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May 28, 2020, 7:00:15 AM5/28/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Sign Relations • Anthesis

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/05/28/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-anthesis/

<QUOTE>

Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of

reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same

reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun.

— C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 2.274

</QUOTE>

In his picturesque illustration of a sign relation, along with his tracing of a corresponding sign process, or

“semiosis”, Peirce uses the technical term “representamen” for his concept of a sign, but the shorter word is precise

enough, so long as one recognizes its meaning in a particular theory of signs is given by a specific definition of what

it means to be a sign.

Resources

=========

• Semeiotic ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Semeiotic )

• Logic Syllabus ( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/logic-syllabus/ )

• Sign Relations ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation )

• Triadic Relations ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Triadic_relation )

• Relation Theory ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Relation_theory )

Regards,

Jon

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey

oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey

facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/05/28/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-anthesis/

<QUOTE>

Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of

reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same

reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun.

— C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 2.274

</QUOTE>

In his picturesque illustration of a sign relation, along with his tracing of a corresponding sign process, or

“semiosis”, Peirce uses the technical term “representamen” for his concept of a sign, but the shorter word is precise

enough, so long as one recognizes its meaning in a particular theory of signs is given by a specific definition of what

it means to be a sign.

Resources

=========

• Semeiotic ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Semeiotic )

• Logic Syllabus ( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/logic-syllabus/ )

• Sign Relations ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation )

• Triadic Relations ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Triadic_relation )

• Relation Theory ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Relation_theory )

Regards,

Jon

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey

oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey

facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

May 28, 2020, 4:10:27 PM5/28/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Klaus, All ...

I'm working at reviewing and revising some pieces I've rewritten

two score times over the last ... lost count of years ... and that

bit from Peirce is one of my favorite epigraphs for the work ahead.

But I take it as an allegorical figure whose purpose is to illustrate

a certain form of relation, and not to be taken too literally. So I'd

agree with your reaction that taking it literally clangs a bit. I think

there are clues in the passage, the hypothetical subjunctive construction,

the unnatural qualification, “without further condition”, etc., telling us

Peirce did not intend it a truth of botany. But taken rightly it does point

to the shape of a proper definition to come. So I'll be getting to that ...

Regards,

Jon

On 5/28/2020 12:30 PM, Krippendorff, Klaus wrote:

> This interesting quote reveals three things to me:

>

> 1. Peirce observed And described what cyberneticians call an adaptive system. The sunflower trying to maximize

exposure to the moving sun by turning.

>

> 2. This behavior may well have an evolutionary advantage in the sense that other flowers that cannot take advantage

of this ability might be less capable of reproduction. While all flowers end up bearing seeds, not all flowers that have

survived today have that capability.

>

> 3. Projecting the triadic sign conception on this process is ludicrous. It demonstrates Peirce’s single-minded

projection of a simplistic conception on everything in the world.

>

> To me signs are the result of interpretations of perceptions. Even if the connection between what one sees and what

it means Is explainable as a circular causality, it always Is conceptualized as such. It seems to me that Peirce

confuses his conception with what IS the case. His triadic explanations do no not cover the dynamics of the sunflower’s

behavior. It favors static descriptions which cybernetics is fundamentally oppose to, moreover including the

cybernetician as enactor of his or her conceptual system.

>

> Klaus

>

> Sent from my iPhone

>

>> On May 28, 2020, at 7:00 AM, Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net> wrote:

>>

>> Cf: Sign Relations • Anthesis

I'm working at reviewing and revising some pieces I've rewritten

two score times over the last ... lost count of years ... and that

bit from Peirce is one of my favorite epigraphs for the work ahead.

But I take it as an allegorical figure whose purpose is to illustrate

a certain form of relation, and not to be taken too literally. So I'd

agree with your reaction that taking it literally clangs a bit. I think

there are clues in the passage, the hypothetical subjunctive construction,

the unnatural qualification, “without further condition”, etc., telling us

Peirce did not intend it a truth of botany. But taken rightly it does point

to the shape of a proper definition to come. So I'll be getting to that ...

Regards,

Jon

On 5/28/2020 12:30 PM, Krippendorff, Klaus wrote:

> This interesting quote reveals three things to me:

>

> 1. Peirce observed And described what cyberneticians call an adaptive system. The sunflower trying to maximize

exposure to the moving sun by turning.

>

> 2. This behavior may well have an evolutionary advantage in the sense that other flowers that cannot take advantage

of this ability might be less capable of reproduction. While all flowers end up bearing seeds, not all flowers that have

survived today have that capability.

>

> 3. Projecting the triadic sign conception on this process is ludicrous. It demonstrates Peirce’s single-minded

projection of a simplistic conception on everything in the world.

>

> To me signs are the result of interpretations of perceptions. Even if the connection between what one sees and what

it means Is explainable as a circular causality, it always Is conceptualized as such. It seems to me that Peirce

confuses his conception with what IS the case. His triadic explanations do no not cover the dynamics of the sunflower’s

behavior. It favors static descriptions which cybernetics is fundamentally oppose to, moreover including the

cybernetician as enactor of his or her conceptual system.

>

> Klaus

>

> Sent from my iPhone

>

>> On May 28, 2020, at 7:00 AM, Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net> wrote:

>>

>> Cf: Sign Relations • Anthesis

May 28, 2020, 4:38:23 PM5/28/20

to ontolo...@googlegroups.com

Jon Awbrey, Klaus Krippendorff, and everyone else:

Peirce's semiotics is his Logic of Vagueness. It is rooted in his philosophy, therefore the triadic structure has to be understood in this perspective. The triadic-trichotomic structure of the sign reflects a view of he world and of our perception of the world. Peirce worried about the misuse of concepts, and therefore invented words, which he defined very precisely. Commenting on his concepts without paying attention to how Peirce defined them will not allow for progress in understanding the relevance of his contributions. The Ethics of terminology he advanced and tried to practice could benefit us all.

Mihai Nadin

-----Original Message-----

From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey

Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2020 3:10 PM

To: Cybernetic Communications <cyb...@googlegroups.com>; Ontolog Forum <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>; Peirce List <peir...@list.iupui.edu>; Structural Modeling <structura...@googlegroups.com>; SysSciWG <syss...@googlegroups.com>

Subject: [ontolog-forum] Re: Sign Relations

Klaus, All ...

I'm working at reviewing and revising some pieces I've rewritten two score times over the last ... lost count of years ... and that bit from Peirce is one of my favorite epigraphs for the work ahead.

But I take it as an allegorical figure whose purpose is to illustrate a certain form of relation, and not to be taken too literally. So I'd agree with your reaction that taking it literally clangs a bit. I think there are clues in the passage, the hypothetical subjunctive construction, the unnatural qualification, “without further condition”, etc., telling us Peirce did not intend it a truth of botany. But taken rightly it does point to the shape of a proper definition to come. So I'll be getting to that ...

Regards,

Jon

On 5/28/2020 12:30 PM, Krippendorff, Klaus wrote:

> This interesting quote reveals three things to me:

>

> 1. Peirce observed And described what cyberneticians call an adaptive system. The sunflower trying to maximize exposure to the moving sun by turning.

>

> 2. This behavior may well have an evolutionary advantage in the sense that other flowers that cannot take advantage of this ability might be less capable of reproduction. While all flowers end up bearing seeds, not all flowers that have survived today have that capability.

>

> 3. Projecting the triadic sign conception on this process is ludicrous. It demonstrates Peirce’s single-minded projection of a simplistic conception on everything in the world.

>

> To me signs are the result of interpretations of perceptions. Even if the connection between what one sees and what it means Is explainable as a circular causality, it always Is conceptualized as such. It seems to me that Peirce confuses his conception with what IS the case. His triadic explanations do no not cover the dynamics of the sunflower’s behavior. It favors static descriptions which cybernetics is fundamentally oppose to, moreover including the cybernetician as enactor of his or her conceptual system.

>

> Klaus

>

> Sent from my iPhone

>

>> On May 28, 2020, at 7:00 AM, Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net> wrote:

>>

>> Cf: Sign Relations • Anthesis

>> At: https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Finquiryintoinquiry.com%2F2020%2F05%2F28%2Fsign-relations-%25E2%2580%25A2-anthesis%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297308680&sdata=KVOMvx21%2FaksMmfSvDln8uZTp6o5N9yzJ3CwG%2BtHYxo%3D&reserved=0

>> academia: https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Findependent.academia.edu%2FJonAwbrey&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297313672&sdata=0%2FNKxbq1%2B4L7t6MglIqroXOXo6RQmE9SAx0brj%2F7F%2Fk%3D&reserved=0

>> oeiswiki: https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.oeis.org%2Fwiki%2FUser%3AJon_Awbrey&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297313672&sdata=blzQwj%2B8fkyvvvAns4tOoyBGq%2B1dYfjchViO77G0ujE%3D&reserved=0

>> facebook page: https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2FJonnyCache&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297313672&sdata=wTbJlXl%2Bzi4nBsY0wr4goMR4mmhBx3yH7fOpru%2FrYZQ%3D&reserved=0

>>

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Peirce's semiotics is his Logic of Vagueness. It is rooted in his philosophy, therefore the triadic structure has to be understood in this perspective. The triadic-trichotomic structure of the sign reflects a view of he world and of our perception of the world. Peirce worried about the misuse of concepts, and therefore invented words, which he defined very precisely. Commenting on his concepts without paying attention to how Peirce defined them will not allow for progress in understanding the relevance of his contributions. The Ethics of terminology he advanced and tried to practice could benefit us all.

Mihai Nadin

-----Original Message-----

From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey

Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2020 3:10 PM

To: Cybernetic Communications <cyb...@googlegroups.com>; Ontolog Forum <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>; Peirce List <peir...@list.iupui.edu>; Structural Modeling <structura...@googlegroups.com>; SysSciWG <syss...@googlegroups.com>

Subject: [ontolog-forum] Re: Sign Relations

Klaus, All ...

I'm working at reviewing and revising some pieces I've rewritten two score times over the last ... lost count of years ... and that bit from Peirce is one of my favorite epigraphs for the work ahead.

But I take it as an allegorical figure whose purpose is to illustrate a certain form of relation, and not to be taken too literally. So I'd agree with your reaction that taking it literally clangs a bit. I think there are clues in the passage, the hypothetical subjunctive construction, the unnatural qualification, “without further condition”, etc., telling us Peirce did not intend it a truth of botany. But taken rightly it does point to the shape of a proper definition to come. So I'll be getting to that ...

Regards,

Jon

On 5/28/2020 12:30 PM, Krippendorff, Klaus wrote:

> This interesting quote reveals three things to me:

>

> 1. Peirce observed And described what cyberneticians call an adaptive system. The sunflower trying to maximize exposure to the moving sun by turning.

>

> 2. This behavior may well have an evolutionary advantage in the sense that other flowers that cannot take advantage of this ability might be less capable of reproduction. While all flowers end up bearing seeds, not all flowers that have survived today have that capability.

>

> 3. Projecting the triadic sign conception on this process is ludicrous. It demonstrates Peirce’s single-minded projection of a simplistic conception on everything in the world.

>

> To me signs are the result of interpretations of perceptions. Even if the connection between what one sees and what it means Is explainable as a circular causality, it always Is conceptualized as such. It seems to me that Peirce confuses his conception with what IS the case. His triadic explanations do no not cover the dynamics of the sunflower’s behavior. It favors static descriptions which cybernetics is fundamentally oppose to, moreover including the cybernetician as enactor of his or her conceptual system.

>

> Klaus

>

> Sent from my iPhone

>

>> On May 28, 2020, at 7:00 AM, Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net> wrote:

>>

>> Cf: Sign Relations • Anthesis

>>

>> <QUOTE>

>>

>> Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun.

>>

>> — C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 2.274 >> >> </QUOTE> >> >> In his picturesque illustration of a sign relation, along with his tracing of a corresponding sign process, or “semiosis”, Peirce uses the technical term “representamen” for his concept of a sign, but the shorter word is precise enough, so long as one recognizes its meaning in a particular theory of signs is given by a specific definition of what it means to be a sign.

>>

>> Resources

>> =========

>>

>> • Semeiotic ( https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Foeis.org%2Fwiki%2FSemeiotic&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297313672&sdata=Hom0ll5hjNc3x79Wdwq5T%2BtN95yTG8L6WYYKoeikGW4%3D&reserved=0 ) >> >> • Logic Syllabus ( https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Finquiryintoinquiry.com%2Flogic-syllabus%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297313672&sdata=%2BTP4aPV0Kkb3SBzHDwLPAGM7C%2BSNNGrH1QvilC3s0lI%3D&reserved=0 ) >> >> • Sign Relations ( https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Foeis.org%2Fwiki%2FSign_relation&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297313672&sdata=S1Q1r1QAUK0P3hqfdsb%2BrA8hKvxda9GyhH9vn0%2FdEmg%3D&reserved=0 ) >> >> • Triadic Relations ( https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Foeis.org%2Fwiki%2FTriadic_relation&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297313672&sdata=Mq0fE%2FoUyz7%2B61USFgmHLaG3oUrNnbRQSbhPY%2F%2BHZDU%3D&reserved=0 ) >> >> • Relation Theory ( https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Foeis.org%2Fwiki%2FRelation_theory&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297313672&sdata=KedUzxR2qfN2IqPv8sUNJIFYt3GoHt76gJD51135T8o%3D&reserved=0 ) >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> inquiry into inquiry: https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Finquiryintoinquiry.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297313672&sdata=eQP0G%2BSnBXJ4%2BfJ%2F699btNCVNzd7vEvQW2Gd1Ya0rYs%3D&reserved=0
>> <QUOTE>

>>

>> Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun.

>>

>> — C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 2.274 >> >> </QUOTE> >> >> In his picturesque illustration of a sign relation, along with his tracing of a corresponding sign process, or “semiosis”, Peirce uses the technical term “representamen” for his concept of a sign, but the shorter word is precise enough, so long as one recognizes its meaning in a particular theory of signs is given by a specific definition of what it means to be a sign.

>>

>> Resources

>> =========

>>

>> academia: https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Findependent.academia.edu%2FJonAwbrey&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297313672&sdata=0%2FNKxbq1%2B4L7t6MglIqroXOXo6RQmE9SAx0brj%2F7F%2Fk%3D&reserved=0

>> oeiswiki: https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.oeis.org%2Fwiki%2FUser%3AJon_Awbrey&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297313672&sdata=blzQwj%2B8fkyvvvAns4tOoyBGq%2B1dYfjchViO77G0ujE%3D&reserved=0

>> facebook page: https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2FJonnyCache&data=02%7C01%7Cnadin%40utdallas.edu%7C29b7fd962a2d4b483f0c08d8034329f1%7C8d281d1d9c4d4bf7b16e032d15de9f6c%7C0%7C0%7C637262934297313672&sdata=wTbJlXl%2Bzi4nBsY0wr4goMR4mmhBx3yH7fOpru%2FrYZQ%3D&reserved=0

>>

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Jun 1, 2020, 11:40:17 AM6/1/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Sign Relations • Definition

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/01/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-definition/

One of Peirce's clearest and most complete definitions of a sign is one he gives in the context of providing a

definition for logic, and so it is informative to view it in that setting.

<QUOTE>

Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human

thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.

Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the

same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from this

definition, together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. I also make a

historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no

novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally

recognized. (C.S. Peirce, NEM 4, 20–21).

</QUOTE>

In the general discussion of diverse theories of signs, the question frequently arises whether signhood is an absolute,

essential, indelible, or ontological property of a thing, or whether it is a relational, interpretive, and mutable role

a thing can be said to have only within a particular context of relationships.

Peirce’s definition of a sign defines it in relation to its object and its interpretant sign, and thus defines signhood

in relative terms, by means of a predicate with three places. In this definition, signhood is a role in a triadic

relation, a role a thing bears or plays in a given context of relationships — it is not as an absolute, non-relative

property of a thing-in-itself, a status it maintains independently of all relationships to other things.

Some of the terms Peirce uses in his definition of a sign may need to be elaborated for the contemporary reader.

• Correspondence. From the way Peirce uses this term throughout his work it is clear he means what he elsewhere calls a

“triple correspondence”, in short, just another way of referring to the whole triadic sign relation itself. In

particular, his use of this term should not be taken to imply a dyadic correspondence, as in the varieties of “mirror

image” correspondence between realities and representations bandied about in contemporary controversies about

“correspondence theories of truth”.

• Determination. Peirce’s concept of determination is broader in several ways than the sense of the word referring to

strictly deterministic causal-temporal processes. First, and especially in this context, he uses a more general concept

of determination, what is known as formal or informational determination, as we use in geometry when we say “two points

determine a line”, rather than the more special cases of causal or temporal determinisms. Second, he characteristically

allows for the broader concept of determination in measure, that is, an order of determinism admitting a full spectrum

of more and less determined relationships.

• Non-psychological. Peirce’s “non-psychological conception of logic” must be distinguished from any variety of

anti-psychologism. He was quite interested in matters of psychology and had much of import to say about them. But

logic and psychology operate on different planes of study even when they happen to view the same data, as logic is a

normative science where psychology is a descriptive science. Thus they have distinct aims, methods, and rationales.

Reference

=========

• Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of

Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73. Online ( https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/L75/l75.htm ) .

Resources

=========

• Semeiotic ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Semeiotic )

• Logic Syllabus ( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/logic-syllabus/ )

• Logic of Relatives ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Logic_of_relatives )

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/01/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-definition/

One of Peirce's clearest and most complete definitions of a sign is one he gives in the context of providing a

definition for logic, and so it is informative to view it in that setting.

<QUOTE>

Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human

thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.

Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the

same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from this

definition, together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. I also make a

historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no

novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally

recognized. (C.S. Peirce, NEM 4, 20–21).

</QUOTE>

In the general discussion of diverse theories of signs, the question frequently arises whether signhood is an absolute,

essential, indelible, or ontological property of a thing, or whether it is a relational, interpretive, and mutable role

a thing can be said to have only within a particular context of relationships.

Peirce’s definition of a sign defines it in relation to its object and its interpretant sign, and thus defines signhood

in relative terms, by means of a predicate with three places. In this definition, signhood is a role in a triadic

relation, a role a thing bears or plays in a given context of relationships — it is not as an absolute, non-relative

property of a thing-in-itself, a status it maintains independently of all relationships to other things.

Some of the terms Peirce uses in his definition of a sign may need to be elaborated for the contemporary reader.

• Correspondence. From the way Peirce uses this term throughout his work it is clear he means what he elsewhere calls a

“triple correspondence”, in short, just another way of referring to the whole triadic sign relation itself. In

particular, his use of this term should not be taken to imply a dyadic correspondence, as in the varieties of “mirror

image” correspondence between realities and representations bandied about in contemporary controversies about

“correspondence theories of truth”.

• Determination. Peirce’s concept of determination is broader in several ways than the sense of the word referring to

strictly deterministic causal-temporal processes. First, and especially in this context, he uses a more general concept

of determination, what is known as formal or informational determination, as we use in geometry when we say “two points

determine a line”, rather than the more special cases of causal or temporal determinisms. Second, he characteristically

allows for the broader concept of determination in measure, that is, an order of determinism admitting a full spectrum

of more and less determined relationships.

• Non-psychological. Peirce’s “non-psychological conception of logic” must be distinguished from any variety of

anti-psychologism. He was quite interested in matters of psychology and had much of import to say about them. But

logic and psychology operate on different planes of study even when they happen to view the same data, as logic is a

normative science where psychology is a descriptive science. Thus they have distinct aims, methods, and rationales.

Reference

=========

• Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of

Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73. Online ( https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/L75/l75.htm ) .

Resources

=========

• Semeiotic ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Semeiotic )

• Logic Syllabus ( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/logic-syllabus/ )

Jun 1, 2020, 12:50:37 PM6/1/20

to Peirce-L, Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Jon A,

I agree that (NEM 4:20) is one of Peirce's best definitions of 'sign'. I also believe that it is his clearest definition of 'formal semiotic'. But in talking about Peirce's logic. it's essential to distinguish three distinct kinds of logic that he developed in detail: mathematical logic, formal semiotic, and normative logic. Elsewhere. he wrote that mathematical logic is the smallest part. But without mathematical logic as the foundation, formal semiotic would not be possible. And without formal semiotic, normative logic would not be possible.

A huge amount of confusion on Peirce-L could be avoided by distinguishing which of the three senses of 'logic' is intended in any occurrence of the word in Peirce's writing.

JA> One of Peirce's clearest and most complete definitions of a sign is one he gives in the context of providing a definition for logic, and so it is informative to view it in that setting.

CSP> Logic will here be defined as
formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be given which no more
refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place
which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time. Namely,
a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign
determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with
something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from
this definition, together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce
mathematically the principles of logic. I also make a historical review
of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that
my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of
logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally
recognized. (NEM 4, 20–21).

Note the word 'here' in the first sentence: "Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic." That does not rule out other senses of the word 'logic' in other writings.

John

Jun 3, 2020, 6:51:04 AM6/3/20

to ontolog-forum

Jon and John and All,

A Sign is unusually active in Peirce's definition:

A (a sign) __brings__ B (interpretant sign) into correspondence with C (object of sign).

Moreover, A __determines__ B or even __creates__ B.

I think this is because a sign is a role of thing in some process, later called information processing.

Nonpsychological conception of logic and sign needs Turing machine, Post machine, i.e. a theory of algorithms aka teleology:-)

Anyway, it would be nice to get an example of such an active sign.

Alex

пн, 1 июн. 2020 г. в 19:50, John F. Sowa <so...@bestweb.net>:

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Jun 10, 2020, 1:20:18 PM6/10/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Sign Relations • Discussion 2

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/10/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-2/

Re: Cybernetics ( https://groups.google.com/d/topic/cybcom/Xb7_CYkMLwA/overview )

::: Bernard C.E. Scott ( https://groups.google.com/d/msg/cybcom/Xb7_CYkMLwA/3aTHnBIzAwAJ )

Re: Sign Relations • Definition

At: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/01/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-definition/

Regarding Peirce's definition of a sign given in the previous post, Bernard Scott writes:

<QUOTE>

It is very helpful [to] distinguish Peirce's formal semiotic (his logic)

from psychological, and by extension, ‘biosemiotic’ understandings of ‘sign’.

</QUOTE>

Dear Bernard,

You raise a very important point. It is critical to distinguish

the abstract theory from its concrete applications. The power of

a great theory lies in the diversity of applications it bears.

But that very power comes with a warning, as the diversity it

generates can be the source of dispute and dissension among

its appliers and interpreters.

We all know the parable of the seven sightless sages and

the polymorphous pachyderm they ponder, so I don't need to

spend a lot of words on the moral of that story here. But

it may be useful to say more about the major misunderstandings

occasioned by, the schisms, sects, and splinter groups spawned

by Peirce's extremely general and powerful theory of triadic

sign relations. I'll attend to that when I next get a chance.

Regards,

Jon

Reference

=========

• Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75),

in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics

by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.

https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/L75/l75.htm

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/10/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-2/

Re: Cybernetics ( https://groups.google.com/d/topic/cybcom/Xb7_CYkMLwA/overview )

::: Bernard C.E. Scott ( https://groups.google.com/d/msg/cybcom/Xb7_CYkMLwA/3aTHnBIzAwAJ )

Re: Sign Relations • Definition

At: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/01/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-definition/

Regarding Peirce's definition of a sign given in the previous post, Bernard Scott writes:

<QUOTE>

It is very helpful [to] distinguish Peirce's formal semiotic (his logic)

from psychological, and by extension, ‘biosemiotic’ understandings of ‘sign’.

</QUOTE>

Dear Bernard,

You raise a very important point. It is critical to distinguish

the abstract theory from its concrete applications. The power of

a great theory lies in the diversity of applications it bears.

But that very power comes with a warning, as the diversity it

generates can be the source of dispute and dissension among

its appliers and interpreters.

We all know the parable of the seven sightless sages and

the polymorphous pachyderm they ponder, so I don't need to

spend a lot of words on the moral of that story here. But

it may be useful to say more about the major misunderstandings

occasioned by, the schisms, sects, and splinter groups spawned

by Peirce's extremely general and powerful theory of triadic

sign relations. I'll attend to that when I next get a chance.

Regards,

Jon

Reference

=========

• Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75),

in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics

by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.

Jun 11, 2020, 1:54:32 PM6/11/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Sign Relations • Signs and Inquiry

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/11/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-signs-and-inquiry/

All,

Here's a paragraph on an issue I've explored in more depth

both before and after writing this bit of ice-breaker to it,

but since it's a topic I get back to every other summer or so

I'll leave this much as a segue and a reminder of the season.

There is a close relationship between the pragmatic theory of signs and the pragmatic theory of inquiry. In fact, the

correspondence between the two studies exhibits so many congruences and parallels that it is often best to treat them as

integral parts of one and the same subject. In a very real sense, inquiry is the process by which sign relations come

to be established and continue to evolve. In other words, inquiry, “thinking” in its best sense, “is a term denoting

the various ways in which things acquire significance” (John Dewey). Thus, there is an active and intricate form of

cooperation that needs to be appreciated and maintained between these converging modes of investigation. Its proper

character is best understood by realizing that the theory of inquiry is adapted to study the developmental aspects of

sign relations, a subject which the theory of signs is specialized to treat from structural and comparative points of view.

Reference

=========

• Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75),

in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics

by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.

ttps://oeis.org/wiki/Semeiotic

• Logic Syllabus

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/logic-syllabus/

• Sign Relations

https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation

• Triadic Relations

https://oeis.org/wiki/Triadic_relation

• Relation Theory

https://oeis.org/wiki/Relation_theory

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/11/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-signs-and-inquiry/

All,

Here's a paragraph on an issue I've explored in more depth

both before and after writing this bit of ice-breaker to it,

but since it's a topic I get back to every other summer or so

I'll leave this much as a segue and a reminder of the season.

There is a close relationship between the pragmatic theory of signs and the pragmatic theory of inquiry. In fact, the

correspondence between the two studies exhibits so many congruences and parallels that it is often best to treat them as

integral parts of one and the same subject. In a very real sense, inquiry is the process by which sign relations come

to be established and continue to evolve. In other words, inquiry, “thinking” in its best sense, “is a term denoting

the various ways in which things acquire significance” (John Dewey). Thus, there is an active and intricate form of

cooperation that needs to be appreciated and maintained between these converging modes of investigation. Its proper

character is best understood by realizing that the theory of inquiry is adapted to study the developmental aspects of

sign relations, a subject which the theory of signs is specialized to treat from structural and comparative points of view.

Reference

=========

• Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75),

in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics

by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.

• Logic Syllabus

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/logic-syllabus/

• Sign Relations

https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation

• Triadic Relations

https://oeis.org/wiki/Triadic_relation

• Relation Theory

https://oeis.org/wiki/Relation_theory

Jun 12, 2020, 6:43:44 AM6/12/20

to ontolog-forum

Jon, sorry for the second posting.

A Sign is unusually active in Peirce's definition:

A (a sign) __brings__ B (interpretant sign) into correspondence with C (object of sign).

Moreover, A __determines__ B or even __creates__ B.

...

It would be nice to get an example of such an active sign, its interpretant sign and an object.

My point is to make the Peirce definition as clear as to be formalized.

Alex

пн, 1 июн. 2020 г. в 18:40, Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net>:

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Jun 12, 2020, 11:40:37 AM6/12/20

to ontolo...@googlegroups.com

Dear and respected colleagues,

Maybe Alex Skhotin can find some answers here:

https://www.nadin.ws/archives/1499

__ __

Without understanding the foundation of Peirce’s sign theory we will only add new labels to what we still do not understand.

Example: iconic sign. There is nothing in Peirce that justifies this formulation. Iconic refers to a specific form of representation. Other forms are indexical
or symbolic. But there is no such thing as a symbol within Peirce’s semiotics. The representation aspect is one of three aspects of the sign: representation, communication, signification.

Enough of this. Jon Awbrey is trying hard to encourage everyone to read and understand what is and what is not part of Peirce’s semiotics.

__ __

Mihai Nadin

To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/CAFxxROSu9n1OttEjdBk4StQcAaQF_etJLEzKRKMT_axiQmVs9A%40mail.gmail.com.

Jun 12, 2020, 1:02:46 PM6/12/20

to ontolog-forum

Dear Nadin,

This sounds great "In Semiosis (Nadin, 1977), I published the mathematical proof of the

equivalence between the Peircean sign definition and fuzzy automata." Maybe you have a formal definition of the Peircean sign? Could you please put it here?

I was excited that JFS and JA agree that Peircean sign definition is clear, precise and correct. Unfortunately I do not understand it ("brings", "creates"...).

Alex

пт, 12 июн. 2020 г. в 18:40, Nadin, Mihai <na...@utdallas.edu>:

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/DM5PR01MB2298DB97606D2579DC104382DA810%40DM5PR01MB2298.prod.exchangelabs.com.

Jun 13, 2020, 2:16:04 PM6/13/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Sign Relations • Discussion 3

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/13/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-3/

Re: Sign Relations • Definition

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/01/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-definition/

Re: Ontolog Forum

https://groups.google.com/d/topic/ontolog-forum/cpgB6B6UjRs/overview

::: Alex Shkotin

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/ontolog-forum/cpgB6B6UjRs/MY7-3dYGBQAJ

Regarding Peirce's definition of a sign linked above, Alex Shkotin writes:

<QUOTE>

A Sign is unusually active in Peirce's definition:

A (a sign) brings B (interpretant sign) into correspondence with C (object of sign).

Moreover, A determines B or even creates B.

It would be nice to get an example of such an active sign, its interpretant sign, and an object. My point is to make

Dear Alex,

Thanks for your comment. It points to a problem lurking in the wings through all these discussions, so let's nudge it

on stage and throw a better light on it.

I remember my first formal logic prof in college being rather adamant about the difference between a logical formula,

which supposedly bore its “logical form” on its sleeve — I recall the very figure he used — and any of its diverse and

sundry natural language paraphrases. As time wore on I would reconfigure many of the lessons impressed on me in those

days, but that one has stuck, I'm guessing because it goes without saying in mathematical and scientific practice.

This treble clef, to vary the figure — forms as objects, formulas as signs, and paraphrases as interpretant signs — is

the key to a fundamental theme.

A very wide field of discussion opens up at this point. To begin we have the logical jump from forms to formulas and

the semiotic drift from formulas to paraphrases. Further on we'll encounter a range of tensions between formal and

informal contexts of inquiry.

Susan Awbrey and I discussed a related set of issues in our “Conceptual Barriers” paper. Here is how we set up our

treatment of three problematics.

<QUOTE>

• Problematic 1 is the tension that arises along a dimension of increasing formalization in our mental models of the

world, between what we may call the ‘informal context’ of real-world practice and the ‘formal context’ of specialized study.

• Problematic 2 is the difficulty in communication that is created by differing mental models of the world, in other

words, by the tendency among groups of specialists to form internally coherent but externally disparate systems of

mental images.

• Problematic 3 is a special type of communication difficulty that commonly arises between the ‘Two Cultures’ of the

scientific and the humanistic disciplines. A significant part of the problem derives from the differential emphasis

that each group places on its use of symbolic and conceptual systems, limiting itself to either the denotative or the

connotative planes of variation, but seldom integrating the two.

</QUOTE>

Please excuse the sweeping preamble. It wasn't meant to sweep your observations under the rug — it's just so many

discussions here and there on the web in recent days are reminding me of the larger designs beyond my more mundane focus

on brass tacks matters. I'll bring this all back to bear on the everyday life of signs the next chance I get.

Regards,

Jon

References

==========

• Awbrey, S.M., and Awbrey, J.L. (2001),

“Conceptual Barriers to Creating Integrative Universities”,

Organization : The Interdisciplinary Journal of Organization,

Theory, and Society 8(2), Sage Publications, London, UK, pp. 269–284.

Abstract:

http://org.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/2/269

Online:

https://www.academia.edu/1266492/Conceptual_Barriers_to_Creating_Integrative_Universities

• Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75),

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/13/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-3/

Re: Sign Relations • Definition

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/01/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-definition/

Re: Ontolog Forum

https://groups.google.com/d/topic/ontolog-forum/cpgB6B6UjRs/overview

::: Alex Shkotin

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/ontolog-forum/cpgB6B6UjRs/MY7-3dYGBQAJ

Regarding Peirce's definition of a sign linked above, Alex Shkotin writes:

<QUOTE>

A Sign is unusually active in Peirce's definition:

A (a sign) brings B (interpretant sign) into correspondence with C (object of sign).

Moreover, A determines B or even creates B.

the Peirce definition as clear as to be formalized.

</QUOTE>
Dear Alex,

Thanks for your comment. It points to a problem lurking in the wings through all these discussions, so let's nudge it

on stage and throw a better light on it.

I remember my first formal logic prof in college being rather adamant about the difference between a logical formula,

which supposedly bore its “logical form” on its sleeve — I recall the very figure he used — and any of its diverse and

sundry natural language paraphrases. As time wore on I would reconfigure many of the lessons impressed on me in those

days, but that one has stuck, I'm guessing because it goes without saying in mathematical and scientific practice.

This treble clef, to vary the figure — forms as objects, formulas as signs, and paraphrases as interpretant signs — is

the key to a fundamental theme.

A very wide field of discussion opens up at this point. To begin we have the logical jump from forms to formulas and

the semiotic drift from formulas to paraphrases. Further on we'll encounter a range of tensions between formal and

informal contexts of inquiry.

Susan Awbrey and I discussed a related set of issues in our “Conceptual Barriers” paper. Here is how we set up our

treatment of three problematics.

<QUOTE>

• Problematic 1 is the tension that arises along a dimension of increasing formalization in our mental models of the

world, between what we may call the ‘informal context’ of real-world practice and the ‘formal context’ of specialized study.

• Problematic 2 is the difficulty in communication that is created by differing mental models of the world, in other

words, by the tendency among groups of specialists to form internally coherent but externally disparate systems of

mental images.

• Problematic 3 is a special type of communication difficulty that commonly arises between the ‘Two Cultures’ of the

scientific and the humanistic disciplines. A significant part of the problem derives from the differential emphasis

that each group places on its use of symbolic and conceptual systems, limiting itself to either the denotative or the

connotative planes of variation, but seldom integrating the two.

</QUOTE>

Please excuse the sweeping preamble. It wasn't meant to sweep your observations under the rug — it's just so many

discussions here and there on the web in recent days are reminding me of the larger designs beyond my more mundane focus

on brass tacks matters. I'll bring this all back to bear on the everyday life of signs the next chance I get.

Regards,

Jon

References

==========

• Awbrey, S.M., and Awbrey, J.L. (2001),

“Conceptual Barriers to Creating Integrative Universities”,

Organization : The Interdisciplinary Journal of Organization,

Theory, and Society 8(2), Sage Publications, London, UK, pp. 269–284.

Abstract:

http://org.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/2/269

Online:

https://www.academia.edu/1266492/Conceptual_Barriers_to_Creating_Integrative_Universities

• Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75),

in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics

by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.

https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/L75/l75.htm
by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.

Jun 15, 2020, 5:38:00 AM6/15/20

to ontolog-forum

Dear Jon!

Thank you for your luxurious answer. Rem acu tetigisti! Following google-trans definition of paraphrase: express the meaning of (the writer or speaker or something written or spoken) using different words, especially to achieve greater clarity, reformulating Peirce's definition is what I keep in mind.

What do you think about the next paraphrase?

Something physical A is a sign iff there exists something mental B determined or created by A, there is an object C and correspondence R such that B is in R correspondence with C and A is in R correspondence with C.

Or formally,

sign(A:physical) ≝ ∃B:mental ∃C:object ∃R:correspondence

((B determined_by A) or (B created_by A)) and R(B C) and R(A C).

Peirce called B - interpretant_sign.

Formalization just clarifies some implied knowledge and requires Simple English to eliminate many connotations of common-sense English.

I am not sure my paraphrase is correct. Could you please write your expert point of view?

Sincerely yours,

Alex

сб, 13 июн. 2020 г. в 21:16, Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net>:

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Jun 15, 2020, 2:15:22 PM6/15/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Sign Relations ??? Discussion 4

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/15/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-4/

Re: Peirce List

At: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-06/thrd2.html#00026

Re: Edwina Taborsky

At: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-06/msg00101.html

All,

A note on a couple of recurring themes may be useful at this point.

1. Peirce's ???metaphorical argument??? for transforming discussion of interpretive agents, whether individuals or

communities, to discussion of interpretant signs is as follows.

<QUOTE>

I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word implies some proposition or, what is the same thing,

every word, concept, symbol has an equivalent term ??? or one which has become identified with it, ??? in short, has an

interpretant.

Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation. Now a representation is something which stands for

something. ??? A thing cannot stand for something without standing to something for that something. Now, what is this

that a word stands to? Is it a person?

We usually say that the word homme stands to a Frenchman for man. It would be a little more precise to say that it

stands to the Frenchman's mind ??? to his memory. It is still more accurate to say that it addresses a particular

remembrance or image in that memory. And what image, what remembrance? Plainly, the one which is the mental equivalent

of the word homme ??? in short, its interpretant. Whatever a word addresses then or stands to, is its interpretant or

identified symbol. ???

The interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are identical. Hence, since it is of the very essence of

a symbol that it should stand to something, every symbol ??? every word and every conception ??? must have an interpretant ???

or what is the same thing, must have information or implication. (Peirce, CE 1, 466???467).

</QUOTE>

There's additional discussion of this passage at the following locations.

??? Inquiry Driven Systems

https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

??? C'est Moi

https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#C.27est_Moi

??? Information = Comprehension ?? Extension

https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

??? Selection 18

https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension#Selection_18

2. When we employ mathematical models to describe any domain of phenomena, we are always proceeding hypothetically, and

the modality of all mathematics, in its own right, is the possible. That is because mathematical existence is existence

in the moderate sense of ???what's not inconsistent???. In the conventional idiom, ???it's would be's all the way down???, and

the usual scales of modality are flattened down to one mode, to wit, Be ???. It is not until we take the risk of acting

on our abduced model that we encounter genuine brute force Secondness.

References

==========

??? Peirce, C.S. (1902), ???Parts of Carnegie Application??? (L 75),

https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/L75/l75.htm

??? Peirce, C.S., Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition,

Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington

and Indianapolis, IN, 1981???. Cited as (CE volume, page).

Regards,

Jon

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/15/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-4/

Re: Peirce List

At: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-06/thrd2.html#00026

Re: Edwina Taborsky

At: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-06/msg00101.html

All,

A note on a couple of recurring themes may be useful at this point.

1. Peirce's ???metaphorical argument??? for transforming discussion of interpretive agents, whether individuals or

communities, to discussion of interpretant signs is as follows.

<QUOTE>

I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word implies some proposition or, what is the same thing,

every word, concept, symbol has an equivalent term ??? or one which has become identified with it, ??? in short, has an

interpretant.

Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation. Now a representation is something which stands for

something. ??? A thing cannot stand for something without standing to something for that something. Now, what is this

that a word stands to? Is it a person?

We usually say that the word homme stands to a Frenchman for man. It would be a little more precise to say that it

stands to the Frenchman's mind ??? to his memory. It is still more accurate to say that it addresses a particular

remembrance or image in that memory. And what image, what remembrance? Plainly, the one which is the mental equivalent

of the word homme ??? in short, its interpretant. Whatever a word addresses then or stands to, is its interpretant or

identified symbol. ???

The interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are identical. Hence, since it is of the very essence of

a symbol that it should stand to something, every symbol ??? every word and every conception ??? must have an interpretant ???

or what is the same thing, must have information or implication. (Peirce, CE 1, 466???467).

</QUOTE>

There's additional discussion of this passage at the following locations.

??? Inquiry Driven Systems

https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

??? C'est Moi

https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#C.27est_Moi

??? Information = Comprehension ?? Extension

https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

??? Selection 18

https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension#Selection_18

2. When we employ mathematical models to describe any domain of phenomena, we are always proceeding hypothetically, and

the modality of all mathematics, in its own right, is the possible. That is because mathematical existence is existence

in the moderate sense of ???what's not inconsistent???. In the conventional idiom, ???it's would be's all the way down???, and

the usual scales of modality are flattened down to one mode, to wit, Be ???. It is not until we take the risk of acting

on our abduced model that we encounter genuine brute force Secondness.

References

==========

??? Peirce, C.S. (1902), ???Parts of Carnegie Application??? (L 75),

in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics

by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13???73.
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/L75/l75.htm

??? Peirce, C.S., Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition,

Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington

and Indianapolis, IN, 1981???. Cited as (CE volume, page).

Regards,

Jon

Jun 15, 2020, 5:25:20 PM6/15/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

[Something along the line is screwing up unicode again. I'll try this way.]

[As always, there's a fully formatted version on my blog at the link below.]

Cf: Sign Relations : Discussion 3

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/13/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-3/

"interpretant".

Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation. Now a representation is something which stands for

something. ... A thing cannot stand for something without standing "to" something "for" that something. Now, what is

this that a word stands "to"? Is it a person?

We usually say that the word "homme" stands to a Frenchman for "man". It would be a little more precise to say that it

stands to the Frenchman's mind -- to his memory. It is still more accurate to say that it addresses a particular

remembrance or image in that memory. And what "image", what remembrance? Plainly, the one which is the mental

equivalent of the word "homme" -- in short, its interpretant. Whatever a word addresses then or "stands to", is its

interpretant or identified symbol. ...

The interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are identical. Hence, since it is of the very essence of

a symbol that it should stand "to" something, every symbol -- every "word" and every "conception" -- must have an

interpretant -- or what is the same thing, must have information or implication. (Peirce, CE 1, 466–467).

</QUOTE>

There's additional discussion of this passage at the following locations.

Inquiry Driven Systems : C'est Moi

https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#C.27est_Moi

Information = Comprehension × Extension : Selection 18

https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

of all mathematics, in its own right, is "the possible". That is because

mathematical existence is existence in the moderate sense of "whatever's

not inconsistent". In the idiom, "It's would-be's all the way down."

In effect the usual scales of modality are flattened down to one mode,

to wit, Be flat. It is not until we take the risk of acting on our

* Peirce, C.S., Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition,

[As always, there's a fully formatted version on my blog at the link below.]

Cf: Sign Relations : Discussion 3

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/13/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-3/

A note on a couple of recurring themes may be useful at this point.

1. Peirce's "metaphorical argument" for transforming discussion
of interpretive agents, whether individuals or communities,

to discussion of interpretant signs is as follows.

<QUOTE>

I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word implies some proposition or, what is the same thing,

every word, concept, symbol has an equivalent term -- or one which has become identified with it, -- in short, has an
to discussion of interpretant signs is as follows.

<QUOTE>

I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word implies some proposition or, what is the same thing,

"interpretant".

Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation. Now a representation is something which stands for

this that a word stands "to"? Is it a person?

We usually say that the word "homme" stands to a Frenchman for "man". It would be a little more precise to say that it

stands to the Frenchman's mind -- to his memory. It is still more accurate to say that it addresses a particular

remembrance or image in that memory. And what "image", what remembrance? Plainly, the one which is the mental

equivalent of the word "homme" -- in short, its interpretant. Whatever a word addresses then or "stands to", is its

interpretant or identified symbol. ...

The interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are identical. Hence, since it is of the very essence of

interpretant -- or what is the same thing, must have information or implication. (Peirce, CE 1, 466–467).

</QUOTE>

There's additional discussion of this passage at the following locations.

https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#C.27est_Moi

Information = Comprehension × Extension : Selection 18

https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension#Selection_18

2. When we employ mathematical models to describe any domain of phenomena,

we are always proceeding hypothetically and tentatively, and the modality
2. When we employ mathematical models to describe any domain of phenomena,

of all mathematics, in its own right, is "the possible". That is because

mathematical existence is existence in the moderate sense of "whatever's

not inconsistent". In the idiom, "It's would-be's all the way down."

In effect the usual scales of modality are flattened down to one mode,

to wit, Be flat. It is not until we take the risk of acting on our

abduced model that we encounter genuine brute force Secondness.

References

==========

* Peirce, C.S. (1902), "Parts of Carnegie Application" (L 75),
References

==========

in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics

by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13-73.
* Peirce, C.S., Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition,

Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington

and Indianapolis, IN, 1981-. Cited as (CE volume, page).
Jun 16, 2020, 8:12:38 AM6/16/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Sign Relations • Discussion 5

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/16/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-5/

Re: Sign Relations • Discussion 4

At: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/15/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-4/

The transformative idea here is not the convertibility of term logic, propositional logic, and monadic predicate logic

-- which has been a commonplace of logic since Aristotle, if not in those words, and only got forgot during the false

subtleties of the Frege-Russell tradition, though even Quine was woke enough in time to write a nice essay on it -- but

rather the transformation from interpreter models to interpretant models. The latter are what Peirce and all in his

train need for constructing abstract formal theories neutral on psychologism, materialism, biologism, and various other

all too stolid -isms.

There's more discussion of Peirce's passage to the interpretant at the following locations.

* Inquiry Driven Systems

( https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview )

* C'est Moi

( https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#C.27est_Moi )

* Information = Comprehension × Extension

( https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension )

* Selection 18

( https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension#Selection_18 )

Regards,

Jon

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/16/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-5/

Re: Sign Relations • Discussion 4

At: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/15/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-4/

The transformative idea here is not the convertibility of term logic, propositional logic, and monadic predicate logic

-- which has been a commonplace of logic since Aristotle, if not in those words, and only got forgot during the false

subtleties of the Frege-Russell tradition, though even Quine was woke enough in time to write a nice essay on it -- but

rather the transformation from interpreter models to interpretant models. The latter are what Peirce and all in his

train need for constructing abstract formal theories neutral on psychologism, materialism, biologism, and various other

all too stolid -isms.

There's more discussion of Peirce's passage to the interpretant at the following locations.

* Inquiry Driven Systems

( https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview )

* C'est Moi

( https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#C.27est_Moi )

* Information = Comprehension × Extension

( https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension )

* Selection 18

( https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension#Selection_18 )

Regards,

Jon

Jun 16, 2020, 2:56:30 PM6/16/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Sign Relations • Examples

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/16/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-examples/

Because the examples to follow have been artificially constructed to be as simple as possible, their detailed

elaboration can run the risk of trivializing the whole theory of sign relations. Despite their simplicity, however,

these examples have subtleties of their own, and their careful treatment will serve to illustrate many important issues

in the general theory of signs.

Imagine a discussion between two people, Ann and Bob, and attend only to the aspects of their interpretive practice

involving the use of the following nouns and pronouns:

"Ann", "Bob", "I", "you".

* The "object domain" of their discussion is the set of two people {Ann, Bob}.

* The "sign domain" of their discussion is the set of four signs {"Ann", "Bob", "I", "you"}.

Ann and Bob are not only the passive objects of linguistic references but also the active interpreters of the language

they use. The "system of interpretation" (SOI) associated with each language user can be represented in the form of an

individual three-place relation known as the "sign relation" of that interpreter.

In terms of its set-theoretic extension, a sign relation L is a subset of a cartesian product O x S x I. The three sets

O, S, I are known as the "object domain", the "sign domain", and the "interpretant domain", respectively, of the sign

relation L as a subset of O x S x I.

Broadly speaking, the three domains of a sign relation may be any sets at all but the types of sign relations

contemplated in formal settings are usually constrained to having I as a subset of S. In that case it becomes

convenient to lump signs and interpretants together into a single class called the "sign system" or the "syntactic

domain". In the forthcoming examples S and I are identical as sets, so the same elements manifest themselves in two

different roles of the sign relations in question.

When it becomes necessary to refer to the whole set of objects and signs in the union of the domains O, S, I for a given

sign relation L, we will call this set the "World of L" and write W = W_L = O ∪ S ∪ I.

To facilitate an interest in the formal structures of sign relations and to keep notations as uncluttered as possible as

the examples become more complicated, it serves to introduce the following general notations:

* O = Object Domain

* S = Sign Domain

* I = Interpretant Domain

Introducing a few abbreviations for use in this Example, we have the following data:

* O = {Ann, Bob} = {A, B}

* S = {"Ann", "Bob", "I", "you"} = {"A", "B", "i", "u"}

* I = {"Ann", "Bob", "I", "you"} = {"A", "B", "i", "u"}

In the present example, S = I = Syntactic Domain.

Tables 1a and 1b show the sign relations associated with the interpreters A and B, respectively. In this arrangement

the rows of each Table list the ordered triples of the form (o, s, i) belonging to the corresponding sign relations,

L_A, L_B as subsets of O x S x I.

Sign Relation Tables L_A and L_B

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/sign-relation-twin-tables-la-lb.png

These Tables codify a rudimentary level of interpretive practice for the agents A and B and provide a basis for

formalizing the initial semantics appropriate to their common syntactic domain. Each row of a Table names an object and

two co-referent signs, making up an ordered triple of the form (o, s, i) called an "elementary relation", that is, one

element of the relation's set-theoretic extension.

Already in this elementary context, there are several different meanings that might attach to the project of a formal

semiotics, or a formal theory of meaning for signs. In the process of discussing these alternatives, it is useful to

introduce a few terms occasionally used in the philosophy of language to point out the needed distinctions. That is the

task we'll turn to next.

Regards,

Jon

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/16/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-examples/

Because the examples to follow have been artificially constructed to be as simple as possible, their detailed

elaboration can run the risk of trivializing the whole theory of sign relations. Despite their simplicity, however,

these examples have subtleties of their own, and their careful treatment will serve to illustrate many important issues

in the general theory of signs.

Imagine a discussion between two people, Ann and Bob, and attend only to the aspects of their interpretive practice

involving the use of the following nouns and pronouns:

"Ann", "Bob", "I", "you".

* The "object domain" of their discussion is the set of two people {Ann, Bob}.

* The "sign domain" of their discussion is the set of four signs {"Ann", "Bob", "I", "you"}.

Ann and Bob are not only the passive objects of linguistic references but also the active interpreters of the language

they use. The "system of interpretation" (SOI) associated with each language user can be represented in the form of an

individual three-place relation known as the "sign relation" of that interpreter.

In terms of its set-theoretic extension, a sign relation L is a subset of a cartesian product O x S x I. The three sets

O, S, I are known as the "object domain", the "sign domain", and the "interpretant domain", respectively, of the sign

relation L as a subset of O x S x I.

Broadly speaking, the three domains of a sign relation may be any sets at all but the types of sign relations

contemplated in formal settings are usually constrained to having I as a subset of S. In that case it becomes

convenient to lump signs and interpretants together into a single class called the "sign system" or the "syntactic

domain". In the forthcoming examples S and I are identical as sets, so the same elements manifest themselves in two

different roles of the sign relations in question.

When it becomes necessary to refer to the whole set of objects and signs in the union of the domains O, S, I for a given

sign relation L, we will call this set the "World of L" and write W = W_L = O ∪ S ∪ I.

To facilitate an interest in the formal structures of sign relations and to keep notations as uncluttered as possible as

the examples become more complicated, it serves to introduce the following general notations:

* O = Object Domain

* S = Sign Domain

* I = Interpretant Domain

Introducing a few abbreviations for use in this Example, we have the following data:

* O = {Ann, Bob} = {A, B}

* S = {"Ann", "Bob", "I", "you"} = {"A", "B", "i", "u"}

* I = {"Ann", "Bob", "I", "you"} = {"A", "B", "i", "u"}

In the present example, S = I = Syntactic Domain.

Tables 1a and 1b show the sign relations associated with the interpreters A and B, respectively. In this arrangement

the rows of each Table list the ordered triples of the form (o, s, i) belonging to the corresponding sign relations,

L_A, L_B as subsets of O x S x I.

Sign Relation Tables L_A and L_B

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/sign-relation-twin-tables-la-lb.png

These Tables codify a rudimentary level of interpretive practice for the agents A and B and provide a basis for

formalizing the initial semantics appropriate to their common syntactic domain. Each row of a Table names an object and

two co-referent signs, making up an ordered triple of the form (o, s, i) called an "elementary relation", that is, one

element of the relation's set-theoretic extension.

Already in this elementary context, there are several different meanings that might attach to the project of a formal

semiotics, or a formal theory of meaning for signs. In the process of discussing these alternatives, it is useful to

introduce a few terms occasionally used in the philosophy of language to point out the needed distinctions. That is the

task we'll turn to next.

Regards,

Jon

Jun 21, 2020, 9:33:03 AM6/21/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Sign Relations • Dyadic Aspects

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/21/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-dyadic-aspects/

We take up the dyadic aspects of triadic relations ...

For an arbitrary triadic relation L ⊆ O × S × I, whether it is a sign relation or not, there are six dyadic relations

obtained by projecting L on one of the planes of the OSI-space O × S × I. The six dyadic projections of a triadic

relation L are defined and notated as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Dyadic Aspects of Triadic Relations

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/dyadic-projections-of-triadic-relations.png

By way of unpacking the set-theoretic notation, here is what the first definition says in ordinary language.

The dyadic relation resulting from the projection of L on the OS-plane O × S is written briefly as L_OS or written more

fully as proj_OS (L) and is defined as the set of all ordered pairs (o, s) in the cartesian product O × S for which

there exists an ordered triple (o, s, i) in L for some interpretant i in the interpretant domain I.

In the case where L is a sign relation, which it becomes by satisfying one of the definitions of a sign relation, some

of the dyadic aspects of L can be recognized as formalizing aspects of sign meaning which have received their share of

attention from students of signs over the centuries, and thus they can be associated with traditional concepts and

terminology. Of course, traditions may vary as to the precise formation and usage of such concepts and terms. Other

aspects of meaning have not received their fair share of attention, and thus remain anonymous on the contemporary scene

of sign studies.

References

==========

• Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75),

• Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995),

“Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”,

Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.

https://web.archive.org/web/20001210162300/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html

https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052

https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Resources

=========

• Semeiotic ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Semeiotic )

• Logic Syllabus ( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/logic-syllabus/ )

Regards,

Jon

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/21/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-dyadic-aspects/

We take up the dyadic aspects of triadic relations ...

For an arbitrary triadic relation L ⊆ O × S × I, whether it is a sign relation or not, there are six dyadic relations

obtained by projecting L on one of the planes of the OSI-space O × S × I. The six dyadic projections of a triadic

relation L are defined and notated as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Dyadic Aspects of Triadic Relations

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/dyadic-projections-of-triadic-relations.png

By way of unpacking the set-theoretic notation, here is what the first definition says in ordinary language.

The dyadic relation resulting from the projection of L on the OS-plane O × S is written briefly as L_OS or written more

fully as proj_OS (L) and is defined as the set of all ordered pairs (o, s) in the cartesian product O × S for which

there exists an ordered triple (o, s, i) in L for some interpretant i in the interpretant domain I.

In the case where L is a sign relation, which it becomes by satisfying one of the definitions of a sign relation, some

of the dyadic aspects of L can be recognized as formalizing aspects of sign meaning which have received their share of

attention from students of signs over the centuries, and thus they can be associated with traditional concepts and

terminology. Of course, traditions may vary as to the precise formation and usage of such concepts and terms. Other

aspects of meaning have not received their fair share of attention, and thus remain anonymous on the contemporary scene

of sign studies.

References

==========

• Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75),

in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics

by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.

https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/L75/l75.htm
by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.

• Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995),

“Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”,

Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.

https://web.archive.org/web/20001210162300/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html

https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052

https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Resources

=========

• Semeiotic ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Semeiotic )

• Logic Syllabus ( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/logic-syllabus/ )

• Sign Relations ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation )

• Triadic Relations ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Triadic_relation )

* Relation Theory ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Relation_theory )
• Triadic Relations ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Triadic_relation )

Regards,

Jon

Jun 22, 2020, 11:20:19 AM6/22/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Sign Relations • Discussion 6

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/22/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-6/

Re: Alex Shkotin

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/ontolog-forum/cpgB6B6UjRs/kpi3Zf7uBQAJ

Dear Alex,

We all love natural languages, our native tongues, but each one has a mind of its own and a habit of saying both more

and less and something other than the meanings we intend at the moment of utterance. So maybe it's a love-hate

relationship, or at least a Liebeskampf.

Whether we are endowed with an inborn faculty for language, even a genetic blueprint for selected species of languages

on a par with our naturally evolved motor and sense organs, or whether we acquire our initial languages from scratch,

every natural language worth its salt preserves a rich heritage of biological and cultural meanings its users will

assimilate, consciously or otherwise. I would not say “resistance is futile” but habits of thought built into our first

and second natures demand persistent habits of critical reflection to break.

We do use natural language paraphrases to “express the meaning of [a logical formula] using different words, especially

to achieve greater clarity” and up to a point they serve that end. But there's a catch. If a natural language

paraphrase could express the precise meaning of a logical formula with greater clarity, what would be the use of the

formula?

Well, that's the beginning of a post I started on the spectrum of formality from form to formal object to formula to

paraphrase. But I decided to let it simmer for another day. Now that we have a workbench stocked with concrete

examples of triadic relations and sign relations we might as well use them to illustrate the abstractions while keeping

our feet on more solid ground.

I'll turn to that task next.

Regards,

Jon

At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/22/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-6/

Re: Alex Shkotin

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/ontolog-forum/cpgB6B6UjRs/kpi3Zf7uBQAJ

Dear Alex,

We all love natural languages, our native tongues, but each one has a mind of its own and a habit of saying both more

and less and something other than the meanings we intend at the moment of utterance. So maybe it's a love-hate

relationship, or at least a Liebeskampf.

Whether we are endowed with an inborn faculty for language, even a genetic blueprint for selected species of languages

on a par with our naturally evolved motor and sense organs, or whether we acquire our initial languages from scratch,

every natural language worth its salt preserves a rich heritage of biological and cultural meanings its users will

assimilate, consciously or otherwise. I would not say “resistance is futile” but habits of thought built into our first

and second natures demand persistent habits of critical reflection to break.

We do use natural language paraphrases to “express the meaning of [a logical formula] using different words, especially

to achieve greater clarity” and up to a point they serve that end. But there's a catch. If a natural language

paraphrase could express the precise meaning of a logical formula with greater clarity, what would be the use of the

formula?

Well, that's the beginning of a post I started on the spectrum of formality from form to formal object to formula to

paraphrase. But I decided to let it simmer for another day. Now that we have a workbench stocked with concrete

examples of triadic relations and sign relations we might as well use them to illustrate the abstractions while keeping

our feet on more solid ground.

I'll turn to that task next.

Regards,

Jon

Jun 23, 2020, 10:15:45 AM6/23/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Sign Relations • Denotation

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/23/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-denotation/

One aspect of a sign's complete meaning concerns the reference a sign has to its objects, which objects are collectively

known as the “denotation” of the sign. In the pragmatic theory of sign relations, denotative references fall within the

projection of the sign relation on the plane spanned by its object domain and its sign domain.

The dyadic relation making up the “denotative”, “referent”, or “semantic” aspect of a sign relation L is notated as

Den(L). Information about the denotative aspect of meaning is obtained from L by taking its “projection” on the

object-sign plane. We may visualize this as the “shadow” L casts on the 2-dimensional space whose axes are the object

domain O and the sign domain S. The denotative component of a sign relation L, alternatively written in any of forms,

proj_OS L, L_OS, proj_12 L, and L_12, is defined as follows.

• Den(L) = proj_OS L = {(o, s) ∈ O × S : (o, s, i) ∈ L for some i ∈ I}.

Tables 3a and 3b show the denotative components of the sign relations

associated with the interpreters A and B, respectively. The rows

of each Table list the ordered pairs (o, s) in the corresponding

projections, Den(L_A), Den(L_B) ⊆ O × S.

Tables 3a and 3b. Denotative Components Den(L_A) and Den(L_B)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sign-relation-twin-tables-den-la-den-lb.png

Looking to the denotative aspects of L_A and L_B,

various rows of the Tables specify, for example,

that A uses “i” to denote A and “u” to denote B,

while B uses “i” to denote B and “u” to denote A.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/23/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-denotation/

One aspect of a sign's complete meaning concerns the reference a sign has to its objects, which objects are collectively

known as the “denotation” of the sign. In the pragmatic theory of sign relations, denotative references fall within the

projection of the sign relation on the plane spanned by its object domain and its sign domain.

The dyadic relation making up the “denotative”, “referent”, or “semantic” aspect of a sign relation L is notated as

Den(L). Information about the denotative aspect of meaning is obtained from L by taking its “projection” on the

object-sign plane. We may visualize this as the “shadow” L casts on the 2-dimensional space whose axes are the object

domain O and the sign domain S. The denotative component of a sign relation L, alternatively written in any of forms,

proj_OS L, L_OS, proj_12 L, and L_12, is defined as follows.

• Den(L) = proj_OS L = {(o, s) ∈ O × S : (o, s, i) ∈ L for some i ∈ I}.

Tables 3a and 3b show the denotative components of the sign relations

associated with the interpreters A and B, respectively. The rows

of each Table list the ordered pairs (o, s) in the corresponding

projections, Den(L_A), Den(L_B) ⊆ O × S.

Tables 3a and 3b. Denotative Components Den(L_A) and Den(L_B)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sign-relation-twin-tables-den-la-den-lb.png

Looking to the denotative aspects of L_A and L_B,

various rows of the Tables specify, for example,

that A uses “i” to denote A and “u” to denote B,

while B uses “i” to denote B and “u” to denote A.

Regards,

Jon

Jun 24, 2020, 4:27:56 AM6/24/20

to ontolog-forum, Cybernetic Communications, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Dear Jon,

My question is closed and practical: there is a paraphrase of Peirce definition of sign, does it mean the same? First what we get from math is that different formulae have the same meaning.

And this is a
paraphrase under consideration: "Something physical A is a sign iff there exists something mental B determined or created by A, there is an object C and correspondence R such that B is in R correspondence with C and A is in R correspondence with C.

Peirce called B - interpretant_sign."

My point is that this particular paraphrase we can formalize easily as

sign(A:physical) ≝ ∃B:mental ∃C:object ∃R:correspondence

((B determined_by A) or (B created_by A)) and R(B C) and R(A C).

What is the profit of formalization? Computing, as Leibniz taught us:-)

Regards,

Alex

пн, 22 июн. 2020 г. в 18:20, Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net>:

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Jun 24, 2020, 11:15:15 AM6/24/20

to Cybernetic Communications, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Sign Relations • Connotation

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/24/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-connotation/

Another aspect of a sign's complete meaning concerns the reference a sign has to its interpretants, which interpretants

are collectively known as the “connotation” of the sign. In the pragmatic theory of sign relations, connotative

references fall within the projection of the sign relation on the plane spanned by its sign domain and its interpretant

domain.

In the full theory of sign relations the connotative aspect of meaning includes the links a sign has to affects,

concepts, ideas, impressions, intentions, and the whole realm of an interpretive agent's mental states and allied

activities, broadly encompassing intellectual associations, emotional impressions, motivational impulses, and real

conduct. Taken at the full, in the natural setting of semiotic phenomena, this complex system of references is unlikely

ever to find itself mapped in much detail, much less completely formalized, but the tangible warp of its accumulated

mass is commonly alluded to as the connotative import of language.

Formally speaking, however, the connotative aspect of meaning presents no additional difficulty. The dyadic relation

making up the connotative aspect of a sign relation L is notated as Con(L). Information about the connotative aspect of

meaning is obtained from L by taking its projection on the sign-interpretant plane. We may visualize this as the

“shadow” L casts on the 2-dimensional space whose axes are the sign domain S and the interpretant domain I. The

connotative component of a sign relation L, alternatively written in any of forms, proj_SI L, L_SI, proj_23 L, and L_23,

is defined as follows.

• Con(L) = proj_SI L = {(s, i) ∈ S × I : (o, s, i) ∈ L for some o ∈ O}.

Tables 4a and 4b show the connotative components of the sign relations

projections, Con(L_A), Con(L_B) ⊆ S × I.

Tables 4a and 4b. Connotative Components Con(L_A) and Con(L_B)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sign-relation-twin-tables-con-la-con-lb.png

References

==========

• Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75),

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/24/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-connotation/

Another aspect of a sign's complete meaning concerns the reference a sign has to its interpretants, which interpretants

are collectively known as the “connotation” of the sign. In the pragmatic theory of sign relations, connotative

references fall within the projection of the sign relation on the plane spanned by its sign domain and its interpretant

domain.

In the full theory of sign relations the connotative aspect of meaning includes the links a sign has to affects,

concepts, ideas, impressions, intentions, and the whole realm of an interpretive agent's mental states and allied

activities, broadly encompassing intellectual associations, emotional impressions, motivational impulses, and real

conduct. Taken at the full, in the natural setting of semiotic phenomena, this complex system of references is unlikely

ever to find itself mapped in much detail, much less completely formalized, but the tangible warp of its accumulated

mass is commonly alluded to as the connotative import of language.

Formally speaking, however, the connotative aspect of meaning presents no additional difficulty. The dyadic relation

making up the connotative aspect of a sign relation L is notated as Con(L). Information about the connotative aspect of

meaning is obtained from L by taking its projection on the sign-interpretant plane. We may visualize this as the

“shadow” L casts on the 2-dimensional space whose axes are the sign domain S and the interpretant domain I. The

connotative component of a sign relation L, alternatively written in any of forms, proj_SI L, L_SI, proj_23 L, and L_23,

is defined as follows.

• Con(L) = proj_SI L = {(s, i) ∈ S × I : (o, s, i) ∈ L for some o ∈ O}.

Tables 4a and 4b show the connotative components of the sign relations

associated with the interpreters A and B, respectively. The rows

of each Table list the ordered pairs (s, i) in the corresponding
projections, Con(L_A), Con(L_B) ⊆ S × I.

Tables 4a and 4b. Connotative Components Con(L_A) and Con(L_B)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sign-relation-twin-tables-con-la-con-lb.png

References

==========

• Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75),

in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics

by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.

by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.

https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/L75/l75.htm

• Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995),

“Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”,

Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.

https://web.archive.org/web/20001210162300/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html

https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052

https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

• Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995),

“Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”,

Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.

https://web.archive.org/web/20001210162300/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html

https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052

https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Resources

=========

• Semeiotic ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Semeiotic )

• Logic Syllabus ( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/logic-syllabus/ )

=========

• Semeiotic ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Semeiotic )

• Logic Syllabus ( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/logic-syllabus/ )