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Ontologists, Systems Scientists, Structural Modelers,
What I find lacking in these ontological bat-capping games is the
dynamic, functional, transformational side of scientific inquiry,
the process that produces the product. If sciences are bodies
of organized knowledge, what is the physiology of those bodies?
That is the variety of systems theory I learned in my schools,
focusing on the states of systems and how they change over time.
When we apply that systems perspective to information systems,
knowledge systems, systems of belief, received opinion, whatever,
the state under investigation is a state of information, knowledge,
and so on, and the question becomes, “What influences and operations
actually do and optimally ought to update that state of info over time?”
For ease of reference, here is my blog rehash of my last post,
seeing as how the main point of it somehow got snipped out:
Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 2
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/09/02/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-discussion-2/
Regards,
Jon
On 9/4/2018 8:07 AM, joseph simpson wrote:
> Aleksandar:
>
> You wrote:
>
> "Aren't all sciences versions of applied Knowledge Representation Ontology
> also known as the Sowa Diamond?"
>
> http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.html
>
> Great question.
>
> Sowa wrote:
>
> "However, there is one basic distinction: all sciences, whether
> the scientists know it or not, are versions of applied mathematics.
>
> Fundamental reason: Pure mathematics does not depend on any empirical
> observation. Every other subject, including so-called common sense,
> use math (formal or informal) to analyze some observable phenomena."
>
> It seems that there needs to be some empirical observation somewhere in the
> mix.
>
> Take care and have fun,
>
> Joe
>
> On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 3:17 AM Aleksandar Malečić <ljma...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Aren't all sciences versions of applied Knowledge Representation Ontology
>> also known as the Sowa Diamond?
>>
>> http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.htm
>>
>> Aleksandar
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 12:05 AM joseph simpson <jjs...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> FYI ..
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>>> From: John F Sowa <so...@bestweb.net>
>>> Date: Mon, Sep 3, 2018 at 12:01 PM
>>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Re: Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)
>>> To: <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9/2/2018 9:54 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>>>> I've been following the discussion on the SysSci list that asks
>>>> the question, “What Is Systems Science?”.
>>>
>>> Systems science, like every other science, is applied semiotic.
>>> The primary difference between the sciences is the subject matter
>>> to which they are applied.
>>>
>>> The reason for differences in terminology is historical and
>>> egotistical. The names that are given to things depend on changing
>>> circumstances, historical accidents, popular fads, and egotistical
>>> desires by people who want to claim that they made a novel discovery.
>>>
>>> For example, where are the boundary lines between psychiatry,
>>> psychology, behavioral science, cognitive science, social science,
>>> sociology, educational psychology, and anthropology?
>>>
>>> Answer: It all depends on which textbook you use.
>>>
>>> However, there is one basic distinction: all sciences, whether
>>> the scientists know it or not, are versions of applied mathematics.
>>>
>>> Fundamental reason: Pure mathematics does not depend on any empirical
>>> observation. Every other subject, including so-called common sense,
>>> use math (formal or informal) to analyze some observable phenomena.
>>>
>>> See the attached cspsci.gif. Note that formal logic and formal
>>> semiotic are two names for the same branch of pure mathematics.
>>> The distinction is whether you call logic a subset of semiotic or
>>> semiotic a subset of logic -- if undecided, flip a coin.
>>>
>>> John
>>>
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Ontologists,
{Resending another msg that didn't get distributed to the list.}
A question arising on another blog, perhaps incidentally, perhaps of the essence,
bought to mind recent discussions in these forums regarding the nature of systems,
variables, and the measurements that give systematic state variables their values.
My current focus being what it is, I couched my answer in pragmatic semiotic terms.
⁂
Measurement is an extension of perception.
Measurement gives us data about an object
system the way perception gives us percepts,
which we may consider just a species of data.
If we ask when we first became self-conscious about this
whole process of perception and measurement, I don't know,
but Aristotle broke ground in a very articulate way with his
treatise “On Interpretation”. Sense data are “impressions”
on the mind and they have their consensual, communicable
derivatives in spoken and written “signs”. This triple
interaction among objects, ideas, and signs is the
cornerstone of our contemporary theories of signs,
collectively known as “semiotics”.
⁂
Regards,
Jon
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Perhaps a different approach that should be investigated is represented here:
http://rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/8/6/20180041.full
From: syss...@googlegroups.com <syss...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
Sent: Wednesday, November 21, 2018 11:35 AM
To: Sys Sci Discussion List <syss...@googlegroups.com>
Subject: [SysSciWG] Re: Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)
Re: Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 10
Artem Kaznatcheev posted an interesting discussion on his blog under the title “Models as Maps and Maps as Interfaces” that I saw as fitting under this head A reader of Peirce may recognize critical insights of pragmatic thought cropping up toward the end of his analysis, prompting me to add the following comment:
Map and “mirror of nature” metaphors take us a good distance in understanding how creatures represent their worlds to themselves and others. But from a pragmatic semiotic point of view we can see how these metaphors lock us into iconic forms of representation, overstretching dyadic relations, and thus falling short of the full power of triadic symbolic relations that support practical interaction with the world.
Regards,
Jon
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