Is Any Use of Nuclear Weapons (Un)thinkable?

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Ellen Thomas

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Jul 1, 2024, 9:36:48 PM (2 days ago) Jul 1
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From The Japan Times, August 5, 2023 : “World War II in the Air," an exhibition covering developments in military aviation during the era, is expected to open in 2025 at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, a curator said earlier this month.
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From The Japan Times, August 5, 2023 :

“World War II in the Air," an exhibition covering developments in military aviation during the era, is expected to open in 2025 at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, a curator said earlier this month.

The plan is underway almost three decades after the museum was forced to scrap a proposal to display the fuselage of the Enola Gay, the aircraft that dropped the Little Boy atomic bomb on Hiroshima, alongside graphic photos [like the one below] and other historical materials on the damage caused by the two bombings.

At the time, the exhibit, planned for the 50th anniversary of [the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki]…sparked a huge controversy in the United States…and drew protests from veterans' and other organizations.


Smithsonian museum plans to show photos ...

After the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, it was obvious that the effects of these new weapons were too widespread and severe to be limited to military targets. Civilians would, unavoidably, be killed.

By World War II, it had been pretty well agreed that civilians should not be killed on purpose in war. “Military” targets were the only legitimate ones.¹ In 1949, after the War, the principle had been incorporated into international law in the Geneva Conventions.

Well, then, to make the use of nuclear weapons “thinkable” in a war that wasn’t “total” or simply “general” in the term used by our nuclear war planners, strategists decided we should develop “tactical” nuclear weapons.

These nuclear weapons would have to have yields smaller than the yields of the bombs used to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki, right? The yields would have to be small enough for the bombs to be usable as weapons whose effects could be limited to a “tactical” military target, like an advancing army, or perhaps to a “strategic” military target, like an arms factory or a dam or a base, without also destroying the surrounding area and its people, churches, schools, and hospitals, as had been done in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The gun-type bomb that destroyed Hiroshima yielded the equivalent of about fifteen thousand tons—30,000,000 pounds—of TNT. The implosion bomb that destroyed Nagasaki yielded a third more— the equivalent of about twenty thousand tons—40,000,000 pounds—of TNT.

The “tactical” nukes would presumably have to yield less than that. How much less? Perhaps only as much as our biggest conventional bombs, say? What did they yield?

The biggest US-supplied bombs being used by Israel in Gaza at this writing are, news reports have said, 2000-pound bombs. That’s how much the bombs weigh, not the amount of explosive in them. The 2000-pound bomb has something less than 1000 pounds of conventional explosive in it. Less than half of one ton.

Some have argued that even these 2000-pound bombs have proved to be too big to be properly used in Gaza, that is, restricted to military uses.

In any case, both J. Robert Oppenheimer—for a time after World War II—and President Eisenhower—throughout his presidency—favored developing “tactical” nuclear weapons, presumably as a way of making the weapons usable for military purposes.

By the late 1950’s we had developed and deployed a large number of nuclear weapons designated as “tactical”—mines and demolition charges to destroy mountain passes, artillery shells, depth charges to attack submarines. Many were deployed in Western Europe, particularly Germany, intended for use against the invading hordes of the Soviet Union. That meant they would be detonated inside the territories of the countries being invaded, our allies, so you did have to hope they would destroy only the invading hordes.

The hordes didn’t materialize during the Cold War and no tactical nuclear weapon was ever used by us. None has been used in any of the wars we have conducted since World War II, like the Korean War, the war in Vietnam, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The “war” on terror. Other undeclared wars we may not know about.

Nor has one been used by any other country that has acquired “tactical” nuclear weapons along the way.

Why not, do you suppose?

A use of tactical nuclear weapons was seriously considered by our military in Vietnam. But it had been decided, finally, that they were militarily useless.

Something else might be in play. Maybe it was thought that any use of a nuclear weapon would open the door to the use of any nuclear weapon. The use of a smaller “tactical” nuclear weapon would make the use of the “strategic” ones much more likely.

Maybe even inevitable.

Something important has happened to the terminology here along the way.

During World War II, “strategic” targets were taken to be resources like railroads, factories, dams, even agricultural fields—resources that might contribute to the war-fighting spirit and ability of the enemy. When it came to nuclear weapons, however, “strategic” came to refer only to certain kinds of weapons, to the ones with very large yields. Too large, it was recognized, to have a strictly military purpose.

They could, of course, serve as “city busters,” even for cities much larger than Hiroshima or Nagasaki. That wouldn’t be a “strategic” use, not in the original sense.

“Tactical” had come to mean “smaller in yield than strategic,” though how much smaller has never to my knowledge been specified. Would 15 kilotons, the yield of the bomb called Little Boy that destroyed the city of Hiroshima, now be considered “tactical?”

Starting in 1991, after the end of the Cold War, the United States began to bring back home all the many “tactical” nuclear weapons it had deployed in Europe (it left some in South Korea).

Russia has retained at home large numbers of the nuclear weapons it calls “tactical.” It has announced it would find it entirely thinkable to use these weapons “in defense of the homeland.”

Hasn’t Russia today defined Ukraine as part of “the homeland’? That’s why it invaded, I understand. Limiting the use of nuclear weapons to “defense of the homeland” may not amount finally to much of a limitation.

Today, the United States has again deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. Just one nuclear weapon, actually. But it’s quite versatile.

At six bases west of Russia—in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey—the United States has now stationed about 150 of a model of thermonuclear bomb, the B61, that can have a “small” yield of 300 tons—60,000 pounds—of TNT. Ten times or so more than any conventional bomb we have but maybe small enough to have a “tactical” or “strategic” use.

But that’s not all the B61 has on offer. The B61 can, easily and quickly, be set to several other yields. Other possible settings of the B61 are

  • 1.5 kilotons (5 times 300 tons, 1/10 of a Hiroshima),

  • 10 kilotons, (2/3 of a Hiroshima: could a bomb that yields the equivalent of 200,000 pounds of TNT still be considered “tactical”?),

  • 45 kilotons (two and a half-times Hiroshima, which can’t serve as “tactical,” right? I’ve read, though, that 50 kilotons, 3 1/3 Hiroshimas, is now taken by our military to be a “tactical” yield.)

  • Or to 60-, 150-, all the way up to 340 kt, maybe even to 400 kt (800,000,000 pounds), of TNT. None of these last four settings offers any prospect of limiting the bomb’s effects to “tactical” or even to “strategic” uses, in the original meaning of the term.²

In the nuclear era, the “tactical-strategic” distinction may have become meaningless. As has the “military-civilian” distinction. When it comes to nuclear weapons, it’s all military targets now. We are. And they are.

There has been no official announcement of this development as far as I know. In fact, concern continues to be expressed about the deaths of civilians in, at the moment, Gaza. The International Criminal Court continues to convict the leaders of some nations of “war crimes” on the ground that they were responsible for the deaths of civilians.

During the war in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has threatened to use their “tactical” nuclear weapons, however they may be defined by the Russians. Putin apparently finds this a thinkable use of their nuclear weapons. Unless he is bluffing. So far, that’s how nuclear weapons seem to have been used since World War II—to bluff.

Bluffing, or threatening, is a “use” of nuclear weapons, of course. But the weapons haven’t been actually used in actual war since we used them in World War II. Which was before we knew—certainly before President Truman knew—just what they would do.

If Putin is not bluffing, he apparently does not worry that any use of a nuclear weapon would open the door to the use of any nuclear weapon.

I do. Am I wrong to do so?

1

By the time the atomic bombs were dropped, the law against targeting civilians had been (surreptitiously?) violated by the United States in Japan in the firebombing raids that had been ordered by General Curtis LeMay on some 60 Japanese cities beginning in March 1945. These firebombings killed more civilians than the two atomic bombings would. LeMay felt that the firebombings had decided the outcome of the war, even before the atomic bombs were dropped.

2

The B61 is about 12 feet long and little over 13 inches in diameter. It weighs something over 700 pounds and is streamlined: it can be carried outside our fighter-bombers as well as in our heavy bombers. I don’t know if someone watching a B61 being loaded onto one of our fighter-bombers would be able to tell whether it had been set at 300 tons or 340 thousand tons. To an outside observer or a radar it might look the same.


B61 nuclear bomb - Wikipedia

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