(RU)Vera Shumilina's presentation, "C.S. Peirce's Theory of Scientific Explanation. From Three Types of Reasoning to a Typology of Scientific Explanations"
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Alex Shkotin
Dec 17, 2025, 2:24:58 AM (5 days ago) Dec 17
to ontolog-forum
I think Pierce fans will find it interesting. You can even attend. But in Russian. I can't resist providing a rough translation into English using Google Translator.
Alex
RAW DATA
The 107th session of the Scientific and Theoretical Seminar "Formal Philosophy" will take place on December 17 at 6:10 PM.
Vera Shumilina
will present a paper entitled "C.S. Peirce's Theory of Scientific Explanation: From Three Types of Reasoning to a Typology of Scientific Explanations"
Abstract
The problem of the existence (and construction) of a universally unified theory of scientific explanation is considered closed (Woodward & Ross, 2021). Only a few decades have passed since its formulation by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), when the existing pluralism of theories across various disciplines (Mancosu et al., 2023; Machamer et al., 2000) called into question the possibility of a single theory of scientific explanation applicable to all disciplines, rather than one focused on law-based physical explanations.
The ongoing debate within the epistemology of scientific explanation between epistemic theories, including unificationism (Friedman, 1974; Kitcher, 1981, 1989), the covering laws model (Hempel, 1965), and the pragmatic approach (van Fraassen, 1980), and theories with ontic, primarily causal, models (Salmon, 1984; Woodward, 2003), has demonstrated the irrelevance of normative approaches to theories of scientific explanation.
The situation in the philosophy of science that emerged by the end of the 20th century was further aggravated by the methodological break with logical theories of explanation (Douven, 2025). This paper will present a theory that allows for resolving the contradictions between the logical, methodological, and philosophical-scientific approaches to the theory of scientific explanation based on a reconstructed theory of scientific explanation by C.S. Peirce. This, in turn, is based on a typology of reasoning as stages of scientific research.
The reconstruction focuses on meeting epistemological requirements. It is shown that the theory meets the requirements of both the epistemic (connection between explanation and prediction, justification of explanations) and the ontic (accounting for various dependency relationships in explanations, ensuring understanding) approaches.
Vera Shumilina
will present a paper entitled "C.S. Peirce's Theory of Scientific Explanation: From Three Types of Reasoning to a Typology of Scientific Explanations"
Abstract
The problem of the existence (and construction) of a universally unified theory of scientific explanation is considered closed (Woodward & Ross, 2021). Only a few decades have passed since its formulation by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), when the existing pluralism of theories across various disciplines (Mancosu et al., 2023; Machamer et al., 2000) called into question the possibility of a single theory of scientific explanation applicable to all disciplines, rather than one focused on law-based physical explanations.
The ongoing debate within the epistemology of scientific explanation between epistemic theories, including unificationism (Friedman, 1974; Kitcher, 1981, 1989), the covering laws model (Hempel, 1965), and the pragmatic approach (van Fraassen, 1980), and theories with ontic, primarily causal, models (Salmon, 1984; Woodward, 2003), has demonstrated the irrelevance of normative approaches to theories of scientific explanation.
The situation in the philosophy of science that emerged by the end of the 20th century was further aggravated by the methodological break with logical theories of explanation (Douven, 2025). This paper will present a theory that allows for resolving the contradictions between the logical, methodological, and philosophical-scientific approaches to the theory of scientific explanation based on a reconstructed theory of scientific explanation by C.S. Peirce. This, in turn, is based on a typology of reasoning as stages of scientific research.
The reconstruction focuses on meeting epistemological requirements. It is shown that the theory meets the requirements of both the epistemic (connection between explanation and prediction, justification of explanations) and the ontic (accounting for various dependency relationships in explanations, ensuring understanding) approaches.
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