Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)

[Jon Awbrey]

Ontolog Forum, Systems Science, Structural Modeling —

Cf: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/21/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%cf%88/

I remember it was back in '76 when I began to notice a subtle shift of
focus in the computer science journals I was reading, from discussing X
to discussing Information About X, or X → Info(X) as I came to notate it.
I suppose this small arc of revolution had been building for years but it
struck me as crossing a threshold to a more explicit, self-conscious stage
about that time.

And thereby hangs a number of tales ...

Jon

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[Jon Awbrey]

Ken,

Thanks for the comment. It made me realize that the notation Info(X) is
probably not the best. It tends to mislead us into thinking we already
have X in hand, in other words, that we already have perfect information
about X and are merely abstracting Info(X) as some derivative of it.
But that is not the sort of situation we are concerned with here.

It might be better to say that Info is all the information we have at
a given moment of investigation and X abstracts the portion of Info
that has to do with X. That might lead us to notate it as X(Info).
This brings to mind the way we speak of observables in physics,
as operators on the total state or wave function or whatever.

If I had to concoct an informal linguistic example — which I'd do solely by way
of rough analogy to the formal mathematical situations we'd have much hope of
resolving in our lifetimes — I'd say the sorts of X we're facing here are what
used to be called “definite descriptions” like “Desdemona's infidelity” or
“Manafort's guilt on the 10 mistried counts”.

In those sorts of situations, discussed to death in years gone by,
what a modicum of pragmatic-semiotic insight adds to the mix is that
all descriptions are indefinite to some degree, all syntax is lax to
some extent.

There are, as usual, clear foresights of that insight in Peirce.
And that is what I'll be getting around to prescently.

Regards,

Jon

On 8/21/2018 6:10 PM, Ken Lloyd wrote:
> When speaking of most things, say x, we are indirectly referencing
> all the meta-levels of x - meta signifying beyond which can include
> higher levels of abstraction as well as lower levels of realizations.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: syss...@googlegroups.com [mailto:syss...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
> Sent: Tuesday, August 21, 2018 1:41 PM
> To: Ontolog Forum @ GG <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>;
> SysSciWG <syss...@googlegroups.com>;
> Structural Modeling <structura...@googlegroups.com>
> Subject: [SysSciWG] Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)
>
> Cf: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/21/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%cf%88/
>
> Ontologists, Systers, Modelers,

[Jon Awbrey]

Systems Science, Structural Modeling,

Here's my blog rehash of a couple earlier comments on the Ontolog list that
may help to explain my use of the term "pragmatic semiotic information".
I forgot that I hadn't shared those comments here, so sorry about that.

Inquiry Driven Systems • Comment 5
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/19/inquiry-driven-systems-%e2%80%a2-comment-5/

Re: Ontolog Forum • Bruce Schuman
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/ontolog-forum/vo8CmL8jt30/2zAl5v_zDQAJ

I would call that the pragmatic-semiotic point of view
and not find anything shocking in it.

One can find earlier foreshadowings — Plato’s Cratylus and the Stoic lekton
are often mentioned in this connection — but the clearest precursor of the
pragmatic-semiotic perspective occurs in Aristotle’s recognition of the
triadic sign relation, most succinctly in his treatise On Interpretation.

Here’s the little essay Susan Awbrey and I wrote on that, tracing
the continuities of pragmatic semiotics from Aristotle up through
Peirce and Dewey and teasing out the intimate relationship between
the theory of signs and the theory of inquiry.

Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry
https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Regards,

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Interesting section of your paper:

"We discuss the role of the interpreter in the activity of interpretation. 

Aristotle assumes that objects and impressions in the mind are constant across all interpreters. 

Confronting this assumption with the needs of hermeneutic and educational practice, we argue that a comparative 

and developmental understanding of interpreters is required. This in turn demands the more complete theory of 

signs envisioned by Peirce and Dewey, which continues to be developed in the semiotic and pragmatic traditions."

We are working on a paper that addresses different kinds of languages, each that have a 

different type of interpreter.  The augmented model-exchange isomorphism (AMEI) provides a

framework in which the semantics of a given natural language relationship may be evaluated and 

explored to identify a common isomorphic expression across all thee language types.

The ability to convert a informal language (natural language) into a formal language in an isomorphic

manner is very valuable for a number of reasons.

At this time we are addressing three natural language relationships that are at the heart of systems science and systems engineering.  These three natural language relationships are:

  1) Part-of  (Necessary to discuss a system with more than one part, part <=> whole)

  2) Precedes (Necessary to discuss a time based process, like creating a system)

  3) Influence (Necessary for the evaluation of system interaction.)

The plan is to have the paper up on Research Gate in a  few days and present the paper contents 

at the September 1st Structural Modeling Project video conference at 9 AM Pacific time.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

[Jon Awbrey]

I've been following the discussion on the SysSci list that asks
the question, “What Is Systems Science?”. I haven't found the
free time to join in yet but it is very interesting to me on
account of the fact my work on Inquiry Driven Systems for the
last 30 years or so can be seen to ask the converse question,
“How Is Science A (Cybernetic or Dynamic) System?”.

The idea that the sciences operate as (some order of) cybernetic systems
is of course nothing new but there is a lot of work to do detailing that
insight and especially building intelligent software systems that assist
scientific research by availing themselves of that task and user model.

Regards,

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Many interesting view points and aspects associated with the methods, goals and artifacts associated with science.

Our next focus is the refactoring and refinement of the existing structural modeling software.

Things are moving along slowly, but moving in the right direction.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

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Joe Simpson

“Reasonable people adapt themselves to the world. 

Unreasonable people attempt to adapt the world to themselves. 

All progress, therefore, depends on unreasonable people.”

George Bernard Shaw

[John F Sowa]

On 9/2/2018 9:54 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> I've been following the discussion on the SysSci list that asks
> the question, “What Is Systems Science?”.

Systems science, like every other science, is applied semiotic.
The primary difference between the sciences is the subject matter
to which they are applied.

The reason for differences in terminology is historical and
egotistical. The names that are given to things depend on changing
circumstances, historical accidents, popular fads, and egotistical
desires by people who want to claim that they made a novel discovery.

For example, where are the boundary lines between psychiatry,
psychology, behavioral science, cognitive science, social science,
sociology, educational psychology, and anthropology?

Answer: It all depends on which textbook you use.

However, there is one basic distinction: all sciences, whether
the scientists know it or not, are versions of applied mathematics.

Fundamental reason: Pure mathematics does not depend on any empirical
observation. Every other subject, including so-called common sense,
use math (formal or informal) to analyze some observable phenomena.

See the attached cspsci.gif. Note that formal logic and formal
semiotic are two names for the same branch of pure mathematics.
The distinction is whether you call logic a subset of semiotic or
semiotic a subset of logic -- if undecided, flip a coin.

John

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Interesting point of view and approach.

Another interesting approach was taken by John Warfield.

John's approach explored the minimal, necessary context needed to support the activity of science.  The necessary contextual, environmental components are:

 1) Human beings (more than one)

 2) Language

 3) Reasoning through relationships

 4) Archival representation of artifacts.

These four components are given as the "Universal Priors to Science," in Chapter 2 of "A Science of Generic Design."

The ability of a given group of human beings to clearly communicate and reason has a significant impact on the development of any type of science.

It may be that expending effort on refining and developing these contextual components will have a great impact on the quality and quantity of science produced.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 7:20 AM Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net> wrote:

Ontologists, Systems Scientists, Structural Modelers,

What I find lacking in these ontological bat-capping games is the
dynamic, functional, transformational side of scientific inquiry,
the process that produces the product.  If sciences are bodies
of organized knowledge, what is the physiology of those bodies?
That is the variety of systems theory I learned in my schools,
focusing on the states of systems and how they change over time.

When we apply that systems perspective to information systems,
knowledge systems, systems of belief, received opinion, whatever,
the state under investigation is a state of information, knowledge,
and so on, and the question becomes, “What influences and operations
actually do and optimally ought to update that state of info over time?”

For ease of reference, here is my blog rehash of my last post,
seeing as how the main point of it somehow got snipped out:

Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 2
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/09/02/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-discussion-2/

Regards,

Jon

On 9/4/2018 8:07 AM, joseph simpson wrote:
 > Aleksandar:
 >
 > You wrote:
 >
 > "Aren't all sciences versions of applied Knowledge Representation Ontology
 > also known as the Sowa Diamond?"
 >
 > http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.html
 >
 > Great question.

 >
 > Sowa wrote:
 >
 > "However, there is one basic distinction:  all sciences, whether
 > the scientists know it or not, are versions of applied mathematics.
 >
 > Fundamental reason:  Pure mathematics does not depend on any empirical
 > observation.  Every other subject, including so-called common sense,
 > use math (formal or informal) to analyze some observable phenomena."
 >

 > It seems that there needs to be some empirical observation somewhere in the
 > mix.
 >
 > Take care and have fun,
 >
 > Joe
 >
 > On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 3:17 AM Aleksandar Malečić <ljma...@gmail.com>
 > wrote:
 >
 >> Aren't all sciences versions of applied Knowledge Representation Ontology
 >> also known as the Sowa Diamond?
 >>
 >> http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.htm
 >>
 >> Aleksandar
 >>
 >> On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 12:05 AM joseph simpson <jjs...@gmail.com> wrote:
 >>
 >>>
 >>> FYI ..

 >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
 >>> From: John F Sowa <so...@bestweb.net>
 >>> Date: Mon, Sep 3, 2018 at 12:01 PM
 >>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Re: Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)
 >>> To: <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>
 >>>
 >>>
 >>> On 9/2/2018 9:54 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

 >>>> I've been following the discussion on the SysSci list that asks
 >>>> the question, “What Is Systems Science?”.
 >>>

 >>> Systems science, like every other science, is applied semiotic.
 >>> The primary difference between the sciences is the subject matter
 >>> to which they are applied.
 >>>
 >>> The reason for differences in terminology is historical and
 >>> egotistical.  The names that are given to things depend on changing
 >>> circumstances, historical accidents, popular fads, and egotistical
 >>> desires by people who want to claim that they made a novel discovery.
 >>>
 >>> For example, where are the boundary lines between psychiatry,
 >>> psychology, behavioral science, cognitive science, social science,
 >>> sociology, educational psychology, and anthropology?
 >>>
 >>> Answer:  It all depends on which textbook you use.
 >>>
 >>> However, there is one basic distinction:  all sciences, whether
 >>> the scientists know it or not, are versions of applied mathematics.
 >>>
 >>> Fundamental reason:  Pure mathematics does not depend on any empirical
 >>> observation.  Every other subject, including so-called common sense,
 >>> use math (formal or informal) to analyze some observable phenomena.
 >>>
 >>> See the attached cspsci.gif.  Note that formal logic and formal
 >>> semiotic are two names for the same branch of pure mathematics.
 >>> The distinction is whether you call logic a subset of semiotic or
 >>> semiotic a subset of logic -- if undecided, flip a coin.
 >>>
 >>> John
 >>>

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[Jon Awbrey]

Ontologists,

There were some problems with email delivery, so reposting this from Sept 4.

Re: John Sowa
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/ontolog-forum/WsdtHpkRvbI/XKoNu5N1BQAJ

What I find lacking in these static ontological hierarchies is the

dynamic, functional, transformational side of scientific inquiry, the

process that produces the product known as knowledge. If sciences are

bodies of organized knowledge, what is the physiology of those bodies?
That is the variety of systems theory I learned in my schools, focusing
on the states of systems and how they change over time.

When we apply that systems perspective to information systems,
knowledge systems, systems of belief, received opinion, whatever,
the state under investigation is a state of information, knowledge,
and so on, and the question becomes, “What influences and operations

actually do and optimally ought to update that state of information
over time?”

[John F Sowa]

On 9/9/2018 10:36 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> Re: John Sowa

>
> What I find lacking in these static ontological hierarchies is the
> dynamic, functional, transformational side of scientific inquiry, the
> process that produces the product known as knowledge.  If sciences are
> bodies of organized knowledge, what is the physiology of those bodies?
> That is the variety of systems theory I learned in my schools, focusing
> on the states of systems and how they change over time.

I agree. But you seem to be disagreeing with me, and I can't see
any contradiction. For the record, see below for a copy of my
previous note and the attached cspsci.gif.

But I admit that my short answer to "What is systems science?"
was too short: "Systems science, like every other science,
is applied semiotic." That's true, but it doesn't say in what
way systems science differs from any other science.

What I should have added is that systems science is a cross-
disciplinary study of the dynamic aspects of all possible
processes -- all the ways that anything may develop, grow.
or interact with anything else.

In fact, Whitehead's process ontology is one of the few that
is compatible with modern science. Everything in nature is
a process that comes to be, develops, and passes away. The
things called objects are just slowly changing processes.

Like every science in cspsci.gif, systems science is an application
of pure mathematics and its semiotic branches. Those branches
include logic and semiotic as well as mathematical theories that
specify processes, motion, interaction, causality, etc.

> the question becomes, “What influences and operations actually do
> and optimally ought to update that state of information over time?”

I agree. I also agree that versions of ontology that focus only
on static patterns that distinguish one type of entity from another
are just narrow, special-case microtheories.

General systems theory (Bertalanffy et al.) is a more fundamental
theory of process in comparison to the static parts of mereology.
GST is like a 4D virtual reality compared to the static "snapshots"
of mereology.

Recommendation for generalizing static ontologies: Replace mereology
with a version of General Systems Theory.

John

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)
Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018
From: John F Sowa <so...@bestweb.net>

[Doug McDavid]

Thanks, John. It’s really good to hear you say that.

Sent from my iPhone

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> <cspsci.GIF>

[Jon Awbrey]

Ontologists,

{Resending another msg that didn't get distributed to the list.}

A question arising on another blog, perhaps incidentally, perhaps of the essence,
brought to mind recent discussions in these forums regarding the nature of systems,
variables, and the measurements that give systematic state variables their values.
My current focus being what it is, I couched my answer in pragmatic semiotic terms.

⁂

Measurement is an extension of perception.
Measurement gives us data about an object
system the way perception gives us percepts,
which we may consider just a species of data.

If we ask when we first became self-conscious about this
whole process of perception and measurement, I don't know,
but Aristotle broke ground in a very articulate way with his
treatise “On Interpretation”.  Sense data are “impressions”
on the mind and they have their consensual, communicable
derivatives in spoken and written “signs”.  This triple
interaction among objects, ideas, and signs is the
cornerstone of our contemporary theories of signs,
collectively known as “semiotics”.

⁂

Regards,

[Azamat Abdoullaev]

It is not so simple. 

There are generally two kinds of signs: conventional and natural.

Mental ideas and images are also signs, natural signs, being themselves meanings and intentions, or "mental words".

Natural signs are causally related.

Natural signs are the source of meaning for conventional signs.

Thus the mind is the medium through which words signify things. 

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 4:55 AM Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net> wrote:

Ontologists,

{Resending another msg that didn't get distributed to the list.}

A question arising on another blog, perhaps incidentally, perhaps of the essence,

bought to mind recent discussions in these forums regarding the nature of systems,

variables, and the measurements that give systematic state variables their values.
My current focus being what it is, I couched my answer in pragmatic semiotic terms.

⁂

Measurement is an extension of perception.
Measurement gives us data about an object
system the way perception gives us percepts,
which we may consider just a species of data.

If we ask when we first became self-conscious about this
whole process of perception and measurement, I don't know,
but Aristotle broke ground in a very articulate way with his
treatise “On Interpretation”.  Sense data are “impressions”
on the mind and they have their consensual, communicable
derivatives in spoken and written “signs”.  This triple
interaction among objects, ideas, and signs is the
cornerstone of our contemporary theories of signs,
collectively known as “semiotics”.

⁂

Regards,

Jon

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[Jon Awbrey]

Azamat, All,

Of course it's not that simple. I called it a cornerstone
not a whole building but it gives us a starting point and
a first approach to a pragmatic semiotic architecture
still being built as we speak.

There is more detail and a trace of semiotic's later development in this paper:

• Awbrey and Awbrey (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”
https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

We began by quoting the founding paragraph from Aristotle:

<QUOTE>

Words spoken are symbols or signs (symbola) of affections or impressions (pathemata) of
the soul (psyche); written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is
speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which
these words are primarily signs (semeia), are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also
the objects (pragmata) of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images,
copies (homoiomata). (Aristotle, De Interp. i. 16a4).

</QUOTE>

We used the following Figure to highlight the structure of the triadic
relation among objects (pragmata), affections or impressions (pathemata),
and symbols or signs (symbola, semeia) as given in Aristotle's account:

• Figure 1. The Sign Relation in Aristotle
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/awbrey-awbrey-1995-figure-1.png

The triadic nexus marked “R” in the Figure is what graph theorists
would call a node or point of degree 3 and it provides a graphical
picture of a relational triple that can be taken in any convenient
order so long as we keep it constant throughout a given discussion.
For example, we could take Aristotle's object, sign or symbol, and
impression in the order (o, s, i), mostly just because I find that
convenient in later developments.

Diagrams of that sort, whether triangular or tri-radial in form, have long been
in common use for conveying the properties of triadic sign relations. But the
intervening years have taught me to my dismay that people tend to be led astray
by pictures like that, often getting stuck on square one, or rather triangle one.
That is, they get stuck on single triples of sign relations rather than grasping
them as they should, as prototypical examples of a whole class of ordered triples.

Regards,

Jon

On 9/10/2018 3:23 AM, Azamat Abdoullaev wrote:
> It is not so simple.
> There are generally two kinds of signs: conventional and natural.
> Mental ideas and images are also signs, natural signs, being themselves
> meanings and intentions, or "mental words".
> Natural signs are causally related.
> Natural signs are the source of meaning for conventional signs.
> Thus the mind is the medium through which words signify things.
>
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 4:55 AM Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net> wrote:
>
>> Ontologists,
>>

>> A question arising on another blog, perhaps incidentally, perhaps of the essence,

>> brought to mind recent discussions in these forums regarding the nature of systems,

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Interesting collection of concepts and insights.

It appears to me that it is very difficult to fully grasp the fundamental issues associated with pragmatic semiotic information when the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry is the main object of study.

I find that the analysis of the languages supported by the "Talking Drums" of Africa help me understand the signaling process at a deeper level.

John Carrington produced some work in this area in the 1940's.

See:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/bq/36-8_396.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F._Carrington

A key feature of these "sign exchanges" or "communication events" is the use of redundant signs or "signal phrases" to eliminate the uncertainty associated with the information exchange.

The physical medium of communication (drum, impact vibration, air pressure) is different between human speech and drum speech.

Human speech has much greater pitch control and tonal variability than "drum speech."  The information loss associated with the restricted drum mechanics is compensated for by repeating many phrases that only make logical sense if they are interrupted in a specific manner.

For example, assume drum speech can not make a clear distinction between the words baby and tree.  

If the drummer wanted to communicate about a tree then there would be statements like, 'Go climb high in the XXX' or 'The fruit is on the XXX."

If the drummer wanted to communicate about a baby the there would be statements like, 'Feed the XXX' or 'The XXX is little and smart."

This type of redundant sign transmission may be used to achieve the semantic goals of the communication. 

However, the redundant sign transmission is just preparing the state of the interpreter.

There are interesting connections between Shannon's information theory and Carrington's analysis of the talking drums.

It would be interesting to map these different views of information exchange to the components of your Figure 1 - The Sign Relation in Aristotle.  Another task to add to the very long "to do" list.

Given the structure of your Theme One Program, you may have already given this type of approach some consideration.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

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[joseph simpson]

This section above:

"The information loss associated with the restricted drum mechanics is compensated for by repeating many phrases that only make logical sense if they are interrupted in a specific manner."

Should read:

"The information loss associated with the restricted drum mechanics is compensated for by repeating many phrases that only make logical sense if they are interpreted in a specific manner.

[Jon Awbrey]

Joe, All,

The subject of natural languages and their relation to formal languages,
for example, logical calculi, logical graphs, and programming languages,
has come up periodically in our discussions and I've been struggling to
arrive at something both cogent and coherent to say about it. But what
the heck, here's a few thoughts off the cuff.

We naturally use our mother tongues as metalanguages to talk among ourselves
in fora like these, not only about well-formalized object languages but also
about the object domains that supply them with semantic substance, in a word,
“meaning”. Nothing about that makes “the natural language of the individual
conducting the inquiry ... the main object of study”. At least, that is not
how I'd personally understand the main task at hand.

I started using the run-on formula “pragmatic-semiotic point of view” during
a few exchanges with Bruce Schuman and John Sowa as a way of alluding to the
line of thinking about signs stretching from Aristotle to Peirce, Dewey, and
pragmatists of that stripe. Here's a link to my blog rehash of that episode:

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Comment 5
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/19/inquiry-driven-systems-%e2%80%a2-comment-5/

Have to break here ... to be continued ...

Jon

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

My phrase:

"pragmatic semiotic information when the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry is the main object of study."

Is cryptic and may not convey my original meaning (semantics), but I think it is close.

The drum example is designed to highlight a small number of ideas and aspects of communication. Two of these aspects are:

1) Multiple language encoding processes combined with two or more communication channels.

2) One communication channel having a higher rate of uncertainty that the other communication channels.  How does the rate of sign (or symbol) uncertainty impact the form and semantics of a specific message.  With an uncertain channel, the message form can be changed to support the intended semantics.  

Next, I will outline another  example based on highway signs.

During a construction and repair event involving a draw bridge and a number of interconnecting surface roads, temporary road signs were placed along the roadway. The existing permanent signs were covered with black plastic to block out the sign messages.  This specific work area was congested and contained many permanent traffic signs among which the temporary traffic signs were dispersed. 

The combined collection of temporary and permanent signs created a situation where the existing "blanked out" permanent signs blocked some areas of the temporary signs.  When I was driving down the road a temporary sign displayed the following:

"Reduce speed to 'blocked out'  5."

So what is the new speed limit?  The speed limit can not be read from the sign.

However, the new speed limit can be estimated using the following contextual information:

Speed limits are given in steps of 5 miles an hour.

The current speed limit is 40 miles an hour.

Traffic ahead appears to b going over 20 miles and hour.

So, the new speed limit is either, 25 or 35 miles an hour.

The information from the road signs is combined with:

Known rules,

Current observations,

Analytical process,

to produce the highest valued estimate of the new speed limit.

So the new speed limit is either 25 or 35 miles an hour.

In this case, the interpreter selects the relevant decision elements from existing the existing knowledge base and contextual facts and makes a decision to reduce speed.  The only question is how much to reduce speed.

In this case symbols exist but the message is incomplete.

Information theory allows some insight in to the value of the message.

These ideas are not well formed yet, but I wanted to send out an initial message to capture these first ragged thoughts.

[Jon Awbrey]

Joe, All,

JS: It appears to me that it is very difficult to fully grasp the

fundamental issues associated with pragmatic semiotic information
when the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry
is the main object of study.

That one took me a double take, but if I understand the “when” clause
as a hypothetical condition, not the assertion of a fixed intention
then I'd naturally agree:

IF the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry

is the main object of study

THEN it is very difficult to fully grasp the fundamental issues
associated with pragmatic semiotic information.

It is naturally worth the effort to reflect on the properties of our
embedding languages but we normally meet with limited, partial, and
well-circumscribed success on any given trial. That is why we study
formalized object languages as microcosms of the enveloping spheres.

So we'll continue on that understanding ...

Regards,

Jon

On 9/11/2018 10:39 PM, joseph simpson wrote:

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Great restatement and comments.

I have three general communication event types that I need to describe.

The Talking Drums communication event is Type One. (Preliminary description of this event is in progress.)

The Draw Bridge Sign event is Type Two. (First cut at describing this event is complete.)

The Native American Language event is Type Three. (This event is not described yet.)

Natural language derives meaning from contextual information.  The Talking Drums and Draw Bridge events are designed to help establish a rich event context that is needed to explore the impact of changing context information on event semantics.

Formal language derives meaning from two sets of rules: 1) Syntax rules detailing allowable symbols and 2) Semantic rules that detail the meaning of the symbols.

My goal is the establishment and refinement of three standard event communication types to serve as a rich contextual foundation that supports natural language to formal language analysis.  The event descriptions are simple stories that provide context.  

The ideas associated with the events and event descriptions are just forming now so, things may be in a dynamic state for a short while.

We will see if these ideas prove useful.

[John F Sowa]

On 9/14/2018 4:48 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> IF   the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry
>     is the main object of study
> THEN it is very difficult to fully grasp the fundamental issues
>     associated with pragmatic semiotic information.

Linguists have always derived grammars from large corpora of
examples. There were no native speakers of ancient Greek,
Latin, or Egyptian, but there were thousands of documents
in Greek and Latin, including more examples of how they
evolved over the centuries.

For Egyptian, they discovered the Rosetta Stone, which had
parallel texts in Greek, hieroglyphics, and a later notation
for Egyptian called demotic.

As a starting point, they made a guess that the Coptic language,
which was still in use for church services evolved from ancient
Egyptian. That proved to be true. And they were able to derive
the meaning, the grammar, and even the pronunciation of Egyptian.
Of course, their pronunciation would be closer to Coptic than the
they way the Pharaohs actually spoke. But it's good enough.

For dictionaries of ancient and modern languages, lexicographers
have always started with citations of the words in context. From
those citations, they derive their definitions.

Today, linguists use the enormous resources of the WWW. That
gives them an immense amount of examples of all the variations
of grammar and meanings.

John

[Jon Awbrey]

Joe, All,

The concept of a triadic sign relation, say L ⊆ O × S × I where O
is the object domain (think “universe of discourse”) and S and I
are domains of signs (think “channels” or “languages”) that we
are using to talk and think about O, is most often applied in
one of two ways.

1. S and I are really the same channel, language, medium, set of signs,
or state space of a system we are using to convey information about O.
In cases where S = I we are often concerned with transformations taking
place within a single set of signals and we may write I = S′ to signify
our focus on sign relational triples of the form (o, s, s′) where s′ is
a sign that follows s in a logical or temporal sequence, in short, where
s′ is the “next state” of s.

2. S and I are two different channels, languages, media, sets of signs,
or state spaces of systems being used to convey information about O.
In this case the issue is one of translation or “interoperability”.

So I think I'd start out viewing your “drum” example under the second case,
but when you really think about it you realize the first case is there, too.

Your “highway sign” example sounds like a traffic control version
of the issues they study in the subject of error correcting codes.

Regards,

Jon

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Thanks for your detailed reply.

I have had a few interruptions, in the last couple of days, and have not had time to provide the third case as a story or think about your response.

However, I think these context rich "stories" will help communicate the fundamental aspects of formal languages, natural languages and the communication process.

In any case, I hope to have a better response in a day or two.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

[joseph simpson]

All:

It has obviously been more than a couple of days and I still am engaged in a process that has expanded to requiring that we move out of our home for a couple of weeks.  Contractors need to address some damage to our home and this has been much more disruptive than I had  anticipated.  

Bottom line:  We will be in a disrupted state until late November.

My top priority is working the OSSMTools requirements development and conceptual code development.

See Github repo at:

https://github.com/jjs0sbw/OSSMTools

I will return to the development of these three rich context examples when and as I get time.

However, it looks like it will be between a few weeks to a couple of months.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

[Jon Awbrey]

Joe (and all),

I am sorry to hear of the difficulties on your home front.
I know we all wish you the quickest of returns to comfort.

I'll also be experiencing intermittent interruptions from
now until the moving vans come and probably a while after
but I'm hoping things will settle down by Thanksgiving.

For the moment I'll just post a few links to matters I've
been trying to get back to and hope to develop further as
time goes by.

The topic named in the subject line is the same thing I used to call
just Semiotic Information but I added the Pragmatic to emphasize the
continuity with Aristotle's pragmata and to point up the intentional
or object-directed dimension of semiotics. Various excursions along
those lines are linked on the following Survey page:

• Survey of “Semiotic Theory Of Information” (STOI)
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/30/survey-of-semiotic-theory-of-information-%e2%80%a2-3/

Regards,

Jon

On 10/1/2018 8:28 PM, joseph simpson wrote:
> All:
>
> It has obviously been more than a couple of days and I still am engaged in
> a process that has expanded to requiring that we move out of our home for a
> couple of weeks. Contractors need to address some damage to our home and
> this has been much more disruptive than I had anticipated.
>
> Bottom line: We will be in a disrupted state until late November.
>
> My top priority is working the OSSMTools requirements development and
> conceptual code development.
>
> See Github repo at:
>
> https://github.com/jjs0sbw/OSSMTools
>
> I will return to the development of these three rich context examples when
> and as I get time.
>
> However, it looks like it will be between a few weeks to a couple of months.
>
> Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,
>
> Joe
>

[Jon Awbrey]

Re: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/11/20/pragmatic-semiotic-information-•-discussion-10/

Artem Kaznatcheev posted an interesting discussion on his blog under the title “Models as Maps and Maps as Interfaces” that I regarded as fitting more or less under this head. A reader of Peirce may recognize that he has rediscovered certain aspects of pragmatic thought. I added the following brief comment that I hope to expand on when I get more time:

The use of map and “mirror of nature” metaphors takes us a good distance in understanding how creatures represent their worlds to themselves and others. But from a pragmatic semiotic point of view we can see how these metaphors lock us into iconic forms of representation, overstretching dyadic relations, and thus falling short of the full power of triadic symbolic relations that support practical interaction with the world.

Regards,

Jon