Cf: Problems In Philosophy • 6
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/11/02/problems-in-philosophy-6/
All,
Another one of those recurring questions which I'm
constantly forgetting what I wrote about it before
just came up again on the Gödel's Lost Letter blog.
Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan
https://rjlipton.wordpress.com/about-me/
::: The Night Of The Ethical Algorithm
https://rjlipton.wordpress.com/2020/11/02/the-night-of-the-ethical-algorithm/
Classical tradition views logic as a normative science,
one whose object is truth. This puts logic on a par with
ethics, whose object is justice or morality in action,
and aesthetics, whose object is beauty or the admirable
for its own sake.
The pragmatic spin on this line of thinking treats logic, ethics, aesthetics as a concentric series of normative sciences, each a subdiscipline of the next.
Logic tells us how we ought to conduct our reasoning in order to achieve the goals of reasoning in general.
Thus logic is a special case of ethics. Ethics tells us how we ought
to conduct our activities in general in order to achieve the good
appropriate to each enterprise. What makes the difference between
a normative science and a prescriptive dogma is whether this telling
is based on actual inquiry into the relationship of conduct to result,
or not.
Here’s a bit I wrote on this a long time ago in a galaxy not far away —
• Logic, Ethics, Aesthetics
https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/Prospects_for_Inquiry_Driven_Systems#Logic.2C_Ethics.2C_Aesthetics
Regards,
Jon
inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
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David and Jon, C. S. Peirce made a very clear and sharp distinction between formal or mathematical logic and logic as semiotic.
Peirce's algebra of logic (1885) is the foundation for Peano's version of logic and the predicate calculus of Whitehead and Russell. The term Peano-Russell notation is a misnomer, since Russell didn't add anything to the notation Peano adopted from Peirce. For a historical summary, see the article by Hilary Putnam: http:///jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm .
By formal logic or mathematical logic, Peirce included everything that modern logicians call formal logic. That also includes Peirce's existential graphs. But Peirce included much more in what he called logic as semiotic.
Peirce's broad use of the term logic is close to the traditional textbooks called 'Logic' in the 19th century. Those books did include a huge amount semiotic along the lines of Aristotle and the medieval Scholastics. De Morgan introduced the term 'formal logic' for the algebraic tradition started by Boole and developed by the 19th century pioneers. That logic did *not* include the semiotic inherited from Aristotle.
Short summary: When Peirce uses the word 'logic' by itself, it's important to check the context to see whather he's talking about formal logic or logic as semiotic.
John
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I have found that logic is necessary for sound ethical opinions.
But not so much for enabling valid deductions, but enabling people to discover the major premises from which they are starting and clarifying the meaning of their opinions. These are almost always presupposed by arguers and are surprisingly hard to expose and to persuade people to examine.
So, when people say that 'reasoning together' will solve ethical disputes, they are often wrong, because they think of reasoning only as making deductions, i.e. discovering implications, and not as working backward to the unstated assumptions of those implications -- discovering the implicants of their views.
In the discussions here concerning logic as a normative science, I have not found too much attention to the meaning of 'normative science'.Wm
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William and David,
Peirce analyzed and discussed these
issues in great detail in his
voluminous publications and
manuscripts. Unfortunately, most 20th c.
philosophers and logicians
wasted too much time studying Frege.
WF> In the discussions
here concerning logic as a normative science, I
have not found too
much attention to the meaning of 'normative science'.
DW> Maybe I'm old fashioned, but I really appreciate people who use
words
in a consistent way. The pain of startup to make sure what words
are
being used are understandable is worth the ability to communicate
clearly and precisely.
If we lived in a discrete universe
with at most a million or so discrete
entities, it might be possible
for intelligent beings to invent a
language and logic that had a
million or so formally defined terms that
could specify everything
that exists.
But we live in a universe that is not only
continuous, it is quantum
mechanical. As a result, everything is
entangled with everything else
in ways that make it impossible to
make absolutely precise observations
and specifications of
anything.
Absolute precision is possible in mathematics, and
useful applications
of mathematics are possible within predictable
error bounds and
engineering tolerances. But nobody knows which, if
any, of the
currently accepted laws of science are absolutely
true.
For more discussion of these of these issues, see the slides
on "Natural
logic": http://jfsowa.com/talks/natlog.pdf .
That has 101 slides for a
3-hour tutorial, but the first 20 slides
have enough examples and
citations for a fairly good justification of
the above claims. See the
next 80 for more.
For a more
formal article about the implications for ontology, see
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf . Section 7 is my recommendation
for
accommodating the issues. The slides I presented at the
ESWC20
conference show how the issues in the natlog tutorial and the
rolelog
article can be implemented:
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/eswc.pdf
Again, I emphasize: I cite a
lot of my own work. But I also cite many
more publications by other
people. If you disagree with anything I
wrote, please read the
authors I cite. But there is still a lot more to say.
John
William and David,
Peirce analyzed and discussed these issues in great detail in his
voluminous publications and manuscripts. Unfortunately, most 20th c.
philosophers and logicians wasted too much time studying Frege.
WF> In the discussions here concerning logic as a normative science, I
have not found too much attention to the meaning of 'normative science'.
DW> Maybe I'm old fashioned, but I really appreciate people who use
words in a consistent way. The pain of startup to make sure what words
are being used are understandable is worth the ability to communicate
clearly and precisely.
If we lived in a discrete universe with at most a million or so discrete
entities, it might be possible for intelligent beings to invent a
language and logic that had a million or so formally defined terms that
could specify everything that exists.
But we live in a universe that is not only continuous, it is quantum
mechanical. As a result, everything is entangled with everything else
in ways that make it impossible to make absolutely precise observations
and specifications of anything.
Absolute precision is possible in mathematics, and useful applications
of mathematics are possible within predictable error bounds and
engineering tolerances. But nobody knows which, if any, of the
currently accepted laws of science are absolutely true.
For more discussion of these of these issues, see the slides on "Natural
logic": http://jfsowa.com/talks/natlog.pdf . That has 101 slides for a
3-hour tutorial, but the first 20 slides have enough examples and
citations for a fairly good justification of the above claims. See the
next 80 for more.
For a more formal article about the implications for ontology, see
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf . Section 7 is my recommendation for
accommodating the issues. The slides I presented at the ESWC20
conference show how the issues in the natlog tutorial and the rolelog
article can be implemented: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/eswc.pdf
Again, I emphasize: I cite a lot of my own work. But I also cite many
more publications by other people. If you disagree with anything I
wrote, please read the authors I cite. But there is still a lot more to say.
John
Dave,
The three kinds of value judgments are Beauty, Goodness, and Truth. They determine the three kinds of normative science: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Normative logic. Peirce equated normative logic with logic as semiotic. But all sciences, including the normative sciences, depend on mathematics and mathematical logic (AKA formal logic).
All empirical sciences, including the normative sciences, depend on phenomenology for the analysis and interpretation of perception. The three parts of normative logic (AKA logic as semiotic) are (1) Critic, which is formal logic; (2) Grammar; and (3) Methodeutic, which is Peirce's name for the methodology of science.
All these issues were discussed and analyzed in detail by Aristotle, debated for centuries by the Greeks, Romans, and Arabs, and developed to a high level of sophistication by the medieval Scholastics. The books called "logic'' from the 13th to the 19th centuries discussed all these issues. But the 20th c. logicians ignored all but the formal logic. They did a lot of good work on logic, but they also lost a great deal.
That is why I said that they wasted too much time studying Frege -- who ignored everything except the formal part.
I'm sure that Jon A. will say more about these issues. I'll say more later.
John
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João Lima> Considering that “Normative Science” is about “knowing what
ought to be” and “Descriptive Science” is about “knowing what is
the
case”, what is the Science category name that deals with “knowing
what
may be hoped”?
First, science is not about what is
true at the moment, but what is
possible, actual, and necessary. All
the laws of science are predictions
about what would be the case if
we took some particular action. Engineering
is primarily about the
future. Therefore, engineering could be defined as
the study of what
doesn't yet exist, but ought to exist.
That point shows how to
interpret verbs like hoping, fearing, wanting...
All of them depend
on value judgments about nonexistent situations.
Those judgments
depend on human intentions, which are fundamental aspects
of
Thirdness.
Instead of saying the modal verb 'ought' determines
normative science,
it's more general to say that normative science is
based on intentions.
As for the question whether one can infer
'ought' from 'is', it's better
to ask whether you can infer someone's
intentions by observing their actions.
The entire system of trials
with a judge and jury is based on the assumption
that it's possible.
But that depends on jurors who understand intentions.
John
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Azamat,
I was not talking about futurology. I was talking about every branch of science and common sense.
AA> Strictly speaking, there is no science of future, not mentioning future studies/futures research or futurology looking more as a pseudoscience.
Please note that all the laws of science are predictions about what would happen under certain conditions. All the laws are tested by making experiments and checking the observed results with the predictions.
In fact, all of our actions in everday life are based on predictions that are true in 99.9% of the cases. When we walk down the street, we make predictions about where to place our feet for the next step. We make predictions that the earth will not crumble under out feet.
With every breath, we predict that our lungs will be filled with oxygen and the CO2 and H2O will be pumped out. As we type on the computer, we predict that words will appear before our eyes, and our messages will be sent to our correspondents.
The future is the focus of attention for everything we do and say. Every year we buy calendars that predict the days ahead, the phases of the moon, the holidays, and all the additional notes we add for our plans, meetings, and other events.
Fundamental principle: Every purposeful action we take in every second of our lives is based on our predictions about the future. And the overwhelming majority of our predictions come true. Just look at the traffic on the highways -- every driver is making predictions every second, and almost all of them come true. The ones that don't are called accidents.
John
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Dear and respected colleagues,
Intrigued by the views on the future. And slightly disappointed that the distinction probability (informed by the past, the deterministic causation) anticipation (informed by the possible future) is not acknowledged. On this note, let me suggest to you the “iron rule of explanation” advanced by Michael Strevens (in The Knowledge Machine: How Irrationlity Created Modern Science—a book published by Liveright).
Of course, on issues of anticipation—as definitory of the living—I would gladly answer questions from anyone interested.
Stay healthy!
Mihai Nadin
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Alex,
Habit is the most fundamental method for making predictions in any field.
AA> [Habit] is hardly any prediction, but rather learnt habitual actions in known stable environments. To predict is to know beforehand basing on data, experience or theory
No. For any subject, from learning to ride a bicycle to doing the most advanced math and science, the novice is somebody who thinks about every step in great detail, but an expert is someone who does it by habit.
Thinking in science and mathematics is very similar to playing games like chess, go, bridge, poker... When faced with any problem, the expert sees the right move at a glance, while the novice is contemplating and analyzing tons of data and evidence.
I don't deny that it's important to do the careful analysis. But the expert does that analysis in order to verify that the initial insight is correct. Novices do far more analysis than experts. But the experts select the correct line of analysis on the first or second try, while the novices are aimlessly sifting through one blind alley after another.
And habit is much more than learning a few patterns for reacting in static environments. A beginner learns to ride a bicycle on a quiet street. But mastery of any skill requires a huge supply of habits for every possible technique in any imaginable circumstance. And it requires the ability to "see" the correct sequence for applying those habits to handle any emergency in a split second.
John
João Lima
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