Wittgenstein and the foundations of meaning
bruces...@cox.net
This point about intentionality raises an issue that keeps coming up for me.
JS
> intentionality is fundamental to every thought, action, and statement by anybody about anything at any time.
I absolutely agree with this. I think it should be foundational to international standards on ontology. This principle is a cornerstone for authentic deep understanding of where meaning comes from. I’d say this idea has many implications for cognitive psychology.
And it seems clear that "intention" in speech and action is closely related to "stipulation". When people say things they intend, they are stipulating meaning -- they are asserting an intention expressed in words. For me, this goes directly to the aphorism from Lewis Carroll (lecturer in mathematics at Oxford and author of Alice in Wonderland):
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all."
From my point of view, Lewis Carroll has got it right. But this perspective seems to be an outlier. The more popular/common view seems to emerge from Wittgenstein’s argument that word meaning is defined by “its use in the language”.
I may be a bit confused about Wittgenstein, and maybe somebody can clarify this point, but from my perspective, this argument that word meaning is grounded in common use is a bit misleading.
Where does common use come from? From our perspective today – seeing this issue from the point of view of computer science and machine translation – and the currently fashionable respect for “diversity” in cultures (“different strokes for different folks”) -- it’s a statistical aggregate of all the ways a word tends to be used, rolled up into a single set of general definitions. Ok, yes, we need this common point of reference, true. But we should not lose track of the creative source – which is the individual voice, the individual speech act. This is where creativity comes from. And if there is a single standard on word meaning, it ought to be strictly grounded in individual human intention in any given moment and context. This is how it actually works, and to see it any other way is slightly “unscientific.”
What we are actually doing when we speak is using words intentionally to convey a meaning we intend. But of course, since we want to be successful in our communications, we tend to draw our assumptions on meaning from our current perception of “the common pool of meaning” (more or less what Wittgenstein is talking about). But this is only a heuristic, a practical choice that improves the probability that the listener will understand what we are talking about.
The ultimate authority – as Lewis Carroll and Humpty-Dumpty insist – is the individual speaker in the actual context of usage – and not “the common pool”.
I say – that people on Ontolog ought to get clear about this. This entire semantics industry should be clear on this. The notion that word meaning in a local context can be authoritatively grounded in some imaginary common pool is misguided and slightly unconscious. It seems like a holdover from the days of games like Scrabble – where we rest the authority for word existence in a dictionary. Ok, so in that game, yes, we need a authority, a referee. Lewis Carroll was probably rebelling against this kind of socially-presumed and imposed authority, when he could clearly see that perspective was a bit dim-bulb and grounded in some kind of semi-mindless rule of the masses. Carroll asserts that the ultimate authority for word meaning reside with the user of the word – who takes their chances – like any poet -- on how well they will be understood.
***
Here a quote on Wittgenstein I came across:
The meaning of a word hinges on its usefulness in context, not its ideal referent outside of all possible contexts.
Wittgenstein’s teaching has practical value. Why waste time arguing over issues that will never be resolved when the whole thing could be deflated with a simple question: ‘Are we even talking about the same thing?’ If you struggle to overcome the urge to define things too carefully, or find yourself becoming obsessed about the meaning of words and their ‘true’ definition, or if you are convinced, like many philosophers, that the existence of a word logically implies some metaphysical essence, or Platonic form, that corresponds to this word, remember that what gives a word meaning is the conventional social discourse within which it is employed. By attending to the ordinary language contexts that give words their meaning, we can avoid misusing them and trying to make them mean things that they aren’t made to mean. The more that we return words to their home, seeing them in terms of the ordinary language contexts that they work within, the easier it becomes to untie the knots in language and understand what is really being said.
The author is on the right track. Let go of any notions of Platonic essence. Word meaning takes shape based on actual use in actual immediate context. But we need to go yet another step. Word meaning resides in the intention of the speaker.
This is the proper location for the absolute understanding of meaning. Start there – and then negotiate – and build your probabilistic common pool. That’s how humans communicate most authentically – and an idea millions of us probably need to absorb – given our current political realities…
https://blogs.illinois.edu/view/25/108073
Bruce Schuman
Santa Barbara CA USA, 805-705-9174
Weavingunity.net
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of John F Sowa
Sent: Sunday, March 31, 2019 7:52 AM
To: ontolo...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Identity vs, Spa-Tem Location
Dear Matthew and Jon A,
MW
> Before we know that we do not even know what evidence might be useful
> to determine whether we are looking at the same thing or not.
Yes. We need a huge amount of intentional thought, language, and action to distinguish relevant data from unintended distractions.
> [JFS] The way the US army answered the question about rifles is the
> only general principle that can end the chain: Assert some officially
> specified identity conditions: Two rifles are "the same"
> if and only if they have the same serial number on their stock.
>
> [MW] Yes. This is an option when intentionality comes into play.
But intentionality is fundamental to every thought, action, and statement by anybody about anything at any time.
MW
> I agree intentionality is another key component an ontology needs to
> account for.
My only revision is to replace "another key" with "inescapable".
Any action that is unintentional is an error, an accident, a misstep, an unconscious lapse, or an irrelevant twitch.
JA
> Some problems can't be solved in the paradigms where they first
> appear, which is why we keep recurring to them without quite freeing
> ourselves from the loops in which they ensnare us.
Yes. Physics is the most precise of the hard sciences. But that precision can require billions of dollars of intentional effort to distinguish the "objective" phenomena from the unintended side
effects: the Higgs boson, life on Mars, gravitational waves...
JA
> one of the most critical passages in all of Peirce's explorations:
>
> C.S. Peirce • Doctrine Of Individuals
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/C.S._Peirce_%E2%80%A2_Doctri
> ne_Of_Individuals
Yes. I recommend that page of quotations by Peirce.
John
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Patrick Cassidy
I got the impression that Humpty-Dumpty was an ontologist. In an ontology, a term (read ‘word’) means exactly what the logic says it means no more, no less.
It’s also true that the terms in an ontology get their meaning from their use in the ‘language’, which is the ontology. If the ontology is used in an application, the ‘use’ includes whatever the application does with the terms. Same for database terms.
For people, of course, the terms mostly refer to things in the real world and then the meaning is intimately linked to things in the real world. But *how* it is linked depends on the arrangement of billions of billions of neural connections in the brain of the person using the term. Tough to analyze.
Pat
P.S. to most ordinary folk, an ontologist talking about ontology can seem as weird as Humpty-Dumpty. Blank stares, mostly.
Bruce>
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all."
Bruce>
From my point of view, Lewis Carroll has got it right. But this perspective seems to be an outlier. The more popular/common view seems to emerge from Wittgenstein’s argument that word meaning is defined by “its use in the language”.
Ferenc Kovacs
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Ronald Stamper
On 31 Mar 2019, at 19:11, bruces...@cox.net wrote:
This point about intentionality raises an issue that keeps coming up for me.JS> intentionality is fundamental to every thought, action, and statement by anybody about anything at any time.I absolutely agree with this. I think it should be foundational to international standards on ontology. This principle is a cornerstone for authentic deep understanding of where meaning comes from. I’d say this idea has many implications for cognitive psychology.And it seems clear that "intention" in speech and action is closely related to "stipulation". When people say things they intend, they are stipulating meaning -- they are asserting an intention expressed in words. For me, this goes directly to the aphorism from Lewis Carroll (lecturer in mathematics at Oxford and author of Alice in Wonderland):"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.""The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things.""The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all."From my point of view, Lewis Carroll has got it right. But this perspective seems to be an outlier. The more popular/common view seems to emerge from Wittgenstein’s argument that word meaning is defined by “its use in the language”.I may be a bit confused about Wittgenstein, and maybe somebody can clarify this point, but from my perspective, this argument that word meaning is grounded in common use is a bit misleading.Where does common use come from? From our perspective today – seeing this issue from the point of view of computer science and machine translation – and the currently fashionable respect for “diversity” in cultures (“different strokes for different folks”) -- it’s a statistical aggregate of all the ways a word tends to be used, rolled up into a single set of general definitions. Ok, yes, we need this common point of reference, true. But we should not lose track of the creative source – which is the individual voice, the individual speech act. This is where creativity comes from. And if there is a single standard on word meaning, it ought to be strictly grounded in individual human intention in any given moment and context. This is how it actually works, and to see it any other way is slightly “unscientific.”What we are actually doing when we speak is using words intentionally to convey a meaning we intend. But of course, since we want to be successful in our communications, we tend to draw our assumptions on meaning from our current perception of “the common pool of meaning” (more or less what Wittgenstein is talking about). But this is only a heuristic, a practical choice that improves the probability that the listener will understand what we are talking about.The ultimate authority – as Lewis Carroll and Humpty-Dumpty insist – is the individual speaker in the actual context of usage – and not “the common pool”.I say – that people on Ontolog ought to get clear about this. This entire semantics industry should be clear on this. The notion that word meaning in a local context can be authoritatively grounded in some imaginary common pool is misguided and slightly unconscious. It seems like a holdover from the days of games like Scrabble – where we rest the authority for word existence in a dictionary. Ok, so in that game, yes, we need a authority, a referee. Lewis Carroll was probably rebelling against this kind of socially-presumed and imposed authority, when he could clearly see that perspective was a bit dim-bulb and grounded in some kind of semi-mindless rule of the masses. Carroll asserts that the ultimate authority for word meaning reside with the user of the word – who takes their chances – like any poet -- on how well they will be understood.***Here a quote on Wittgenstein I came across:The meaning of a word hinges on its usefulness in context, not its ideal referent outside of all possible contexts.Wittgenstein’s teaching has practical value. Why waste time arguing over issues that will never be resolved when the whole thing could be deflated with a simple question: ‘Are we even talking about the same thing?’ If you struggle to overcome the urge to define things too carefully, or find yourself becoming obsessed about the meaning of words and their ‘true’ definition, or if you are convinced, like many philosophers, that the existence of a word logically implies some metaphysical essence, or Platonic form, that corresponds to this word, remember that what gives a word meaning is the conventional social discourse within which it is employed. By attending to the ordinary language contexts that give words their meaning, we can avoid misusing them and trying to make them mean things that they aren’t made to mean. The more that we return words to their home, seeing them in terms of the ordinary language contexts that they work within, the easier it becomes to untie the knots in language and understand what is really being said.The author is on the right track. Let go of any notions of Platonic essence. Word meaning takes shape based on actual use in actual immediate context. But we need to go yet another step. Word meaning resides in the intention of the speaker.This is the proper location for the absolute understanding of meaning. Start there – and then negotiate – and build your probabilistic common pool. That’s how humans communicate most authentically – and an idea millions of us probably need to absorb – given our current political realities…
<image001.png>
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<humptydumpty2.png>
John F Sowa
> Responsibilities introduce much complexity if you want to compute using
> our method - if you are prepared to take responsibility for the
> approximations you introduce, you can reduce that complexity easily
> enough, but you cannot be evasive on that score. That is really
> irritating for AI but quite positive for Collective Intelligence, CI.
human project of any value for any purpose -- especially engineering.
That is one of many reasons why I maintain that purpose, goals,
responsibility -- in one word, *intentions* -- are essential for
any top-level ontology.
John
Steve Newcomb
Just as ...
[..,.] responsibility is more fundamental than truth [...]... rhetoric precedes philosophy.
Ontology is the rhetoric of human perspective. One way to accord due respect to the perspectives of real persons is to express them rigorously, warts and all, not omitting their inevitable inconsistencies.
But why bother?
I would answer, "Mainly to sustain meaningful dialog between perspectives, to improve them, and to support the adoption of whatever perspectives best fit human goals."
There's another, less obvious but more important reason: to elevate respect for human creativity, diversity and imperfection. It's not about efficiency or profit, or even about public policy. It's about rejecting slavery in all its forms and embracing liberty. It's about bending the arc of history toward justice.
Finally, the most occult and perhaps most compelling reason: simply to practice the rhetoric of ontology. To make it work as an everyday affair. To serve. It's a high calling.
[Aside about rhetoric and responsibility: I can't help noticing that, in most of the public spaces on the web, there's an ongoing stampede *away* from personal responsibility. Instead of owning our perspectives and standing behind our utterances, we actively conceal our identities and hide behind pseudonyms and avatars. Most of our utterances are like confetti thrown into a crowd, but sometimes our anonymous confetti is more like lit firecrackers, and too often it's like bombs. At best, it's not constructive. Due caution is always warranted; words matter. So why do social media not demand constructive intent, at least to the extent of disallowing anonymity? Is it just for private gain at public expense?]
bruces...@cox.net
How about replacing the word “game” – which is confusing and perhaps misleading – and replacing it with the word “negotiation” – which can be a “game-like” process – and might have a winner and loser like many games – but seems to more accurately describe what is actually happening in human interaction – as people work together towards an agreement --
?
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Jack Park
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bruces...@cox.net
This video is quite fascinating.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BhuOzBS_O-M
And it goes over this same issue – about the relationship between games and negotiation – and it describes how this regularly happens at large scale.
One issue that comes up for me – is “local independence” – which I suppose has something to do with competition and wanting to “win”
But see it in a global context – as “one system” – with all these contending elements, all pushing one another in locally independent ways – this seems like a fantastic model for -- ??? – the future of democracy????
Competition drives optimization – and in the context of the whole – “a rising tide lifts all boats”???
I’ll have to watch this video a few more times…..
From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Jack Park
Sent: Monday, April 8, 2019 10:29 AM
To: ontolo...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Wittgenstein and the foundations of meaning
There is a context in which avatars cannot be all that bad, IMHO. Scholarship on the nature of avatars abounds, but my favorite is this John Seely Brown quote: "I would rather hire a high-level World of Warcraft player than an MBA from Harvard".
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Michael DeBellis
John F Sowa
I have been tied up with other work, which has prevented me from
commenting on this thread. But I strongly believe that Ludwig W.
was on the right track in his later philosophy.
Some of the issues result from differences between the English 'game'
and the German 'Spiel'. For example, the German verb 'spielen' is
used for playing a violin, but nobody would talk about gaming a violin.
Ronald
> crucial advice to avoid divorcing problems of meaning from the
> activity/game being conducted/played.
word 'Sprachspiel' as 'Speech activity' or 'task-related dialect'
or 'sublanguage' or 'jargon'.
For example, turn to any daily newspaper and look at the language
used to talk about the stock market, the fashion industry, the
cooking and foodie pages, or the many different sports, each of
which has its own jargon. Just think of 'love' in tennis,
'birdie' in golf, 'walk' in baseball, 'power play' in hockey...
Bruce
> perhaps misleading – and replacing it with the word “negotiation” –
> which can be a “game-like” process – and might have a winner and
> loser like many games
their characteristic jargon, but they don't have winners & losers
or negotiations. Think of Speech activity instead of Speech game.
There is often some mixing of jargon. When trains began to
replace horses in the 19th c, people would talk about the "hind
wheels" of a locomotive. Today, when most ships "set sail",
the "sailors" don't climb the rigging to set the sails.
Each one of those specialties has a totally different vocabulary
and characteristic way of talking. That's what Wittgenstein
meant by a Sprachspiel.
Michael,
> thought a lot of the time because he changed his philosophy
> significantly from his early work to later
in 1922) and his work in the 1930s and later.
In his first book, he followed Frege and Russell in a very strict
logic-based philosophy. Then after he "solved" all the problems
of philosophy, he left Cambridge to teach elementary school in an
Austrian mountain village.
That's where he learned that children (and grown-ups) don't think
the way Frege and Russell said they should. When he came down
from the mountain in the 1930s, he had a very different view
of language, life, and logic.
Philosophers who like their philosophy nice and tidy love his
first book and hate his later work. Wittgenstein never gave up
on logic. He kept saying "Yes, but..." And so do I.
I address those ideas in "Signs, Processes, and Language Games":
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
John
Jon Awbrey
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
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John F Sowa
TK
> I am by no means an expert with Wittgenstein's texts or their
> translations to English and if there was a particular meaning
> attached to 'game' and 'Spiel' but I am very familiar with
> German/English translation and word use and my first instinct
> would be to translate 'Spiel' with 'play'.
I agree. But note the way Wittgenstein introduced the word
'Sprachspiel' in _Philosophical Investigations_, Section 23:
LW
> Das Wort "Sprachspiel" soll hier hervorheben daß das _Sprechen_
> der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit, oder einer Lebensform.
>
> The word "language-game" is used here to emphasize the fact that the
> _speaking_ of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.
Since a Sprachspiel is part of an activity, he might have chosen the
word "Sprachtätigkeit". But that would take four syllables.
JA
that there are countless (unzähliger) kinds. See below for a copy
of Section 23, which lists a sampling of the variety.
Every use of language of any kind involves some Sprachspiel.
It's impossible to use language outside of a Sprachspiel.
For example, the use of language for buying a hamburger at McDonald's
involves a Sprachspiel that is similar to the language for buying
popcorn at the movies. But it's different from buying dinner at a
restaurant and very different from buying a car or a house.
Each kind has a distinctive syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.
Note the ending of Section 23 below. There Wittgenstein criticizes
the narrow views of "logicians", which include his mentors (Frege
and Russell) and himself as the author of his first book.
John
________________________________________________________________________
Section 23 of Wittgenstein's _Philosophical Investigations_ :
23. But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question,
and command? --- There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of
use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this
multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types
of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and
others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of
this from the changes in mathematics.)
The word "language-game" is used here to emphasize the fact that the
_speaking_ of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.
Consider the the variety of language-games in the following examples,
and in others:
* Giving orders, and obeying them---
* Describing the appearance of an object, or
giving its measurements---
* Constructing an object from a description (a
drawing)---
* Reporting an event---
* Speculating about an event---
* Forming and testing a hypothesis---
* Presenting the results of an experiment in
tables and diagrams---
* Making up a story; and reading it---
* Play-acting---
* Singing catches---
* Guessing riddles---
* Making a joke; telling it---
* Solving a problem in practical arithmetic---
* Translating from one language into another---
* Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
--- It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in
language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of
word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of
language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)
Jon Awbrey
All sorts of players have given us all sorts of spiel about speech acts over the years,
but Peirce stands out from the chorus in giving us generative models of semiosis based
on triadic sign relations that maintain a constant relation among signs, their active
interpretants in conduct, and pragmata, the objects and objectives of the whole action.
Shy of that, the speilerei of Austin and Wittgenstein simply never gets off the ground.
Regards,
Jon
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John F Sowa
> Peirce stands out from the chorus in giving us generative models
> of semiosis based on triadic sign relations that maintain a constant
> relation among signs, their active interpretants in conduct, and
> pragmata, the objects and objectives of the whole action.
In fact, he developed his major contributions to semiotic *after*
he had worked as an associate editor of the _Century Dictionary_.
During that time, Peirce had written, revised, or reviewed over
16,000 definitions -- far more than the overwhelming majority of
people working on ontology or knowledge representation today.
But his experience in defining those words, led Peirce to anticipate
much of what Wittgenstein wrote about Sprachspiele. I believe Peirce
would enthusiastically agree with Wittgenstein's later philosophy.
In fact, LW himself credits Frank Ramsey with pointing out the errors
in his first book and giving him critical insights that led to his
later philosophy. And Ramsey had studied Peirce's writings (from
some of the early publications) and recommended them to Wittgenstein.
But it's not clear how much LW had read by or about Peirce.
For more about the relationship between Peirce, Ramsey, and
Wittgenstein, see the article by Jaime Nubiola:
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTM
John
bruces...@cox.net
Thank you for this, Michael.
I think this note is the 7th time in the last few days I have tried to write a response to this thread, on the theme of “language games” – and every time I have shut myself down for being too aggressive and a little presumptuous/snarky. Maybe it’s in the air – Easter and the Notre Dame fire accelerate my emotions, and the Barr/Trump process compels me to look for a significantly better approach to semantics. We have to stop dawdling and being politely confused, and figure this out.
I looked at a lot of articles on “Wittgenstein and word games” in the last couple of days and still had no clue on why people think this idea is interesting.
But I think I found something this morning I can chew on: John’s essay on word games:
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/lgsema.pdf
“Language Games, A Foundation for Semantics and Ontology”
I’m going through this article in detail, reading and commenting, and I do find many points of significant agreement – and I want to note those points carefully with appreciation. But why “game” is the best and most illuminating interpretation possible, I have as yet no idea.
If this concept of “game” is our “foundation” – I’d say we are building on sand. But let me read this article carefully.
PS -- think Humpty Dumpty gives us a great clue to a very productive way to understand meaning:
Language and meaning are intentional. And where Humpty says “it means just want I choose it to mean” – neither more nor less -- he is saying something very significant.
That last phrase – neither more nor less – is an exactingly mathematical concept that is a precise key—grounded in dimensionality and measurement – to exactly how meaning works (and not the vague metaphor most people probably think it is – since they have no idea what “more” or “less” could mean) . But I say that this is how we escape from the world of wobbly/mushy metaphors and move on to an absolutely stable and rational foundation for meaning.
“Stipulation is a top-down intentional cascade of dimensional measurements or affirmations” – and it is that fluency that explains the complexity and immediate adaptability of language that people are trying to characterise with the metaphor of “game”.
From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Michael DeBellis
Sent: Monday, April 15, 2019 11:38 AM
To: ontolog-forum <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>
Subject: [ontolog-forum] Re: Wittgenstein and the foundations of meaning
Also, yes – this theme of “each person has their own language” is also very important.
Bruce, for what it's worth I completely agree with you (and Humpty Dumpty) and not with Wittgenstein. Although it's difficult to pin down what Wittgenstein actually thought a lot of the time because he changed his philosophy significantly from his early work to later and also because his writing style wasn't very analytic, He wrote a lot in aphorisms kind of like many of Nietzsche's books and like Nietzsche I think the result is that a lot of philosophers interpret Wittgenstein to mean what they want him to mean. In any case I agree "common use" isn't a scientific concept, it's a common sense concept and the goal of science (at least as I see it) is to move beyond common sense. BTW, I also think the Humpty Dumpty point of view is consistent with Chomsky's approach. It's why Chomsky coined the term I-Language to emphasize that each person has their own individual language to express their Intentions (the "I" in I-Language means both Individual and Intentional). We can communicate according to this view because our I-Languages are common enough that we can understand each other even though each one is subtly unique.
I totally agree with that.
Michael
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John Bottoms
The term "Game" is a professional formalism that should be used in dealing with computer linguistics issues. The components of a game are, at a minimum, 1.) Inputs, 2.) Rules, and 3.) Outputs. These define all the basic components of a formal game, and any exchanges between any agents can be defined within this framework. "Rules" includes "negotiation", which can be specified by the rules.
The effort to change "Language Games" to "Language negotiation" would narrow or restrict the abstract concept rather than clarify it. Likewise, "play" as in "Word Play" does not specify any components and is meaningless in the sense that it does not aid to just rename a concept, thought "Word Play" might help in colloquial usages.
-John Bottoms
FirstStar Systems
Concord, MA USA
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Marco Neumann
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Marco Neumann
KONA
Michael DeBellis
bruces...@cox.net
Just very quick – thanks Michael, and thanks John and Marco for your interesting comments.
My primary motivations are “humanitarian” – though I have a very long history of pursuing the precise analysis of holistic things. If you want to quickly eyeball something the likes of which you may have never seen, here is a small Annapurna of interconnected thought-forms that emerged for me two or three years ago.
I’ve done a huge amount of homework on these themes, and maybe (who knows) all this potential might somehow magically (or by grace) coalesce. I do think there is a very powerful and very simple integration waiting in the wings, like a Michelangelo statue that exists hidden inside the uncarved rock… ”waiting to be revealed”
The last month or two, I’ve continued to flirt with this very wild and explosive idea of a “closed loop interval ontology” – which is based on the notion that all measurement is defined in “intervals” – the way the decimal system (and yes, the Dewey Decimal system) is divided into recursive/cascaded levels of decimal places – each one of which takes exactly the same form, at a different level of scale.
I think this idea maps into all the major ontological forms that are based on hierarchy (taxonomy, mereology, the very notion of abstraction itself – the concept of “many/one”) – all taking the same general form.
So all of this maps onto an interval like simple “ruler” – which is a measurement template of “unit 1” – and every measure defined on it also takes that form, of “unit 1” (1, .1, .01, .001, .0001, .00001, .000001…)
The head-bending explosive notion is that this form can be twisted around on itself (like a moebius strip) such that top level “unit” (“the entire ruler as one unit”) can be mapped directly straight into the infinitesimal (smallest units at the edge of continuity). This “closes the space” into a single integral form that I tend to believe can map and define every conceivable thought-form, at any level of abstraction.
I’ve been going through every article on Wikipedia that relates to the concept of continuum and linear order, and exploring ways those pieces can be pasted together to form a one-size-fits-all-conceptual-structures model of reality. In my giddier moments, I tend to suppose this might be the most powerful single idea in the history of philosophy.
Keep it simple 😊
Diagram of how to build a cathedral – or an entire civilization…
From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Michael DeBellis
Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2019 11:53 AM
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Michael DeBellis
John F Sowa
> My primary motivations are “humanitarian” – though I have a very
> long history of pursuing the precise analysis of holistic things.
meant by saying that a language game is a form of life (Lebensform):
"All the world’s a stage, And all the men and women merely players."
(See below for the full quotation.)
Note that each person "plays many parts", and each part is a different
form of life with a different language game (Sprachspiel). In just
a single day, the language game changes with every situation.
Typical situations: Getting up in the morning; having breakfast;
going to work; in meetings with colleagues, managers, visitors,
clients...; coffee break; having lunch; back to work; going home;
at home with family...
With every entrance and exit of any of the people (actors), the
situations change, the topics change, and the forms of life change.
At every step, the language -- vocabulary, syntax, semantics, and
tone of voice -- switches to a different Sprachspiel.
The different "forms of life" and the language that goes with them
are especially noticeable when you visit family and friends from
an earlier stage -- Thanksgiving Dinner or a reunion of any kind:
high school, college, old friends, family, neighbors...
The task of developing ontologies for all those forms of life would
be a good exercise in "the precise analysis of holistic things."
John
_______________________________________________________________
From As You Like It, Act II, Scene VII, by William Shakespeare,
All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and their entrances,
And one man in his time plays many parts,
His acts being seven ages. At first, the infant,
Mewling and puking in the nurse’s arms.
Then the whining schoolboy, with his satchel
And shining morning face, creeping like snail
Unwillingly to school. And then the lover,
Sighing like furnace, with a woeful ballad
Made to his mistress’ eyebrow. Then a soldier,
Full of strange oaths and bearded like the pard,
Jealous in honor, sudden and quick in quarrel,
Seeking the bubble reputation
Even in the cannon’s mouth. And then the justice,
In fair round belly with good capon lined,
With eyes severe and beard of formal cut,
Full of wise saws and modern instances;
And so he plays his part. The sixth age shifts
Into the lean and slippered pantaloon,
With spectacles on nose and pouch on side;
His youthful hose, well saved, a world too wide
For his shrunk shank, and his big manly voice,
Turning again toward childish treble, pipes
And whistles in his sound. Last scene of all,
That ends this strange eventful history,
Is second childishness and mere oblivion,
Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.
Marco Neumann
* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vTqSIzMnsRI
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Nadin, Mihai
Wittgenstein and the game discussion:
https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/voices.uchicago.edu/dist/9/177/files/2014/01/Gustafsson-Wittgenstein-and-chess-W-workshop.pdf
You will be surprised by how precise his take is. Yes, the meaning is in the use, in the pragmatics.
Best wishes.
Mihai Nadin
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Michael DeBellis
Marco Neumann
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bruces...@cox.net
This “Big Book of Concepts” seems to be an excellent and high-level review of concept theory.
I just ordered a copy from Amazon.
I browsed quite a bit of it through the “Look Inside” feature, and liked everything I saw. The fact that it was first published in 2002 doesn’t seem to outdate it, at least not for me.
Plus there is a very promising 5-star review, that reads
The Big Book of Concepts is the best book on concepts since George Lakoff's Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, published 15 years earlier. I am a professional cognitive scientist and I first read this book a number of years ago. I recently needed to look something up on infant concept formation, so I reread the chapter called "Concepts in Infancy," and was reminded just how good the book is. It is crammed with so much information that it has the potential for being as dry as dust, but, happily, it is loaded with clear examples, and is written in such a fluid style that you tend to keep reading, even after you've found the item or reference or example you were looking for. The book includes in-depth discussions of everything from theories of what constitutes a concept, to how they develop, to how they are related to words, and to the role of computational modeling in concept understanding (the succinct description of Nosofsky's Generalized Context Model, pp. 65-71, is one of the clearest, simplest descriptions of that model around). In short, for people interested in concepts and categorization, this book is a must-have for their library.
From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Marco Neumann
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 4:50 AM
To: ontolo...@googlegroups.com
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Michael DeBellis
bruces...@cox.net
Thanks Michael, good to see this substantial comment. I’ve ordered this book, and really look forward to working through it, but it’s going to be week or so. I did eyeball the preview on Amazon and it’s very promising and more or less right up my alley.
This morning in my world, the big news is author and presidential candidate Marianne Williamson’s book The Politics of Love, which I must say I simply find thrilling. Maybe networking with her can help get the global ontology movement unstuck from its chronic complexity. I’d love to do that. https://www.amazon.com/Politics-Love-Handbook-American-Revolution/dp/0062873938
*
I thought I’d go through your message in “dialogue” format.
Bruce, glad you like The Big Book of Concepts. I haven't finished it yet but I agree it's excellent. I really like the early discussion of the various mathematical models to attempt and explain prototype or exemplar kinds of reasoning.
I do want to go through the mathematical models. Based on what I’ve seen of the Big Book of Concepts, it’s all very resonant with my kind of analysis and need for mathematically precise but intuitive models. The author Gregory Murphy is a professor of psychology, so maybe that’s why I find it understandable – I was a psych major at UC Santa Cruz.
And yes, I like his review of conceptual theory. I was first introduced to a lot of this through the book Categories and Concepts, by Smith and Medin, which I first heard about from John’s book Conceptual Structures – a long time ago. Gregory Murphy generally follows their paradigm, using their terms. I’ve since then bought and read many books on cognitive psychology and these various approaches, including a few books by Lakoff. A couple of years ago I corresponded briefly with Elinor Rosch.
And of course I come into this conversation from my own point of view, which I first developed as the concept of “The Universal Hierarchy of Abstraction” and later a more detailed mathematical analysis based on the concept of “synthetic dimension” – which is recursively defined as an algebraic structure suggesting that “every semantic structure is entirely constructed from synthetic dimensions” --where a synthetic dimension is a dimension the values of which are also dimensions. So the claim is, every ordered class is a synthetic dimension, and an example is a “taxon” in mathematical taxonomy, where the objects in the taxon can be ordered by one of the defining dimensions the objects have in common. Every ordered class (like a taxon) is a synthetic dimension – and its objects can also be defined in synthetic dimensions. Every semantic structure – from the most complex to the most simple – defined in one primitive algebraic element, in a form that dovetails perfectly with the architecture of computer data structures.
This does get a little tricky, but the entire concept is grounded in the notion of “cut” or distinction, and thereby maps into the real number line and the continuum. This model proposes that a synthetic dimension is a “universal primitive” from which all conceptual structure can be constructed and defined (kind of in the spirit of “compositional semantics” – bigger units built out of small units in a strictly-defined linear format grounded in empirical measurement) I’ve done a lot with that theme, but the most readable articles are still rather ancient and found at originresearch.com
So the bottom line in this approach goes to this notion of parsing the continuum. In this approach, every idea or concept originates as a parsing or cut in the primal undifferentiated tabular-rasa wordless continuum, then takes on structure and dimensional values like “more or less”. Labels/words get attached to these objects, and these structure become word meanings. Over time many of these word meaning definitions become approximately institutionalized and socialized, and this is how civilization develops a common language we can share.
This is consistent with the Humpty-Dumpty approach of independent top-down context-specific stipulative word meaning, as those individualized special-case interpretations enter the common pool of human experience, enabling shared communication. This of course is one of the explanation for “vagueness” or maybe “round-off error” in word meanings. Seen this way, every word is to some degree a generalization, that might require further specification if the inherent ambiguity in the term becomes troublesome or confusing or controversial.
In spite of the criticism of people like Lakoff there is a fair amount of evidence that set theoretic hierarchies are important in the way people naturally organize information. There is some fairly dated but still excellent research by Frank Keil that shows how much children leverage taxonomies as they understand new concepts and also work by Scott Atran and others that show people from Hunter Gatherer tribes to Biologists seem to use the same basic common sense ontology as a starting point for reasoning about the biological world.
I agree with this – and want to tack in an observation about “empirical” theories of psychological practice. In creating a psychological theory, the issue of developing a well-correlated empirical model of “what people actually do” can become misleading. People don’t all do the same thing, so finding examples, or finding counter examples, may not be definitive (”actually prove anything”).
So, do “people” think in hierarchical terms? The answer probably is “some do, some don’t, and in various ways, with differing degrees of accuracy and utility.” Trying to make general statements about “humans” can be very misleading. So what is the right approach? I’d say it ought to involve the effort to create a “correct” way to think – to be accurate, to be rational, to be both empirical and holistic at the same time, test hypothesis accurately, etc.
Out on the internet, there are big lists of “logical fallacies” – or guidelines for what not to do in rational discourse. So, for me, though I have a background in psychology, I am really looking for “prescriptive” approaches, intended to solve problems and help guide humans towards what they could or should do, rather than trying to describe with they actually do.
https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_fallacy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fallacies
The models I want to see might be constrained by idealistic problem-solving engineering design. I’d like to see the emergence of a politics grounded in something like the ideals and vision of Marianne Williamson, but defined at large scale on the internet and grounded in a well-negotiated universal ontology.
Having said that it's also clear from the data of experiments that Rosch and then many others did that people often think in ways that are inconsistent with pure set theory. So for example people will say that Chair is a kind of Furniture and that CarSeat is a kind of Chair but that CarSeat is not a kind of Furniture.
Yes, and that is perfectly reasonable in a context-specific model of categories. The notion that words have some meaning cast in stone – possibly in “Platonic” ways – can be (probably is) very misleading (and should be seen, I would say, as a well-intended but somewhat blind relic of the past). Word meaning is assigned by the intention of the user, and can vary slightly or significantly in every instance of usage.
Or there seems to be "structure" to human hierarchies so that a certain level (called the Basic Level) has unique properties. The Basic level tends to be the first level learned by children, it has predefined motor activities, it is the highest level (most abstract) that can be visualized, it is what people usually use to refer to a specific instance. So for example Dog is a basic level concept. People can visualize a dog but not a mammal. They tend to say "the dog is outside" rather than "the mammal is outside" or "the rotweiller is outside". Or Chair is also at the Basic level. We tend to use all chairs more or less the same way but not all examples of Furniture.
Yes, and there is a lot that can be said about this – including long and maybe tedious discussions about the relationship between symbolic abstractions (words) and the real-world concrete instances they represent (“my dog Fido”).
BTW, this Basic level is one of the things (getting back to the original topic of the thread) that was originally influenced by Wittgenstein's idea that words like "game" don't have necessary and sufficient conditions for their definition but rather have a "family" resemblance more like a hub and spoke Semantic Net with the Basic concepts in the hub and the related concepts as spokes connected to it.
The family resemblance concept is useful and intuitive, and connects to a lot of related ideas like “fuzzy logic” and the notion of metaphor. I look forward to getting my copy of the Big Book of Concepts so I can go through his taxonomy of theories and work out some of my general notions on synthetic dimensionality in terms of his examples. More or less, I want to define all types of comparison and metaphor in the same strict mathematical terms – using synthetic dimensions to define every facet of these concepts. A metaphorical comparison is a simple and obvious thing to define in terms of dimensionality, and maintaining strict and consistent method is very important in developing a general model of semantic structure.
**
And yes, this message is a bit long – but I wanted to stick in a brief excerpt from a footnote in Murphy’s Big Book of Concepts. He talks about Wittgenstein in terms I personally found very clarifying.
I like his definition of language games: ”talk”
Rosch and Mervis (1975) and many others after them have attributed the basic family resemblance view to the philosopher Wittgenstein, whose discussion of games was described earlier. However, Ramscar (1997) points out that Wittgenstein did not endorse this psychological account of concepts. Wittgenstein's real interest in this issue was whether one could provide a traditional philosophical analysis of concepts. As such, his reference to family resemblances had a primarily negative import: He was emphasizing that there were no defining features even though category members do have some kind of similarity. Wittgenstein was in fact deeply skeptical about the possibility of analyzing concepts at all. Although his philosophy is impossible to summarize here (and is not described very straightforwardly in his writing), he seems to have believed that concepts could only be understood as arising out of our activities and “language games” (talk), That is, he felt that the attempt to describe concepts by their components was doomed to failure. Clearly, this is inconsistent with the goals of the classical view, which holds that concepts can be defined. However, it is also possibly at odds with psychological theories like those of Rosch and Mervis that describe concepts as (nondefinitional) sums of their components. In short, attribution to Wittgenstein as a source for psychological models should be more circumspect than they typically have been, as he was probably more skeptical about concepts than most modern psychological theories are, and he was not proposing a psychological theory in any case. See Ramscar (1997) for a good summary and discussion.
From: ontolo...@googlegroups.com <ontolo...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Michael DeBellis
Sent: Sunday, April 28, 2019 10:31 AM
To: ontolog-forum <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Re: Wittgenstein and the foundations of meaning
Bruce, glad you like The Big Book of Concepts. I haven't finished it yet but I agree it's excellent. I really like the early discussion of the various mathematical models to attempt and explain prototype or exemplar kinds of reasoning.
Marco Neumann
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John F Sowa
Marco
> veer off Wittgenstein's language game again.
of what Wittgenstein was talking about. The Politics of
love vs the politics of fear are two very different language
games that are based on primal emotions.
Emotions are the single most important feature of life.
Any ontology that ignores them is meaningless. It cannot
answer the most fundamental of all questions: "Why?"
That question is the foundation of every academic study and
every activity in our daily lives: Science, engineering,
finance, business, religion, politics, and, most generally,
-- philosophy, phenomenology, metaphysics, esthetics, ethics,
logic, linguistics, psychology, and life.
Bruce
> high-level review of concept theory.
> attempt and explain prototype or exemplar kinds of reasoning.
patterns of language, reasoning, and thought. Wittgenstein had
a solid background in mathematics, logic, science and engineering.
He was studying aeronautical engineering at the University of
Manchester before he went to Cambridge to work with Russell.
Marco
John F Sowa
Marco
> I would say though there might be some good use for Lakoff &
> Gärdenfors et al in the ontology engineering process after all.
switched to linguistics. Gärdenfors is the G of the AGM axioms
for belief or theory revision.
It's no accident that people who have a background in math
and logic are among the most innovative in the softer areas.
Without some knowledge of the formal mathematical patterns,
people who dabble in the soft stuff tend to produce mush.
By the way, Wittgenstein taught a course on the foundations of
mathematics in 1939, and Alan Turing attended every lecture.
From the lecture notes of the people who attended, it seemed to
be a debate between LW and AT about mathematical language games.
Michael
> theory. So for example people will say that Chair is a kind of
> Furniture and that CarSeat is a kind of Chair but that CarSeat
> is not a kind of Furniture.
like chess pieces: the same words or the same chess pieces
can be used in different games. The language game for furniture
is part of the language games about activities in a house. Since
a car can be used as a dwelling, the language game about cars
uses many of the same words, but in different patterns.
It's very common to borrow words from one language game and
use them in a metaphorical sense for a different activity.
But only a fraction of the details are carried over from one
language game to another.
For example, the term 'bogged down' comes from the language
of cowboys on a cattle drive. Most of the drive goes through
dry areas, but the cattle need to get water from time to time.
And the water holes often have muddy areas where some cattle
may get bogged down.
Freeing a steer that is bogged down is a tricky process that
requires two cowboys -- one in the front and one in the rear.
In the first step, both of them roll the steer on its back.
Next the cowboy in the rear slides it out of the bog. Then
he holds onto an angry steer while the guy in front runs away.
Today, people who use the term "bogged down" in different
language games rarely, if ever, think of those details or
their implications.
Basic point: Nearly every word has an open-ended range
of "senses" in different language games. That's why many
professional lexicographers say that the list of senses
for any word in any dictionary are not and cannot be a
complete partitioning of all possible uses of that word.
Implication: That's not a failure in human reasoning.
It's the result of using a finite vocabulary to describe
a continuous world with a continuous range of activities
and ways of thinking, feeling, and talking about them.
John
William Frank
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Kingsley Idehen
> Emotions are the single most important feature of life.
> Any ontology that ignores them is meaningless. It cannot
> answer the most fundamental of all questions: "Why?"
Wouldn't reasoning and inference informed by an ontology be the route to
answering the mercurial question: "Why?"
My comment implies that a declarative rules language combined with an
ontology is how one would typically determine "Why?"
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