Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?
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John F Sowa
Aug 9, 2018, 9:34:17 AM8/9/18
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In various discussions of ontology, some people have claimed
that existentially quantified variables can only refer to things
that actually exist in the physical universe.
But mathematicians happily use existentially quantified variables
to represent elements of infinite sets, even uncountably infinite
sets high up in Cantor's hierarchy. Theoretical physicists use
variables to represent hypothetical entities that have never been
observed. Even "down to earth" engineers refer to things in plans
that might never be funded.
But some ontologists deprecate things that are "imaginary".
They claim that an ontology can only refer to physical actualities.
If so, their ontologies are worthless for engineering -- because
*every* engineering design is purely imaginary until the plan is
finally implemented in a finished product.
C. S. Peirce discussed, analyzed, and clarified these issues.
I'll summarize the discussion and suggest useful distinctions.
The basic issue is the question of "real possibilities", which
Peirce discussed in many writings. For example, CP 2.385:
> To the old distinction between logical and real possibility and
> necessity, [Kant] applied two new pairs of terms, analytic and
> synthetic, and subjective and objective...
Pure mathematics is the study of logical possibility. Numerals,
for example, are marks on paper or sounds in the air that exist
physically. But the numbers they represent cannot exist physically
because there are too many of them. However, we can apply some
finite subset of the numbers to the world when we count things.
That subset of the possibles exists in that application to reality.
Theoretical physics is the study of real possibility. Engineering
is the field that turns real possibles (practical plans) into
actualities. A plan for a bridge or an airplane, if well designed,
represents a real possibility. While they're designing and building
the thing, engineers talk about it as if it were real. But it is
just a real possibility until it is finished. As soon as it's
finished, that possibility becomes an actuality.
Some ontologists make a sharp distinction between the real
and the imaginary. They deprecate imaginary things, as if
they were beneath contempt. If so, their ontology is beneath
contempt: it cannot be used for any practical application,
because every engineering design is purely imaginary.
Summary: Pure mathematics is the study of logical possibility.
Theoretical physics is the study of real possibility. And
engineering turns possibility into reality. Ontology defines
what's possible, and a database catalogs what's actual.
John
that existentially quantified variables can only refer to things
that actually exist in the physical universe.
But mathematicians happily use existentially quantified variables
to represent elements of infinite sets, even uncountably infinite
sets high up in Cantor's hierarchy. Theoretical physicists use
variables to represent hypothetical entities that have never been
observed. Even "down to earth" engineers refer to things in plans
that might never be funded.
But some ontologists deprecate things that are "imaginary".
They claim that an ontology can only refer to physical actualities.
If so, their ontologies are worthless for engineering -- because
*every* engineering design is purely imaginary until the plan is
finally implemented in a finished product.
C. S. Peirce discussed, analyzed, and clarified these issues.
I'll summarize the discussion and suggest useful distinctions.
The basic issue is the question of "real possibilities", which
Peirce discussed in many writings. For example, CP 2.385:
> To the old distinction between logical and real possibility and
> necessity, [Kant] applied two new pairs of terms, analytic and
> synthetic, and subjective and objective...
Pure mathematics is the study of logical possibility. Numerals,
for example, are marks on paper or sounds in the air that exist
physically. But the numbers they represent cannot exist physically
because there are too many of them. However, we can apply some
finite subset of the numbers to the world when we count things.
That subset of the possibles exists in that application to reality.
Theoretical physics is the study of real possibility. Engineering
is the field that turns real possibles (practical plans) into
actualities. A plan for a bridge or an airplane, if well designed,
represents a real possibility. While they're designing and building
the thing, engineers talk about it as if it were real. But it is
just a real possibility until it is finished. As soon as it's
finished, that possibility becomes an actuality.
Some ontologists make a sharp distinction between the real
and the imaginary. They deprecate imaginary things, as if
they were beneath contempt. If so, their ontology is beneath
contempt: it cannot be used for any practical application,
because every engineering design is purely imaginary.
Summary: Pure mathematics is the study of logical possibility.
Theoretical physics is the study of real possibility. And
engineering turns possibility into reality. Ontology defines
what's possible, and a database catalogs what's actual.
John
Jean Vieille
Aug 10, 2018, 3:50:50 AM8/10/18
to ontolog-forum
How one could decide what is imaginary, real?
- An idea is can have as much attributes as anything that exist. Any representation of reality is as much of interest than the reality itself. For example, ontologies are not real, but we use them, Ontologies need to care about themselves.
- Reality as we perceive it is subjective, it is not objectively "real". To convince everyone, think about political/war "facts" narratives around Syria, Palestine, Russia. You will find totally opposed "realities" depending on the observer, commenter.
- Yes, engineering starts from bubbling ideas that sometimes become reified. If we remove imagination from the World, not much will be left.
"Reality is an illusion created by lack of alcohol" (a seemingly Irish quote, actually from N.F. Simpson)
John F Sowa
Aug 11, 2018, 9:00:04 AM8/11/18
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On 8/10/2018 3:50 AM, Jean Vieille wrote:
> How one could decide what is imaginary, real?
Anything you imagine is, by definition, imaginary.
> How one could decide what is imaginary, real?
To determine whether or not it is real is an empirical issue.
For example, a plan for a bridge is imaginary until it is
built. The empirical test is easy: go to the site and
check whether it exists at all or in some unfinished state.
For that reason, the issue of imaginary or real is *not*
a matter or logic or of ontology. Any good ontology will
apply equally well to a historical book, a historical novel
that is partly imaginary, or to a realistic novel that is
completely imaginary.
Another issue is mathematics. Every theory of pure
mathematics is purely imaginary. Only those theories that
are applied to the real world refer to something real.
Even then, many mathematical theories have aspects that
will never refer to anything real. For example, Peano's
axioms for the integers specify an infinite set. But only
a finite subset can ever be used in any application.
That is why the issue of imaginary or real is a question
of what belongs in the *database*. An ontology is a theory
about what can exist, not a catalog of what does exist.
John
Joel Luís Carbonera
Aug 11, 2018, 10:21:25 AM8/11/18
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I had to deal with imaginary objects (actually, objects designed by engineers and that do not exist yet) in an ontology some years ago. In that opportunity we decided to define a new ontological class for this kind of object. Because, altough they have a lot of the properties of physical objects, they only have these properties within the realm of mental worlds, and due to this, they also seem to have other kinds of properties and participate in some mental processes (what is not possible for physical objects).
Another way of dealing with these mental objects, in my opinion, is to consider them as propositional contents that are manipulated by minds. But in this approach it's hard to stablish relationships between the physical properties of actual objects and the properties of the imaginary, ideal, version of it.
We also have though about using some kind of possibilism to deal with this subjects. But we haven't made progress with this plan.
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John F Sowa
Aug 11, 2018, 11:43:35 AM8/11/18
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On 8/11/2018 10:21 AM, Joel Luís Carbonera wrote:
> Another way of dealing with these mental objects... is to consider
objects, scientific hypotheses, and documentation of any kind
about anything that is not immediately present.
It's the distinction between signs and reality. What we can
say about anything of any kind is independent of whether that
thing did exist, exists now, or will exist.
Suppose you have photographs and documentation about a
building, and you don't yet realize it has been destroyed
(for example, by a fire, flood, or tornado).
The absence of the building does not affect anything that
was said about it -- in the ontology or in the database.
The same point is true about the same kind of documentation
about a building that is in plan, just funded, currently
being built, almost completed, and finally finished.
In all these cases, the ontology does not change. But the way
you can get more data about it does change.
> We also have thought about using some kind of possibilism to deal
But it's important to distinguish three things:
1. Ontology: A specification and classification of the types
of entities that exist now, in the past, or in the future
2. Database: A catalog of instances that are classified according
to the types in the ontology. A temporal DB will include time
stamps for all for all events. A DB for development will
include the status of all planned objects and with cross-
references to events in the temporal DB.
3. Logics, reasoning, and computation: There is an open-ended
variety of ways of reasoning, querying, simulating, and
talking about anything and everything in #1 and #2.
For generality, flexibility, and ease of maintenance, these three
should be clearly distinguished. The third is or should be open-
ended. #1 and #2 should support any kind of computation or reasoning.
That means #1 and #2 should be not be constrained by changes in #3.
General principle: The distinction between signs and reality must
be at the very top level: Everything we think or do, reason or
compute, depends on the difference between representation and the
physical people, places, things, and events that are represented.
See http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
John
> Another way of dealing with these mental objects... is to consider
> them as propositional contents that are manipulated by minds. But
> in this approach it's hard to establish relationships between the
> physical properties of actual objects and the properties of the
> imaginary, ideal, version of it.
Those are important issues that are also true of historical
> imaginary, ideal, version of it.
objects, scientific hypotheses, and documentation of any kind
about anything that is not immediately present.
It's the distinction between signs and reality. What we can
say about anything of any kind is independent of whether that
thing did exist, exists now, or will exist.
Suppose you have photographs and documentation about a
building, and you don't yet realize it has been destroyed
(for example, by a fire, flood, or tornado).
The absence of the building does not affect anything that
was said about it -- in the ontology or in the database.
The same point is true about the same kind of documentation
about a building that is in plan, just funded, currently
being built, almost completed, and finally finished.
In all these cases, the ontology does not change. But the way
you can get more data about it does change.
> We also have thought about using some kind of possibilism to deal
> with this subjects. But we haven't made progress with this plan.
That's fine. You're talking about some version of modal logic.
But it's important to distinguish three things:
1. Ontology: A specification and classification of the types
of entities that exist now, in the past, or in the future
2. Database: A catalog of instances that are classified according
to the types in the ontology. A temporal DB will include time
stamps for all for all events. A DB for development will
include the status of all planned objects and with cross-
references to events in the temporal DB.
3. Logics, reasoning, and computation: There is an open-ended
variety of ways of reasoning, querying, simulating, and
talking about anything and everything in #1 and #2.
For generality, flexibility, and ease of maintenance, these three
should be clearly distinguished. The third is or should be open-
ended. #1 and #2 should support any kind of computation or reasoning.
That means #1 and #2 should be not be constrained by changes in #3.
General principle: The distinction between signs and reality must
be at the very top level: Everything we think or do, reason or
compute, depends on the difference between representation and the
physical people, places, things, and events that are represented.
See http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
John
Ravi Sharma
Aug 11, 2018, 4:14:11 PM8/11/18
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Joel
If it is a design, it is based on logic, known principles, past similar models (visual - mental depictions) and science/math (physics-fluid dynamics, standard model, relativity etc.). Thus such items when used with current imaginary but proposed real object can have some confidence in use of ontology for design. Actually engineering projects succeed this way whether Aircraft, Space probes or Systems / chemical engineering based (mostly imaginary designs). Using ontologies for such imaginary (yet non-real before prototype is made) things should be still useful, valid as well as successful when real objects or processes are created provided proven or accepted items under assumptions are used for imaginary design? If this does not succeed then theory or proposal needs modification of above attributes or sub-parameters. Physicists many times wait for decades before imaginary theories become proven, such as quarks and Bosons as examples!
Regards.
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Joel Luís Carbonera
Aug 11, 2018, 4:26:13 PM8/11/18
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Ravi,
The point is that in some cases we need to represent in the same model the actual objects, and the objects when they are conceptualized in the mind of someone. For example, we need to represent an specific chair that was created according to some design (conceptualized in some mind and represented in some blueprint) and the designed object itself (the imaginary objects). For example, imagine that we need to implement an application where chairs are produced according to some design and the application should be able to evaluate if the chair matches the design. Such application involves an ontology that should represent both kinds of objects and should be able to distinguishing both kinds of objects as well.
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Pat Hayes
Aug 11, 2018, 9:37:15 PM8/11/18
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On 8/11/18 1:25 PM, Joel Luís Carbonera wrote:
> Ravi,
> The point is that in some cases we need to represent in the same
> model the actual objects, and the objects when they are
> conceptualized in the mind of someone. For example, we need to
> represent an specific chair that was created according to some
> design (conceptualized in some mind and represented in some
> blueprint) and the designed object itself (the imaginary
> objects). For example, imagine that we need to implement an
> application where chairs are produced according to some design
> and the application should be able to evaluate if the chair
> matches the design.
OK so far, but...
> Ravi,
> The point is that in some cases we need to represent in the same
> model the actual objects, and the objects when they are
> conceptualized in the mind of someone. For example, we need to
> represent an specific chair that was created according to some
> design (conceptualized in some mind and represented in some
> blueprint) and the designed object itself (the imaginary
> objects). For example, imagine that we need to implement an
> application where chairs are produced according to some design
> and the application should be able to evaluate if the chair
> matches the design.
Such application involves an ontology that
> should represent both kinds of objects and should be able to
> distinguishing both kinds of objects as well.
the chair or chairs - and specifications or representations or
descriptions or blueprints; but none of these are possible or
imaginary chairs. The specifications - let us use that term to
encompass all the other notions - are of course real, and what
they specify might or might not be; but either way, to paraphrase
Korzybski, the specification is not the product.
Now, one way to describe a specification is in terms of the
things it specifies, as we do when we talk of a blueprint FOR A
BUILDING, but while this way of talking is natural, it is not
actually necessary and it can be misleading, as I think it is
being in this discussion. Your example is surely one in which
there is a chair-specification and an actual chair - both real -
such that the specification fails in some way to specify the
chair - a certain important relation (of satisfaction?) between
them fails to hold. But one can say all this without invoking
possible-but-not-actual chairs.
Pat Hayes
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John F Sowa
Aug 11, 2018, 10:11:38 PM8/11/18
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On 8/11/2018 4:25 PM, Joel Luís Carbonera wrote:
> we need to represent in the same model the actual objects, and the
> objects when they are conceptualized in the mind of someone.
I agree with Pat, but I'd like to simplify the example.
> we need to represent in the same model the actual objects, and the
> objects when they are conceptualized in the mind of someone.
An ontology is like a dictionary that happens to be stated
in a formal logic instead of a natural language.
People who are building a chair, sitting on a chair,
talking about a chair, or thinking about a chair can
all use exactly the same dictionary to define a chair.
For that, you don't need to go beyond first-order logic.
The only case in which you might use modal logic in your
dictionary is to define words like 'possible' or 'necessary'.
But those are words that belong to logic. They are not
words that define anything you might see, hear, touch,
eat, or sit on.
John
Paola Di Maio
Aug 12, 2018, 12:28:14 AM8/12/18
to ontolog-forum
glad to see many assumptions of aspects of 'reality' representatIon being discussed
On Sun, Aug 12, 2018 at 7:41 AM, John F Sowa <so...@bestweb.net> wrote:
People who are building a chair, sitting on a chair,
talking about a chair, or thinking about a chair can
all use exactly the same dictionary to define a chair.
yes, sure
but lets not forget that people can also not use any dictionary - in the sense that we can build/sit on/think of a chair without the use of formal language nor any kind of representation whatsoever
we can also sit on a rock, or anything else
that is not labelled as 'chair'
For that, you don't need to go beyond first-order logic.
I never though about FOL to sit a chair to be honest :-)
PDM
Matthew West
Aug 12, 2018, 5:05:19 AM8/12/18
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Dear Joel,
ISO 15926 uses possible individuals for imaginary particulars, and in particular plans (a key part of the Oil and Gas business). It has worked very well for us, enabling e.g. plan vs outcome and alternative plans to be compared.
Regards
Matthew West
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Jon Awbrey
Aug 12, 2018, 8:36:43 AM8/12/18
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Matthew, Ontologists:
In the systems approach to inquiry I’ve been pursuing, all values of variables, specifications, or state descriptions come in three modalities: expected, intended, and actually observed.
A difference between expectation and observation is accounted as a “surprise” and calls for an explanation.
A difference between intention and observation is accounted as a “problem” and calls for a plan of action.
Here’s a link to more discussion:
Prospects for Inquiry Driven Systems • Architecture Of Inquiry
Regards,
Jon
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bruces...@cox.net
Aug 12, 2018, 4:34:44 PM8/12/18
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I like to see this argument as a sub-set of a broader point of view, which asserts that ALL "objects" in the "real" world are essentially known in terms of concepts -- which are abstract symbolic mental constructions defined in some kind of code, and which "represent" the object for purposes of communication. Is "abstract and symbolic" the same thing as "imaginary"?
This is a slightly confrontational point of view, because it suggests that so-called "real objects" are all (and perhaps only) known by their abstract properties -- even if they are highly touchy-feely (sensory-motor, "empirical", "concrete", "actual"). As soon as we say or think one thing about them, they are represented by coded/symbolic abstractions -- which we can if we wish correlate and validate against our empirical/sensory experience or testing/validation.
This perspective creates a kind of spectrum along which we might define attributes like "imaginary" -- and along this spectrum we might find different kinds of mathematics -- like the mathematics of bridges that describe "real" projects that were soundly engineered because the mathematics was correct. Engineering math is tightly mapped to empirical experience -- because it must be. Get fuzzy and the bridge falls down.
Philosophers will no doubt debate things like this forever -- but if this instinct for integral universality ends up a prevailing meme ("paradigm"), these different points of view will find themselves defined in a broad inclusive spectrum.
- Bruce Schuman
http://origin.org/one/book.cfm?ont=1
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of John F Sowa
Sent: Saturday, August 11, 2018 6:00 AM
To: ontolo...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Re: Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?
On 8/10/2018 3:50 AM, Jean Vieille wrote:
This is a slightly confrontational point of view, because it suggests that so-called "real objects" are all (and perhaps only) known by their abstract properties -- even if they are highly touchy-feely (sensory-motor, "empirical", "concrete", "actual"). As soon as we say or think one thing about them, they are represented by coded/symbolic abstractions -- which we can if we wish correlate and validate against our empirical/sensory experience or testing/validation.
This perspective creates a kind of spectrum along which we might define attributes like "imaginary" -- and along this spectrum we might find different kinds of mathematics -- like the mathematics of bridges that describe "real" projects that were soundly engineered because the mathematics was correct. Engineering math is tightly mapped to empirical experience -- because it must be. Get fuzzy and the bridge falls down.
Philosophers will no doubt debate things like this forever -- but if this instinct for integral universality ends up a prevailing meme ("paradigm"), these different points of view will find themselves defined in a broad inclusive spectrum.
- Bruce Schuman
http://origin.org/one/book.cfm?ont=1
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of John F Sowa
Sent: Saturday, August 11, 2018 6:00 AM
To: ontolo...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Re: Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?
On 8/10/2018 3:50 AM, Jean Vieille wrote:
> How one could decide what is imaginary, real?
Anything you imagine is, by definition, imaginary.
To determine whether or not it is real is an empirical issue.
For example, a plan for a bridge is imaginary until it is built. The empirical test is easy: go to the site and check whether it exists at all or in some unfinished state.
For that reason, the issue of imaginary or real is *not* a matter or logic or of ontology. Any good ontology will apply equally well to a historical book, a historical novel that is partly imaginary, or to a realistic novel that is completely imaginary.
Another issue is mathematics. Every theory of pure mathematics is purely imaginary. Only those theories that are applied to the real world refer to something real.
Even then, many mathematical theories have aspects that will never refer to anything real. For example, Peano's axioms for the integers specify an infinite set. But only a finite subset can ever be used in any application.
That is why the issue of imaginary or real is a question of what belongs in the *database*. An ontology is a theory about what can exist, not a catalog of what does exist.
John
To determine whether or not it is real is an empirical issue.
For example, a plan for a bridge is imaginary until it is built. The empirical test is easy: go to the site and check whether it exists at all or in some unfinished state.
For that reason, the issue of imaginary or real is *not* a matter or logic or of ontology. Any good ontology will apply equally well to a historical book, a historical novel that is partly imaginary, or to a realistic novel that is completely imaginary.
Another issue is mathematics. Every theory of pure mathematics is purely imaginary. Only those theories that are applied to the real world refer to something real.
Even then, many mathematical theories have aspects that will never refer to anything real. For example, Peano's axioms for the integers specify an infinite set. But only a finite subset can ever be used in any application.
That is why the issue of imaginary or real is a question of what belongs in the *database*. An ontology is a theory about what can exist, not a catalog of what does exist.
John
Jon Awbrey
Aug 12, 2018, 5:10:13 PM8/12/18
to ontolo...@googlegroups.com
Bruce,
I would call that the pragmatic-semiotic point of view and not see anything shocking about it so far as what you say below.
Regards,
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
I would call that the pragmatic-semiotic point of view and not see anything shocking about it so far as what you say below.
Regards,
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
Ravi Sharma
Aug 12, 2018, 9:15:28 PM8/12/18
to ontolog-forum
The NC machine can read a blueprint (still imaginary and representing a mental model) to create a real product.
Leonardo the Vinci's drawings were used recently for the first time to create a massive metal horse where no such object existed since Leonardo drew it, as far as we know and not on scale as large.
This is an example of a drawn model becoming touchable real statue!
human mind, machines, software models made it real.
My point is that more complex mental models (imaginary but use and stand on proven theories) not yet real e.g. higher energy LHC that confirmed Quarks, become real and ontology and logic and math can be used in imaginary as well as real cases!
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John F Sowa
Aug 12, 2018, 10:35:46 PM8/12/18
to ontolo...@googlegroups.com
Bruce and Jon,
Bruce
"Signs and Reality": http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
In terms of Peirce's semiotic, I would rephrase that paragraph
by replacing some of the key terms:
> ALL "objects" in the "real" world are perceived, conceived,
> and recognized in terms of signs -- which are the iconic,
> indexical, and symbolic mental constructions which "represent"
> the objects for purposes of communication, reasoning, and action.
> The terms "abstract", "symbolic", and "imaginary" refer to
> various ways of using signs.
And by the way, everybody who uses computers to process data
observes that distinction without thinking about it.
In ancient times, one of my colleagues at IBM submitted a tongue-
in-cheek suggestion for saving money in recycling punched cards:
Load the cards to tape, ship the tapes, and punch out the cards
at the recycling plant.
John
Bruce
> ALL "objects" in the "real" world are essentially known in terms
> of concepts -- which are abstract symbolic mental constructions
> defined in some kind of code, and which "represent" the object
> for purposes of communication. Is "abstract and symbolic" the
> same thing as "imaginary"?
Jon
> of concepts -- which are abstract symbolic mental constructions
> defined in some kind of code, and which "represent" the object
> for purposes of communication. Is "abstract and symbolic" the
> same thing as "imaginary"?
> I would call that the pragmatic-semiotic point of view
> and not see anything shocking about it
Yes. For anybody who is shocked, please read or reread my article
> and not see anything shocking about it
"Signs and Reality": http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
In terms of Peirce's semiotic, I would rephrase that paragraph
by replacing some of the key terms:
> ALL "objects" in the "real" world are perceived, conceived,
> and recognized in terms of signs -- which are the iconic,
> indexical, and symbolic mental constructions which "represent"
> the objects for purposes of communication, reasoning, and action.
> The terms "abstract", "symbolic", and "imaginary" refer to
> various ways of using signs.
And by the way, everybody who uses computers to process data
observes that distinction without thinking about it.
In ancient times, one of my colleagues at IBM submitted a tongue-
in-cheek suggestion for saving money in recycling punched cards:
Load the cards to tape, ship the tapes, and punch out the cards
at the recycling plant.
John
bruces...@cox.net
Aug 14, 2018, 6:47:26 PM8/14/18
to ontolo...@googlegroups.com
On the mathematics of robust bridge engineering
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUu0FWlMpgk
64 million page views....
Is this convergent iteration??
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of John F Sowa
Sent: Sunday, August 12, 2018 7:36 PM
To: ontolo...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Re: Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?
Bruce and Jon,
Bruce
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUu0FWlMpgk
64 million page views....
Is this convergent iteration??
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of John F Sowa
Sent: Sunday, August 12, 2018 7:36 PM
To: ontolo...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Re: Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?
Bruce
> ALL "objects" in the "real" world are essentially known in terms of
> concepts -- which are abstract symbolic mental constructions defined
> in some kind of code, and which "represent" the object for purposes of
> communication. Is "abstract and symbolic" the same thing as
> "imaginary"?
> concepts -- which are abstract symbolic mental constructions defined
> in some kind of code, and which "represent" the object for purposes of
> communication. Is "abstract and symbolic" the same thing as
> "imaginary"?
Jon
> I would call that the pragmatic-semiotic point of view and not see
> anything shocking about it
Yes. For anybody who is shocked, please read or reread my article "Signs and Reality": http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
In terms of Peirce's semiotic, I would rephrase that paragraph by replacing some of the key terms:
> ALL "objects" in the "real" world are perceived, conceived, and
> recognized in terms of signs -- which are the iconic, indexical, and
> symbolic mental constructions which "represent"
> the objects for purposes of communication, reasoning, and action.
> The terms "abstract", "symbolic", and "imaginary" refer to various
> ways of using signs.
And by the way, everybody who uses computers to process data observes that distinction without thinking about it.
In ancient times, one of my colleagues at IBM submitted a tongue- in-cheek suggestion for saving money in recycling punched cards:
Load the cards to tape, ship the tapes, and punch out the cards at the recycling plant.
> I would call that the pragmatic-semiotic point of view and not see
> anything shocking about it
Yes. For anybody who is shocked, please read or reread my article "Signs and Reality": http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
In terms of Peirce's semiotic, I would rephrase that paragraph by replacing some of the key terms:
> ALL "objects" in the "real" world are perceived, conceived, and
> recognized in terms of signs -- which are the iconic, indexical, and
> symbolic mental constructions which "represent"
> the objects for purposes of communication, reasoning, and action.
> The terms "abstract", "symbolic", and "imaginary" refer to various
> ways of using signs.
And by the way, everybody who uses computers to process data observes that distinction without thinking about it.
In ancient times, one of my colleagues at IBM submitted a tongue- in-cheek suggestion for saving money in recycling punched cards:
Load the cards to tape, ship the tapes, and punch out the cards at the recycling plant.
Azamat Abdoullaev
Aug 16, 2018, 1:10:16 PM8/16/18
to ontolog-forum
John wrote: "In various discussions of ontology, some people have claimed that existentially quantified variables can only refer to things that actually exist in the physical universe".
It is a big issue little discussed before.
In the link below a general typology of all possible variables is presented.
John
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John F Sowa
Aug 16, 2018, 7:01:41 PM8/16/18
to ontolo...@googlegroups.com
On 8/16/2018 1:10 PM, Azamat Abdoullaev wrote:
> John wrote: "In various discussions of ontology, some people have
> claimed that existentially quantified variables can only refer to
> things that actually exist in the physical universe".
>
> It is a big issue little discussed before.
>
> In the link [Azamat's classification] a general typology of all
> John wrote: "In various discussions of ontology, some people have
> claimed that existentially quantified variables can only refer to
> things that actually exist in the physical universe".
>
> It is a big issue little discussed before.
>
> possible variables is presented.
That's a useful typology.
But there is exactly *one* fundamental distinction that is necessary
and sufficient to support all of science. It has been called by
various names. But to use the terminology that scientists find
convenient, I'll use just two terms: 'physical' and 'mathematical'.
1. Some x exists in the physical universe iff x has space-time
coordinates. This includes regions or shapes of space-time
that don't include any matter or energy (AKA holes). They may
also be zero volume points, lines, or surfaces (AKA boundaries).
To accommodate quantum mechanics and experimental error, the
coordinates can be approximate. And the coordinates could be
relative to something whose existence is considered beyond doubt.
For example, I believe we can agree that the earth exists.
2. Some x exists in a mathematical sense, if there is a consistent
theory T, stated in some version of logic, such that the following
English sentence (or its equivalent in the logic notation) is true:
"The theory T implies that there exists an x with property p(x)."
The only requirement is that the theory T must be consistent.
It can be about numbers, circles, and triangles. But it could
be about things with any names you prefer: unicorns, angels,
vampires, or little green men from outer space.
For this purpose, the terms 'mathematical', 'imaginary' and
'logically possible' are equivalent: They imply that the
entity x might not exist in space-time, but they leave open
the possibility that some physical thing that resembles x
might be discovered.
This distinction does not exist in BFO. But I believe that it is
necessary and sufficient to support mathematics and every branch
of physical and social science.
John
Joel Luís Carbonera
Aug 16, 2018, 8:30:13 PM8/16/18
to ontolog-forum
2018-08-11 22:36 GMT-03:00 Pat Hayes <pha...@ihmc.us>:
On 8/11/18 1:25 PM, Joel Luís Carbonera wrote:
Ravi,
The point is that in some cases we need to represent in the same model the actual objects, and the objects when they are conceptualized in the mind of someone. For example, we need to represent an specific chair that was created according to some design (conceptualized in some mind and represented in some blueprint) and the designed object itself (the imaginary objects). For example, imagine that we need to implement an application where chairs are produced according to some design and the application should be able to evaluate if the chair matches the design.
OK so far, but...
Such application involves an ontology that
> should represent both kinds of objects and should be able to
> distinguishing both kinds of objects as well.
Here I disagree. Until then you had been speaking of objects - the chair or chairs - and specifications or representations or descriptions or blueprints; but none of these are possible or imaginary chairs. The specifications - let us use that term to encompass all the other notions - are of course real, and what they specify might or might not be; but either way, to paraphrase Korzybski, the specification is not the product.
I think that we don't disagree about this...If I understood correctly your point of view, we have two kinds of entities: the objects and the specifications of the objects and both are real entities. Probably, the specifications are some kind of informational entity or a proposition, or something like this. Right?
Now, one way to describe a specification is in terms of the things it specifies, as we do when we talk of a blueprint FOR A BUILDING, but while this way of talking is natural, it is not actually necessary and it can be misleading, as I think it is being in this discussion. Your example is surely one in which there is a chair-specification and an actual chair - both real - such that the specification fails in some way to specify the chair - a certain important relation (of satisfaction?) between them fails to hold. But one can say all this without invoking possible-but-not-actual chairs.
However, for most of the applications it is not enough to just consider that the specification is a proposition or an informational object. Because these notions are "black boxes" that don't allow us to deal with the internal details. We would like to say that a given specification is a specification of some object, let's say, a Chair. And we would like to say that the weight of every actual chair built according the specification should macth the weight of the specified chair. That is, we would like to represent that there is a relationship (of some kind) between the object specified and the objects that are built according to the specification, and that there is a relationship between the properties of both objects. So, in general, for doing this, people think about the specified object as an entity in itself and not just information.
For example, let us imagine that we have a small room with several objects within it and a virtual representation of this scenario. The room has some chairs and a table, and the virtual 3D representation of it has also representations of the same chairs and table. People talk about these virtual objects as virtual objects and not as pieces of information (bits in some hardware). People talk about virtual objects and, in order to keep the relationship between the actual objects and the virutal ones, it is hard to avoid the notion of virutal/fictional/imaginary objects.
A similar case, in my point of view, is when we need to deal with fictional characters. For example, in what kind of ontological category you would classify Sherlock Holmes? It it a person? Is it a fictional entity? Is it a content of a thought that is generically dependent on some mind?
Maybe we could avoid talking about imaginary entities in the ontology, but I think that we sould fail in capturing the distinctions that people would like to preserve.
Pat Hayes
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Joel Luís Carbonera
Aug 16, 2018, 8:32:43 PM8/16/18
to ontolog-forum
2018-08-12 6:04 GMT-03:00 Matthew West <dr.matt...@gmail.com>:
Dear Joel,
ISO 15926 uses possible individuals for imaginary particulars, and in particular plans (a key part of the Oil and Gas business). It has worked very well for us, enabling e.g. plan vs outcome and alternative plans to be compared.
That's nice!
I was thinking about a similar approach for dealing with a similar problem in the same domain.
I'll take a look.
Thank you for the pointer.
Best regards.
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Azamat Abdoullaev
Aug 17, 2018, 10:04:48 AM8/17/18
to ontolog-forum, so...@bestweb.net
John wrote:
[The only requirement is that the theory T must be consistent.
It can be about numbers, circles, and triangles. But it could
be about things with any names you prefer: unicorns, angels,
vampires, or little green men from outer space.
For this purpose, the terms 'mathematical', 'imaginary' and
'logically possible' are equivalent: They imply that the
entity x might not exist in space-time, but they leave open
the possibility that some physical thing that resembles x
'logically possible' are equivalent: They imply that the
entity x might not exist in space-time, but they leave open
the possibility that some physical thing that resembles x
might be discovered].
It is all strong points, which could be discussed in terms of the ontological distinction of Abstracta (Universals) and Concreta (Particulars), where the reality boundary is always shifting from the abstract to concrete things.
I prefer the language of worlds, or realities, like as:
physical worlds of material entities:
mental worlds of cognitive entities, including logical and mathematical objects, and all fictitious things, "unicorns, angels, vampires, or little green men from outer space",
social worlds of social entities and relations,
actual worlds of real entities,
digital worlds of information things, etc.
There are possible and impossible imaginary universes.
The latter as fictional,
imagined, constructed, fictitious worlds appear in novels, comics, films,
television shows, video games, and other creative works.
Sometimes it is hard to differ the science fiction concepts from theoretical physics concepts, as dark energy and dark matter.
And lists of fictional universes are just shocking:
List of fictional shared universes in film and television
List of fictional universes in animation and comics
List of fictional universes in literature
List of science fiction universes
Add up here a multitude of virtual worlds, mixing with the physical world, and our standard metaphysical distinctions of mathematical and physical, necessary and possible, in need of full reviewing.
The ontological modality of entities (being necessary or impossible, possible or contingent, actual and physical) is modifying as to new knowledge and technological advancement.
What presently utopia or dystopia, fictional cities, countries, planets, or universes, tomorrow new realities.
Thanks
John
John F Sowa
Aug 18, 2018, 4:21:58 PM8/18/18
to ontolog-forum, ontolog...@googlegroups.com, Doug Skuce
On 8/17/2018 10:04 AM, Azamat Abdoullaev wrote:
> strong points, which could be discussed in terms of the ontological
> distinction of Abstracta (Universals) and Concreta (Particulars),
There is no fundamental difference between ontology and science.
> strong points, which could be discussed in terms of the ontological
> distinction of Abstracta (Universals) and Concreta (Particulars),
They are both derived from exactly the same data: physical
observations and mathematical imagination. That is why the most
fundamental distinction is between mathematics and physics:
1. All abstracta, universals, and imaginary possibilities belong
to pure mathematics. This includes games like bridge, chess,
poker, computer games, etc. It also includes all consistent
fantasies or hypotheses of any kind. Every consistent theory,
considered by itself, is a branch (or twig) of pure mathematics.
2. The concrete particulars include all patterns of matter, energy,
space, and time -- living or nonliving. Any mathematical theory
that is consistent with observation may be applied to that aspect
of reality.
In short, pure mathematics is purely imaginary. And applied math
is a hypothesis about reality. And by the way, the distinction
mathematical/physical is very closely related, if not identical, to
the terms logos/physis by Heraclitus, Dharma/Maya by Gautama Buddha,
and Dao/Ten-Thousand-Things by Lao Zi.
In my article "Signs and Reality", I discussed the distinction
between Peirce's semeiotic and the physical world. But Barry
claimed that I was just proposing one philosopher's choice.
To answer Barry, I'll replace the terms signs/reality with an
equivalent pair that all scientists accept: mathematical/physical.
But I identify that distinction with the closely related insights
of those three near contemporaries along the Silk Road, circa 500 BC.
Although scientists might like the pair mathematicas/physics,
textbooks on those subjects tend to ignore the human level of
perception, action, feelings, and needs. That is why I recommend
the three gurus from 500 BC to provide a broader perspective.
As humans who work with and depend on the latest and greatest
modern technology, we have to reconcile both levels. That is why
I recommend the following four philosophers for guidance on methods
for integrating the human perspective and the scientific perspective.
1. Charles Sanders Peirce, a scientist, mathematician, logician,
philosopher, and engineer. See "Peirce's contributions to the
21st century", http://jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf
2. Alfred North Whitehead, a mathematician, logician, and
philosopher who developed a highly innovative process theory
that bridges the gap between Heraclitus and modern physics,
especially quantum mechanics and 4-dimensional space-time.
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, an engineer, logician, and philosopher
whose first book can serve as the foundation for any ontology
that may be implemented in a digital computer, and whose second
book covers all the complexities of language and life.
4. Edmund Husserl, a mathematician who attended Brentano's
lectures on psychology and made important contributions to
formal ontology. Husserl based his 6th Logical Investigation
on Brentano's theory on intentions, but analytic philosophers
criticized it. I agree with some of their criticism, but they
missed the essential point: An adequate theory of intentionality
requires a solid foundation in Peirce's semiotic.
Summary: Ontology must accommodate all the levels. The top-level
distinction of mathematical/physical, logos/physis, or signs/reality
is a universal foundation that has inspired philosophy for over two
and a half millennia.
John
Obrst, Leo J.
Aug 18, 2018, 7:51:31 PM8/18/18
to ontolo...@googlegroups.com, so...@bestweb.net
One way to differentiate common, realist fiction from fabulist (fantasy, science fiction, magic realism) is that the former contrives new instances, while the latter modifies axioms at the class (universal) level. Shakespeare’s King Lear, Joyce’s Ulysses do not modify existing class axioms; but Kafka’s The Metamorphosis, Borges’s The Library of Babel, and Garcia Marquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude do. Among the latter, some tweak, some do radical revisions. Asimov’s Foundation series is fairly realistic, except for psychohistory, faster than light travel. Lovecraft’s Cthulhu mythology is bizarre because he radically modifies class axioms. Tolkien is somewhere in-between.
Thanks,
Leo
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John F Sowa
Aug 18, 2018, 10:31:58 PM8/18/18
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Azamat and Leo,
Summary: The topmost level should make one fundamental distinction
that has an open-ended range of implications:
1. Physics is the science of actuality. It includes everything
observable by any means as well as the space-time that contains
everybody and everything. Its quantified variables refer to
patterns of actually existing things and processes and the
space-time that includes them.
2. Pure mathematics is the science of open-ended possibility.
Its quantified variables range over unbounded infinities
of patterns that may or may not exist in actuality. The
infinities of mathematics include all actual patterns that
have existed, do exist, or will exist plus infinitely more
that may never exist.
Azamat
>>[JFS] Summary: Ontology must accommodate all the levels. The
Thanks for the note of support.
Eugene Wigner talked about the "unreasonable" effectiveness
of mathematics for describing reality. But the reason why
math is so effective is that its possibilities are infinitely
more numerous than anything that can ever be actual.
Re ISO standard: I believe that the terminology of Possible/Actual
and Mathematical/Physical is more acceptable for modern programmers
and computer scientists than the philosophers' terminology of
universals/particulars. I would put the philosophers' terms in
footnotes, not in the main text of an ISO standard.
Azamat
> Reality varies as zillion worldviews or conceptual frameworks.
We all share the same actuality. But the number of options
for describing or interpreting that actuality is infinitely
greater than the actuality.
But the reasoning methods enforce a discipline on the way those
patterns develop. Some interpretations and reasoning methods
will be successful -- and others will get you into trouble.
Azamat
> On other side, a philosophical physicalism insists that a physical
> TOE is the same as a philosophical (ontological) theory of everything.
But there are infinitely more possibilities than actualities.
There is no guarantee that we will ever find an absolutely
perfect TOE. We have to make do with what we can find and test.
Leo
John
Summary: The topmost level should make one fundamental distinction
that has an open-ended range of implications:
1. Physics is the science of actuality. It includes everything
observable by any means as well as the space-time that contains
everybody and everything. Its quantified variables refer to
patterns of actually existing things and processes and the
space-time that includes them.
2. Pure mathematics is the science of open-ended possibility.
Its quantified variables range over unbounded infinities
of patterns that may or may not exist in actuality. The
infinities of mathematics include all actual patterns that
have existed, do exist, or will exist plus infinitely more
that may never exist.
Azamat
>>[JFS] Summary: Ontology must accommodate all the levels. The
>>top-level distinction of mathematical/physical, logos/physis,
>>or signs/reality is a universal foundation that has inspired
>>philosophy for over two and a half millennia.
>>
> [AA] Agree with the premise and conclusion.
>>or signs/reality is a universal foundation that has inspired
>>philosophy for over two and a half millennia.
>>
Thanks for the note of support.
Eugene Wigner talked about the "unreasonable" effectiveness
of mathematics for describing reality. But the reason why
math is so effective is that its possibilities are infinitely
more numerous than anything that can ever be actual.
Re ISO standard: I believe that the terminology of Possible/Actual
and Mathematical/Physical is more acceptable for modern programmers
and computer scientists than the philosophers' terminology of
universals/particulars. I would put the philosophers' terms in
footnotes, not in the main text of an ISO standard.
Azamat
> Reality varies as zillion worldviews or conceptual frameworks.
We all share the same actuality. But the number of options
for describing or interpreting that actuality is infinitely
greater than the actuality.
But the reasoning methods enforce a discipline on the way those
patterns develop. Some interpretations and reasoning methods
will be successful -- and others will get you into trouble.
Azamat
> On other side, a philosophical physicalism insists that a physical
> TOE is the same as a philosophical (ontological) theory of everything.
But there are infinitely more possibilities than actualities.
There is no guarantee that we will ever find an absolutely
perfect TOE. We have to make do with what we can find and test.
Leo
> One way to differentiate common, realist fiction from fabulist
> (fantasy, science fiction, magic realism) is that the former
> contrives new instances, while the latter modifies axioms at
> the class (universal) level.
My only change is to replace "class (universal)" with "mathematical".
> (fantasy, science fiction, magic realism) is that the former
> contrives new instances, while the latter modifies axioms at
> the class (universal) level.
John
Jon Awbrey
Aug 19, 2018, 5:30:13 PM8/19/18