Re: Darwin or Design? - The Inductive Puzzle

[Laurence O'Donnell]

Hey Evan,

Sorry for my horrible delay. Reading week is upon me. Ahh, so much to do, so little time... I appreciate your thoughts and would like to delve into the discussion with you. I ask forgiveness beforehand for the absurd length of this e-mail. (Yikes!)

Now onto the puzzle.

If I understand the heart of the puzzle, it is the issue of circularity that is most "puzzling." The tension comes from taking the presupposition that God's Word is the ultimate norm for truth in all areas of life. For, on the surface it seems that if one accepts this presupposition, induction (the scientific method, historical inquiry, etc.) become futile endeavors in foregone conclusions.

I would like to respond from two perspectives. First, from a philosophical perspective I wish to (a) address the issue of Christianity's circularity, (b) make a case for the scientific method in light of Christian circularity, and (c) propose a harder puzzle. Second, (d) from a biblico-theologico perspective I would like to make a case for the scientific method in light of the cultural mandate.


(a) On Christian Circularity

In matters of ultimate standards Christianity is not alone in advocating a circular position: everyone argues in a circle in the sense that (1) everyone must have an ultimate starting point for knowing and (2) an ultimate starting point for knowledge is by definition circular. Thus, at the outset it should be recognized that there is a distinction between arguing circularly on a non-ultimate level and on an ultimate level. The former might look like this: The weather is cold; therefore, the weather is cold. The latter seeks to answer questions like this: On what ultimate basis do you support your claim that science can reveal truth? And its answer might look like this: Science reveals truth as it operates within the God-ordained context of Christian theism, which is that the triune God exists and has revealed himself through cosmos and logos.

The necessity of circularity on ultimate standards is poignant: What higher evidence can one put forth than an ultimate standard? If God is the Creator whose revelation of all things through creation and through Word are infallible and perfect, what higher evidence could possibly be brought to verify His existence? Anything we could muster (arguments from reason, empiricism, or subjectivity) would be mere drops in the bucket of His own creation. God is verified by Himself alone; to allow himself to be verified by any other standard would be an insult to his very nature as almighty God. (To say this is not to say that God cannot be verified rationally, empirically, or subjectively; rather, it is to say that verifications of God must be done on God's own terms, following His rules.)

Atheists argue circularly to suppress God just as much as Christians argue circularly to proclaim God. Some may argue that God does not exist because in their minds they don't need God. So, they adopt autonomy as their ultimate standard, and at the end of the day all of their answers come back to, "I myself decide what is truth." Non-Christian scientists may argue that they "just follow the facts," that induction and the scientific method are the starting points of truth. And thus their answers always come down to "My observations tell me so."

A rationalist (i.e. Descartes) assumes reason as his starting point and then tries to deduce all knowledge from this basis. An empiricist (i.e. Hume or Locke) takes sense experience to be the starting point of knowledge and builds his system of truth upon it. A subjectivist (i.e. Rorty) may take existential satisfaction as the fountain of truth, and attempt to live and think upon that basis. The point is that in all three cases, the ultimate arguments of all three are circular. The bottom line answer of the first is always, "Because reason tells me so." The second, that "Experience tells me so." And the third, that "My heart satisfaction tells me so."  Circular argumentation is unavoidable when dealing with ultimate presuppositions.

The bottom line is that on matters of ultimate truth, no one can escape circular argumentation of ultimate standards, not even atheists, scientists, rationalists, irrationalists, skeptics, subjectivists, anybody. John Frame, in his Apologetics to the Glory of God, makes this point saying that "Every philosophy must use its own standards in proving its conclusions; otherwise, it is simply inconsistent. Those who believe that human reason is the ultimate authority (rationalists) must presuppose the authority of reason in their arguments for rationalism. . . . The point is that when one is arguing for an ultimate criterion, whether Scripture, the Koran, human reasons, sensation, or whatever, one must use criteria compatible with that conclusion. IF that is circularity, then everybody is guilty of circularity" (p. 10).

Caveat: Frame further makes the point in class lectures and in his writings that though this type of circular argument may be sound, it is not necessarily persuasive. Thus, he suggests a broadening of this narrow circle to this effect to increase an arguments persuasiveness: Because the whole cosmos reveals God in addition to God's written Word, Christians should welcome using all manner of rational, empirical, or subjective arguments that are in accord with His revelation. Thus, a non-Christian may not like the circularity argument on its own, but he or she may be willing to engage in a theistic proof or evidential argument which should lead them eventually to a faithful acception of the circular implications of God. (However, this idea should be seen in light of my note on the distinction between argument and evidence below.)


(b) On the Scientific Method in Light of Christian Circularity

The fact that God's revelation through Word and creation is the ultimate standard of truth does not in any way diminish the value or importance of science; rather, this fact is what gives value and grounds the purpose of science. The world seen through the eyes of a Christian scientist is a vast playground in which to revel in the wonder of an all-powerful, all-wise, all-loving, and all-present Creator who reveals himself in his creation. At every point in the cosmos the Christian scientists knows that every particle has a God-glorifying meaning within the God-ordered and God-interpreted universe. Those working in new fields where science has never gone before receive the extremely high privilege of walking in the vanguard of discoveries of God's natural revelation. New technologies let us see the vast wonders of creation in ways previous generations did not even dream about. All of this serves to highlight the glory of God, His Creator-Son Christ, and His powerful present Spirit.

Furthermore, the Christian scientist knows that since truth and beauty are revealed by God, it is possible to discover both within God's revelation, a certainty not enjoyed by non-Christians.

Without Christian circularity (that the triune Creator God exists and Has revealed Himself in Word and creation) science would be a dull exercise in purposeless chaos. This leads me into the next point.

(c) A Harder Puzzle

I find it more puzzling to try to conceive of a world in which science would have purpose and meaning apart from the world revealed in Christian theism. Perhaps one could call the entire history of philosophy man's attempt to find truth without the epistemic implications of God (especially the circular ones). Yet, the sum of non-Christian philosophy is always n-1.

(d) A Brief Biblical-Historical Context for Science

A further deepening of the purpose and value of science is seen when science is placed in its proper context within the biblical view of human dignity. In Gen. 1:26ff we learn that man, the royal image of God, was given a royal job to fulfill as God's representatives on earth: he was to fill the earth and subdue it, starting in the Garden and spreading throughout the whole earth. This task of filling and subduing the earth to the glory of God is the proper context for science: only in this setting does humanity taste her God-given dignity and God receives His glory. And from this trajectory science is to be seen as part of the images of God subduing the earth for God's glory.

Even though the images of God rebelled in the Fall and lost dignity, their dignifying job remained the same in spite of added difficulty (curse). So, the scientific endeavor post-Fall must recognize that it has to deal with the effects of the Fall until the glorious day of the Consummation of all things.

God's covenant with Noah provides further direction for understanding the role of science, for in that covenant God promised a stable earth, never again to be destroyed. Obviously, God's promise of a stable earth is highly important to science, which depends heavily on this stability for meaningful progress in its investigations. Without this promise, scientists would have no hope that all of their work would be wasted tomorrow.

God's covenant with Abraham puts God's own existence on the line if He does not fulfill humanity's dignity by causing Abraham's seed to fill the earth and subdue it for God's glory within the Promised Land. Thus, we learn that God Himself is the power we must rely on to accomplish our human dignity, and science (within Abraham's covenantal context) learns that its own dignity comes from relying on God for help to fulfill the great task of humanity.

God's covenant with Moses reveals to science God's moral law which she dare not cross as she pursues humanity's goal of filling and subduing the earth.

(I'm going more quickly than I should . . . trying to be brief.)

God's covenant with David reveals to science that she will be free to flourish to the glory of God when God's King faithfully upholds God's law, leads the people in worship, and protects his people from sin and danger from outsiders.

God's covenant with the Christ reveals to science the God for whom she is to make known His name among the nations: She is to point to the glory of Jesus Christ, by whom the Father created all things through the power of the Spirit. Also, science meets in Jesus the God who takes away the curse under which she is groaning in pursuit of her dignifying goal. One day, when Christ consummates all things, God's glory will be revealed as never before as the curse on the cosmos is lifted and the creation is free to sing praise to God forevermore. At that time, science will proclaim God's glory more brightly than ever.

I know this was a simplified, brief treatment, but I tried to show that science finds its context in the Kingdom of God in the cultural mandate. This grounding gives the utmost dignity to science and turns the sting of the "loaded dice" (see below) on its head. For it would be utter irrationalism for any scientists to try to do science autonomously, suppressing science's God-given context.


Now that I've given some preliminary remarks, let me turn to the puzzle itself.

The puzzle roughly goes like this:

The authority of Scripture (whether or not one is committed to
inerrancy) has both deductive and inductive grounding. For example, one
might hold the teaching of Christ's resurrection as authoritative
because of the inexplicable growth of Christianity in the first
century, the defects of alternative hypothesis's, and the consistent
Gospel accounts of the resurrection story itself. All of the above
premises that substantiate the authority of the resurrection claim are
inductive claims. It is imaginable that future textual and historical
studies might strengthen or weaken these premises.

If you are using induction to generally refer to empirical sense experience and deduction to refer to reasoning, then I would like to offer some qualifiers based on an (assumed biblical) theory of holistic human knowing--that people know truth by an interrelated web of reason (head), empirical experience (hand), and subjective experience (heart).  From this starting point, even if a person gives an inductive argument, he knows it to be a rational argument as well as a subjectively persuasive argument. That is to say, in any argument, whether it is rational, empirical, or subjective, an argument is always known holistically--by all three perspectives on truth. (Here, and in my whole reply, I am leaning on John Frame's perspectival epistemology developed in his Doctrine of the Knowledge of God.)

So, when you say, "All of the above premises that substantiate the authority of the resurrection claim are inductive claims," I agree, but with the added notion that these inductive arguments are known holistically (they are not irrational, they support the historical facts, and they are subjectively persuasive) by the knower.

Moreover, I'd like to make a secondary point here on the matter of the interrelation between induction and deduction: Neither induction nor deduction operate in a vacuum. They always operate together in interrelation to each other. Science's inductive method is performed on deductive assumptions ( i.e. big ones being that [a] truth exists and [b] can be discovered through induction--foundational principles that cannot be proven purely inductively). And deductive premises are formed via induction. (i.e. I observe through sense experience that all men I know grow old and die. Therefore, I can postulate a premise that all men are mortal. One could not even postulate this premise without first having an inductive (empirical/sense) experience with at least one other man to know what a man is, what life is, etc.)

So, it important to note here the necessary interrelation between induction and deduction in science specifically, and in the search for truth generally. (Perhaps the problem of the one and the many in philosophy is akin to the interrelation between induction and deduction in science.)

However, one might
hold to the teaching of Christ's resurrection on the strength of
deductive premises:

1) My religious experience leads me to believe that I have experienced
the "power of Christ's resurrection".
2) My belief that I have experienced the "power of Christ's
resurrection" leads me to accept the resurrection account in
Scripture.
3) Therefore, my religious experience (in some part) governs my view of
the authority of the resurrection account.

Again, just to point out an example of the ind./ded. interrelation in the example above it is "my religious experience," an inductive (empirical/sense) and subjective experience, that leads me to postulate a deductive premise.

Many believers accept the authority of the resurrection account on both
inductive and deductive grounds. In fact, some accept Scriptures
account of the resurrection without any awareness of the strength or
weakness of the inductive claims involved.

Again, there seems to be here a hint of some sort of existential element we are talking about here, which is evidenced in the claims of such believers who cannot prove by formal induction or deduction why the Scriptures are true, but they "know it somehow in their hearts."

This, however, does not
change the fact that the authority of the resurrection account (and
consequently the authority of Scripture itself) has inductive grounding
that hangs on the strength of the premises involved. Our exploration of
the inductive grounds of the authority of Scripture forces us to invoke
at least some claims of science, and more generally, the scientific
method.

I think I'm tracking with you. In other words, no matter if some Christians never bother with the inductive claims of Scripture, Scripture still makes inductive claims. As such, these claims ought to be able to be verified by science (by induction).  I strongly agree, but would add the following thoughts:

1. The authority of the resurrection account does not fall to the hands of autonomous inductive premises, but on Christian inductive premises. Thus, that we are "forced" to "invoke at least some claims of science" is not due to the fact that autonomous man questions God, but is due to the fact that God (the ultimate authority) commands his royal images to give answers for the hope that lies within them through the Gospel.
   
   
2. Your observation that Scripture makes inductive claims that ought to be tested does not refute someone's subjective experience unless there is a standard, a norm, above both science and subjective human experience that is the ultimate arbiter of truth.
   
   
3. Notice how quickly our talk of the "facts" (i.e. induction) turns quickly to ethical language (like using the word "ought," or to use your words, "Our exploration ...of Scripture forces us to invoke at least some claims of science....") Why do people (even non-Christians) use such ethical language when discussion what is supposedly "just the facts"? I think this is so because truth demands a norm, and norms demand a response (obedience or disobedience, rationality or irrationality). Christians rely on the powerful foolishness of the Gospel, then, to proclaim their ultimate norm. Autonomous God-suppressors rely on their own foolishness to proclaim their own autonomy as the ultimate norm.

Whose science, or what type of science are we talking about here when we say that Scripture forces us to look at the empirical data? Do we intend to raise up science as an autonomous norm which governs all of our interpretation of "the facts" of the universe? Can the inductive method even do this if we wanted it to? (How does induction tell us what we ought to do?) More directly, can "Our exploration of the inductive grounds of the authority of Scripture" be done by a person who has no a priori influence of norms (rules for thinking)?

A good answer would probably be much more nuanced, but for a cursory answer I would say that if it is true that the Triune God of the Word did indeed create all things according to His purposes, then autonomous induction is impossible. In such a cosmos there would be only induction as a dependent creature-servant of the independent Creator-Lord or as dependent creature-rebel who deny the independent Creator-Lord. Middle ground is not possible, for the Creator would always be the ultimate norm (authority).

Caveat: A huge distinction needs to be made here that I am not advocating "bible thumping" as science, as if the Bible were a scientific textbook itself. No. The Bible is not a science textbook, and much confusion is eliminated by realizing that you cannot ask a question of a book which the book was not written to answer. However, if it is true that the triune Creator God of the Bible has indeed made time and space (a tremendous inductive claim indeed) and has made himself known in time and space (yet another bold inductive claim), then if we ignore/reject/suppress "Him with whom we have to do" at the outset of our scientific endeavor ( i.e. to claim autonomous induction), then we would not be doing science; rather, we would be being priests of folly, irrationality, and lies against whom the wrath of God is coming (Romans 1), for He Himself says that "a fool says in his heart that there is no God."

Additionally, this "either/or" talk of either God's way or foolishness needs to be seen in light of the distinction between evidence and argument, given below. (Important point !)

The puzzle now seems obvious. If Scripture is our authority in all
scientific matters and the authority of Scripture has inductive
grounding, what are our options if we wish examine historical claims
like the resurrection of Christ?

I think that the puzzle lies more so with autonomous man, not with God. Humanity has a simple choice, the same one it had in the Garden: (1) Either perform induction as a dependent, created being who is serving the Creator, or (2) suppress the Creator and attempt to exalt yourself as the autonomous norm who governs inductive truth. The former leads to true knowledge of the truth (as much as is possible by a finite created being); the latter leads to irrationality (Scripture's "folly"), deception, curse, death, enslavement to sin (Romans 1), and eternal damnation.
 

I hearken again to my words on circularity and ask, "By what standard do we as Christians validate our induction?" I answer what I think Scripture answers: "We validate induction in the context of God's self-revelation through general and special revelation."

It seems as we have loaded the dice. If I accept the authority of the
resurrection account (because I accept the authority of Scripture)
BEFORE I start evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence
involved, I have effectively dismissed the inductive grounds for the
resurrection. My controlling presuppositions that I accept as
necessarily true might directly conflict with the contingent claims
that I am about to examine.

Let us not forget that reading, studying, and verifying the veracity of Scripture is itself an inductive process, though one that is in a constant dance with deduction. To posit the "controlling presupposition" you speak of one must first inductively investigate the message of the Bible. This is an important point when considering presuppositions because we are not presupposing in a vacuum, and we are not presupposing whatever we want ( i.e. that what really lies behind the universe is a huge Starbucks carmel frapp). (See thoughts about the interrelation of induction and deduction above.)

Though at first glance the "loaded dice" might appear troubling, I would dare to argue that in no area of life would you want to impose so harsh of an inductive standard of truth as you have suggested here. Indeed, I would argue that such a presupposition less state is impossible, even for the induction process itself to exist. If I buy into your standard, then I force myself to admit that I cannot believe that anything exists until I have first-hand, empirical experience of it which was not impeded by any a priori assumptions. For example, I couldn't say that any states in America exist until I have visited them myself. I couldn't say the Internet exists until I examined each server, data pipeline, etc. I couldn't prove my own history as a baby if I didn't have artifacts, eyewitnesses, etc.

A further important thought on the "loaded dice" is that the issue non-Christians have in this matter of starting points is not that the dice is loaded. Rather, their contention is that they do not like the God who loaded the dice. They seek to spit this God out of the dice and to replace Him with something else in the dice (i.e. secular humanism; autonomous induction; etc.). This is the point of Romans 1. The dice is always loaded, by both sides.
 

Even worse, the foundation of my belief in the authority of Scripture
(and consequently its authority over scientific endeavors) involves
inductive claims that I have not settled, or I would not be examining
the inductive claims in the first place.

First, again, I understand the feeling here, but it would be absurd, wouldn't it, to claim that no one could believe the Bible until he or she made a thorough inductive search of every inductive claim in the Bible before he or she could have warranted, sound belief? Upon no other area of life do we force such a harsh inductive test. Can I believe that a glass of water is real without first examining each h20 molecule under the microscope? Our finiteness limits us in ways we will never overcome.

Second, who gives you authority to be the judge over God's Word, as if God needs your inductive search to be settled or needs your stamp of inductive approval before He will call you into account for who He is and what He has done in history and what He has spoke to you in His Word? If the Scriptures are true, then the "foundation of [your] belief in the authority of Scripture" does not depend on you or any inductive genius you bring to the table, but on God. (See, for example, the Westminster Confession of Faith chapter 1 - http://opc.org/documents/CFLayout.pdf - and take note of the Scripture references highlighting Holy Spirit's role in believing the Scriptures)

Scripture has inductive grounding->I use science to examine the
inductive claims of Scripture->All the while, the authority of
Scripture (which presupposed the truth of both deductive and inductive
claims) must govern my scientific endeavors.

It seems as though this approach simply begs the question.

It would beg the question were created human beings on the same level as the Creator God. But, if God is the Creator he says he is, then the Creator/creature distinction could not be otherwise: If the triune Christian God exists, no man in any endeavor (be it science, or anything) can operate on an autonomous basis without violating the nature of God. To opperate autonomously would be irrational and foolish, for God and his standards would be the very paradigm for rationality. Therefore, I argue that your second premise is incorrect, for you have allowed science an autonomy that nowhere exists in God's created order. All science is Christian science, because all particles in the universe are God's particles, created, sustained, and pre-interpreted by Him. Therefore, all operating of science must be done in the context of God's self-revelation following God's norms.

One might argue that Scripture provides the necessary precondition for
"doing" science at all, and therefore stands as the authority over
science, but this does not evade the problem of importing inductive
claims into a statement like "Scripture is authoritative" without
arguing for them.

I think here that you are mixing up the two types of circularity. Like I mentioned above, Christians cannot argue circularly like this on the non-ultimate level: Scripture is true; therefore, Scripture is true. But, they must argue like this on the ultimate level: God exists and has revealed Himself clearly through the cosmos and through the logos. The Spirit of God verifies these truths to my thinking, sense experience, and heart through His Word and world. Therefore, because the Creator of all has revealed that there is no higher authority, power, or presence in the universe, I must submit all areas of my thought and life to His Lordship.

Further, this approach protects the inductive claims
of Scripture from falsification, because falsification of the
resurrection account would lead to the falsification of Scripture's
authority as a whole. There is a problem here. An inductive claim that
is not falsifiable is not an inductive claim at all! If I am to accept
a priori the authority of Scripture, this seems to deny the obvious
fact that Scripture makes claims must be inductively settled.

A very important point must be made here, a point which affects everything I have written thus far: The crux of your puzzle is overcome in the distinction between "evidence" and "argument." John Frame, in the Five Views on Apologetics , says the distinction thus: "[W]e should make some distinction between (1) the objective data given to us in the created world and (2) our use of these data to construct arguments for the truth of Christianity" (p. 77). When I said above that "all science is Christian science," I was speaking of the evidence, the objective created order, all revelation (both general and special). When I speak of man knowing and using the evidence, I am speaking of "argument." The former is perfect, infallible, and innerant. The latter is fallible, finite, and can be misguided, misunderstood, etc.

Because of the limitations of finiteness and the noetic affects of sin, no Christian, even a good Christian scientist, should think that his or her arguments are equal to God's perfect revelation of the objective evidence. Therefore, with the distinction between evidence and argument in mind, to accept God's revelation (in creation and Word) as the ultimate standard of truth (the evidence) does not exempt one from making false inductive claims (the arguments).

However, if this distinction is true, then another important application follows: No true arguments can turn against God's revealed, objective evidence. God will never accept an argument from anyone that Jesus did not resurrect, for such an argument flies in the face of God's revealed evidence. However, this is not to say that science will not correct our understanding of Scripture. For example, Copernicus helped the church correct its earth-centric view of the universe, a case in which the argument was be corrected, not the evidence.

I hope you guys find this at least a bit thought provoking. Let me know
what you think.

Thanks!

Well, if you read this far I ought to buy you a drink. Cheers, mate. I'll shoot for a shorter go at further interactions.

only by grace,
LO

--
Laurence O'Donnell
http://LaurenceO.com

[evdawgiddydog]

I think we are operating under different understandings of epistemic
circularity. I accept Alston's argument (in "Beyond Justification) that
all epistemic models are ultimately circular. For example, arguing for
the reliability of sense perception means I must assume that my sense
perception is reliable. Our description of this circularity is
necessitated by our cognitive limitation. However, why should I include
God as one of these epistemic factors that I must assume (like sense
perception)? Van Til argues that the deontological requirement of
properly functioning agents is submission to God's self-revelation.
This, however, pushes the question back one peg.

Van Til relies on a Kantian-style transcendental argument whereby one
posits the "ontic necessity" (or precondition) of the intelligibility
of a certain experience to establish the existence of certain entities
or concepts. For all of its muster, I find this type of argumentation
wholly unconvincing. When you make statements about the vastness of
God's nature visa-a-vis our cognitive limitation, what perspective are
you assuming? Under Van Til's lights, any statement (of ours) about
God's nature will suffer from the same limitations that he accuses
others of when they utilize an "evidential" perspective. How am I to
recognize the property of God's nature that necessitates my submission
if my cognitive equipment is not adequate for a contingent assessment
of his ontological status? It seems as if Van Til assumes a
transcendental perspective in order to argue for cognitive
limitation--and then sell it off as an argument for the transcendental
necessity of God.

Further, the statement "God verifies himself" seems incoherent. It
passes over the principle problem: the onus is on US to recognize the
self-attestation of God and submit to his authority. I (as the subject)
must have the epistemic capacity to recognize the authority of God's
self-revelation as truth (as the object), and then fulfill my
deontological requirement. At the very least, transcendental
argumentation relies on a (much debated) logical structure for its
validity and soundness. Further, the subject must be persuaded by this
argument:

1) God is the pre-condition of the intelligibility of experience

2) Experience is intelligible

3) Therefore, God exists.

The efficacy of this argument relies on much more then the nature of
the God whose existence it is supposed to support. In my acceptance of
this argument, I have undermined the very principle that the argument
purports to establish. Namely, I have exercised my autonomy in order to
prove that man does not operate autonomously apart for the precondition
of experience (God). "God verifies himself" fails because the notion of
"self-attesting" authority fails. In order for either concept to be of
epistemic interest there must be an agent who recognizes their claims
as true. The agent must verify, "God verifies himself" or the semantic
content of this statement is unintelligible; how can a proposition be
"verified" without a party to whom the proposition is verified?
Take for example the logical structure of the above argument. If
successful, the argument is supposed to show that God comprises the
necessary ontology for logic. However, my acceptance of the argument
turns on what I think of the logical structure of the argument. Again,
we are stuck in the same rut: I use a certain logical method to "prove"
that God is the ontic necessity for the use of logic. This strikes me
as viciously circular, if not dishonest.

Let me iterate something important here. If there is such a being as
God, his ontological status is certainly not contingent on our musings.
There is a stark distinction between the epistemic currency of a
concept and the ontological status of the being under question. In my
view, the "ultimacy" of God is not demonstrated by the epistemic
currency of the transcendental argument for his existence. I believe
God has the ontological status that the creeds afford him, but I do not
believe it because I must assume him in order to practice intelligible
epistemology. I think Van Til errs when he moves from "God's existence
is ultimate in matters" of truth to "I must have enough cognitive
access to posit him as the precondition of the intelligibility of
experience". Importance does not equal access. If Berkley's argument
for idealism succeeds, it is no doubt the most important epistemic
principle on he market (mental categories are all that exists).
However, we do not have immediate access to its truth by virtue of its
potential status of ultimate importance.

The proposition "God exists" has important epistemic implications,
but why should I assume that I have a perspective that allows me to
assume its transcendental necessity?

I have detailed comments ready regarding the rest of your message, but
for the sake of space and readability, why don't we hash through this
point by point? Kant's transcendental form of argumentation needs to be
demonstrated if we are to accept it as ground for Scripture's authority
over scientific inquiry.

[evdawgiddydog]

Laurence,

I hope you did not find my response too truncated. I want you to know
that I read through your entire post and I have several thoughts--many
of which are at deep odds with your arguments. However, I think it best
that we deal with one issue at a time. This approach would save time
and wouldn't pigeonhole us into encylopedic entries that no one has the
courage to read (except for us, of course).

Have a great day,

Evan

[Laurence O'Donnell]

No, not truncated at all. Thanks for keeping her at a sane length. (Feeling sorry for my big-daddy post again...)

I'll try to respond quicker (and shorter) henceforth. (I'm curious as to how "firefingers" over there responds so quickly and powerfully! You da man.)

Have a great weekend too,
LO

PS: I'm around the tampa area most Saturdays. Would you be up for grabbing coffee or something sometime?

[Laurence O'Donnell]

I think we are operating under different understandings of epistemic
circularity. I accept Alston's argument (in "Beyond Justification) that
all epistemic models are ultimately circular. For example, arguing for
the reliability of sense perception means I must assume that my sense
perception is reliable. Our description of this circularity is
necessitated by our cognitive limitation. However, why should I include
God as one of these epistemic factors that I must assume (like sense
perception)?

There are a variety of ways to answer the "why" question. The short answer for Christians is that without God as one's epistemic foundation, one is led to irrationality as he tries to understand himself, the universe, and God due to a lack of an ultimate norm. The short answer argument behind this conclusion is the Creator/creature distinction: The implications of God's nature ( i.e. that He is the Lord of All, including the norms for knowing truth) demand that all of his creatures seek truth on God's own terms, which means seeking truth as creatures who are submitting to their Creator's authority.

To unpack this briefly, since we are here talking about circularity on the level of ultimate truth, the "why" answer for Christians is that God's revelation of himself forces us to submit to His ultimate authority as our foundation of truth (and everything). His special (logos) revelation is full of implicit and explicit epistemic norms. Take the implicit epistemic implications of Genesis 1, for example. If Gen. 1 is true, at no point in the universe can I ever claim a more ultimate norm for truth than the Creator who created everything and reveals all truth. (C.f. Van Til's Creator/creature distinction below.) Or take the explicit epistemic norms by which the logos claims specifically that God is the starting point of knowledge and wisdom in Psalm 111:10, Prov. 1:7, 9:10, 15:33, et. al. Thus, the paradigm for rationality in the logos is to search for truth as a dependent, creature-servant of the Lord in submission to the Lord's authority.

Moreover, as Christians, we are not limited to talking about logos revelation to prove our starting point. (Indeed it is impossible to separate logos and cosmos, for no one could know the former without the latter, and vice versa. The two can only be separated for pedagogical purposes.) We could rather start from any perspective ( i.e. rational, empirical, or subjective) within cosmos revelation and be led to see the ultimate authority, control, and presence of the Lord from any of these perspectives as long as we are seeking truth on God's terms (obeying His norms). Thus, the Christian worldview remains perfectly consistent with itself on its own terms. Nothing higher can be asked of an ultimately circular argument.

The implications of such argumentation (for the Christian worldview, or any other worldview) is that such ultimate norms necessarily confront all other supposed ultimate authorities. Therefore, at the end of the day, only one circle is the true circle with ultimate authority. All others will have at least one point of inconsistency and will lead to irrationality at that point. This is seen clearly in the attempt at using any of the cosmos revelation perspectives autonomously. If we use these perspectives (rationalism, empiricism, subjectivism) on our own terms, we are led into irrationality (again, on the ultimate level). (This whole can of worms about perspectives on truth needs to be developed within the context of the interrelation of subject, object, and norm, but I'll save it for another e-mail if you are interested. . . .)

Another way to answer this "why" question is to ask the inverse: Why not must one assume God as the ultimate epistemic starting point? Or in other words, by what standard of truth or by what norm do you seek to hold God to account? Your own? Rationalism? Empiricism? Subjectivism? In my last e-mail, I tried to show that positing such a situation was the harder puzzle, in my opinion. For, to do this one would have to posit a perfectly consistent epistemic system that does not lead to irrationality, skepticism, or subjectivism on the ultimate level--an impossible task from the Christian perspective. Just as no man can step out of his own skin to examine himself autonomously, so no man can step out of the God-created cosmos (including God's authority over epistemology) to examine the cosmos autonomously. As Romans 1 clearly teaches, every part of the universe (including our own selves as images of God) confronts us with the ultimate implications of God's authority.

Van Til argues that the deontological requirement of
properly functioning agents is submission to God's self-revelation.

If you are speaking of Van Til's Creator/creature distinction, then I'm tracking with you. If not, please correct me....

In other words, on God's terms, the deontological requirement upon creatures is that in every sphere of life creatures must submit to the authority, control, and presence of their Creator. To do otherwise is irrational if indeed the triune Creator God of Scripture exists and has revealed himself authoritatively in cosmos and logos.

This, however, pushes the question back one peg.

So also (I would add as a secondary point here) to question the authority of an ultimate standard puts oneself in the position of needing to account for the ultimate peg upon which one attempts to stand himself.

 
I respectfully disagree with your interpretation of Van Til on these points:

Van Til relies on a Kantian-style transcendental argument whereby one
posits the "ontic necessity" (or precondition) of the intelligibility
of a certain experience to establish the existence of certain entities
or concepts.

(I'm no Kant expert, so please tell me if I'm missing your point here. Can you offer some passages of Kant for me to read on Kant's transcendentalism?)

Van Til's creator/creature distinction is not the same as Kant's noumena/phenomena. Van Til's starting point is God's self-revelation in logos and cosmos. Kant's starting point is an autonomous attempt to balance rationalism and empiricism with the god concept thrown in on the back side in order to help with the ethical difficulties of an autonomous system.

Furthermore, (skipping the Kant issue for a moment) would you not agree that the possibility of predication is impossible without the necessary precondition of an ordered, rational cosmos; the existence, order, and purpose of language; etc. How else can you read this e-mail? Or what is left of the world but purposeless chaos and nihilism if all preconditions are shunned, where that even possible? If there were a more compelling alternative to the precondition of God, then what it is?

For all of its muster, I find this type of argumentation
wholly unconvincing. When you make statements about the vastness of
God's nature visa-a-vis our cognitive limitation, what perspective are
you assuming? Under Van Til's lights, any statement (of ours) about
God's nature will suffer from the same limitations that he accuses
others of when they utilize an "evidential" perspective.

First, from what basis are you judging that you are "wholly unconvinced" . . . by what standard are you wiping God out of the epistemic picture?

Second, in essence, (if I hear your correctly) what you are saying here is that Van Til has no right to claim the necessity of God and the necessity of human cognitive limitation at the same time. For how could an infinite Creator be known by a finite creature? So, it appears we are left with a self-defeating circle: To know the infinite God one must have infinite cognitive ability. Man's cognitive ability is not infinite. Therefore, man cannot know God.

I think such an interpretation of Van Til's Creator/creature distinction is a misunderstanding of creaturely "limitation" in (a) God's transcendence and imminence and (b) the distinction between argument and evidence (explained in my previous e-mail), especially how the noetic effects of sin affect the cognitive ability of creatures.


(a) God solves the infinite/finite problem by revealing himself to the finite.

A non-Christian view of God's transcendence speaks of God's attributes like his infinity, immensity, power, presence, etc. in ways that make Him beyond human knowing. Muslims, for example, often talk of God this way. It is as if God is so far "out there" that words cannot describe him. On the flip side, a non-Christian view of God's imminence speaks of God as if he is one with nature as in, for example, pantheism. A Christian view of God's imminence and transcendence is way different than these two extremes, for it acknowledges both "sides" of the picture.

Important to a Christian view of trans./imm. is that Christians' knowledge of God is not comprehensive. Logos revelation such as Deut. 29:29 (and many other passages) reveal this plainly--finite humans (even Christians) can never comprehend God totally, because God is infinitely beyond total comprehension by any finite creature. He has not revealed everything about himself to man. However, finite humans can apprehend truth about God because God, in his deep grace, has stooped low and revealed Himself to humanity. And every time that God reveals himself to humanity whether through creation or Word, He always speaks perspicuously (in "baby talk"--language that humans can understand). So, because of God's self-revelation it would be wrong to interpret Van Til as purporting the Creator/creature distinction to be the paradoxical reason that humans ought to know the infinite God, but can't due to their own finiteness.

(A related issue, for another e-mail, would be how Scripture's view of the depravity of man affects man's knowledge of God....)


(b) Creature's thoughts of God's revelation is not the same as God's revelation; rather, creature's thoughts are always affected by creaturely finiteness and sin.

Though all of God's revelation through creation and Word is infallible, perfect, holy, etc., there is a huge distinction between that revelation (the evidence) and human use of that evidence (argument). In a sense, you are correct to say that Van Til's arguments suffer from the noetic (cognitive) effects of sin and the limitation of human finiteness, for Van Til wrote as a redeemed sinner who was still influenced by his sinful nature and as a creature he did not have infinite cognitive abilities.  However, from such an acknowledgement it does not follow that God was unknowable to Van Til. God allows creatures to know as much about Him as He reveals, nothing more, and nothing less. On judgement day, no one will be held accountable for whether they believed Van Til's arguments. Rather, people are held accountable to God's self-revelation in logos and cosmos. The degree of faithfulness displayed by Van Til's arguments about God's evidence is up for debate against the authority of the evidence (revelation) itself.

How am I to
recognize the property of God's nature that necessitates my submission
if my cognitive equipment is not adequate for a contingent assessment
of his ontological status?

Van Til is not saying that creatures are unable to know God due to their finiteness. Rather, he would echo Paul in saying that creatures can and do know God, yet they dislike the implications of God, so they suppress this knowledge and reject God (Romans 1:18ff.).

Also, even if (which is not the case) Van Til did argue that humans are accountable to God even though God blinded them so that they could not know God, by what standard of fairness would you make such a judgement? Doesn't Paul ask a very similar question in Romans 9:14ff?

It seems as if Van Til assumes a
transcendental perspective in order to argue for cognitive
limitation--and then sell it off as an argument for the transcendental
necessity of God.

If Van Til's starting point was his own autonomy (his own norm by which he judged God), then your conclusion would be a possibility. However, Van Til's starting point is God's self-revelation in creation and in His Word (God's own authority). Thus, though I disagree with how you are understanding him, when Van Til argues transcendentally, he is merely echoing God's self-revelation (with the distinction between argument and evidence understood), which includes God's ultimate authority over epistemology as in every other area of life. God, if He is the supreme Creator of all, cannot reveal himself in any other way than as the ultimate norm of truth. To do so would be to deny himself, a logical impossibility for God.

Further, the statement "God verifies himself" seems incoherent.

In the context of what I was saying in my previous message I should have more clearly said, "God (as with any ultimate standard) can only be verified on His own terms, or by his own authority/norm."  

It
passes over the principle problem: the onus is on US to recognize the
self-attestation of God and submit to his authority. I (as the subject)
must have the epistemic capacity to recognize the authority of God's
self-revelation as truth (as the object), and then fulfill my
deontological requirement.

Here you are importing an ethical norm without providing a basis for it. For you are saying (1) If God is going to hold me accountable for his self-revelation, then (2) I must have the creaturely ability to know God. From whence comes your "must"? What authority can you cite to substantiate such a claim? (In other words, what right do you have to claim that this is a "problem"?)

Furthermore, here is a prime example of the subject, object, norm relationship: You have your subject (I) and your object (God), but where is your norm? The upshot of what I have been saying can be boiled down to this: If God is the Lord of All as He claims to be in His self-revelation, then He is the ultimate epistemic norm for human thinking. If I (being a creature) deny this norm, I am left in the precarious place of exalting my own norms in the place of God's. Whether I try to substitute rational norms, empirical norms, or subjective norms, all of these norms used autonomously will lead to irrationalism because they ignore the only true norm that can unite them coherently in the Christian worldview, the "uber norm"--God's own authority.

A creature will only be able to accept God's total normative authority over all areas of his life if he rejects his own attempts at autonomy and embraces God's total Lordship. Only then, as creatures embrace God's norms for truth, will God's actions regarding his self-revelation make sense in the Christian worldview.

At the very least, transcendental
argumentation relies on a (much debated) logical structure for its
validity and soundness.

If one rejects God's norms in logic, then what norms would he use to replace God's? And by what authority?

The "logic" of God seems fairly straightforward: I am God. What I say goes in all areas of life, including epistemology.
 

Further, the subject must be persuaded by this
argument:

1) God is the pre-condition of the intelligibility of experience

2) Experience is intelligible

3) Therefore, God exists.

The efficacy of this argument relies on much more then the nature of
the God whose existence it is supposed to support.

By what authority can you make such a claim of the argument's validity? (Further, on what authority do you claim its soundness? Autonomous logic?)

In my acceptance of
this argument, I have undermined the very principle that the argument
purports to establish. Namely, I have exercised my autonomy in order to
prove that man does not operate autonomously apart for the precondition
of experience (God).

I disagree. If you accept the soundness and the validity of the argument, you are doing so not by asserting your own autonomous authority. Rather, you are submitting yourself to God's ultimate authority. You would be saying, "I agree, God, with what you have already said." Not, "Because of my own authority, I agree with God's ultimate claim of authority." There is a world of difference between the two.

"God verifies himself" fails because the notion of
"self-attesting" authority fails.

(Ignoring my re-clarified version of this statement above for a second...) It fails . . . unless, of course, you are God :-).

Fails to whom? To you? By what authority do you hold God to account for whom he chooses to reveal himself?

Didn't we agree earlier that all ultimate standards are ultimately circular? If so, doesn't it follow that ultimate standards are also ultimately self-attesting on matters concerning themselves? Wouldn't God, then, be his own authority on how He reveals himself to man, if God is indeed an ultimate standard?

In order for either concept to be of
epistemic interest there must be an agent who recognizes their claims
as true. The agent must verify, "God verifies himself" or the semantic
content of this statement is unintelligible; how can a proposition be
"verified" without a party to whom the proposition is verified?

By what authority "must" there be an agent? Again, where's the norm?

On the flip side, doesn't Romans 1:18ff (part of God's own normative authority) proclaim that human agents do indeed know God, and yet suppress that very knowledge of Him?

Take for example the logical structure of the above argument. If
successful, the argument is supposed to show that God comprises the
necessary ontology for logic. However, my acceptance of the argument
turns on what I think of the logical structure of the argument.

I disagree. Your acceptance of the argument turns on whether you are using logic in accordance with God's norms or not. If not, then you had better be able to account for why you are rejecting God's norm and replacing it with your own.

Again,
we are stuck in the same rut: I use a certain logical method to "prove"
that God is the ontic necessity for the use of logic. This strikes me
as viciously circular, if not dishonest.

I agree about being in a rut, it's just which one we're in I'm disagreeing with :-).
Autonomous reason leads to irrationality (the "viciously circular" rut). Reason under God's Lordship leads to true rationality.

 

Let me iterate something important here. If there is such a being as
God, his ontological status is certainly not contingent on our musings.
There is a stark distinction between the epistemic currency of a
concept and the ontological status of the being under question.

...the argument/evidence thing...I'm with you. The asiety of God demands it.

In my
view, the "ultimacy" of God is not demonstrated by the epistemic
currency of the transcendental argument for his existence.

Ok. I'll accept your judgment (and perhaps we will never agree on this point), but would ask on what authority you are making that judgment.

In my view, God's Lordship over all areas of life is based on his own self-revealed authority in Word and creation.

I believe
God has the ontological status that the creeds afford him, but I do not
believe it because I must assume him in order to practice intelligible
epistemology.

Ok. Then, by what authority does a Christian practice intelligible epistemology if not by God's self-revelation?

I think Van Til errs when he moves from "God's existence
is ultimate in matters" of truth to "I must have enough cognitive
access to posit him as the precondition of the intelligibility of
experience". Importance does not equal access.

I think I disagree with your interpretation of Van Til on this point, but I have not read enough of him offer a sound reply from his own words. Do you have specific passages in mind here?

If Berkley's argument
for idealism succeeds, it is no doubt the most important epistemic
principle on he market (mental categories are all that exists).
However, we do not have immediate access to its truth by virtue of its
potential status of ultimate importance.

Again, such statements cry out for a norm:  By what authority could one claim such things?

The proposition "God exists" has important epistemic implications,
but why should I assume that I have a perspective that allows me to
assume its transcendental necessity?

You should assume God's transcendental necessity on no other authority than God's own authority. It is not that I have such a perspective that I am arguing for; rather, it is that God has revealed himself as the ultimate power, presence, and authority of the universe. In my understanding of his self-revelation in his cosmos and logos, God requires me to always acknowledge His Lordship over every area of life. Therefore, for me to think or live as if there is one iota in the cosmos that is not under God's ultimate authority would be inconsistent with my understanding of God's self revelation. So, I argue that it is on the basis of God's own authority as the Lord of All that He is the Lord of epistemology.

I have detailed comments ready regarding the rest of your message, but
for the sake of space and readability, why don't we hash through this
point by point? Kant's transcendental form of argumentation needs to be
demonstrated if we are to accept it as ground for Scripture's authority
over scientific inquiry.

Rather, I would argue that God's own authority as the Lord of all (including science) needs to be acknowledged if Christians are going to do science Christianly.
 

Whew, fingers are getting tired. Better call it a day. Thank you again for your willingness to hash through these things together. I appreciate the friendly push-back and am enjoying the interaction. It is revealing all sorts of areas in which I need to grow.

only by grace,
LO

[evdawgiddydog]

Hey Laurence,

I am not ignoring your reply...I have many thoughts but little time. I
will hopefully put something of substance up in the next two days.

Thanks for the patience,

Evan

[Laurence O.]

Hey Evan,

Hope you are doing well and keepin' your head above water. Things are
crazy on my side of the state . . . papers, reading, and Hebrew
paradigms galore.... But ahh, the weather is so nice!

In my course readings this week I came across an article from John
Frame that (I think) helped me understand your Van Til/Kant point more
clearly. Let me add this brief (and I really promise to be short this
time!) note on what you said, and at your liesure please let me know if
I am tracking with your argument more clearly.

When you said the following:

... you are basically (a) arguing that Van Til took over Kant's
transcendental approach but claimed God as the starting point to
replace Kant's starting point, the autonomous mind of man, and then (b)
asking how Van Til can claim a purely transcendental theistic starting
point for knowledge without dealing with the non-transcendental realm
(empiricism, rationalism, and existentialism), for it appears that he
would defeat his own starting point if he attempted to use
non-transcendental arguments to boulster his transcendental starting
point.

If I'm tracking with your question/critique, then I'd say you are
making a point that is close to John Frame's assessment of Van Til's
"logical leap":

*** Begin Frame quote from
http://reformedperspectives.org/hof/ApolFall2006/Transcendental%20Arguments.doc
***
But how can we defend the logical move from "intelligible universe"
to "theistic universe?" Van Til rarely articulated his reason for
that move; he seemed to think it was self-evident. But in effect, he
reverted at this point to apologetics of a more traditional type.
Apologists have often noted that we could not know the world at all
unless it had been designed for knowledge. If the world were nothing
but matter, motion, time, and chance, we would have no reason to think
that the ideas in our heads told us anything about the real world. Only
if a person had designed the world to be known, and the human mind to
know it, could knowledge be possible. So Van Til at this point reverted
to a traditional teleological argument. He never admitted doing this,
and he could not have admitted it, because he thought the traditional
teleological (like the other traditional arguments) were autonomous and
neutral.
*** End Quote***

In this brief piece Frame goes on to argue that God's revelation does
indeed make this radical transcendental claim, and no Christian
apologetic (and applied to our case, epistemic) argument is complete
without the transcendental implications of God's self-revelation.
However, in Frame's estimation assuming this transcendental starting
point (as Christians ought) does not force Christians to exclude the
traditional (non-transcendental) arguments because these arguments
bring the Christian theism argument full circle. In other words, the
transcendental argument is the goal of the non-transcendental ones, and
neither is complete without the others. (Frame's words are much more
clear than mine....)

In a word, I'm saying I think I understand better and am more agreeable
with your assessment of transcendental argumentation now than I thought
I was at first.

only by grace,
LO

[evdawgiddydog]

Hey LO,

That article looks helpful indeed. I need to apologize man....my world
the last week has been absolutely insane--on every level. When are you
over in Tampa? Perhaps we can get together.

Evan