{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Revisited

[Jon Awbrey]

Ontolog Forum, Systems Science, Structural Modeling —

Three summers ago I hit on what struck me as a new insight into one of the most recalcitrant problems
in Peirce's semiotics and logic of science, namely, the relation between “the manner in which different
representations stand for their objects” and the way in which different inferences transform states of
information. I roughed out a sketch of my epiphany in a series of blog posts then set it aside for the
cool of later reflection. Now looks to be that later and looking out my window it is certainly cooler.

A first pass through the variations of representation and reasoning distinguishes
the axes of iconic, indexical, and symbolic manners of representation on the one hand
and the axes of abductive, inductive, and deductive modes of inference on the other.
Early and often Peirce will argue for a natural correspondence between these modes of
inference and these manners of representation but Peirce's early arguments differ from
his later accounts in ways deserving a second look. This is partly for the extra points
in his line of reasoning and partly for his explanation of indices as signs constituted
by convening the variant conceptions of sundry interpreters.

To be continued ...

Jon

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

You wrote:

" I roughed out a sketch of my epiphany in a series of blog posts then set it aside for the
cool of later reflection. "

Are you able to provide pointers to the existing blog posts?

Thanks for the additional information.

Take care, be good to yourself and stay warm,

Joe

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Structural Modeling" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to structural-mode...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to structura...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

--

Joe Simpson

“Reasonable people adapt themselves to the world. 

Unreasonable people attempt to adapt the world to themselves. 

All progress, therefore, depends on unreasonable people.”

George Bernard Shaw

Git Hub link:

https://github.com/jjs0sbw

Research Gate link:

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joseph_Simpson3

YouTube Channel

https://www.youtube.com/user/jjs0sbw

Web Site:

https://systemsconcept.org/

[Nadin, Mihai]

Dear Jon Awbrey,

Dear everyone,

If you do not consider all the elements constitutive of a sign together, you are not working with a Peirce understanding of the sign. I kept out of the discussion because I feel no need to correct anyone.

In this case I will only submit to all of you a diagram that describes the sign in its unity. There is no semantics that can be defined without acknowledging the sign in its UNITY--between the object represented, the representation, the process (open ended) of interpretation:

 

                                            

 

I wish you all well. And will step back again.

Mihai Nadin

--

All contributions to this forum are covered by an open-source license.

For information about the wiki, the license, and how to subscribe or unsubscribe to the forum, see http://ontologforum.org/info/

---

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ontolog-forum" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to ontolog-foru...@googlegroups.com.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/ed5fd687-7901-4e65-267e-efc1d39ed640%40att.net.

[Jon Awbrey]

Re: { Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Revisited
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/23/information-comprehension-x-extension-%e2%80%a2-revisited/

Here's a few resource links I meant to add:

• Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information • 4 (See especially the section on I = C × E)
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/08/survey-of-pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-4/

• My Notes • Information = Comprehension × Extension
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

• C.S. Peirce • Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_06/v2_06.htm

Regards,

Jon

--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

[Azamat Abdoullaev]

"There is no semantics that can be defined without acknowledging the sign in its UNITY--between the object represented, the representation, the process (open ended) of interpretation"

That's a good point.

And, again, { Information = Comprehension × Extension } is just wrong.

The truth is {Meaning = Comprehension × Extension}

Information = Meaning + Data

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/2e2782e66ef244f5bfbc62c096a19df7%40utdallas.edu.

[Jon Awbrey]

Joe:

I collected links to previous Selections, Comments, and Discussions on this topic at the following Survey page:

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/08/survey-of-pragmatic-semiotic-information-•-4/

But my plan for the next month or so will be to review all this material in a careful if somewhat plodding manner.  I’ve been studying Peirce for just over 50 years now and I’m still seeing new facets of the gem 💎 each time I return to what I imagined was familiar texts, so I’ll be taking time to nose 👃 the roses 🌹 this time around. 

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

[John F Sowa]

On 1/24/2019 7:38 AM, Azamat Abdoullaev wrote:
> { Information = Comprehension × Extension } is just wrong.
> The truth is {Meaning = Comprehension × Extension}

I agree.

> Information = Meaning + Data

But I would add more detail to explain that point:

1. The noun 'information' is a nominalized verb. Like many
nominalizations, the word is ambiguous.

2. One sense is the process of informing, and the other sense
is the direct object of the verb, i.e., that meaning which
is conveyed by the process.

3. The meaning is stated or shown by a sign, such as a statement
in some language or by pointing to something observable.

4. The data (literally, what is given) is a sign (possibly a
very large sign composed of many smaller signs) that someone
(or something) must interpret in order to derive the meaning.

These four points, which people usually process without thinking
about them, must be recognized and accommodated by anybody who
is designing an AI system.

Re explainable AI: Any system that interprets data by doing
something can be very useful. But a system that can explain
its interpretation must be able to identify the above steps
and answer questions about them.

John

[Azamat Abdoullaev]

"Re explainable AI:  Any system that interprets data by doing something can be very useful.  But a system that can explain
its interpretation must be able to identify the above steps and answer questions about them".

Yes. 

It must the guidelines for real AI developers, to program

Meaningful Data and Understanding Algorithms as parts of Deep Understanding instead of Deep Learning. 

--
All contributions to this forum are covered by an open-source license.
For information about the wiki, the license, and how to subscribe or
unsubscribe to the forum, see http://ontologforum.org/info/
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ontolog-forum" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to ontolog-foru...@googlegroups.com.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/628a616e-49ec-3336-2c1d-b72cb3c2ca96%40bestweb.net.

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Thanks for the additional information.

In the context of the current discussion it is interesting to consider the following formula:

Implication = Extension x Intension

In addition, it is interesting to further consider a point by John Sowa:

"One sense is the process of informing, and the other sense

     is the direct object of the verb, i.e., that meaning which
     is conveyed by the process."

In the context of the process of informing (receiving a message), the information receiver performs a state change when receiving new information.

If the information receiver acquires that same message again, then the information 

receiver does not respond with a state change (the receiver already knows this information).

The meaning of the message is the same in each case.

The information content of the message is high when it is first received (the message contains information).

The information content of the message is zero when the message is received again (the message contains no information).

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

[Jon Awbrey]

Dear Mihai,

I remember us having some previous discussions on the Peirce List, or maybe it was
some other list, quite a few years ago, but just by way of becoming re-acquainted
here's an article of mine bearing on the present topic, namely, the relationship
between Peirce's theory of triadic sign relations and his theory of inquiry.
It also gives a smattering of historical context, bracketing Peirce between
Aristotle and Dewey.

Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”,
''Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines'' 15(1), pp. 40–52.

• https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Regards,

Jon

--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

On 1/23/2019 5:07 PM, Nadin, Mihai wrote:
> Dear Jon Awbrey,
>
> Dear everyone,
>
> If you do not consider all the elements constitutive
> of a sign together, you are not working with a Peirce
> understanding of the sign. I kept out of the discussion
> because I feel no need to correct anyone.
>
> In this case I will only submit to all of you a diagram that
> describes the sign in its unity. There is no semantics that

> can be defined without acknowledging the sign in its UNITY —

> between the object represented, the representation, the
> process (open ended) of interpretation:
>

> [cid:image0...@01D4B335.D15CDE70]

[John F Sowa]

On 1/24/2019 11:04 AM, Azamat Abdoullaev wrote:
> [Explainable AI] must provide the guidelines for real AI developers,

> to program Meaningful Data and Understanding Algorithms as parts of
> Deep Understanding instead of Deep Learning.

Yes. I would add that the term 'deep learning' has been misused by
the neural net developers. Geoff Hinton and his colleagues designed
better algorithms for training neural networks with multiple layers.

Their original term was deep neural networks (DNNs). But the hype
artists stole the term 'deep learning' from educational psychology.
That was deliberately misleading, but they got a lot of funding.

In education, deep learning always meant deep understanding. That
goes back to the 19th c. philosopher Johann Friedrich Herbart, who
founded the systematic study of learning and education. See
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/johann-herbart/

The correct term for what DNNs do is "shallow learning from immense
volumes of data". It's certainly useful, but it's not deep.

John

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: { Information = Comprehension × Extension } Revisited • Selection 1
At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/26/information-comprehension-x-extension-revisited-%e2%80%a2-selection-1/

Ontolog Forum, Systems Science, Structural Modeling —

Our first text comes from Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1866,
titled “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”.
I still remember the first time I read these words and the
light that lit up the page and my mind.

<QUOTE>

Let us now return to the information. The information of a term is
the measure of its superfluous comprehension. That is to say that the
proper office of the comprehension is to determine the extension of the
term. For instance, you and I are men because we possess those attributes —
having two legs, being rational, &c. — which make up the comprehension of man.
Every addition to the comprehension of a term lessens its extension up to a
certain point, after that further additions increase the information instead.

Thus, let us commence with the term colour; add to the comprehension
of this term, that of red. Red colour has considerably less extension
than colour; add to this the comprehension of dark; dark red colour
has still less [extension]. Add to this the comprehension of non-blue —
non-blue dark red colour has the same extension as dark red colour, so
that the non-blue here performs a work of supererogation; it tells us
that no dark red colour is blue, but does none of the proper business of
connotation, that of diminishing the extension at all. Thus information
measures the superfluous comprehension. And, hence, whenever we make a
symbol to express any thing or any attribute we cannot make it so empty
that it shall have no superfluous comprehension.

I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that
the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference lies merely in
this superfluous comprehension and is therefore entirely removed
by a consideration of the laws of information.

(Peirce 1866, p. 467)

</QUOTE>

Reference
=========

• Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”,
Lowell Lectures of 1866, pp. 357–504 in Writings of Charles S. Peirce :
A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project,
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

[Nadin, Mihai]

Dear and respected colleagues,
The discussion in information is too important is you deal with ontology aspects. May I suggest a reading to the group?
ftp://ftp.inf.puc-rio.br/pub/docs/FomularioSolicitacoes/nsmail.pdf

Willing to entertain questions. Peirce is more than meets the eye.

Mihai Nadin

-----Original Message-----
From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
Sent: Saturday, January 26, 2019 10:26 AM
To: Ontolog Forum <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>; SysSciWG <syss...@googlegroups.com>; Structural Modeling <structura...@googlegroups.com>

--
All contributions to this forum are covered by an open-source license.
For information about the wiki, the license, and how to subscribe or unsubscribe to the forum, see http://ontologforum.org/info/
---

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ontolog-forum" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to ontolog-foru...@googlegroups.com.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/5787a84a-2615-dc09-7d09-0eb2484e688a%40att.net.

[joseph simpson]

Mihai:

Interesting work, just a few short comments.

Shannon and Weaver focused on "The Mathematical Theory of Communication."

In their work, communication was used "in a very broad sense to include all of the procedures by which one mind may affect another."

Their work defined three levels of communication problems:

  Level A: The technical problem

  Level B: The semantic problem

  Level C: The effectiveness problem.

These three levels provide a basic discussion framework.

Two primary questions are:

  -- What amount of information is encoded in any communication?

  -- What is the value of the information encoded in any communication?

Answering these two primary questions in terms of the basic discussion framework may be an approach that helps illuminate the information and semiotic processes involved in any specific communication.

Take care, b good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/70dd0fd46cf042abacbbf5df9a4f9374%40utdallas.edu.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

[Azamat Abdoullaev]

"Yes.  I would add that the term 'deep learning' has been misused by
the neural net developers.  Geoff Hinton and his colleagues designed
better algorithms for training neural networks with multiple layers.

Their original term was deep neural networks (DNNs).  But the hype
artists stole the term 'deep learning' from educational psychology.
That was deliberately misleading, but they got a lot of funding".

Indeed. 

Hinton reconsidered his DL-classic views: 

https://www.quora.com/Why-is-Geoffrey-Hinton-suspicious-of-backpropagation-and-wants-AI-to-start-over/answer/Kiryl-Persianov?__filter__=&__nsrc__=2&__snid3__=3821818114

--
All contributions to this forum are covered by an open-source license.
For information about the wiki, the license, and how to subscribe or
unsubscribe to the forum, see http://ontologforum.org/info/
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ontolog-forum" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to ontolog-foru...@googlegroups.com.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/5bf1778d-e07c-ec8e-fffb-ceba5d772b84%40bestweb.net.

[Nadin, Mihai]

Dear Joseph Simpson,

Thank you. What you call Level B was not addressed. Shannon made it clear that there is no semantics in the model.

No, they did not deal with information. They dealt with data. More precisely:  how do we transmit data in the most effective way. No semantics, no meaning. Only data associated with meaning becomes in formation.

 

The value of the data encoded (at the emitter side) was never a subject. Shannon wrote often about the fact that his model was strictly syntactic. That was their assignment (from the military and from the Lab where Shannon worked).

If you ever want to learn more about it, please let me know.

 

May I quote you: Take care, be good to yourself and have fun

 

Mihai Nadin

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/CAPnyebxsgGuk4Un72hKvvagSWyXF0xGa_d_6nT-nUg1BovK1Mg%40mail.gmail.com.

[joseph simpson]

Mihai:

Interesting response.

My text:

'In their work, communication was used "in a very broad sense to include all of the procedures by which one mind may affect another." '

The portion in double quotes was taken directly from page 3, of "The Mathematical Theory of Communication," Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, 1963.

My text:

"Level A: The technical problem

  Level B: The semantic problem

  Level C: The effectiveness problem."

Was adapted from page 4, of "The Mathematical Theory of Communication," Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, 1963.  I did not use double quotes in my original message because I did not quote that section word for word.

In addition, the book, "Operations Research and Systems Engineering," Charles D. Flagle, William H. Huggins and Robert H. Roy, 1960, Johns Hopkins Press, has a nice section on Information Theory.  It is my plan to adapt the examples from the Johns Hopkins work as practical scenarios to provide a basis for message and communication analysis.

I will try to be more careful when I do not use a complete quote, and just indicate that it is adapted from a specific source.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/621cb40dab454b0496e515a761351655%40utdallas.edu.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

[Nadin, Mihai]

Dear Joseph Simpson,

Your integrity was never questioned.

Just a quote:

Roughly speaking, Shannon entropy is concerned with the statistical

properties of a given system and the correlations between the states of two systems,

independently of the meaning and any semantic content of those states.

Cf. What is Shannon information? Lomardi, Holik, Vanni

 

Shannon himself (A Mathematical Theory of Communication, Reprinted with corrections from

The Bell System Technical Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 379–423, 623–656, July, October, 1948):

The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or ap-

proximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have meaning ; that is they refer

to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic

aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem.

 

Well, he was solving an engineering problem. Please note also that his initial paper was a theory of communication. Later he regretted to have named it (with Weaver) a theory of information.

 

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

 

Mihai Nadin

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/CAPnyebzABhDZH3_6H9fhi7a8gYcQQMaEv1Atewq5fsb1MQXo7w%40mail.gmail.com.

[Mike Bergman]

Hi Mihai,

Thanks for making this point. The confusion over what the term "information" includes or not in the Shannon paper has been a source of misunderstanding for decades. You are exactly correct in your interpretation, as I see things, which was also reinforced in Weaver's subsequent expansion on the original Shannon paper.

Best, Mike

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/621cb40dab454b0496e515a761351655%40utdallas.edu.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
__________________________________________

Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com
http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
__________________________________________ 

[joseph simpson]

Mihai:

A final comment on this subject.

Please see the quote below, from : 

Reprinted with corrections from The Bell System Technical Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 379–423, 623–656, July, October, 1948.

A Mathematical Theory of Communication 

"Two extremes of redundancy in English prose are represented by Basic English and by James Joyce’s book “Finnegans Wake”. The Basic English vocabulary is limited to 850 words and the redundancy is very high. This is reflected in the expansion that occurs when a passage is translated into Basic English. Joyce on the other hand enlarges the vocabulary and is alleged to achieve a compression of semantic content.

The redundancy of a language is related to the existence of crossword puzzles. If the redundancy is zero any sequence of letters is a reasonable text in the language and any two-dimensional array of letters forms a crossword puzzle. If the redundancy is too high the language imposes too many constraints for large crossword puzzles to be possible. A more detailed analysis shows that if we assume the constraints imposed by the language are of a rather chaotic and random nature, large crossword puzzles are just possible when the redundancy is 50%. If the redundancy is 33%, three-dimensional crossword puzzles should be possible, etc.  "

Communication may be enhanced using semantic correction.  While the noise in some communication channels may be addressed using correction codes and other error correcting approaches, there are some communication channels that do not have these types of capabilities.

A simple example of a semantic correction communication system is the "Talking Drums of Africa." 

For a brief background see:  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F._Carrington

The talking drum technology did not have the tonal range of the human voice.  Therefore the spoken tonal languages could not be reproduced 100 percent on the drums.  A good drummer would craft words that fit the drum tonal range and then create a semantic story that eliminated any uncertainty in the message information.  Note, the message sender and receiver would have to share a common semantic context.

Information uncertainty can be eliminated using semantic compression or decompression. 

Further, messages may be encrypted in a similar manner.  The Navajo code talkers are an example.

That is enough for now.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/86fb285c55e34897bb441629dbae91a7%40utdallas.edu.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: { Information = Comprehension × Extension } Revisited • Selection 2
At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/28/information-comprehension-x-extension-revisited-%e2%80%a2-selection-2/

Ontolog Forum, Systems Science, Structural Modeling —

Over the course of Selection 1 Peirce introduces the ideas he needs
to answer stubborn questions about the validity of scientific inference.
Briefly put, the validity of scientific inference depends on the ability
of symbols to express “superfluous comprehension”, the measure of which
Peirce calls “information”.

Selection 2 sharpens our picture of symbols as “general representations”,
contrasting them with two species of representation whose characters
fall short of genuine symbols.

<QUOTE>

For this purpose, I must call your attention to the differences there are
in the manner in which different representations stand for their objects.

In the first place there are likenesses or copies — such as statues,
pictures, emblems, hieroglyphics, and the like. Such representations
stand for their objects only so far as they have an actual resemblance
to them — that is agree with them in some characters. The peculiarity
of such representations is that they do not determine their objects —
they stand for anything more or less; for they stand for whatever
they resemble and they resemble everything more or less.

The second kind of representations are such as are set up by a convention of men
or a decree of God. Such are tallies, proper names, &c. The peculiarity of these
conventional signs is that they represent no character of their objects.

Likenesses denote nothing in particular;
conventional signs connote nothing in particular.

The third and last kind of representations are symbols or general representations.
They connote attributes and so connote them as to determine what they denote.
To this class belong all words and all conceptions. Most combinations of words
are also symbols. A proposition, an argument, even a whole book may be, and
should be, a single symbol.

(Peirce 1866, pp. 467–468)

</QUOTE>

Reference
=========

• Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”,
Lowell Lectures of 1866, pp. 357–504 in Writings of Charles S. Peirce :
A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project,
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

Resources
=========

• Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/08/survey-of-pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-4/

[Azamat Abdoullaev]

It looks no life-critical things so corrupted as the critical matter of signs and symbols, regardless that the best minds attended to it.

We are lost in signs, indications, manifestations, marks, notes, omens, patterns, prognostics, signals, symbols, symptoms, tokens and types.  

A sign signifies, or points to and points out something.

A symbol stands for, represents or takes place of some thing, because of likeness or resemblance in nature, qualities, etc

So, any sign is signifying.

Any symbol is functioning as a substitute or surrogate.

Traditionally, we are free to mix signs and symbols, so we call notations of language, science or the arts, as music, while there is a distinction, paper money substitutes the gold, and road signs points out some location or direction.   

In all, there are three kinds of signs:

natural signs;

conventional signs;

hybrid signs, as digital things.

As to Augustine,  there are also 3 types of things in the world:

things per se, some things are simply things, and any signs at all;

some things are also signs of other things;

some things are always used as signs, as words or ideas or images, meanings or intentions.

Natural signs are subject to causation, as the fire and its smoke, ideas/images and actions, or animal cries communicating pain or pleasure, fear or anger.

Natural signs are the cause of meaning in conventional signs; as mental entities are the means of through which words signify things.

Thus, the kinds of things functioning as signs and the the kinds of things the signify define the nature of meaning or the modes of signification.

Bottom line

Humans are better defined as Homo Symbolicus.

Symbolism is now everywhere, in maths, science, language, psychology, poetry, philosophy, religion, and, of course, computing, its best product, real AI technology.

Then it is important to know 3 simple truths:

Sings and symbols differ in nature

Signification = Denotation x Connotation

Meaning = Extension x Intension

Information = Data + Signification (Meaning) 

As an information signal is a sign of communication to convey some meaningful information; a radio wave or e-current transmitting intelligence in code.

In more details, signs and symbols discussed in Reality and Universal Ontology...

 https://www.igi-global.com/book/reality-universal-ontology-knowledge-systems/859

--
All contributions to this forum are covered by an open-source license.
For information about the wiki, the license, and how to subscribe or
unsubscribe to the forum, see http://ontologforum.org/info/
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ontolog-forum" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to ontolog-foru...@googlegroups.com.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/afda3e66-6208-52a8-d945-9c64753c2ae5%40att.net.

[bruces...@cox.net]

 

> It looks no life-critical things so corrupted as the critical matter of signs and symbols, regardless that the best minds attended to it.

> We are lost in signs, indications, manifestations, marks, notes, omens, patterns, prognostics, signals, symbols, symptoms, tokens and types.  

 

I had to laugh. I fully sympathize. How confused and swamp-trapped are we?  😊 (actually, trying to figure out Peirce’s definitions make me feel this way.  How can “scientists” build a working analytical model designed to solve real-world problems on a foundation of sheer vagueness and ambiguity? What for heaven’s sake is “superfluous comprehension” https://goo.gl/LKHRHV  ?)

 

> A sign signifies, or points to and points out something.

> A symbol stands for, represents or takes place of some thing, because of likeness or resemblance in nature, qualities, etc

 

What I want to see emerge is a universal/general-purpose single method for building information structures that accomplishes this.  We need a single method to “describe anything” (any abstract symbolic structure) in terms of qualities (properties, characteristics, attributes, dimensions, facets – all of which become measurable to a known error tolerance through this method)

 

For me, the great core mystery of semantic ontology is the principle of “a cut on a cut” – a distinction on a distinction – the way a species is a distinction on a genus.  That’s the generic form of hierarchical categorization across descending levels.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxon

 

I want to see all of this defined in terms of an isomorphism linking dimension and ordered class (“a dimension is an ordered class”).  It seems that this method is “absolutely recursive” – it defines any level of abstraction – and because measurement is grounded in dimensionality, creates an unbroken algebraic definition chain to ground any abstraction in empirical measurement.

 

But what is the bottom of this cascade (“it’s turtles all the way down” -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down )?

 

The chain looks like this: “a cut on a cut on a cut on a cut on a cut…”  “A taxon cuts a taxon cuts a taxon…” -- and a taxon – an ordered class – is isomorphic to a dimension.  And every facets in the description or representation is also a dimension.

 

This is potentially infinite recursion.  But the mystery seems to be – this thing hits a limit.  How do we define this?  This is the deep mystery, I think.

 

My suspicion is – this is an innately closed space – like the center-point of the Big Bang – from which every possibility of abstract representation springs forth.  But how does it close and become a sealed space?  What is the limit of this process?  How can it be described in a finite way?

 

Maybe complementarity is a clue – sort a yang/yin active/passive – “that which cuts” (“the cutter”) versus “that which is cut” (“the cuttee”) – both taking the same algebraic form, but somehow perceived in a different polarity (active/passive, black/white, full/empty.  Perhaps ee have to view the process from an angle to see it this way (?)

 

So – in this vision, every symbolic object in this list is constructed the same way:

 

> Symbolism is now everywhere, in maths, science, language, psychology, poetry, philosophy, religion, and, of course, computing, its best product, real AI technology.

 

I’d say construct every facet of ontological thinking mentioned in this paragraph in the same way:

 

https://goo.gl/w8Gxdz

 

All kinds of science, basic or applied, hard or soft, theoretical or empirical, fundamental or

descriptive, natural or humane, to some degree partake in the general theory of entities and

relationships as special sciences, or domain specific ontologies. All types of knowledge,

theoretical, formal, experimental or practical, presuppose essential, ontological knowledge

of things. Implicitly or explicitly, ontological principles can be found among mostly general

theories, mostly universal axioms and laws, and in mostly interesting scientific problems. As

underlying ideas, ontological categories, classes, concepts, notions, and terms lead the list

of the great ideas making the very substance of the grand elemental conceptions. For they

are the abstractions by which thought knows the world and minds think things, the terms

in which we formulate major principles and facts of reality, the notions in which we make

definitions, put fundamental questions, and solve decisive problems. Ontological ideas constitute

the very framework of mental contents and cognitive processes as the heart of mental life. They

reside in languages, natural or artificial, as the mind in the body, as pungency in

pepper; since the syntactic and grammatical categories and semantic classes are inherently

tied to world things. Our human language is pervaded with ontological categories, in terms

of which we describe the fundamental constituents and properties of reality and explain the

complex dynamics of the nonlinear world of things. All great human actions and intellectual

achievements, all our rational practice of choice and moral codes are intrinsically guided by

ontological rules and principles as primary and unvarying truths of reality.

 

The large order and broad goal of ontology is to produce the explanatory schemas of all

being and reality, giving the guiding principles and rules for a wide variety of special truths

and particular facts. The ontological verities come up as the basic laws of reality occupying

the highest level in the hierarchy of truths and meanings: mental, logical, mathematical,

semantic, verbal, scientific, empirical as well as moral, ethical, esthetic, and religious. So the

quest of underlying truths, universal and necessary, is the ultimate goal of the fundamental

ontology and ontological theories, aimed to uncover the general knowledge and universal

laws applicable to all existence in its basic levels, parts, and domains. These are not all

the substantial implications of the general knowledge of reality. Never-foreseen before

technological artifacts and engineering systems are lining up beyond the current horizons

of knowledge and technology.

 

 

Bruce Schuman

Santa Barbara CA USA, 805-705-9174

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: { Information = Comprehension × Extension } Revisited • Selection 3
At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/30/information-comprehension-x-extension-revisited-%e2%80%a2-selection-3/

Ontolog Forum, Systems Science, Structural Modeling —

Selection 3 opens with Peirce remarking a critical property of genuine symbols —
the class of symbols is not closed under combinations. In particular, there are
logical conjunctions of symbols and logical disjunctions of symbols which are not
themselves genuine symbols.

Applying this paradigm to terms, Peirce introduces two sets of examples under the
headings of “conjunctive terms” and “disjunctive terms” designed to illustrate the
correspondence between manners of representation and modes of inference.

<QUOTE>

Yet there are combinations of words and combinations of conceptions
which are not strictly speaking symbols. These are of two kinds
of which I will give you instances. We have first cases like:

• man and horse and kangaroo and whale,

and secondly, cases like:

• spherical bright fragrant juicy tropical fruit.

The first of these terms has no comprehension which is adequate to the
limitation of the extension. In fact, men, horses, kangaroos, and whales
have no attributes in common which are not possessed by the entire class
of mammals. For this reason, this disjunctive term, man and horse and
kangaroo and whale, is of no use whatever. For suppose it is the subject
of a sentence; suppose we know that men and horses and kangaroos and whales
have some common character. Since they have no common character which does
not belong to the whole class of mammals, it is plain that mammals may be
substituted for this term. Suppose it is the predicate of a sentence, and
that we know that something is either a man or a horse or a kangaroo or a whale;
then, the person who has found out this, knows more about this thing than that
it is a mammal; he therefore knows which of these four it is for these four
have nothing in common except what belongs to all other mammals. Hence in
this case the particular one may be substituted for the disjunctive term.
A disjunctive term, then, — one which aggregates the extension of several
symbols, — may always be replaced by a simple term.

Hence if we find out that neat are herbivorous, swine are herbivorous,
sheep are herbivorous, and deer are herbivorous; we may be sure that
there is some class of animals which covers all these, all the members
of which are herbivorous. Now a disjunctive term — such as neat swine
sheep and deer, or man, horse, kangaroo, and whale — is not a true symbol.
It does not denote what it does in consequence of its connotation, as a
symbol does; on the contrary, no part of its connotation goes at all to
determine what it denotes — it is in that respect a mere accident if it
denote anything. Its sphere is determined by the concurrence of the four
members, man, horse, kangaroo, and whale, or neat swine sheep and deer
as the case may be.

Now those who are not accustomed to the homologies of the conceptions of
men and words, will think it very fanciful if I say that this concurrence
of four terms to determine the sphere of a disjunctive term resembles the
arbitrary convention by which men agree that a certain sign shall stand for
a certain thing. And yet how is such a convention made? The men all look
upon or think of the thing and each gets a certain conception and then they
agree that whatever calls up or becomes an object of that conception in either
of them shall be denoted by the sign. In the one case, then, we have several
different words and the disjunctive term denotes whatever is the object of
either of them. In the other case, we have several different conceptions —
the conceptions of different men — and the conventional sign stands for
whatever is an object of either of them. It is plain the two cases are
essentially the same, and that a disjunctive term is to be regarded as
a conventional sign or index. And we find both agree in having a
determinate extension but an inadequate comprehension.

(Peirce 1866, pp. 468–469)

[Ferenc Kovacs]

What are the implications on the structural and procedural features of the knowledge of the world "in the mind" of some recent studies? The human brain works backwards to retrieve memories 

The human brain works backwards to retrieve memories When we remember a past event, the human brain reconstructs that experience in reverse order, according to a new...

Ferenc Kovacs

Cell phone: 36-70-6784000 

Landline:36-87-782831

--
All contributions to this forum are covered by an open-source license.
For information about the wiki, the license, and how to subscribe or
unsubscribe to the forum, see http://ontologforum.org/info/
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ontolog-forum" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to ontolog-forum+unsub...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/108de28f-3753-fc75-aecb-1e332191b37d%40att.net.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Virus-free. www.avast.com

[Jon Awbrey]

Azamat, All —

By my lights, the semiotics or theory of signs handed down to us
by Aristotle, Augustine, Medieval Scholastics, Locke, and others
took a significant leap forward toward a truly scientific theory
with the work of C.S. Peirce. This became possible, I believe,
not so much driven by any mutations in the taxonomy of signs as
due to his concurrent development of the logic of relative terms
and the mathematics of relations, especially triadic relations.

The task I've set for myself under this heading is threefold:

1. There is the scholarly task of figuring out what Peirce meant
by his formula: “Information = Comprehension × Extension”.

2. There is the scientific task of finding out whether Peirce's theory
of information tells us anything useful about empirical realities.

3. There is the theory-engineering task that bridges tasks 1 and 2.
It looks for ways to repair incomplete or inconsistent theories
in order to give them a better grasp of the empirical realities.

So I'll be maintaining a focus on that for the time being.

Regards,

Jon

On 1/29/2019 9:52 AM, Azamat Abdoullaev wrote:
>
> It looks no life-critical things so corrupted as the
> critical matter of signs and symbols, regardless that
> the best minds attended to it. We are lost in signs,
> indications, manifestations, marks, notes, omens, patterns,
> prognostics, signals, symbols, symptoms, tokens and types.
> A sign signifies, or points to and points out something.
> A symbol stands for, represents or takes place of some thing,

> because of likeness or resemblance in nature, qualities, etc.