March 20). When the question of sending additional
Turkish forces was put to the Afghan foreign minister, Dr. Spanta
stated his appreciation of the support of Turkish troops, while
underlining that he was not asking for an increase in their numbers
(Milliyet, March 20).

It is important to note that the current mandate of Turkish troops
does not authorize Turkish troops to conduct counter-terrorism
operations in Afghanistan. So far, Turkish troops have been engaged
solely in post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building activities
in Afghanistan, such as training the new Afghan army and commanding
ISAF twice since its inception in 2002.

During his regional tour last week, Vice President Cheney visited the
NATO base in Bagram, Afghanistan, where he reiterated the U.S. demand
for more troops in Afghanistan by stating the need to keep adequate
forces in the region “in order to provide security to overcome the
threats posed by the radicals such as Taliban and al-Qaeda” (Hurriyet,
March 21). His remarks signal that the U.S. request for additional
troops is likely to be one of the most critical issues on the agenda
of the NATO summit in early April.

It is critical to note that the United States is not merely demanding
more troops under the ISAF framework, but rather is demanding more
combat troops for use in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan,
especially in the hard-pressed southern provinces. Turkish Foreign
Ministry sources argued that should the government decide to send
additional troops to Afghanistan, the original parliamentary
resolution of 2001 would be enough to authorize the measure; yet, when
it comes to changing the mandate of Turkish troops—i.e. from
humanitarian assistance to counter-terrorism—then the final word
belongs to the Turkish General Staff (Hurriyet, March 21). It was for
this reason that Cheney met with General Buyukanit as well as the
political leadership.

At a press conference on March 18, General Buyukanit clarified the
position of the Turkish General Staff on the issue of providing combat
troops to Afghanistan: “Just a month after taking up my duty in this
post [in 2006] I said that we would not send a single soldier to
Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism. I still hold onto the same
position… Our troops are in Kabul and under the ISAF which has no
mission to fight against terrorism. Thus our troops are not there for
this purpose. Additional troops are asked for the fight against
terrorism... but we have no authority to send troops for this.” After
indicating that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) were already at war
with PKK terrorists, Buyukanit added that “it would not be proper for
Turkey to deploy some of its troops for another struggle” (Turkish
Daily News, March 19; March 22). On the other hand, Turkish
politicians seem reluctant to close the door. For example, when
Foreign Minister Babacan was asked about his position on sending
troops to Afghanistan he preferred to say that “we will establish a
balance and make our decision” (Milliyet, March 20).

Although sending additional troops is not difficult for NATO’s second-
largest army in terms of capacity, the issue has more complex
political implications. Domestically both Turkish political and
military elites are in essence facing the very same constraint—the
fact that Turks are a predominantly Muslim society. Even though there
is a distinction made between the Afghan people and the Taliban, it is
still likely that there will be elements in society trying to depict
the operations of Turkish combat troops as Muslims made to fight other
Muslims by the United States. This is likely to further antagonize
Turkish public opinion toward the United States and whomever—i.e. the
government and/or the military—is allied with it. This concern is
particularly relevant at the political level where the ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKP) has roots and a constituency among
conservative Muslims in Turkish society. While a combat mission in
Afghanistan seems out of the question for now, there are reports that
Ankara is considering the addition of one helicopter and several
hundred troops to its force in Kabul (Turkish Daily News, March 21).

When it comes to the Turkish military’s position, one would expect the
strategic balance to be more influential than the fact that both
Afghan and Turkish people are Muslim. That is in part true, since the
TSK is not only the military of the secular Turkish Republic, but
also, more importantly, its guardian. In this respect it is critical
to remember that the TSK has been undertaking a series of counter-
terrorism operations against PKK terrorists that have been using
northern Iraq as a safe haven. Although both Turkey and the United
States classify the PKK as a terrorist organization, U.S. reluctance
to take decisive action against terrorist havens in northern Iraq has
upset U.S.-Turkish relations in general, and U.S.-Turkish counter-
terrorism cooperation in particular. It seems the frustration of the
Turkish military with a lack of American resolve to deny PKK
terrorists safe havens in U.S.-occupied Iraq remains at the heart of
the TSK’s reluctance to send combat troops to Afghanistan. After all,
it would be unrealistic to expect full-fledged Turkish support for
counter-terrorism when the United States is dragging its feet with
respect to Turkey’s own counter-terrorism concerns. Recently, the
United States opened Iraqi airspace and provided real-time
intelligence in support of Turkish cross-border counter-terrorism
operations and air strikes in northern Iraq. These steps demonstrate
U.S. policymakers’ understanding of the weight of U.S. policies in
Iraq on U.S.-Turkish relations. It seems as long as the United States
remains in Iraq, Iraq is likely to be at the heart of U.S.-Turkish
relations whether the issue is sending Turkish combat troops to
Afghanistan or the ongoing missile shield negotiations.

Giray Sadik is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the
University of Georgia.