Film and Censorship - Wednesday
ravee...@gmail.com
THOUGHT PAPER
K.A. ABBAS V UNION OF INDIA
Raveena Rao Kallakuru - 213018
This case deals with the issue of pre-censorship of a film. The petitioner essentially contends that censorship of a film through its preview by judging it on the basis of some standards is unconstitutional. The Court ultimately holds that it is not and that prior restriction of speech is envisaged by Article 19 (2). I agree that prior restraint of speech in interest of society is envisaged by the Constitution. However, I argue that the judgment does not logically flow on four grounds. Incidentally, the Court points out that “film censorship since our independence has become one of strictest in the world”. Upon reading this, one would expect a slightly progressive/reasoned judgment. That does not happen. First, the Court differentiates films from other form of media.[1] If the Court has previously held that prior restraint of newspapers isn’t entirely valid, then merely because a film combines light and sound, how does it become valid? If it is based on the effects, I would watch a film once, but I read the Hindu every day. Second, the Court does not apply the ‘void for vagueness’ principle and instead states that statutes must be construed in accordance with the Constitution. They believed that the statute was in fact quite clear, while the reality is different.[2] Then comes its ultimate flaw in analytical reasoning. It essentially states that so long a scene is handled artistically, the vulgarity associated with it disappears. Considering how it is universally acknowledged that cinema is art, the Court is essentially saying that so long art is treated artistically by the producer, these restrictions shouldn’t be applied. And then the Court leaves this delicate situation of determining what is artistic to the Censor board or the Courts. This is clearly arbitrary considering one doesn’t know exactly when its speech would be restrained and also would lead to the chilling effect. Third, the Court cites examples of brilliant historical work. It fails to recognise how most historical works were considered revolutionary and ‘vulgar’ when they came about. Fourth, the Court is unclear about its ‘standard of the viewer’. It then goes on to say that we must judge art by the ‘normal morally healthy man’ and not by the ‘most depraved in society’. This sentence reeks of paternalism since the Court is actually passing a judgment on the morality of man. And it doesn’t bother to explain how it is doing so, it just is. And this is the problem with the judgment.
[1] A person reading a book or other writing or hearing a speech or viewing a painting or sculpture is not so deeply stirred as by seeing a motion picture
[2] We are quite clear that expressions like 'seduction', 'immoral traffic in women'. 'soliciting, pros- titution or procuration', 'indelicate sexual situation' and 'scenes suggestive of immorality', 'traffic and use of drugs', 'class hatred" 'blackmail associated with immorality' are within the understanding of the average men and more so of persons who are likely to be the panel for purposes of censorship.
ksh...@nujs.edu
THOUGHT PAPER
Srishti School of Art, Design and Technology v. The Chairperson, Central Board of Film Certification and Anr.
KSHITIJ MAHESHWARI
In tthis case, the petitioner was directed to carry out four excisions in her film. Three of the four excisions were upheld by the FCAT, i.e. the Appellate Board.
What must be kept in mind and what was laid down in the first few paragraphs of the judgment itself by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, are the principles that govern censorship in India. In K.A. Abbas, the Supreme Court had categorically held that censorship of films with prior restraint was justified under the Indian Constitution. Similarly, in Ramesh v. Union of India the standard that was laid down was that a film when viewed in entirety should be capable of creating a lasting impression of a message of peace and coexistence and that the people were not likely to be obsessed, overwhelmed or carried away by the violence or fanaticism shown in the film. This judgment (Ramesh) can be said to be acting as an impediment to the filmmaker’s ideas as to what can be shown in his film as he must keep in mind that in a film which carries scenes of violence and fanaticism, a balancing act in the form of a message of peace and coexistence must be ensured.
However in this case, (Srishti) the Court despite sticking to the principle of “viewed in entirety”, did not lay emphasis on the other unnecessary restrictions like necessity of a balancing act. Instead it built the argument on Article 19(1)(a) as being the source of putting forth views which may not be acceptable to others and therefore the views of the filmmaker must not be curtailed.
Another positive aspect of this judgment is the importance that was given to individual views, of both the filmmaker and of the viewer. Without unnecessary policing by the State, the rights of the viewer to receive ideas and to think based on what the actual content is, would only aid and strengthen the democratic practices. This policing results in both the curtailment of the rights of the filmmaker to put his views across as he wishes as well as the rights of the viewers to make informed choices. The pro free speech views of the Court as summarized above have to a certain extent truncated the extensive powers in the form of the guidelines that were conferred on the CBFC. What has also been firmly reiterated in this judgment is the concept of a reasonable viewer not being provoked into violence if the film merely forwarded ideas which could at the most be called counter views or differing opinions. Since the burden is on the State to prove that a situation of public disorder would arise, it will also have to incur the burden and must now show that the speech (of the filmmaker to put forth the views and that of the viewer to make an autonomous judgment) that is being restricted will more likely result in general harm in the form of public disorder than it would result in an extensive discussion (which enriches democratic principles) on the merits of what has been portrayed in the film.
jah...@gmail.com
Thought Paper 1:
K. A. Abbas v. the Union of India
Jahnavi Visvanathan - 212106
Despite analysing a case like K. A. Abbas from the point of view of a twenty-first-century (in which the internet allows mostly unrestricted access to censored content across jurisdictions) film-viewer, I am not of the opinion that the Supreme Court was entirely incorrect in upholding the constitutionality of the censorship of films, especially so because this challenge to the same arose, for the first time, as early as the 1970s. However, I disagree with certain aspects of the Court’s articulation of the reasons behind its verdict.
The Court attempted to justify its position by highlighting that film is a medium which is “universally recognised” to be starkly different from other forms of expression, and I specifically fail to see how that line of thinking would not be equally pertinent, if not more, in building a case against the Court’s view. The Court is perhaps correct to the extent of acknowledging that films involve a degree of realism and an appeal to the visual and aural senses that is unmatched by other forms of expression. However, while recognising such aspects of film as so different and so intrinsic to the medium, the Court’s view seems needlessly restrictive, curbing a unique aspect of a particular medium of expression, something which should logically be accorded additional protection under the framework of Article 19. The Court explicitly appreciated the fact that the medium of film is more true to life than arguably “any other form of representative art”. However, the Court uses this observation to justify the belief that pre-censorship is therefore necessary when it comes to films, as the medium is fundamentally different from other art forms.
In my opinion, it is inherently inconsistent to acknowledge that a certain kind of impact is unique to a particular artistic or expressive medium, and yet to strengthen the case for restricting freedom of expression through such a medium because of the very same reason. This implies that films allow individuals to create content in a manner that cannot be achieved through any other form of media, which would logically justify less interference with the manner of disseminating such art because of its distinctiveness.
Furthermore, the Court also held that the delicate functioning of a censor and its duties “cannot be the subject of an exhaustive set of commands established by prior ratiocination”. However, it is possible that allowing the Censor Board such liberty would instead lead to arbitrariness, as the Board is not a static entity, but is made up of a variety of individuals, its composition also being subject to a change in these members. This is an especially worrisome outcome considering the fact that, as we have seen in subsequent cases, the acts and role of the Censor Board have indeed been heavily criticised by Indian courts following K. A. Abbas. In F. A. Picture International v. Central Board of Film Certification, for example, the Court minced no words in laying down that the Censor Board, in that case, “[did] no credit to the maturity of a democratic society by making an assumption that people would be led to disharmony by a free and open display of a cinematographic theme”.