Dragon Framework

[Marlys Stotesberry]

Theseare the firms that are now emerging as outstanding cases to examine if we as scholars are to make sense of the key developments in the global economy driven by the successes of firms from the Asia Pacific. Critical to their successes have been strategies that involve various aspects of linkage (connecting up with existing players), leverage (securing technologies or other resources from these linkages) and learning (or repeated exercise of linkage and leverage activities) to enhance dynamic capabilities.

A third feature of LLL strategizing is that it is adapted to the interconnected, interlinked character of the global economy into which the new DMs are expanding. They thereby are enabled to build light, latticework organizational structures as they expand into markets around the world. By contrast the OLI framework ignores the substrate on which the process of internationalization unfolds.

Many studies of internationalization from various countries have now appeared where LLL is a framework under study. Firms internationalizing from Turkey, for example, were studied by Demirbag, Tatoglu, and Glaister (2009); from Latin America by Ciravegna, Lopez, and Kundu (2016); and from India by Thite, Wilkinson, Budhwar, and Mathews (2016). Particular sectors such as white goods have also been the focus of studies employing the LLL framework, as in the study of DMs Ko from Turkey, Haier from China and Mabe from Mexico described by my colleagues Federico Bonaglia and Andrea Goldstein and myself in the Journal of World Business (2007). These studies will doubtless be amplified by further empirical work devoted to furthering the range of countries and industries studied.

In this brief paper I review the progress achieved and evolution of the conceptual strategic framework of LLL, offered at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a way of making sense of the distinctive strategies of newly emerging multinationals from newly emerging industrializing countries. As these firms and their points of departure in countries like China, India and Brazil have become more significant in the global economy, so the significance of the LLL framework as a way of explicating their strategic choices has also been enhanced. In the debate between myself and professors Dunning and Narula staged by this journal in 2006 (Dunning, 2006; Narula, 2006; Mathews, 2006a, 2006b), I was at pains to point out that I did not see LLL as a strategic framework displacing microeconomic reasoning of OLI, but rather as a way of complementing the timeless insights of OLI with the strategic necessities of latecomer firms that were seeking to become players in the globalized economy. This remains the case after a decade and a half of further development. Refinements have now appeared such as the need to distinguish between the learning in latecomers that is driven by linkage and leverage and the development of autonomous capabilities that enable these firms to power ahead to parity with global leaders. Others could no doubt be introduced that better integrate the notion of LLL reasoning within the scholarship on organizational learning. But the fundamental distinctive feature of LLL as a strategic framework, compared with OLI as based on timeless microeconomic reasoning, remains. These are the differences that can be expected to be reinforced as studies of DMs proliferate in IB in coming years.

If this error or a similar error still occurs after rebooting, we recommend manually installing the .NET framework v4.0 from the Dragon 12 installation disc. The Microsoft .NET Framework v4.0 installer can be started by running the "dotNetFx40_Full_x86_x64.exe" file found in the "[drive letter]:\ISSetupPrerequisites\dotNetFramework" folder on the Dragon 12 installation disc.

The European Commission's adequacy decision on the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework (DPF), adopted on July 10th, 2023, marks a crucial moment in transatlantic data protection. Following an Executive Order issued by President Biden in October 2022, this decision confirms that the United States (U.S.) meets European Union (EU) standards for personal data protection. The decision extends to all transfers from the European Economic Area (EEA) to U.S. entities participating in the framework, promoting privacy rights while facilitating data exchange. Key aspects include oversight of U.S. public authorities' access to transferred data, the introduction of a dual-tier redress mechanism, and granting new rights to EU individuals, encompassing data access and rectification. However, the EU-U.S. DPF presents both promise and challenges in health data transfers. While streamlining exchange and aligning legal standards, it grapples with the complexities of divergent privacy laws. The recent bill for the introduction of a U.S. federal privacy law emphasizes the urgent need for ongoing reform. Lingering concerns persist regarding the EU-U.S. DPF's resilience, especially amid potential legal battles before the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The history of transatlantic data transfers between the EU and the U.S. is riddled with vulnerabilities, reminiscent of the Ouroboros-an ancient symbol of a serpent or dragon eating its own tail-hinting at the looming possibility of the framework facing invalidation once again. This article delves into the main requirements of the EU-U.S. DPF and offers insights on how healthcare organizations can navigate it effectively.

Public debt financing is a common practice in all countries across the world, even though typical practice of each country varies by a great deal. For example, according to IMF, as of 2017, the general government debt to GDP ratio ranges from 9% (Estonia) to 238% (Japan). As stated in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, borrowing is an important tool for financing investments critical to sustainable development and covering short-term imbalances between revenues and expenditures. Government borrowing can also allow fiscal policy to play a countercyclical role over economic cycles.

Both frameworks adopt the same standards for identifying low income countries (based on their eligibility for concessional financial resources). As of May 31, 2019, 47 of the 131 countries that have officially signed BRI cooperation agreements with China are included in the List of LIC DSAs for PRGT-Eligible Countries. The graph below shows the distribution of debt stress risk ratings of these LICs from low to in distress. In addition, another 11 BRI countries not in risks of debt distress have been assigned suggested debt limits in General Resources Account (GRA) arrangements.

For countries in debt stress or at high risk of debt stress, including some countries with moderate risks of debt stress, IMF and the World Bank would advise them to avoid or limit non-concessional borrowing (NCB) (or only accept in exceptional cases), and provide limits for concessional borrowing to some countries, leaving space for grants. For countries with moderate or low risks of debt distress, borrowing would be advised to be assessed on a loan by loan basis, with the option to request borrowing ceilings.

The DSF risk assessments already inform lending policies of other creditors including many Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). With the issuance of the BRI DSF, China seems ready to adopt the mechanism too. For China, this is unequivocally a critical step in risk management for Chinese creditors and constructive response to the debt trap diplomacy theory.

Meanwhile, there is probably no perfect framework for debt sustainability analysis. As the effort of a DSF is to provide judgements about future macroeconomic dynamics in a scenario of debt stress, estimates of the discount factor and feedback effects of fiscal policies would inevitably be subjective, even if empirical analysis of historical data is full incorporated.

Instead of hindering the scaling up of development finance, risk management should enable development finance to strengthen vulnerable economies and generate multiplier effects over the long term to improve the status of public finance, and insure timely debt repayment. This is by no means an easy task, and requires coordination and trust between governments and the private sector.

Even though debt to China remains a relatively small share in the public debt portfolio of most countries, China has emerged as an important international creditor as the Belt and Road Initiative unfolds, and deserves to be part of the multilateral engagement in debt sustainability control. Meanwhile, given the challenges and imperfect nature of development finance risk management, a diversity of approaches could create healthy competition to get it right.

Playing D&D with one player and one DM is a wonderful way to play the game. With one player and one dungeon master, we can truely focus our stories on the character. Playing D&D one-on-one is not a lesser form of D&D. It's a different way of playing as rich and entertaining as playing D&D with a group. If you haven't tried it, give it a shot.

To see some one-on-one D&D in action, watch Enrique Bertran and I play through Dragon of Icespire Peak one-on-one. The adventures of Barundar and Bing were great fun to play and taught me a whole lot about running one-on-one D&D.

More recently, while stuck at home during the pandemic, my wife and I have been playing D&D one-on-one and we've really enjoyed it. Playing D&D with someone you live with is a whole different kind of game. Instead of sitting down at a table for three to four hours in one session, you can break the game up into pieces and play out each piece in its own separate and shorter session. You can even play some of the sessions in different environments, such as while taking a walk or preparing dinner.

This has resulted in a different framework for D&D, with different phases for the different kinds of scenes taking place. Because this is a pick-up-and-go game, it's also different than a fully fleshed out campaign. Each session can be its own focused quest, maybe even from a job board similar to the one in Dragon of Icespire Peak from the D&D Essentials Kit.

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