Recent articles about theory in psychological research?

[a.]

I haven't come across any recent articles about (the role of) theory in psychology and i find that remarkable given the many recent papers about other important topics like replication, publication bias, etc.

As far as i can remember, i didn't receive much (perhaps any) education on (the role of) theory in psychological research, and i would view the topic as highly important and relevant concerning the possible improvement of psychological research.

I was wondering whether:

1) anyone can point me to recent papers about this topic

and if these are not available,

2) if it would be useful if someone would write a paper about this (perhaps including the role, and the possible implications of replications for psychological theories)

Kind regards.

[Denny Borsboom]

Hi 

I discussed some (in my view plausible) links between the replicability problem and the fact that psychology has few theories that are both precise and have some scope in an OSC blog some time ago. That's here:

http://osc.centerforopenscience.org/2013/11/20/theoretical-amnesia/

I don't know many other treatises on this connection, but if you find any I would be interested to learn.

Best

Denny

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[Eric-Jan Wagenmakers]

If you want theory in psychology, just open *any* issue of "The
Journal of Mathematical Psychology" or "Psychological Review".
Hundreds of pages of theory every few months, and that's just in these
two journals.

Cheers,
E.J.
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[Tal Yarkoni]

One that comes to mind for me is Greenwald's recent paper on the role of theory and method in psychology:

http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/pdf/NothingSoTheoretical.PPS.2012.pdf

That said, is there any reason the work has to be recent? Perhaps part of the reason there hasn't been very much work on the role of theory in psychology lately is that people like Paul Meehl already did a fine job of tackling these issues decades ago, and it's not clear that anything has really changed in the interim. See for example:

https://meehl.dl.umn.edu/sites/g/files/pua1696/f/144whysummaries.pdf

https://meehl.umn.edu/sites/g/files/pua1696/f/169problemisepistemology.pdf

Tal

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[a.]

Thanks all for the replies!

I have some reading to do now.

I have the feeling that that will leave me with many more unanswered questions about (the role of) theory in psychological science, and how psychological science should move forward.

This perhaps also probably explains my longing for a concise recent/future article about these matters (but perhaps this is not possible).



 

[Fred Hasselman]

I have at least two such manuscripts on the verge of submission (which really stretches the meaning of “on the verge of”), I’ll list some unpublished stuff at the end.

My take is that current theories and methods of inference are based on an ontology and epistemology that cannot be used to study human behaviour and cognition the way it is currently advertised we study human nature. That is, if the object of study is indeed as complex and context sensitive as is claimed by many scholars.

If you want to learn why some scholars think along the same lines, start with:

Noble, D. (2008). Claude Bernard, the first systems biologist, and the future of physiology. Experimental Physiology, 93(1), 16-26.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1113/expphysiol.2007.038695/full   >> These 10 principles apply to psychology as wel, most important: there is no privileged level of causality, there are no programs in genes, there are no programs in the brain, there are no programs at any other level in the body, the self is not an object.

Stepp, N., Chemero, A. and Turvey, M. T. (2011), Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science. Topics in Cognitive Science, 3: 425–437. doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01143.x

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01143.x/full >> Argues against the mechanistic (=machine metaphor) approach to study human behaviour and cogintition, e.g. anticipation.

Turvey, M. T., & Carello, C. (2012). On intelligence from first principles: Guidelines for inquiry into the hypothesis of physical intelligence (PI). Ecological Psychology, 24(1), 3-32. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10407413.2012.645757 >> What are the kind of theoretical constructs and methodologies that are needed to generate a theory about human nature that is truly integrative with theories in other scientific disciplines? (= depart from the same principles and laws and is at least not contradictory to consensus positions in applied mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology).

Best,

Fred

Hasselman, Fred and Seevinck, Michael P and Cox, Ralf F. A., Caught in the Undertow: There is Structure Beneath the Ontic Stream (December 21, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2553223 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2553223  >>  Promotes the idea to adopt a form of Structural Realism in psychological science.

Some of these ideas from te manuscript above were further developed in this dissertation https://osf.io/ephca/ (apologies in advance for being way too long).  >> If you manage to get through the preface (Sane as it ever was. The historical meaning of the crisis in psychology) and first chapter (Dealing with theoretical diversity)  you should have a good idea about the literature discussing theorising in psychology.

Fred Hasselman

m...@fredhasselman.com

Publications, data more:

http://fredhasselman.com

Blog on science and other hobbies:

http://anti-ism-ism.blogspot.nl

Twitter: 

https://twitter.com/FredHasselman

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[Fred Hasselman]

On 25 Sep 2016, at 15:59, Eric-Jan Wagenmakers <ej.wage...@gmail.com> wrote:

If you want theory in psychology, just open *any* issue of "The
Journal of Mathematical Psychology" or "Psychological Review".
Hundreds of pages of theory every few months, and that's just in these
two journals.

Ok, but where can we find the reports of rigorous test of those theories that lead to say, a least 70% of those theories being falsified or rendered scientifically implausible? 

I think publishing theoretical claims that never get refuted is just as problematic as publishing empirical claims that cannot be reproduced.

It is not enough to posit a theory and go on a confirmation-biased verification-spree of weak predictions from weak deduction chains (e.g statistical model fit to test presence of signs of correlations) to subsequently claim a substantive theory has been generated.

I sincerely doubt that anything remotely similar to what mr.&mrs. Science had in mind when they created the Scientific Method to test Scientific Theories is currently being practiced in the social sciences.

But I will gladly abandon that position when presented with an anomaly or antithesis to the claim :)

On 25 Sep 2016, at 16:01, Tal Yarkoni <tyar...@gmail.com> wrote:

One that comes to mind for me is Greenwald's recent paper on the role of theory and method in psychology:

http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/pdf/NothingSoTheoretical.PPS.2012.pdf

That is a very problematic text in my opinion, because of something I call "the Explorer Delusion”. 

Wrote something about it... some time ago… http://anti-ism-ism.blogspot.nl/2013/11/the-explorer-delusion-we-need-to.html 

All the best,

Fred

[Eric-Jan Wagenmakers]

Doing theoretical work need not imply one is on board with Popper. I personally do not like Popper's philosophy at all. But that's an aside. If you look at how models in mathematical psychology develop, you will see an increase in sophistication in response to a growing number of benchmark findings. Occasionally a completely different model is proposed. Proposing models and adjusting them in response to key findings is what the game is all about. The 1986 book on response times by Luce is a good example. So in light of the literature I don't really see where you're coming from.

Cheers,
EJ

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[a.]

On Sunday, September 25, 2016 at 10:49:21 PM UTC+2, Fred wrote:

I have at least two such manuscripts on the verge of submission (which really stretches the meaning of “on the verge of”), I’ll list some unpublished stuff at the end.

Ah great! 

I have read parts of your dissertation and some of your posts on your website and partly because of that i realized 1) i know nothing about (the role of) theory in psychological science, 2|) wondered why i wasn't taught any of this, and 3) wondered whether, and where, people publish about these matters.

I can follow parts of your dissertation, and other parts are just too difficult for me personally to grasp. But please note that i am not very smart, am not an intellectual, and am very pragmatic.This is perhaps why i am/was looking for concise papers that i can (mostly) understand concerning these matters.

For instance, your chapter "Sane as it ever was: the historical meaning of the crisis in psychology" fits that bill for me. I am glad you published that chapter of your dissertation (perhaps so people can refer to it whenever statements like "but psychology is still very young" arguments are being used).

I also like the chapter "Corroborative evidence: a growing body or morbid obesitas?" a lot. That's exactly the sort of paper i was thinking about. Have you thought about publishing that chapter/or an adaptation of it leaving out the specifics about dyslexia and making it more general?

Thank you again!

[Fred Hasselman]

Doing theoretical work need not imply one is on board with Popper. I personally do not like Popper's philosophy at all. But that's an aside. If you look at how models in mathematical psychology develop, you will see an increase in sophistication in response to a growing number of benchmark findings. Occasionally a completely different model is proposed. Proposing models and adjusting them in response to key findings is what the game is all about. The 1986 book on response times by Luce is a good example. So in light of the literature I don't really see where you're coming from.

Who said you have to be on board with Popper? 

Philosophy of science advances as well, maybe you are more into Feyerabend, if you want do your work based on verification alone, fine, if you accept a pluralistic reality, fine, but this means that even if you preregister and subsequently verify a prediction you cannot escape confirmation bias.

I personally do not like the idea of equating scientific theorising to a game of proposing and adjusting models based on benchmark findings. Theories implicate benchmark findings, statistical models can be constructed from data and they can corroborate a theory. If theories or models cannot be shown to be false, they are not a product of science, this has nothing to do with Popper, but with the demarcation between scientific and non-scientific knowledge about the world.

I am curious though, if I propose a model that competes with your model, don’t you want to know which one is best at predicting stuff that actually goes on in reality? Or should we just keep on verifying our own models until one of us leaves academia? If we cannot decide which model is best, the specific form in which the models was cast is trivial at best, that's rather important to know.

I can’t imagine how a science can advance if it doesn’t actively and rigorously tests its theoretical claims, especially if those claims compete to explain the same phenomena.

all the best,

Fred

On Sep 25, 2016 23:52, "Fred Hasselman" <namless...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 25 Sep 2016, at 15:59, Eric-Jan Wagenmakers <ej.wage...@gmail.com> wrote:

If you want theory in psychology, just open *any* issue of "The
Journal of Mathematical Psychology" or "Psychological Review".
Hundreds of pages of theory every few months, and that's just in these
two journals.

Ok, but where can we find the reports of rigorous test of those theories that lead to say, a least 70% of those theories being falsified or rendered scientifically implausible? 

I think publishing theoretical claims that never get refuted is just as problematic as publishing empirical claims that cannot be reproduced.

It is not enough to posit a theory and go on a confirmation-biased verification-spree of weak predictions from weak deduction chains (e.g statistical model fit to test presence of signs of correlations) to subsequently claim a substantive theory has been generated.

I sincerely doubt that anything remotely similar to what mr.&mrs. Science had in mind when they created the Scientific Method to test Scientific Theories is currently being practiced in the social sciences.

But I will gladly abandon that position when presented with an anomaly or antithesis to the claim :)

On 25 Sep 2016, at 16:01, Tal Yarkoni <tyar...@gmail.com> wrote:

One that comes to mind for me is Greenwald's recent paper on the role of theory and method in psychology:

http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/pdf/NothingSoTheoretical.PPS.2012.pdf

That is a very problematic text in my opinion, because of something I call "the Explorer Delusion”. 

Wrote something about it... some time ago… http://anti-ism-ism.blogspot.nl/2013/11/the-explorer-delusion-we-need-to.html 

All the best,

Fred

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[Michael Ingre]

The sentiment in most of the sciences in human nature and behaviour seems to be that empirical data trumps theory every time. But it is also quite evident that, in particular in psychology, most empirical evidence is discarded and what is published is almost exclusively the "significant" part of the distribution. How do we know what the distribution looks like, and thus what the phenomenon under study looks like, when we only focus on the tails of the distribution?

>If theories or models cannot be shown to be false, they are not a product of science

One has to wonder how you would show a theory to be false when academic journals and researchers alike almost exclusively wants to publish positive evidence. It seems to me that we have created a system for academic publishing with the potential to "prove" anything where its is almost impossible to reject a theory once it is published; just consider two recent meta-analyses showing "strong" empirical evidence of paranormal extrasensory abilities in humans after weighing the empirical evidence of 26 and 90 empirical studies.

http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00390/full

http://f1000research.com/articles/4-1188/v2

Regards,

Michael

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