Torts And Damages Aquino 2019 Pdf
Torie Crivello
The view that intentional acts fall within the purview of Article 2176 on quasi-delict is subject to a minority opinion to the contrary. There are authorities for the view that quasi-delict refers merely to negligenct acts. (Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. VII-A, p. 37.
Under this view, quasi-delict is homologous but not identical to tort of common law. (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Cia Transatlantica, 38 Phil. 875). In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Company (38 Phil. 768 [1918]), the Supreme Court cited Manresa (Vol. 8, p. 68) who declared that the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
Chief Justice Davide (then Associate Justice) expressed the same view in Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals(219 SCRA 115 [1993]). He observed that Article 2176 is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willingness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
PURPOSES OF TORT LAW
MAJOR PURPOSES.
1) to provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of parties who might otherwise take the
law into their own hands;
2) deter wrong-ful conduct;
3) to encourage socially responsible behaviour; and
4) to restore injured parties to their original condition, insofar as the law can do this, by compensating
them for their injury.
BALANCING OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS.
This is consistent with the view that civil law is the mass of precepts that determine or regulate relations that exist between members of the society for the protection of private interests.
Equity- on the other hand, has broadly been defined as justice ac-cording to natural law and right. (Justice Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Ed., p. 1). It is also described as justice outside legality. (Tupas vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 597, 602 [1991]). Equity is often invoked in justifying the rule regarding mitigation of liability if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
KINDS OF NEGLIGENCE
-Actionable negligence may either be culpa contractual, culpa aquiliana and criminal negligence. Thus, an action for damages for the negligent acts of the defendant may be based on contract, quasi-delict or delict. The bases of liability are separate and distinct from each other even if only one act or omission is involved.
Culpa aquiliana distinguished from crimes.
culpa aquiliana or quasi-delitos under the Civil Code, viz.:
a) Crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern;
b) The Penal Code punishes or corrects criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage;
c) Delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law
clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes; and
d) The liability of the employer of the actor-employee is subsidi-ary in
crimes while his liability is direct and primary in quasi-delict.
CONCURRENCE OF CAUSES OF ACTION
It should be noted, however, that a single act or omission may give rise to two or more causes of action. The obligation based on one is separate and distinct from the other. That is, an act or omission may give rise to an action based on delict, quasi-delict and even contract.
A. DEFINITION AND TEST OF NEGLIGENCE.
Article 1173 defines negligence as the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Hence, they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against harm.
Reasonableness may depend upon five factors:
1) The magnitude of risk (A risk is more likely to be unreasonable the greater it is);
2) The value or importance of that which is exposed to the risk, which is the object that the law desires to protect, and may be called the principal object;
3) A person who takes a risk of injuring the principal object usually does so because he has some reason of his own for such conduct (referred to as the collateral object);
4) The probability that the collateral object will be attained by the conduct which involves risk to the principal (the utility of the risk); and
5) The probability that the collateral object will be attained without taking the risk (the necessity of the risk).
RULE IN THE PHILIPPINES.
The rule in the Philippines has always been that what consti-tutes ordinary care vary with the circumstances of the case; that negligence is want of care required by the circumstances.
STANDARD OF CONDUCT: GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY
The Supreme Court explained in Picart vs. Smith (supra, at p. 37) that the standard of conduct used in the Philippines is that of paterfamilias in Roman law or that who is referred to in Article 1173 of the Civil Code (in rel. Art. 2178) as a good father of a family. What should be determined in negligence cases is what is foreseeable to a good father of a family. A good father of a family is likewise referred to as the reasonable man, man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, or ordinary reasonable prudent man. In English law, he is sometimes referred to as the man on top of a Clapham omnibus.
It should be noted in this connection that under the Revised Pe-nal Code, a child who is age nine (9) or below is exempt from criminal liability. (Art. 8). A child over nine (9) but below fifteen (15) is like-wise exempt from criminal liability if he acted without discernment. Under the Family Code and the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the choice of the child who is at least 12 where his custody is in question is to be respected unless there is no valid reason to accord the same with respect. The consent of children who are at least ten (10) of the person who will adopt and the natural parents of the person to be adopted are likewise required in adoption cases.
The doctrine in Jarco Marketing Corporation et al. v. Court of Appeals (ibid.) therefore modifies the rule laid down in Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (supra.). If the child is under nine years, it is no longer necessary to determine his maturity and capacity because he is conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence. If the child is above nine to fifteen, he is disputably presumed to be incapable of negligence but the opposing party can prove that the child is at such stage of maturity and capacity that he can already determine what a reasonable man would do under the same circumstances.
(1) Liability of children
It should be noted, however, that the absence of negligence does not necessarily mean absence of liability. Thus, under the Revised Penal Code, a child who is nine years old can still be subsidiarily li-able with his properties. (Art. 101, Revised Penal Code). This liability is considered liability without fault. (1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code 883). Similarly, the absence of negligence or intent on the part of the child may not excuse the parents from their vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code or Art. 221 of the Family Code because they are liable for their own negligence in the supervision of their child. The minor child, on the other hand, shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him if he has no parents or guardian.
c. Physical Disability
In The Common Law, Justice Holmes explained that the weak-nesses of a person will not be an excuse in negligence cases. A weak, clumsy or accident prone person must come up to the standard of a reasonable man, otherwise, he will be considered negligent.
d. Experts and Professionals.
An expert should exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular field that he is in. In fact, when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skills, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempted to do.
Mississippi courts increasingly confront cases with multistate and multinationalcontacts in which some or all of the claims are governed by foreign law.(2)The law of Conflict of Laws has undergone dramatic changes in the pastfew decades, and Mississippi rules depart, often radically, both from traditionalapproaches and from approaches in other states. Conflicts law has becomecomplicated further by the growth of federal constitutional restrictionson state choice-of-law rules and, in a few areas, by federal statutes andtreaties binding on the state.(3)
This Article considers common problems that arise in Mississippi conflictof laws cases. Part I discusses the enforcement of foreign judgments. PartII treats Mississippi statutes of limitations on foreign causes of action.Part III considers requirements for raising conflicts-of-law issues instate and federal courts and procedures for proving the content of foreignlaws. Part IV examines general choice-of-law rules in Mississippi.(4)Part V addresses special choice-of-law problems that arise in federal court.Part VI surveys important constitutional restrictions on the applicationof Mississippi law in cases that may be governed by other laws and alsodiscusses special equal protection issues that can arise when Mississippilaws discriminate against persons based on their place of residence orcitizenship. Part VII reviews limits placed by the doctrine of sovereignimmunity on suits against foreign states and countries in state and federalcourts in Mississippi.
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