Question regarding final slide in Nicola Guarino's presentation
gregsharp73
Robert Rovetto
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John Bottoms
Greg,
You might add "onomastics" to this list; the study of naming.
In terms of how these are used, I think a linguist would look at their use in common speech. And that would become the basis of the specific ontology. Common subsets could be cataloged into a category of "free entities" as per IBM Watson.
-John Bottoms
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Ítalo Oliveira
1. How, if at all, are we to understand these theories as being related to each other? Or are they mutually exclusive?
2. If they are related, are they capable of being united?
3. Is this list, in some sense, complete, and how would we know that?
4. And finally, for sake of clarity, what are the synonyms or hyponyms that we should associate with these theories as named here? (.ie where does Predicate Logic go? Term Logic?, etc.)
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Alex Shkotin
Maybe it's a good idea to collect our questions to NG in one place.
Here are my:
Let's take a well known part of reality: movement of planets around the Sun.
Is there chance to get examples of:
-conceptualization
-good and bad models
-ontology
?
Alex Shkotin
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Chuck Woolery
Greg,
Thank you for our list of Theories.
Regarding your first question. The answer is that nothing in the known universe is independent.
And it is a fundamental principle, first principle, objective truth... and it should be a “self-evident truth” [see the Declaration of Independence] ...) that “Everything is connected, everything is interdependent, so everything is vulnerable.... And that’s why this has to be a more than whole of government, a more than whole of nation [effort]. It really has to be a global effort....” Jen Easterly. CISA director. Oct. 29, 2021. [the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency is our nation’s newest federal agency established in 2018]. https://www.c-span.org/video/?515706-1/protecting-critical-infrastructure FYI ‘Everything’ is an autological word – defining itself.
"There will be no Homeland Security until we realize that the entire planet is our homeland. Every sentient being in the world must feel secure." - John Perkins
We too often forget that our environment is our most fundamental and essential life support infrastructure! And everything is totally vulnerable unless humanity works together.
Given the US Constitution and the international ‘laws’ that we all ‘depend on’ are based on the illusion of Independence...I’m counting on you and this group to bring some sanity to humanity. 😉
By suggesting an engineering approach to amending the Constitution and the UN Charter to abide by “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”. Good luck! 😉
Cw
Chuck Woolery, Former Chair
United Nations Association, Council of Organizations
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Blogs: 435 Campaign: www.435globaljustice.blogspot.com (May 2017 through today)
Dothefreakinmath http://dothefreakinmath.blogspot.com (June 2006 to Nov 2016)
The Trilemma http://trilemma.blogspot.com/ (Oct 2011 to Nov 2013)
“Today the most important thing, in my view, is to study the reasons why humankind does nothing to avert the threats about which it knows so much, and why it allows itself to be carried onward by some kind of perpetual motion. It cannot suffice to invent new machines, new regulations, new institutions. It is necessary to change and improve our understanding of the true purpose of what we are and what we do in the world. Only such an understanding will allow us to develop new models of behavior, new scales of values and goals, and thereby invest the global regulations, treaties, and institutions with a new spirit and meaning.” President Vaclav Havel, Czech Republic.
Here’s a video of optimism if you dare watch it https://www.rethinkx.com/videos
"A human being is part of the whole, called by us 'Universe'; a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings, as something separated from the rest - a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and affection for a few persons nearest us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole nature in its beauty. Nobody is able to achieve this completely, but striving for such achievement is, in itself, a part of the liberation, and a foundation for inner security." -Albert Einstein. As quoted in Quantum Reality, Beyond the New Physics, p. 250.
“The sad truth...is that most evil is done by people who never made up their minds to be or do either evil or good.” Hannah Arendt quoted in The Bulwork.
What are you doing to ensure the funding and achievement of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals by or before the year 2030? Connect the dots! See the web of life! Achieve ‘justice for all’. Or, prepare for the catastrophic consequences. cw
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Gary Berg-Cross
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Alexandre Rademaker
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Barry Smith
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Gilles Kassel
The list of these different theories illustrates the fact that they
relate to different parts or levels of granularity of reality, but
also that they represent different, possibly contradictory, points of
view on this reality. These theories are interconnected and the first
point (the scope of these theories) justifies the need to combine them
in order to reason about any part of reality. The second point is more
delicate and, in my opinion, merits a distinction in the question of
unity between the syntactic (specification) and semantic
(conceptualisation) levels.
It is one thing to be able to cover, within the same ontology,
different categories covering different portions and levels of
granularity of reality, as current foundational ontologies attempt to
do. But what about taking into account the different irreconcilable
points of view that can be adopted on reality? I'm thinking, for
example, of popular common-sense theories of reality that are
contradicted by scientific theories. It seems to me that this question
was addressed in the 2003 report ‘WonderWeb Deliverable D18’
presenting the first versions of DOLCE, BFO and GFO, where the notion
of option was raised:
« We strongly believe it’s important to have a library of
foundational ontologies, reflecting
different commitments and purposes, rather than a single monolithic
module. Indeed, we
believe that the most important challenge for the Semantic Web is not
so much the agreement
on a monolithic set of ontological categories, but rather the careful
isolation of the
fundamental ontological options and their formal relationships. In our
view, each module
in this library should be described in terms of such fundamental options”.
So the question I am asking is this: does the commonly accepted notion
of conceptualisation allow this notion of option to be taken into
account?
Best,
Gilles Kassel
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Elisa Kendall
I've been in violent agreement with your view on optionality for as long as I've been doing this kind of work. And that was part of the motivation behind building the "Lego brick" library of small components we've been working on at OMG. See https://www.omg.org/spec/Commons for details. The 1.2 specification is still in beta form, but the final version will be posted within a month or so, and the ontologies are there. Unfortunately, they are not all on the 1.2 page - some that haven't changed are on the 1.1 or even 1.0 pages, but they all dereference.
We can map the elements of the OMG library to any upper ontology (or at least those you've mentioned that are now part of the ISO library) consistently, but leave that to the user as different use cases may require different higher-level commitments. It really comes down to your requirements for building an ontology in the first place IMHO, and which commitments are appropriate for that use case. Having common patterns under the hood makes the overall ontology more consistent, helps with human understanding, and ML algorithms, LLMs and other automation recognizes them and can leverage them. And, even if the requirements of a particular use case are in conflict with a given TLO in some sense, one can map to the TLO if mandated by a stakeholder. The mapping may not be fully satisfactory for some users, but I can't say that I've ever worked on an ontology that didn't have a significant amount of 'discussion' about various abstractions. The critical thing is to bring the discussion and work back to the requirements, and then work from there to achieve consensus. Requirements seem to be an afterthought for some ontology development efforts, which is a bigger challenge IMHO.
Best,
Elisa
gregsharp73
Thank you everyone for these answers. My interest behind these questions is most peaked by Barry’s response and would like to pull on this thread a little, if I may. I assume that he cites the article “Basic Concepts of Formal Ontology” because of the clear connections between Nicola’s list items of “Theory of Parts and Wholes” and “Theory of Dependence” and Husserl’s development of a formal ontology based in mereology, and in which “necessary dependence” as a consideration of “horizontal relations” is explored. This is in contrast to first, formal logic vs. formal ontology, and second, “vertical relations” of extensional theories of mereology vs. dependence. The article then acknowledges that “set theory is a mathematical theory of tremendous power” while laying down arguments for why it is an inadequate theory for formal ontology. What follows is an illustrated “ontology of substance and accident” and the axiomatization and marriage of mereology and a theory of dependence to topology. The illustration of ontology explored is in the “domain of mesoscopic reality that is given in ordinary human experience”, specifically, Aristotle’s substances and accidents. These are succinctly explained (examples omitted here):
· Substances have various properties (qualities, features, attributes)
· Substances undergo various sorts of changes (processes, events) called Accidents
· The ontology is confessedly incomplete because of “other sorts of denizens of mesoscopic reality” that are not treated.
· The relations between substance and accident are explored despite their being “radically different in their ontological makeup”.
o Substances are that which can exist on their own
o Accidents require support from substances in order to exist, thus
§ “substances are the bearers or carriers of accidents and accidents are said to ‘inhere’ in their substances”
o Substances are both numerically one and the same
§ But can admit contrary accidents at different times
o Substances endure through time
§ The existence of accidents is portioned out through time
o And so on…
In Nicola’s slide there appears to be a plea for “a neutral formal ontology”. Is the presented ontology to be understood as an example of a “neutral ontology”? It is certainly addressing the items on Nicola’s list as being related (in this case, at least items 1 (mereology) and item 4, and perhaps even 2, 5 or 6), but what is it saying is the basis of this relatedness, and how has that basis been formalized? If we were to resort to the tools of logic like those that appear in the proposed axioms for mereology (.ie predicates with quantified variables and logical connectives), is neutrality then found primarily in the employment of logic? It would seem that the paper already argued against that formalism as being inadequate, or at least of set theory as a metatheory as not being appropriate to the task at hand.
These types of questions are what then arise for me:
1. What is the formalization of “substance as bearers/carriers of accidents” or alternatively, “inherence of accidents to substances”? Can something like an inclusion relation be employed given they are “radically different”?
2. What is the formal definition of “process” that distinguishes it from “event”? What about the means to understand them as subtypes of “changes” or “accidents” without assuming a prior type system or sets?
3. What is the theory of time (given process and event require it) and its formalization? Does this theory of time come from within (.ie a derivable theory of extension) or from something else outside of this ontology which has been explicitly constrained to the mesoscopic domain of human experience?
To get to the point behind these types of questions - where is the metatheory that formalizes the expression of an ontology like this that would allow us to judge it as being neutral?
And should we expect the answers, or the formal tools necessary for addressing questions like this, to precede the ontology as externalized axioms or should they be derived from within the ontology itself? Is the latter approach the only way to stop kicking the can?
Please forgive me if these questions seem impertinent or even obtuse. I do have a sincere interest in establishing a common understanding for what the criteria for a neutral and formal ontology might be.
Mark Underwood
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Gilles Kassel
I'd like to pick up on your question about the radical ontological
difference between substances (e.g. Julius Caesar) and accidents (e.g.
Caesar crossing the Rubicon) and, incidentally, about the difference
between processes and events.
To grasp this difference, I find it instructive to refer to a
difference mentioned by Antony Galton between what he calls the
‘dynamic experiential world’ and its ‘static history’, in his (2008).
Experience and History: Processes and their Relation to Events.
Journal of Logic and Computation, 18(3), 2008, p. 323.
"[…] processes differ markedly from events in their relation to
change. Whereas events are fixed items of history which cannot be
described as undergoing change, processes are more like ordinary
objects in that they can be directly present at one time and can
undergo change as time proceeds. This leads to a fundamental
ontological distinction between EXP, the dynamic experiential world of
objects and processes as they exist at one time, and HIST, the static
historical overview populated by events that are generated by the
ongoing process in EXP."
According to Galton, events are ontologically HIST, while objects and
processes are EXP.
Leaving Caesar aside, let's take a (seemingly) simpler example, that
of a patient whose temperature has fluctuated throughout the day and
whose doctor judges at the end of the day that an event has occurred:
‘the patient's temperature has risen since this morning’. What is the
nature of this event?
My view is that this accident is a mental construct on the part of the
doctor, historically accounting for the way in which the patient's
temperature has evolved over the course of a day. Ontologically
speaking, according to my interpretation of Galton's ‘fundamental
ontological distinction’ between EXP and HIST, I consider the event to
be a mental entity, while the patient and the processes (responsible
for his temperature) are material entities.
This point of view amounts to identifying a reference dependency
between accidents and substances: the event ‘the patient's temperature
has risen since this morning’ refers in particular to the patient and
his temperature.
This is not, however, the type of dependence adopted by Husserl. As we
know, Frege and Husserl were detractors of the ‘psychologism’ in
philosophy, and their anti-psychologism has unfortunately become
commonplace in philosophy. An example of this is the point of view
expressed by the French philosopher and physician Georges Canguilhem
(1904-1995) in a 1980 text entitled ‘The Brain and Thought’.
“Philosophy has nothing to expect from the services of psychology, a
discipline which Husserl was able to say that the way in which it came
on the scene, in the time of Aristotle, made it ‘a permanent calamity’
for philosophical minds”.
It couldn't be clearer!
Gilles
gregsharp73 <gregs...@gmail.com> a écrit :
> and perhaps even 2, 5 or 6), but what is it saying is the basis of this
> for mereology (.ie predicates with quantified variables and logical
> connectives), is neutrality then found primarily in the employment of
> logic? It would seem that the paper already argued against that formalism
> as being inadequate, or at least of set theory as a metatheory as not being
> appropriate to the task at hand.
>
> These types of questions are what then arise for me:
>
> accidents” or alternatively, “*inherence* of accidents to substances”? Can
> different”?
>
> 2. What is the formal definition of “process” that distinguishes it
> from “event”? What about the means to understand them as subtypes of
> “changes” or “accidents” without assuming a prior type system or sets?
>
> 3. What is the theory of time (given process and event require it)
> and its formalization? Does this theory of time come from within (.ie a
> derivable theory of extension) or from something else outside of this
> ontology which has been explicitly constrained to the mesoscopic domain of
> human experience?
>
> To get to the point behind these types of questions - where is the
> metatheory that formalizes the expression of an ontology like this that
> would allow us to judge it as being neutral?
>
> And should we expect the answers, or the formal tools necessary for
> addressing questions like this, to precede the ontology as externalized
> axioms or should they be derived from within the ontology itself? Is the
> latter approach the only way to stop kicking the can?
>
> Please forgive me if these questions seem impertinent or even obtuse. I do
> have a sincere interest in establishing a common understanding for what the
Alican Tüzün
Isn't the example that you have given as an event:
"The patient's temperature has risen since this morning" is a process and not an event? I am looking through the "instantaneous" quality.
If the answer is no, how have you decided that it is an event and not the former?
Best,
Alican
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Gregory Sharp
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Gilles Kassel
Historically, since at least Aristotle, two categories of ‘occurents’
have been commonly distinguished, the distinction being based on the
following intuitions: a ‘process’ is an occurrent that ‘goes on’,
without intrinsically (essentially) containing an end condition,
whereas an event is a closed occurrent, with spatiotemporal limits.
The question is whether there are any ontological options currently
being defended that are consistent with these intuitions.
To account for ‘physical’ processes (existing in the material
stratum), some authors conceive them as 3D entities that endure over
time in a way analogous to that of objects. We find such a conception
defended by Rowland Stout (1997, Processes; 2003, The life of a
process; 2016, The category of occurrent continuants) and Antony
Galton (2006, On What Goes On: The ontology of processes and events; &
Riichiro Mizoguchi 2009, The water falls but the waterfall does not
fall: New perspectives on objects, processes and events).
Now, what about events such as ‘the patient's temperature has risen
since this morning’? To account for this, my ontological
presuppositions are as follows: on the one hand, I distinguish a
mental stratum distinct from the material stratum and, on the other, I
consider as real the entities of popular psychology such as
intellectual attitudes (e.g. ‘to think’, ‘to judge’) and their
contents. Following these presuppositions, I conceive the
above-mentioned event as a content of an attitude of judging, a
content accounting for a life history of physical objects and
processes projected onto a given spatiotemporal region, in this case
the region occupied by the patient during the day. The doctor judges
the truth of the occurrence of the event. His judgement is based on
truth makers, which are states of affairs in this region. I have
presented these conceptions in my (2019, Physical processes, their
life and their history; 2022, Abstract events in semantics).
Note: the conceptions mentioned do not imply that there are no events
with a material reality. Other conceptions based on other options are
defended in the literature.
I hope I've answered your question.
Best,
Gilles
Alican Tüzün <tuzun...@gmail.com> a écrit :
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Michael Denny
If one considers 'process' as a psychological judgment, as it appears you do, this distinction seems to broadly distance the process entity from any 'event' entity in the physical world where discernible changes in real objects or their characteristics occur in time and space. This gap may have some possible shortcomings: 1) it complicates explaining processes parsimoniously as partially deterministic (and thus more or less repeatable) sequences of events; 2) it requires a higher level of abstraction than a history of observable events: and 3) it presupposes a boundless order of occurrence that, in order to achieve identity, necessarily commits to an intention. Conversely, events allow a terminal outcome or cycle of event sequences with rigidity and explanatory power without further labeling.
Mike
David Whitten
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Michael Denny
David,
True, but the concern I have is with the primary distinction often given to process over simply events. To me, a partial ordering of events serves the purpose without conjuring the artifice of process. John’s ontology of process really only deals with different event sequences where starting and ending events are noted. Partial order and determinism of event sequences suffice without the construct of process when describing real world observables. If some theories about this world must invoke a process construct then so be it, but for the most part event sequences are likely adequate without the effort of trying to make process a real thing.
Mike
From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com [mailto:ontolo...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of David Whitten
Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2025 11:12 PM
To: ontolo...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Question regarding final slide in Nicola Guarino's presentation
If a process is a 4-dimensional construct with events as constituents, it seems to me that more
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Gilles Kassel
I think that in these discussions, we should pay attention to 3 points.
One is the overall structure of reality. Personally, I take as my
starting point the structuring of reality into 3 main ‘strata’:
material, mental and social. Cf. Roberto Poli (1998, Levels; 2006,
Levels of Reality and the Psychological Stratum) for the notion of
stratum, a defense of this tripartition and a list of questions under
debate. This leads me to distinguish between substances (objects) and
processes in each stratum: the erosion of a coastline, the oxidation
of a metal (in the material stratum); a judgement (as an activity), an
arithmetic operation (mental); the repeal of a law, a recession in the
economy (social). Pace parsimony, the structure of the world being
complex, our ontological theories must reflect this complexity. To
answer Michael (if I understand his remarks correctly), I consider
that each stratum of reality corresponds to a type of explanation that
mobilizes its own causal relations (this is what defines the notion of
stratum). In the material stratum, processes control the temperature,
color, etc., of objects. In the mental stratum, it's the fact of being
addressed in an email that leads me to respond. I equate these
‘reasons’ with ‘causes’.
The second is our use of terms, which is not yet sufficiently
standardized in the designation of occurrences. For example, given
John Sowa's characterization of processes - ‘Processes can be
described by their starting and stopping points’ - I feel that his
taxonomy is best understood as a taxonomy of ‘events’.
The third is the identity criteria for occurrences. To confine
ourselves to the material stratum, one question concerns the
identification of criteria for distinguishing processes from events.
Various theories regard processes and events as sharing the same
nature, the distinction being based on a mereological granularity:
events are proper parts of processes (or vice versa). It seems to me
that Fred Dretske adopts such a point of view in his notion of process
(1988, Explaining behavior. Reasons in a World of Causes). Other
authors defend the idea that processes are in some way the stuff of
events (cf. Thomas Crowther, 2018, Process as Continuants and Process
as Stuff). For my part, I have no firm opinion on the matter. Hoever,
it seems to me that in the arguments put forward, we should
distinguish between linguistic arguments and ontological arguments.
That we talk about events (and think about them) is one thing, that
they really exist is another.
Best,
Gilles
Michael Denny <rega...@gmail.com> a écrit :
> David,
> True, but the concern I have is with the primary distinction often
> given to process over simply events. To me, a partial ordering of
> events serves the purpose without conjuring the artifice of process.
> John’s ontology of process really only deals with different event
> sequences where starting and ending events are noted. Partial order
> and determinism of event sequences suffice without the construct of
> process when describing real world observables. If some theories
> about this world must invoke a process construct then so be it, but
> for the most part event sequences are likely adequate without the
> effort of trying to make process a real thing.
>
>
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com
> [mailto:ontolo...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of David Whitten
> Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2025 11:12 PM
> To: ontolo...@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Question regarding final slide in
> Nicola Guarino's presentation
>
>
>
> If a process is a 4-dimensional construct with events as
> constituents, it seems to me that more
>
> than one process may be constructed using some or more of the same events.
>
>
>
> In John Soda’s writing ( http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/process.htm )
>
> He has a graph differentiating five (5) different kinds of processes.
>
>
>
> https://www.jfsowa.com/figs/process.gif
>
>
>
>>> &utm_source=foot
>
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Chris Partridge
Although ‘levels of organization’ has been a key concept in biology and its philosophy since the early twentieth century, there is still no consensus on the nature and significance of the concept. In different areas of philosophy and biology, we find strongly varying ideas of levels, and none of the accounts put forward has received wide acceptance. However, emerging work on levels of organization suggests that the insights garnered from the concept are far from exhausted.
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Michael Denny
Thanks for your reply. Yes, it makes sense that at least three perspectives, or strata, may be accepted as views on events/processes, but if we accept that these strata build on one another up from material to mental and social the reductionist take is that it remains physical events unfolding in time with interpretations attached solely by human cognition. I struggle with the notion that events could possibly not exist in the trajectory of the world and should not be given some primacy in describing it. For the materialist, process may be more a term of convenience than of explanation.
Alican Tüzün
It was a very explicit explanation. Thank you for it!
Best,
Alican
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Gilles Kassel
Thank you for letting me know about this SEP entry, which is very rich!
These notions of levels are obviously a tough challenge for
ontological analyses.
Best, Gilles
Chris Partridge <partri...@gmail.com> a écrit :
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Chris Partridge
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Gilles Kassel
You mention a ‘reductionist’ stance that consists of considering that
in the end there are ‘really’ only physical events, even if, in the
case of human behavior, we can produce descriptions that appeal to the
cognitive level. But these are just 'perspectives' with no ontological
value (if I'm translating what you say correctly).
Let's take the example of an event/process: a body movement, such as
raising an arm.
A physiologist will have no trouble explaining that nerve impulses
have occurred, causing muscles to contract.
Now let's look at the context of this alleged event/process: a cyclist
held out his arm to the left as he was about to turn.
In this case, a commonsense explanation is to recognize that we are
dealing with an action on the part of the cyclist, who has
intentionally extended his arm to the left, knowing that, according to
a convention of the highway code, a cyclist who extends his arm to the
left indicates that he is turning left.
To give an account of the reality of this part of the world, should we
restrict ourselves to the physiologist's meaning? The intuitive answer
is that to do so would be to give an incomplete account of the
cyclist's gesture. In fact, we are used to providing explanations in
terms of actions and mobilizing a causal theories of actions (in terms
of intentions, desires and beliefs).
In so doing, we are committing ourselves ontologically to popular,
common-sense psychological concepts (in the same sense as our
common-sense physical concepts). Are we right to integrate such
theories into our ontologies? My first answer is that it is up to
scientific psychology, particularly cognitive psychology, to tell us
about the reality of these entities. As it happens, cognitive
psychology provides us with such results in certain fields (e.g. the
psychology of mental representations and perception). That being the
case, I believe that common-sense psychological theories, even if they
are erroneous, have a social relevance, and that we should therefore
make room for them in our ontologies.
In short, I think there are several reasons not to reduce the mental
to the physical, ontologically speaking.
Ravi Sharma
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Michael Denny
Yes, of course, I would not deny that there are valid psychological and social realities (understood cognitively) that inform the human world. Once so, they invoke intentional actions/events/processes. My initial remark referred to the distinction of 'process' being made over 'event' in the broader sense of occurrence including strictly physical things. Then I said that process, when used in contrast to events, "presupposes a boundless order of occurrence that, in order to achieve identity, necessarily commits to an intention". If one is willing or eager to accept that an observed sequence of events (whether or not fully ordered and deterministic) has an acknowledged intention, then yes calling the sequence a process may have utility. My concern was the imposition of intention on the occurrence of events, especially naturally occurring sequences of events outside of human effort. Here, in the latter case, I would claim that process unnecessarily overstates/reifies/generalizes the existence of those events. Here the event/change constituents of process can stand on their own. If one is speaking more generally about occurrence and intention then process may apply.
The sufficiency of event sequence versus process in many situations was the point I was trying to make. In respect to your cyclist's arm gesture, when the event sequence clearly has an intention behind it you may be inclined to call it a process. Whatever the intention, the act itself is that sequence of events and open to interpretation by its observers who may or may not respond as expected.
John F Sowa
Alex Shkotin
John,
Ontologically asking: are you talking about moving matter where we have atomic nuclei, clouds of electrons, and photons moving from one electron to another? In Einstein space. And there are only four kinds of events:
-two: an electron has issued a photon, and an electron has absorbed a photon.
-two: two electron clouds united in one, and one electron cloud is splitted in two.
In this case, the State is a ContinuousProcess, where the process parameters are the same over time, and the Event is a continuous part of the Process that is somehow different from the previous and subsequent ones.
If you are talking about various mathematical abstractions, then it would be good to refer to the theory from which the terms are taken. For example, to the theory of discrete processes.
Alex
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Alex Shkotin
Ravi,
When we study a particular part of reality (usually on Earth), it is important to identify those entities that are stable, that preserve themselves in the observed processes.
And it turns out that electrons are absolutely stable, the vast majority of atomic nuclei (except for rare isotopes that do not have a significant effect on the process) are also stable.
No matter how complex and energetic the processes are (for example, the launch of Starship), the composition of atomic nuclei and electrons will be the same at the beginning and at the end of this process.
The internal structure of the atomic nucleus is complex, but I will allow myself to note that the electron does not know about this: for it, this is a point with mass, charge and other physical characteristics important for its movement.
When we look at some classification, the first question is: what entities and their processes are we talking about?
It's like with a theory: what is this theory about?
In theory itself, we have primary terms. But in order to apply this theory, we must specify the object of application and make sure, justify that the theory is applicable.
About your "four known forces"
i.e. "
Gravitational Force.
Electromagnetic Force.
Strong Nuclear Force.
Weak Nuclear Force.
G is in Einstein space-time, as I mentioned.
E is photon based.
SN and WN are about life inside atomic nuclei.
Alex
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Alex Shkotin
Ravi Sharma
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Alex Shkotin
Ravi,
It is usual or even inevitable in physics, to use one or another level of abstraction suitable to solve this particular task.
Ontological abstraction is like this.
The World consists of three types of particles: nuclei, electrons, photons. All are stable, but photons are issued and absorbed by electrons.
The space is Einsteinian.
The laws of movement of these particles can be discussed separately.
This is enough to describe all phenomena we use in practice except biological ones as we don't know the laws there yet.
Following Matter - Wikipedia `All everyday objects that can be touched are ultimately composed of nuclei embedded into clouds of electrons.`
Or as Landau would say: the fact that the nucleus has a structure can be neglected.
Ontologically speaking, a separately existing atom is a great rarity in nature. A molecule can be made of atoms, but it does not consist of them.
Alex
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David Whitten
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Ravi Sharma
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John F Sowa
Alex Shkotin
John,
Thank you for your reference to Features and Fluents: The Representation of Knowledge about Dynamical Systems, Vol 1. 1994.
This is all what we need: the same theoretical background.
Situation inspired me to note https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/process-classification-gemini-alex-shkotin-aljpe
Alex
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Gary Berg-Cross
Perhaps this could be included in Track 2.
gregsharp73
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Gilles Kassel
In response to Greg's request, I'd like to set out, not my recipe, but
my compass for tackling these issues.
First of all, I think it's important to distinguish between ‘levels of
complexity’ and ‘levels of reality’. The notion of ‘level of reality’
is more specific in that it is linked to the notion of existence. The
two terms ‘reality’ and ‘existence’ are commonly used as synonyms.
Since existence is the subject matter of ontology, the term
‘ontological level’ can also be used synonymously.
To focus on the levels of reality, we need to consider the conceptual
primitives adopted to describe these levels. When we look at our
theories of the world, we see that some primitives are more ‘general’
than others, in that they are used to describe several levels. This
idea is present in the notion of ‘formal ontology’, in contrast to the
notion of ‘regional ontology’. Personally, I prefer to avoid using
these notions, partly because of their Husserlian connotations, and
partly because the term ‘formal’ leads to ambiguity with the term
‘formalized’. In this respect, I feel that Alex's clarification is
quite clear in giving the term ‘formal’ the meaning of ‘formalized’.
As a result, I prefer to stick with a notion of the generality of
conceptual primitives to reflect, for example, the fact that the
object primitive and mereological relations are used to describe many
levels of reality. The same could be said of process and event
primitives.
Staying with the question of the choice of relational primitives, we
can see that mereological relations tend to be intra-level, unlike the
constitution relation, which tends to be inter-level. This is a
philosophical tradition that has been taken up in applied ontology, as
can be seen in Claudio Masolo's (2010) article: Understanding
Ontological Levels.
To complete my answer, and to reveal what I consider to be an
important part of my compass, I recommend that we be careful to
distinguish between ‘levels of reality’ and ‘levels of our knowledge
of reality’. Claudio Gnoli and Roberto Poli address this issue in
their (2004) Levels of Reality and Levels of Representation. One of
the issues is to clarify where the boundary lies between the material
stratum and the mental stratum. By talking about ‘levels of
representation’ or ‘levels of knowledge’, I'm not referring to the
question of the neural implementation of our representations, which is
the subject of neuropsychology, but to the way in which our
representations allow us to refer to the world (material or
otherwise), which is a question of semantics. In fact, I believe that
the relations of representation and reference are central to
structuring our ontologies.
P.S. (for Greg): I don't know enough about Whitehead's cosmology to
venture into that territory...
Gilles
>
> It looks like you have your own formal language, that is great.
> Do you have a comparison with DL or OWL2, or any other hets.eu family of
> languages?
>
> Alex
>
> чт, 6 февр. 2025 г. в 02:25, gregsharp73 <gregs...@gmail.com>:
>
>> Gary,
>> I'm curious if Gilles and Chris have more to say about "levels" as a means
>> of addressing the unification challenges that I brought up with the initial
>> question on this thread.
>> I can share that my working hypothesis in developing a pattern language (
>> www.patternslanguage.com) is that there might be a finite and fixed set
>> of seven abstract relations, all inter-related under a single operation (I
>> explaining ascending levels of complexity as far as they run in any
>> direction: conceptual/physical, spatial/temporal, logical/mereological and
>> semantic. And that the available rules which govern that expanding
>> complexity are immutable: the same at every level. That is at least the
>> vision that compels me. I believe that Whitehead was captivated by the
>> same vision in his speculative philosophy and cosmology. And I came to
>> understand that our methods are very much aligned (see my other thread on
>> Whitehead for what I mean by that).
>> Of course, there are other ways to bake this cake, so I for one, would be
>> interested in comparing recipes.
>> Greg
>>
>> On Wednesday, February 5, 2025 at 1:13:25 PM UTC-7 Gary Berg-Cross wrote:
>>
>>> Some of the people supporting a good conversation here such as Greg
>>> Sharp, Gilles Kassel', and Chris Partridge might be the makings of a
>>> good panel for the Summit.
>>>
>>> Perhaps this could be included in Track 2.
>>>
>>> Any thoughts?
>>>
>>> Gary Berg-Cross
>>> Potomac, MD
>>
>
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Chris Partridge
>> of addressing the unification challenges that I brought up with the initial
>> question on this thread.
Firstly, apologies in advance for not looking carefully at the "unification challenges".
I suspect that levels where the objects at each level are relatively isolated is a barrier to complexity.
That in complex systems, there is a lot of interconnection - and that the attraction of levels is that this is suppressed.
It seems to me that that the standard chaos narrative where a butterfly beating its wings causes something to happen at a different scale trades on this idea that causal connection should somehow stick to within their scale level.
I wonder whether introducing levels would then somehow create a barrier to unification where complex systems (such as most modern large computer systems - think SAP, Oracle, etc.) are involved.
But I'm just wondering at the moment.
Of course, the idea that systems somehow have boundaries within some level or scale also seems attractive - but I'm guessing the internet allows for some systems/communities to be quite separated.
Maybe the attraction of the restricted levels/scale is just a 'looking under the lamppost in the dark' (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streetlight_effect) pragmatic methodology - just as historians of science suggest that banning 'action at a distance' was for some of Descartes contemporaries.
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gregsharp73
Greg
Paul Tyson
> On Feb 6, 2025, at 15:55, gregsharp73 <gregs...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> I have spent the last couple of years trying to "wrestle to the ground" 1. Aristotle's term logic and 2. modern predicate logic.
Best,
—Paul
gregsharp73
Alex Shkotin
Hi Gilles,
Very interesting. Let me clarify my more pragmatic point.
We took one or another science or technology as a cultural phenomenon and activity.
And the question #1 is where and how its theoretical knowledge does exist outside human minds? Is that books, articles, reports and other kinds of documents including formal ontologies, knowledge bases, and DB schemas.
Maybe we have a place where this knowledge is concentrated, maybe as proposed here (PDF) Theory framework - knowledge hub message #1.
The question #2 is: do we need to formalize this knowledge i.e. rewrite it in one or another formal language?
As it's more or less clear that all verbal knowledge can be formalized.
I am talking about theories and technologies of the material world. Where we talk about physical systems, studying the laws of their motion.
It is very interesting to talk about the levels of physical reality. After all, it is amazing that in a crystal of table salt size 1 mm, the number of nuclei is 4.4 10^19 (Gemini), and they are all arranged in such a way that they oscillate in the nodes of the cubic lattice!
Gemini:
At a heating temperature (about 25 °C), the lattice pitch of NaCl is approximately 0.564 nanometers (nm) or 5.64 angstroms (Å).
It is difficult to determine the exact values of the thermal vibrations of the nucleus in a NaCl crystal at low temperatures. However, some estimates can be given: The amplitude of thermal vibrations of atoms is usually tenths of an angstrom (Å). For comparison, the lattice pitch of NaCl is about 5.64 Å.
◻️
How are theories about different entities at different levels of the material world structured? Should they be brought to concentrated form, for example, axiomatic theories? Should these axiomatic theories be formalized?
After all, even Hilbert's axiomatic theory for Euclidean geometry is not formalized. And this is not form material world, this is from math.
And someone, for example, GENO project, are taking on the formalization of genomics ⛲
We are on the way to a huge theoretical knowledge concentration. And this spontaneously started in OWL2 ontologies.
By the way, this week the AGIR community had an interesting report on the Knowledge Management System based on Husserl's approach: https://cognito.one/.
Thank you for interesting references:
https://www.loa.istc.cnr.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/kr10v0.7.pdf
https://www.gnoli.eu/gnoli&poli2004.pdf
Alex
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Alex Shkotin
Greg,
The problem with formal systems from Russel's to Bourbaki's or HoTT is that it takes time even to begin to understand it.
I'll try "formalism in pattern" this weekend 🏋️
And if you have formal language, why not take https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-primer/ and show your formalization for examples there.
Like here https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-primer/#Object_Properties
"We start by indicating that Mary is John's wife.
Functional-Style Syntax
ObjectPropertyAssertion( :hasWife :John :Mary )
"
Write the same in your language.
In the table Claude 3 Sonnet & OWL2 Primer(-:PUBLIC:-) the first column keeps the English form of every Primer proposition, and the second - OWL2\FS form.
It is possible to add a column for your formalization.
Alex
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gregsharp73
To further unpack my cryptic response to Paul’s understandable incredulity regarding the integration of Traditional and Modern Logics and to follow up on Alex’s request for an example of the formal notation used in Pattern Logic, I put together an article: https://patternslanguage.com/articles/f/unifying-logic-traditional-premises-and-classical-propositions
I will attach the summary diagram below which explains my response to Paul above.
I believe this article nicely closes the loop on where my interest lay in raising this question about Nicola’s last slide. I do see a means of unifying these various theories using the same toolbox of fixed patterns that I demonstrate in unifying Traditional and Modern Logic in the article. To sketch out an approach:
1. Theory of Parts (Mereology) à universal and partial quantifiers of pattern logic with mediation copulas
2. Theory of Unity and Plurality à generic quantifiers (individual and total) and copulas of pattern logic
3. Theory of Essence and Identity à general quantifiers and mediation copulas as explained in the article
4. Theory of Dependence à quantified monadic predicates of Modern Logic as explained in the article
5. Theory of Composition and Constitution à universal and partial quantifiers of pattern logic with union and overlap copulas
6. Theory of Properties and Qualities à quantified monadic predicates of Modern Logic as explained in the article
These discoveries have been made in obscure and isolated labor over many years now and I would welcome collaboration as it has arrived at this point of so many different branching paths. Please contact me if you have an interest in walking any of them with me.
Thanks,
John F Sowa
To further unpack my cryptic response to Paul’s understandable incredulity regarding the integration of Traditional and Modern Logics and to follow up on Alex’s request for an example of the formal notation used in Pattern Logic, I put together an article: https://patternslanguage.com/articles/f/unifying-logic-traditional-premises-and-classical-propositions
I believe this article nicely closes the loop on where my interest lay in raising this question about Nicola’s last slide. I do see a means of unifying these various theories using the same toolbox of fixed patterns that I demonstrate in unifying Traditional and Modern Logic in the article. To sketch out an approach:
gregsharp73
Hi John,
You are right of course. But why?
Here's a challenge for you and the forum... (you made me do this!)
1. Look at these diagrams and identify which one is Modern Logic and which one is Traditional Logic.
2. Using words from any chosen natural language, label each shape and each line on the diagram. A hint: your list of seven reserved words won't appear as labels on this diagram.
3. How are these shapes related to each other? Here's a hint: https://patternslanguage.com/transformation
4. Given that you can define "Logic" in so many ways how could you defend the assertion that for any definition of your choosing, it is the fact that you can represent it by selecting from, and labeling a diagram like this that defines it as a logic?
The article above is my preliminary answer. You will find that these diagrams correspond to the patterns used in the given examples (and any other example not given but which follows the parameters specified for Modern and Traditional Logics).
GregAlex Shkotin
Greg,
The article is very interesting as it keeps examples of your terminology and applications of your notation. It will take time to study details.
Preliminary questions:
You have a linear language with sentences like this "∃ person isPhilosopher(person)" or this "ꓱPhilosopher ⊇ ∂Person". Where is the grammar of this language?
You have a diagrammatic language with diagrams like in your email and article. Where is the grammar of this language? As a diagrammatic language has a grammar.
Is it true that any statement of linear language can be diagrammed and vice versa?
The work done is impressive!
Is it correct that "there exists a person, person is a philosopher." or more naturally for me: "there exists a person, who is a philosopher."
may be formalized in your notation as
"∃ person isPhilosopher(person)" or
"ꓱPhilosopher ⊇ ∂Person"
Are both formulas from your language?
In FOL we have for the same
"ꓱx Person(x) ∧ Philosopher(x)"
In mani-sorted logic we will have
"ꓱx:Person Philosopher(x)" where Person is a sort.
This is what I asked you: please, translate "Mary is John's wife." to your language.
The article is fine. But we have only two primary activities with formal language (linear or diagrammatic):
-formalization: translate an NL-sentence to a formula,
-verbalization: translate a formula to an NL-sentence.
Your intention to work without bind variables remind me Bourbaki's ◻️ sign and that strictly speaking their formative construction is a diagram ⚔️
Very interesting.
And, one more formal language is great, as the more the better, but what is an advantage?
For example, the advantage of DL-languages is the tableau algorithm.
By the way, the advantage of FOL is that its grammar is very small: inductive definitions for terms, atomic formulas, and quantified formulas.
Alex
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Alex Shkotin
Greg,
Studying new notation should have a reason, as everybody here has his own favorite one.
The most powerful formal language I know is https://isabelle.in.tum.de/library/HOL/HOL/HOL.html.
This is a challenge for you: define your language using HOL.
Logic is not about formulas, it's about knowledge processing, i.e. derivation rules.
And one very important note: if you have a processor to work with your languages (linear or diagrammatic) (aka interpreter) then where is a demo of knowledge in your notation processing?
As a community of practice we are talking here first of all about computer processable artifacts.
This is a challenge for you: grammar and interpreter 🐋
Alex
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gregsharp73
Okay Alex, this runs a little long but I hope it helps. I have pulled out your questions in red…
1. Where is the grammar of this language?
These were in the links in from my message on 2/6/25. The entire ADEPT LION pattern language (not just the grammar of the logical aspect which we are discussing here) is composed from
· The operation of limitation: ⊇
· An occasion: uniquely identified (Greek letters for purposes of describing the Language’s signature)
· Absence of an occasion: ∅ (again, merely for purposes of describing the Language’s signature)
I could stop here and say “that is the signature of ADEPT LION”. And you would protest because this isn’t interesting enough to give to a theorem prover. And of course there is still the matter of introducing a fixed graph schema.
The types of the signature allow us to express the left side of the ten Limitation Laws (https://patternslanguage.com/limitation) which ground the meaning of these additional symbols ¬, ⊉, [α], ≈, =, ∪, ∩, ⊆.
Interpretation of all patterns of the language do not require the use of the limitation laws. The patterns of the fixed schema are expressible with the signature alone but that would be analogous to a human trying to read binary as well as machines do. The set of grounded symbols help the human in sense-making when it comes to pattern interpretation. The schema of patterns involves three “considerations” of each uniquely identified occasion expressed in three formulas.
1st consideration: [u]E ⊇ [w]T ⊇ [t]E
2nd consideration: [v]sign ≡ [u]E ⊇ [w]T ⊇ [t]E
3rd consideration: [y]D ⊇ [w]T ⊆ [z]P ⊇ [x]A
Where did the “≡” in the second formula come from? We could add it to the signature or consider it to be a result of applying the Law of Approximate Mediation (V) and rewrite it as:
([u]E ⊇ [w]T ⊇ [t]E) ⊇ [v]sign ⊇ ([u]E ⊇ [w]T ⊇ [t]E) ⊢ [v]sign ≈ [u]E ⊇ [w]T ⊇ [t]E
What happened to all the Greek letters? The lowercase Latin letters in square brackets (only there for readability) represent seven edge types (called channels) of the fixed network graph schema. And the uppercase Latin Letters represent vertex types (called occasions of types, the types being called ontological constructs which have names like, A for ascription, D for description, E for entity, P for Process, T for translation: the ADEPT acronym). The formula for the First Consideration is rendered into English as “In its 1st consideration, an occasion is composed as (the entity of) its use channel, limiting (the translation of) its word channel, limiting (the entity of) its thing channel.”
The act of pattern interpretation requires the interpreter to make choices regarding the sequence in which they apply the limitation laws, analogous to choices about the order of operations in mathematical algebra (what I call the question of “where to put the parentheses?”).
I could continue unpacking all of this for you here, but honestly, the webpages do a better job of presenting the material visually and sequentially. We have been discussing the “theory of pattern” which starts here: https://patternslanguage.com/theory-of-pattern
I believe why you are thinking that I haven’t answered your question regarding the “grammar of this language” is because you are supposing that every computable language has to be something describable in First or Higher Order Logic. But why does that presupposition matter to anyone but a computer scientist?
“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy”
2. You have a diagrammatic language with diagrams like in your email and article. Where is the grammar of this language?
In my work on ADEPT LION, I have employed three main types of diagramming: https://patternslanguage.com/diagramming
The example is a “rivulet diagram”.
3. Is it true that any statement of linear language can be diagrammed and vice versa?
ADEPT LION is not a linear language. It is a pattern language. and not in the sense used in the context of software engineering or in the other thread about ontology design patterns(ODP). ADEPT LION can express those other senses of "design patterns", but that is a different topic. In short, you can think of ADEPT LION a metatheory for those design pattern theories which is grounded in a particular fixed schema of graph "patterns".
Any statement of a linear language can be disambiguated into a statement of pattern language (or at least that is my naïve assumption) but this means that you must be ready to explain what you meant by the statement. That being said, ambiguous statements can also be translated into pattern language with all of their ambiguity.
Trying to translate any pattern into a linear language is a ghastly idea. Theoretically, I would say it could be done in a descriptive sense but I suspect a lot of meaning would also be lost in the act. And it would be like trying to read binary.
4. Is it correct that "there exists a person, person is a philosopher." or more naturally for me: "there exists a person, who is a philosopher."may be formalized in your notation as "∃ person isPhilosopher(person)" or "ꓱPhilosopher ⊇ ∂Person"?
No. You are conflating Modern and Traditional Logics here. This is the primary point being made by the examples. The mapping you seek is to the first proposition in FOL, not the one after your “or” which is a statement of Pattern Logic that captures the intent of a Term Logic premise.
The italicized words in the latter formula are most generally to be understood as being of type concept but they have a pattern sub-type that allows us to see them also as logical terms appropriate for use in Term logic (I’m not trying to settle any debate as to whether Aristotle would permit the use logical individuals or universals in his system, so I chose for this example “some person is a philosopher” instead of “Socrates is a man”).
5. Are both formulas from your language?
Sort of for the first, and yes for the second. The "∃ person isPhilosopher(person)" is an English rendering of a FOL formula which would be expressed unambiguously in Pattern Logic as "ꓱPerson ∧ ꓱPhilosopher”. I know this is confusing but these ꓱ’s are the existential quantifier of Pattern Logic, not of Modern Logic. A pattern logic existential quantifier symbol corresponds to a specific pattern, or arrangement of occasions like this:
These patterns are not subject to change, or more specifically, they are not subject to the symbolic manipulations that are the block and tackle of the axiomatic logical systems that you are familiar with. Those axiomatic manipulations of “linear languages” do not apply to them. The meaning of this existentially quantified concept is structurally embodied in these three occasions of pattern which we are merely interpreting.
Which takes us to your next question.
6. In FOL we have for the same "ꓱx Person(x) ∧ Philosopher(x)" In mani-sorted logic we will have "ꓱx:Person Philosopher(x)" where Person is a sort.
Again, do not confuse Pattern Logic statements, and especially their quantifier symbols with those of any other logic. And while we’re on the topic of symbol confusion, please do not confuse limitation as “⊇” with “superset of or equal to” from set theory. The world is sadly running short of nice mathematical symbols despite being overrun by emojis!
7. This is what I asked you: please, translate "Mary is John's wife." to your language.
Your original challenge has already been answered in two ways (Your example is of the same form as mine but about person and philosopher rather than Mary and John’s wife). But the other reason for the example is that the answer depends on whether your intention in this natural language was to translate it into Term Logic or Modern Predicate Logic using Pattern Logic. In Term logic you would parse this to an I-premise (some A is a B) where term A is “Mary” and term B is “John’s wife”. In Predicate Logic you would be parsing “there exists a Mary and Mary is John’s wife”. This involves an existentially quantified constant (or variable is you prefer pronoun substitutions as in your question 4 above) “Mary” and a monadic predicate “is John’s wife” (note the “is”).
8. And, one more formal language is great, as the more the better, but what is an advantage?
Where I hope all of this is going is that you can see a role, not for “one more formal language” but for a formal language that is fundamentally different from any other because it is grounded in a fixed system of interpretable patterns and not axioms of modern logic which find no grounding apart from social convention. I suppose the greatest advantage of grounding in something other than social convention has to do with the need for a disambiguation of language. You know, “Tower of Babel” kind of problems.
Alex Shkotin
Greg,
It is very interesting. And for me there is no doubt you invented something important.
Let me share my conclusions.
a) You do have linear language. Example: "ꓱPerson ∧ ꓱPhilosopher".
b) You do have diagrammatic language. Example:
c) You do not have a grammar for both. Maybe you just do not know this technique. May I kindly recommend to you my reference book The Theory of Parsing, Translation, and Compiling: An introduction to compiling. Alfred V. Aho, Jeffrey D. Ullman. Prentice-Hall, 1972 https://books.google.ru/books?id=45VQAAAAMAAJ&hl=ru
Good theory is never old 🎯
d) You do not have Interpreter to work with your structures by computer.
e) Your central term is Pattern. For example, guys from https://cognito.one/ inspired by Husserl, have a primary term as Aspect, but they have Interpreter.
Alex
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Alex Shkotin
Gregory Sharp
Greg
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Alex Shkotin
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gregsharp73
