Final reminder for the Launch of the Ontology Summit 2026

[Ken Baclawski]

Ontology Summit 2026
Ontologies: Past, Present, Future

The first session will be on Wednesday 18 February 2026 at Noon US/Canada Eastern Time.

The Ontology Summit 2026 is the 20th anniversary summit.  To celebrate this auspicious occasion, we will have a retrospective of past summits as well as both current ontology activities and future prospects.

Connection URL:

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/86994661673?pwd=mMUeaWyWhBMSzTw3SgH5GjMv2Qx4rH.1
Meeting ID: 869 9466 1673
Passcode: 803090

The summit web page is: https://ontologforum.com/index.php/OntologySummit2026

Ken Baclawski

Chair, Ontology Summit 2026

[John F Sowa]

Phil,

Ontology is a study and classification of things that exist or may exist.  That includes physical things as well as ideas, thoughts, propositions, discoveries, and hypotheses about things that currently exist or may be designed, created, defined, imagined, proposed, suggested, or hypothesized by anyone, anywhere, in any notation, language, or symbol system.

There is only one certain statement that we can assert about any broad coverage ontology, no matter how excellent or comprehensive it may be:  it is obsolescent on the day after it has been fully specified.

But it is possible to have complete and perfect ontollogies for systems or policies that must be supported precisely for some particular purpose.  An example would be the specification of accounts and services of a bank.  The specification is, by definition, correct.  If there is any discrepancy, the implementation is incorrect.

ISO has a policy that any standard must be reaffirmed or revised every five years.

John

 

---

From: "Philip Jackson" <philipcj...@hotmail.com>

Thanks very much for the presentations yesterday on the history of ontology summits.

The presentations reminded me of a possible topic for discussion at this year's summit: To create a system that has human-level AI, should the system have multiple ontologies, for different domains? Should it have a meta-ontology, an ontology of ontologies?

Michael and I posted a few remarks about this in ontolog-forum last year and then corresponded briefly about it offline. We did not write a paper though perhaps this would be a good discussion topic at some point during this year's forum. I don't have anything further prepared to say about it, though quite possibly you or others in the forum may.

Best,

Phil Jackson

[Philip Jackson]

John,

Thanks for these comments. A natural question is whether an ontology is itself a thing that can exist. If existence includes ideas, thoughts, and propositions, then presumably an ontology can exist, as an idea that is a collection of propositions. And if we can have multiple different ontologies, e.g., with each ontology for a different domain of things that can exist, then we could have an ontology of these ontologies, i.e., a meta-ontology. 

This  seems to make sense, at least as something that may be designed, defined, imagined, proposed, suggested, etc. Of course, people are free to choose whether or not to spend their time creating a meta-ontology, or different meta-ontologies. 

Phil

---

From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> on behalf of John F Sowa <so...@bestweb.net>
Sent: Thursday, February 19, 2026 3:12 PM
To: ontolog-forum <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>
Cc: CG <c...@lists.iccs-conference.org>
Subject: [ontolog-forum] Final reminder for the Launch of the Ontology Summit 2026

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[John F Sowa]

Phil,

For physical things in the universe, existence means that somewhere at some point in time since the Big Bang, there was something.  But this raises the question of what does it mean to make a true statement about somehting that no longer exists at the present moment.   

Or what does it mean to say that if I do operation X  on something Y that a predictable change on Y will occur?  For example, I can predict: " If I drink this cup of coffee, the cup will be empty."  Then somebody else says:  "prove it."   So I drink it, and turn the cup upside down and say:  "See.  Nothing spills out." .

Those are examples of statements about non-existent states.    And they show that people can make such statements, and they are capable of causing them to become true.  

Bit those are examples about physical things.  Numbers are nonphysical things that people specify by axioms.  Various people have invented physical methods for drawing symbols that have a one-to-one correspondence with those non-physical things.  Since different people can consistently make exactly equivalent statements about those non-physical things, we use the same word 'exist' that we use for physical things that may or may not exist at the current moment in time and place.

That example can be generalized for all the kinds of non-physical entities  for which we use phrases like "There exist",  "Let there be,,, such that ,,,", and all the similar statements used in logic, mathematics, and every branch of mathematics, science, philosophy, linguistics, etc.

Since we can use language consistently to talk about all such things, it is meaningful for us to generalize words like "exist" to apply to such non-physical things that we call "things in our ontology".

Summary:  This terminology is true by a convention that supports meaningful discussions, literature, philosophy and science.  In short, it works.

Re ontology:  That's another non-physical thing about which we can make consistent statements that other people can verify by doing similar reasoning in their own preferred language.  In short, it works.

Does that mean those theoretical things really exist?  That all depends on what language game you choose for defining the word 'really'.   As Clark Gable said, "Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn."

John

 

---

From: "Philip Jackson" <philipcj...@hotmail.com>

John,

Thanks for these comments. A natural question is whether an ontology is itself a thing that can exist. If existence includes ideas, thoughts, and propositions, then presumably an ontology can exist, as an idea that is a collection of propositions. And if we can have multiple different ontologies, e.g., with each ontology for a different domain of things that can exist, then we could have an ontology of these ontologies, i.e., a meta-ontology. 

This  seems to make sense, at least as something that may be designed, defined, imagined, proposed, suggested, etc. Of course, people are free to choose whether or not to spend their time creating a meta-ontology, or different meta-ontologies. 

Phil

---

From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> on behalf of John F Sowa 

[Alex Shkotin]

Phil,

Is this a good idea to ground your initial question this way: 

"To create a system that has human-level AI, should the system have multiple knowledge-bases, for different domains? Should it have a meta-knowledge-base, a knowledge-base of knowledge-bases?"

Just to distinguish ontology as studying i.e. kind of activity and ontology as a materialized result of some activity.

Alex

чт, 19 февр. 2026 г. в 23:56, Philip Jackson <philipcj...@hotmail.com>:

To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/SJ1PR11MB62995DA60C6856727B28CD91C16BA%40SJ1PR11MB6299.namprd11.prod.outlook.com.

[Philip Jackson]

John, thanks very much for your comments.

I agree with everything you've written, including the quote from Clark Gable as Rhett Butler. 🙂

Phil

---

From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> on behalf of John F Sowa <so...@bestweb.net>
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2026 12:35 AM
To: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>; CG <c...@lists.iccs-conference.org>
Subject: RE: Re; meta-ontologies - was: [ontolog-forum] Final reminder for the Launch of the Ontology Summit 2026

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[Philip Jackson]

Alex,

Thanks for your suggestion. I think it is a good idea.

Phil

---

From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> on behalf of Alex Shkotin <alex.s...@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2026 5:10 AM
To: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>
Cc: CG <c...@lists.iccs-conference.org>
Subject: Re: Re; meta-ontologies - was: [ontolog-forum] Final reminder for the Launch of the Ontology Summit 2026

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[John F Sowa]

Phil and Alex,

Short answer:  Everything is a thing.

If you can think it, it exists as an idea.  If you state it, it exists as a proposition.

But the idea or proposition might be false.  That means that what it supposedly refers to does not exist in the form that the idea or proposition indicates.  However, it might be useful in suggesting some kind of further reasoning or action that would lead to a correction that is true.

Since ontologies are ideas or statements of ideas, they exist.  Therefore, you can include them in an ontology of the contents of books, papers, or email notes like the ones we're reading and writing.

John

 

---

From: "Alex Shkotin" <alex.s...@gmail.com>

Phil,

Is this a good idea to ground your initial question this way: 

"To create a system that has human-level AI, should the system have multiple knowledge-bases, for different domains? Should it have a meta-knowledge-base, a knowledge-base of knowledge-bases?"

Just to distinguish ontology as studying i.e. kind of activity and ontology as a materialized result of some activity.

Alex

чт, 19 февр. 2026 г. в 23:56, Philip Jackson <philipcj...@hotmail.com>:

John,

Thanks for these comments. A natural question is whether an ontology is itself a thing that can exist. If existence includes ideas, thoughts, and propositions, then presumably an ontology can exist, as an idea that is a collection of propositions. And if we can have multiple different ontologies, e.g., with each ontology for a different domain of things that can exist, then we could have an ontology of these ontologies, i.e., a meta-ontology. 

This  seems to make sense, at least as something that may be designed, defined, imagined, proposed, suggested, etc. Of course, people are free to choose whether or not to spend their time creating a meta-ontology, or different meta-ontologies. 

Phil

---

From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> on behalf of John F 

[Alex Shkotin]

JFS:"Short answer:  Everything is a thing."

AS: No. The idea of a thing, of an entity, is a very developed category. We begin our study not even with the phenomenon itself, but rather try to guess and understand what's going on there: what entities are there and what the process is.

For me, it's always been logically unacceptable that the top class in OWL2 is Thing. Well, at least Something is.

JFS:"If you can think it, it exists as an idea.  If you state it, it exists as a proposition.

But the idea or proposition might be false.  That means that what it supposedly refers to does not exist in the form that the idea or proposition indicates.  However, it might be useful in suggesting some kind of further reasoning or action that would lead to a correction that is true.

Since ontologies are ideas or statements of ideas, they exist.  Therefore, you can include them in an ontology of the contents of books, papers, or email notes like the ones we're reading and writing.

"

AS: Yes, I forgot to mention the second of your three meanings of the term "ontology"—knowledge in the head or mind of a given person. If we tell an expert in a given subject area that they have an ontology in their head and we're going to extract it from them, I think they'll take our terminology into account.

And since Phil found the term "knowledge base" useful, let me quote a few IT terms [1].

I added "interoperability" . Perhaps Todd will be interested.

Sorry for the markup, this is working material.

 

Alex

[1] https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/en/#iso:std:iso-iec:2382:ed-1:v2:en

2123771 knowledge

<artificial intelligence> collection of facts, events, beliefs, and rules, organized for systematic use

Note 1 to entry: knowledge : term and definition standardized by ISO/IEC [ISO/IEC 2382-28:1995].

Note 2 to entry: 28.01.03 (2382)

[SOURCE:ISO-IEC-2382-28 * 1995 * * * ]

2121399 knowledge base K-base

database that contains inference rules and information about human experience and expertise in a domain

Note 1 to entry: In self-improving systems, the knowledge base additionally contains information resulting from the solution of previously encountered problems.

Note 2 to entry: knowledge base; K-base: term, abbreviation and definition standardized by ISO/IEC [ISO/IEC 2382-1:1993].

Note 3 to entry: 01.06.18 (2382)

[SOURCE:ISO-IEC-2382-1 * 1993 * * * ]

2123867 knowledge base K-base

database that contains inference rules and information about human experience and expertise in a domain

Note 1 to entry: In self-improving systems, the knowledge base additionally contains information resulting from the solution of previously encountered problems.

Note 2 to entry: A new abbreviation is added to that mentioned in ISO/IEC 2382-1:1993.

Note 3 to entry: knowledge base; K-base; KB: terms, abbreviation and definition standardized by ISO/IEC [ISO/IEC 2382-28:1995].

Note 4 to entry: 28.04.06 (2382)

[SOURCE:ISO-IEC-2382-28 * 1995 * * * ]

2123801 knowledge tree

hierarchical semantic network represented by a tree-like directed graph

Note 1 to entry: knowledge tree: term and definition standardized by ISO/IEC [ISO/IEC 2382-28:1995].

Note 2 to entry: 28.02.11 (2382)

[SOURCE:ISO-IEC-2382-28 * 1995 * * * ]

2123773 knowledge-based system

information processing system that provides for solving problems in a particular domain or application area by drawing inferences from a knowledge base

Note 1 to entry: The term "knowledge-based system" is sometimes used synonymously with "expert system", which is usually restricted to expert knowledge.

Note 2 to entry: Some knowledge-based systems have learning capabilities.

Note 3 to entry: knowledge-based system; KBS: term, abbreviation and definition standardized by ISO/IEC [ISO/IEC 2382-28:1995].

Note 4 to entry: 28.01.05 (2382)

[SOURCE:ISO-IEC-2382-28 * 1995 * * * ]

interoperability [5]

2120585 interoperability

<distributed data processing> capability of two or more functional units to process data cooperatively

Note 1 to entry: See interoperability (01.01.47).

Note 2 to entry: interoperability : term and definition standardized by ISO/IEC [ISO/IEC 2382-18:1999].

Note 3 to entry: 18.05.05 (2382)

[SOURCE:ISO-IEC-2382-18 * 1999 * * * ]

2121317 interoperability

<fundamental terms> capability to communicate, execute programs, or transfer data among various functional units in a manner that requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics of those units

Note 1 to entry: interoperability : term and definition standardized by ISO/IEC [ISO/IEC 2382-1:1993].

Note 2 to entry: 01.01.47 (2382)

[SOURCE:ISO-IEC-2382-1 * 1993 * * * ]

пт, 20 февр. 2026 г. в 23:04, John F Sowa <so...@bestweb.net>:

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[Joao Paulo Almeida]

On Sat, Feb 21, 2026 at 8:02 AM Alex Shkotin <alex.s...@gmail.com> wrote:

JFS:"Short answer:  Everything is a thing."

AS: No. The idea of a thing, of an entity, is a very developed category. We begin our study not even with the phenomenon itself, but rather try to guess and understand what's going on there: what entities are there and what the process is.

For me, it's always been logically unacceptable that the top class in OWL2 is Thing. Well, at least Something is.

Dear Alex, please clarify why you'd say "logically unacceptable". As I see it, "Thing" in OWL2 is just a label for the universal class. Paraphrasing what John said (and independently of OWL), it would be the class U such that for all x U(x).

What would be the best label for a universal class in your opinion?  I hope you are not suggesting "Something" as that label. 

best regards,

João Paulo

[Alex Shkotin]

Dear João Paulo, for me Something is better than Thing. But to be more careful let be begin from what I kept in mind to write as

IN ADDITION:

For me, philosophical terms are best systematized by Hegel. I asked chatGPT: "Briefly explain once again the place of the term 'thing' in Hegel's system of terms."

And I found his answer very helpful.

I would ask the same question about Peirce's approach, but I  can't evaluate the AI's answer usefulness.

I am ready to discuss the best term for upper class in OWL2. Which doctrine do you prefer?

best regards,

Alex

сб, 21 февр. 2026 г. в 15:04, 'Joao Paulo Almeida' via ontolog-forum <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>:

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[Joao Paulo Almeida]

Dear Alex,

To me, “Something” is most inadequate. It is an indefinite pronoun and not a noun. 

We use nouns like “Planet”, “Person” and “Earthquake” to label classes.

Alex Shotkin is a “Person” not a “Something”, the Earth is a “Planet”, not a “Something”. 

Further, you talk about the set of all things, not the set of all somethings. 

Every car is a thing. But: “Every car is a something” does not parse. 

So, definitely “Something” is a bad choice. (OMG KerML has the horrendous top-level “Anything” classifier, which is equally bad in my opinion.)

I prefer “Entity” to “Thing” for the lack of an ideal term. But “Thing” is the second-best if I were forced to pick. 

Best regards,
João Paulo

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[Gilles Kassel]

Dear Alex and João Paulo,

I do indeed find the term “Entity” preferable.

In philosophy, the term “entity” commonly refers to “everything that
exists.” Personally, I chose this term as the root of my EFO ontology.

However, beyond the choice of terminology, the question remains as to
determining the domain of these entities. As a first approximation, we
can say that everything we can think of exists, whether it be physical
or mental objects. But the question of non-existent objects always
comes back to us, whether they are fictional or have been thought of
as actually existing (e.g., Vulcan).

It is one thing to say that we can conceive of these non-existent
entities. By this we mean that our ideas/concepts about these entities
exist. But, do we want to consider that these entities to which these
ideas/concepts refer also exist?

Personally, this is the commitment I make, considering that these
non-existent objects nevertheless exist mentally. The domain of EFO
ontology thus corresponds to all those objects to which our thoughts
refer, considered as mental. In this way, I justify the choice of the
term “entity” as the root of ontology.

Now, we can also choose this term without worrying about the issue of
non-existent objects!

Best,

Gilles

'Joao Paulo Almeida' via ontolog-forum

<ontolo...@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

> Dear Alex,
>
> To me, “Something” is most inadequate. It is an indefinite pronoun and not
> a noun.
>
> We use nouns like “Planet”, “Person” and “Earthquake” to label classes.
>
> Alex Shotkin is a “Person” not a “Something”, the Earth is a “Planet”, not
> a “Something”.
>
> Further, you talk about the set of all things, not the set of all
> somethings.
>
> Every car is a thing. But: “Every car is a something” does not parse.
>
> So, definitely “Something” is a bad choice. (OMG KerML has the horrendous
> top-level “Anything” classifier, which is equally bad in my opinion.)
>
> I prefer “Entity” to “Thing” for the lack of an ideal term. But “Thing” is
> the second-best if I were forced to pick.
>
> Best regards,
> João Paulo
>
>
> Em sáb., 21 de fev. de 2026 às 11:07, Alex Shkotin <alex.s...@gmail.com>
> escreveu:
>
>> Dear João Paulo, for me Something is better than Thing. But to be more
>> careful let be begin from what I kept in mind to write as
>>
>> IN ADDITION:
>>
>> For me, philosophical terms are best systematized by Hegel. I asked
>> chatGPT: "Briefly explain once again the place of the term 'thing' in
>> Hegel's system of terms."
>>
>> And I found his answer

>> <https://chatgpt.com/s/t_6999b89439c081919d53c290a5fc79bd> very helpful.

>>
>> I would ask the same question about Peirce's approach, but I can't
>> evaluate the AI's answer usefulness.
>>
>>
>> I am ready to discuss the best term for upper class in OWL2. Which
>> doctrine do you prefer?
>>
>>
>> best regards,
>>
>> Alex
>>
>>
>> сб, 21 февр. 2026 г. в 15:04, 'Joao Paulo Almeida' via ontolog-forum <
>> ontolo...@googlegroups.com>:
>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Feb 21, 2026 at 8:02 AM Alex Shkotin <alex.s...@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> JFS:"Short answer: Everything is a thing."
>>>>
>>>> AS: No. The idea of a thing, of an entity, is a very developed
>>>> category. We begin our study not even with the phenomenon itself, but
>>>> rather try to guess and understand what's going on there: what
>>>> entities are
>>>> there and what the process is.
>>>>
>>>> For me, it's always been logically unacceptable that the top class in

>>>> OWL2 is Thing. Well, at least *Something* is.

>>>>
>>>>
>>> Dear Alex, please clarify why you'd say "logically unacceptable". As I
>>> see it, "Thing" in OWL2 is just a label for the universal class.
>>> Paraphrasing what John said (and independently of OWL), it would be the
>>> class U such that for all x U(x).
>>>
>>> What would be the best label for a universal class in your opinion? I
>>> hope you are not suggesting "Something" as that label.
>>>
>>> best regards,
>>> João Paulo
>>>
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>>>
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>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/CAFxxROQY%3DNff2uUjatDxXH73X4XmYZCpGjuidk4mm_Ot8y1pQA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
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>>
>
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[Alex Shkotin]

Dear Paolo,

The high-level terms we encounter in TLO and elsewhere are used within the framework of one or another approach to logic. Your own approach and preferences are natural, but it's still assumed that for subtle issues of logic and the use of high-level terms as a system, we turn to philosophers. I turn to Hegel, and you?

As for the philosophical understanding of "Something," here's Hegel's treatment in the basement [1]. You're underestimating, for example, pronouns—a level of powerful abstraction.

The relationship between categories is a subtle topic.

Alex

[1] https://chatgpt.com/s/t_6999e1b214fc81919efd03a9383a9e7d

Sure! Here's a review of the term "Something" in Hegel’s system, broken down into five points, translated into English:

---

Review of "Something" (Etwas) in Hegel’s System:

1. Conceptual Definition:

• "Something" (German: Etwas) represents a minimally determined being. It’s a step beyond pure being (rein Sein) and is the first level of determination. Unlike pure being, which is indeterminate, something already has some form of distinction but is still quite abstract.

2. Relation to "Nothing" and "Pure Being":

• Hegel’s logic begins with the dialectical movement of Being (Sein) and Nothing (Nichts). The contradiction between these two gives rise to Becoming (Werden). As the dialectic develops, Something (Etwas) is reached, which signifies a determinate form of being that emerges from the dialectical tension between being and nothing.

3. Connection to "Other" (Anderes):

• Something is inherently relational. It only exists by being distinguished from the Other (Anderes). This relationship of differentiation is essential because something cannot exist without something else to define it against. The concept of otherness is built into the very definition of something in Hegel’s system.

4. Finite vs. Infinite:

• Something is finite by nature. Hegel uses it to describe finite being that is still caught in the limits of determination. It cannot remain as something indefinitely; it has the potential to transition into something else. This transition from something to its opposite or negation leads to the more complex categories of the finite and infinite.

5. Relation to "Thing" (Ding):

• In contrast to "Thing" (Ding), which is a more developed concept, "Something" is more abstract. While Thing (Ding) refers to a unity of multiple properties, Something (Etwas) is an initial, rudimentary form of being that becomes more complex as it develops in Hegel's dialectical system.

---

In short, Something (Etwas) in Hegel’s logic is the first step towards becoming determinate. It is not an absolute or final category but a necessary moment in the unfolding of reality through the dialectical process.

сб, 21 февр. 2026 г. в 18:13, 'Joao Paulo Almeida' via ontolog-forum <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>:

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[Alex Shkotin]

Dear Gilles,

Understanding the subtleties of what nonexistent entities are and the modes of nonexistence, as well as, for example, where and how mental entities exist, is only possible by relying on a particular philosophical doctrine, i.e., by having a well-founded system of high-level terms.

If you have one, for example, in EFO, present it.

Among high-level terms, nothing can be chosen as a basis, only as a starting point—root in your terms - "Where to begin." Hegel begins with Being, and you start with Entity. It turns out that the interconnectedness of terms from the doctrine of Being is already given to you. This is, so to speak, the approach of the practical mind.

And again, I'm curious: do you adhere to any philosophical doctrine?

Best,

Alex

сб, 21 февр. 2026 г. в 18:40, 'Gilles Kassel' via ontolog-forum <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>:

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[Gilles Kassel]

Dear Alex,

I come back to the question: do we want to consider the entities to
which our ideas/concepts refer also exist? Reformulated in other
terms: what doctrine of reference do we adopt? What ontological status
should we accord to intentional objects, that is, to the objects to
which our mental states and acts are directed?

These questions, longstanding in philosophy, were vigorously debated
within Franz Brentano's school, notably between Husserl, Meinong,
Twardowski, and later Ingarden. History teaches us that Husserl's
doctrine, following Frege's theory of reference, according to which
intentional objects are external to the minds of subjects, became a
dogma in philosophy—see in particular the article by Barry Smith
(1978). Frege and Husserl: The Ontology of Reference. Journal of the
British Society for Phenomenology 9(2):111–125).

Recently, I defended an interpretation of Twardowski's doctrine that
tends to show that every (mental) concept becomes an internal (also
mental) object. The consequence is that all representations, including
those wrongly described as objectless, have an object. If I think of a
mountain made of gold, I have in mind an object to which I attribute
the properties of being a mountain and being made of gold.

The paper is in French :
https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n1-philoso010514/1122517ar/abstract/

Currently, my project consists of adopting this conception of the
concept to define a class of ontologies that I call epistemic.

https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/advances-kr/article/view/59175

Best,

Gilles

Alex Shkotin <alex.s...@gmail.com> a écrit :

> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/CAFxxROQY-sysSH4MD%2BJYpW7a2LHMf4TRh%3DPf0%2BxpvAcR_YAf8Q%40mail.gmail.com.

[hpo...@verizon.net]

What about something like a congressional district or a school district? They typically have no physical manifestations other than some drawing on a map. Most people don't really know what the boundaries are for these types of objects because they have no overt boundaries that caansn be detected by our senses. They are a social construct, shared by some population of minds - and quite changeable - by the stroke of a pen, or a few bytes in a computer.

Hans

>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/CAFWj3C9-Rger38z-46wR

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[do...@foxvog.org]

I would agree that Thing is a good English term to use for the universal
class. I dislike "Something" and consider "Entity" to be too narrow a
concept. Classes are things. Relationships among things are things.
Properties are things.

-- doug foxvog

>> And I found his answer [1] very helpful.

>> [2].

>
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> [3].

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> [4].
>
>
> Links:
> ------
> [1] https://chatgpt.com/s/t_6999b89439c081919d53c290a5fc79bd
> [2]
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/CAFWj3C8OeXTMG3Y5%2B4EMhJ2fFDyb9RFnZWBxMiD8gJjLZZj%2BkA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&amp;utm_source=footer
> [3]
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> [4]
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[do...@foxvog.org]

Cyc answered all these questions over 30 yests ago. Nonexistent objects
exist within a mental space, which Cyc calls a microtheory. Statements
in a microtheory can conflict with those in parallel microtheories.
Rules about how the workd/universe works can be different in different
microtheories.

Congressional districts are types of GeopolitcalEntity. Same with
PostalCodes and SchoolDistricts.

Wheel reinvention is not necessary. I urge folk to always check how Cyc
has ontologized a concept before trying to do it on your own. Millions
of the most common concepts are ontologized there.

Maybe what you want to encode isn't in Cyc, but a slightly broader
concept likely is. Make you specific concept a specialization of the
existing one.

-- doug foxvog

[Gilles Kassel]

Dear Hans,

The question you raise concerns “fiat” objects, as recently studied in
a series of articles by Barry Smith and Achille Varzi. As early as
1994 (Fiat Objects, proc. of ECAI), Barry wrote:

“(…) the entities in question (fiat objects and fiat processes) are
autonomous portions of autonomous extended reality and are ‘objective’
in this sense. The respective boundaries, however, are created by us;
they are the products of our mental and linguistic activity, and of
associated conventional norms and habits.”

The objectivity in question is that defined a century earlier by
Frege, and the portion of extended autonomous reality corresponds to
Frege's third world. We are therefore led to consider that these
objects are not in the minds of subjects.

The notion of concept and intentional object that I defend invites us
to make different commitments by considering, on the contrary, that
these objects are in the minds of the people concerned. More
precisely, since mental concepts are private, the assumption is that
these people have representations that are sufficiently similar (if
not identical) for these objects to be shared. When communicating
about these congressional districts or school districts, the people
concerned consider that they are thinking and talking about the “same”
thing. A notion of intersubjectivity replaces a notion of objectivity.

Now, these objects can indeed be modified with the stroke of a pen.
For the population concerned, this means that people must change their
representations.

Best,

Gilles

hpolzer via ontolog-forum <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/024001dca376%24ea3fa420%24bebeec60%24%40verizon.net.

[hpo...@verizon.net]

Gilles,

Thank you for the explanation and I support your notion of concept(ual?) and intentional object.

To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/20260221234004.Horde.ZjlGqHj1ERgHyPpheox5VJt%40webmail.u-picardie.fr.

[John F Sowa]

Doug, Hans, Alex and everybody else,

I agree with Doug Foxvog on these issues.  He has a lot of experience in working with Cyc.   And I strongly believe that Doug Lenat and his group have faced, addressed, and developed solutions for many issues and puzzles that are being discussed.

Over the years, I have had many discussions with Lenat.  We always agreed on the problems, but we might disagree on terminology and on certain design choices for the solution.

General principle:  When in doubt about any design decision about ontology, always look at what choices Lenat and other Cyc developers developed.  There is a 99% probability that they faced the same problems. 

It's unlikely that their design decisions were bad, but there may be better terminology for naming the solution.  It/s also possible that newer developments may suggest a more general solution that includes the Cyc solution as a special case. 

I am not claiming that Cyc methods are perfecr.  But I am saying that they developed useful solutions to more kinds of problems than anybody else on the planet.  We should learn from their experience -- their solutions, their partial solutions, and even their mistakes.

Since Doug Foxvog worked on Cyc, his knowledge is important, and he sould be consulted about any suggested solutions.

If any other Cyc users or developers are on this list, please speak up and let us know your experience and suggestions..

John

____________________

[Igor Toujilov]

That’s right. The term Thing was already established in industry
during the last decade with the concept of Internet of Things (IoT).
There are already huge implementations of IoT in software, for
example, Amazon Web Services (AWS) IoT.

I am a robotics programmer. Every time we make a new robot, we
provision it as an IoT thing.

> To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/bc9ad1cbd7723b3cfd2f9599630c0670%40foxvog.org.

[Alex Shkotin]

Dear Gilles,

I'm sincerely surprised that Plato's glorious idea "...Husserl's doctrine, following Frege's theory of reference, according to which intentional objects are external to the minds of subjects, became a dogma in philosophy…" is still alive. I'll definitely ask my formal philosopher friends this week.

I looked at your work in English – impressive!

However, I belong to a different school of thought: a theoretical text is taken and formalized. Even the best philosophical and even mathematical texts have to be systematized before.

For me, a classic example is the task of formalizing Hilbert's text.

The formalization of Hegel's Science of Logic was undertaken here.

With this approach, the formalization is inserted into the source text for each unit of text separately.

In this case, no new text is created; it's like a literal translation of the existing one. Moreover, new terms such as WorldlyEntity, Occurrent, etc. are not introduced unless absolutely necessary and with definition.

And each formula has its own verbalization.

For example, your axiom A1 should be formulated in natural language. I think something like this:

For any Entities x, w, if the Worldly Entity x occupies a spatiotemporal place in World w, then x is a Worldly Entity and w is a World.

So, if I understand you correctly, then I am with you that each person has their own ideal, which contains many "things", including various mental objects with which they work.

A very interesting work and project.

Many interesting things could be discussed. For example,

Starting with Entity, you also skip all the terms and categories of Hegel's Doctrine of Being. So, do all practitioners believe that qualities, quantities, continuity, space, and time can be used immediately without explanations or axiomatics? 

You mentioned Montague, and I remembered my work, which suggests that a formal language should be HOL, not FOL.

And so on.

It is nice to exchange ideas.

Best,

Alex

сб, 21 февр. 2026 г. в 22:57, 'Gilles Kassel' via ontolog-forum <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>:

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[John F Sowa]

Alex, Giles, and Igor,

Important point:  By making a statement more precise, formalization REDUCES the number of cases for which it may be true.  In short, formalization increases the probability that the statement is false.

Summary:  More precise => Therefore, more likely to be false.

In any empirical science, it is very difficult to determine whether the available evidence is sufficient to support a completely formalized theory.  In the early stages, a less formal summary may be a more useful guideline for further research.

There are also many issues to consider about FOL vs HOL.  In particular, reasoning methods in truly general HOL are impossibly complex for any practical computational system. 

Therefore, Common Logic provides the option of quantified variables that refer to functions and predicates without the computational complexity of truly general HOL.  All these issues have been discussed in the literature about CL, but most people who talk about there things have never read the literature.

John

 

---

From: "Alex Shkotin" <alex.s...@gmail.com>

[do...@foxvog.org]

AS, you are conflating "thing" with "entity" and then arguing that
Entity should not be the universal. Folk accept the second half of that
argument. But most of us accept Thing as a reasonable top node, thereby
disputing your conflation of Thing with Entity.

> On Sat, Feb 21, 2026 at 8:02 AM Alex Shkotin
> <alex.s...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> JFS:"Short answer: Everything is a thing."
>>
>> AS: No. The idea of a thing, of an entity, is a very developed
>> category. We begin our study not even with the phenomenon itself,
>> but rather try to guess and understand what's going on there: what
>> entities are there and what the process is.
>>
>> For me, it's always been logically unacceptable that the top class
>> in OWL2 is Thing. Well, at least Something is.
>
>

[Dan Gillman]

Arguing over terms without specifying what they mean is an exercise in futility.

Dan Gillman

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[Alex Shkotin]

Doug,

I rashly listed Thing and Entity as comma-separated: "The idea of a thing, of an entity, is a very developed category." I inadvertently wrote "category" instead of "categories" . The idea was that neither Thing nor Entity should be a top-level class.

Thank you for correcting my English. I'm sorry it led you to the radical conclusion that I'm conflating these two categories.

As for the place of the term Entity in Hegel's system of logical terms, here is [1] chatGPT's opinion, which I find interesting.

For me, a process is something, not a thing.

Singling out any one top-level term as the top-level one is a savage violation of the relationship between these terms, which only IT can withstand. Because the IT slogan is: "It works for me!" 🛠️

Alex

[1] https://chatgpt.com/s/t_699d80e1e8f0819191253301e7ccd2cd 

Very interesting question.

If we take the English term “entity” in its general sense (not strictly technical, but meaning “something that is”), there is no single exact equivalent in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. The closest term depends on what you mean by entity.

Let’s examine the possibilities.

---

1️⃣ If entity = “something that exists at all”

The closest Hegelian term is:

Etwas — “something”

This is minimally determined being — simply “something” as opposed to nothing.
Any entity in the most abstract sense would be an Etwas.

But this is a very early and abstract level in Hegel’s system.

---

2️⃣ If entity = “an object with properties”

Then the closest term is:

Ding — “thing”

This is:

• a bearer of properties

• a relatively stable unity of characteristics

In IT, an entity is often understood as a carrier of attributes — this is quite close to Hegel’s concept of thing within the Doctrine of Essence.

---

3️⃣ If entity = “something that independently exists”

Then possible terms are:

• Seiendes — being (that which is)

• Existierendes — something that exists

These are more ontological terms, less structural.

---

4️⃣ If entity = “a unit within a system of relations”

Then a better match might be:

Moment

For Hegel, nothing is absolutely self-subsistent; everything is a moment of a larger whole.
In that sense, an entity as a modeled element within a system is closer to a “moment” than to a “thing.”

---

5️⃣ Strictly speaking

There is no category in Hegel that simply means “entity in general.”

Because:

• “entity” presupposes a fixed ontology of discrete things,

• whereas Hegel does not begin from an ontology of ready-made entities,

• but from a self-developing structure of determinations.

---

Summary

IT “entity”	Closest Hegelian term
just “something”	Etwas
bearer of attributes	Ding
existing being	Seiendes
element in a system	Moment

If we think in terms of the Entity–Attribute–Relationship model, the closest equivalent would be Ding (“thing”).

With one important caveat: in Hegel, a “thing” is not an ultimate unit of reality but only a stage in the logical development of determinations.

вт, 24 февр. 2026 г. в 04:49, <do...@foxvog.org>:

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