10578 [PROCEEDINGS]Fortress at Sea? The Carrier Invulnerability Myth

[NOTICIARIONAVAL]

Fortress at Sea? The Carrier Invulnerability Myth

Issue: Proceedings Magazine - January 2010 Vol. 136/1/1,283

By Commander John Patch, U.S. Navy (Retired)


America's nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, especially in today's
irregular, asymmetric warfare climate, could be little more than slow-
moving targets.

The recently renewed debate over aircraft carrier requirements has
focused mainly on the factors of cost and utility. These issues
notwithstanding, analysts often overlook or understate the carriers'
inherent vulnerabilities. Regardless of the number of carriers
national leadership decides to maintain, because they remain the U.S.
Navy's preeminent capital ship and a symbol of American global power
and prestige, they are a potential key target for both unconventional
and conventional adversaries. Carrier proponents, however, universally
seem to accept on faith alone the premise that a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier (CVN) is essentially invulnerable.

Yet an intelligent adversary could potentially exploit carrier
weaknesses. The sudden, unexpected loss of a CVN, especially by
unanticipated asymmetric means, would shock both the military
establishment and the American psyche-perhaps being a military
equivalent to the Twin Towers' collapse on 9/11. The truth is, a
deployed aircraft carrier is more vulnerable to mission kill than is
commonly believed, and the Department of Defense should consider
efforts to prevent or mitigate such an exigency.

The carrier debate is alive and well. The current effort surrounding
the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)and the near-term
decommissioning of the nearly 50-year-old USS Enterprise (CVN-65) are
raising the volume of the argument, specifically on the number of
carrier strike groups (CSGs) needed to meet national and combatant
commander demands.

Recurring congressional statutes also dictate minimum carrier fleet
size, often despite differing advice from Navy secretaries and
military leaders.1 The carrier's value in the post-9/11 era?amidst a
global security paradigm defined by the often ambiguous
characteristics of irregular, asymmetric, or hybrid warfare-remains an
unanswered question. While combat-proven in conventional conflicts and
for certain aspects of irregular warfare, future roles and structure
of the carrier force remain murky.

Assessments of aircraft carrier vulnerability are not new. The Soviets
debated building a significant carrier fleet in the 1960s but
determined that large carriers had no place in the nuclear age, partly
because of their vulnerability to missiles with nuclear warheads.2
While later choosing to build larger carriers, Moscow always retained
the view that carriers remained vulnerable. While the American carrier
debate has continued since 1945, it has focused largely on missions,
cost, and force structure-not vulnerability.
Presumed Impregnable

The U.S. view of carrier invulnerability is a perilous assumption. If
9/11 taught Washington anything, it clearly demonstrated that fortress
America was vulnerable in ways its citizens and defenders never
imagined. Terrorists selected targets with maximum psychological
impact, employing a relatively sophisticated asymmetric method,
seemingly incorporating many of the basic principles of war and
operational art: simplicity, synergy, simultaneity and depth,
surprise, tempo and timing, security, etc.

The basic operational plan also reflected an awareness of the efficacy
of the classic indirect approach-a key aspect of asymmetric warfare.
They also exploited a basic vulnerability of open, democratic
political systems-a benign operating environment. If a handful of
Saudis could plan and carry out effective attacks halfway around the
world in a foreign land, why then could other adversaries not
accomplish the same in local waters familiar to them?

The typical carrier capabilities that lead to presumptions of
impregnability include: speed, armor, compartmentalization, size,
defenses (air wing, own-ship, escorts, etc.), blue-water sanctuary
(range from shore and from adversary/targets), and technological
superiority of U.S. weapon systems. Not often discussed, though, is
how a smart enemy might exploit technology or subterfuge to obviate
some traditional carrier strengths. Some potential examples include:

* Mass media, satellite communication, and the Internet can
provide location and disposition of U.S. carriers when they are near
shipping lanes or coastal waters; carrier presence is obvious well
before the silhouette appears on the horizon.
* Carriers not supporting a conflict requiring continuous air wing
operations will not be operating at higher speeds, especially at
night.
* Fast, low profile, open-ocean craft are widely available.
* Armored hangar bay doors are useless when open, typical to lower
conditions of readiness.
* Carrier crew size and diversity would likely allow unfettered
access to clandestine infiltrators of almost any ethnicity.
* While nuclear power provides virtually unlimited steaming,
carriers remain dependent on forward staging areas and supply ships
for food, aviation fuel, and stores.
* The insatiable appetite for information afloat is satisfied by
way of precious, uninterrupted bandwidth flowing through multiple
nodes with varying vulnerabilities.

Next-Generation Weapons Are Here Now

Emerging technologies and new classes of advanced conventional weapons
are also making the carriers' ostensible invulnerability more suspect.
Most experts see recent advances in foreign antiship cruise missiles
(ASCM), offensive information operations capabilities, stealthy diesel
and nuclear-powered submarines, deep water rising mines, and antiship
ballistic missiles (ASBM) as direct threats to carrier strike groups
proximate to the littorals (i.e., when supporting air operations
inland). While contemporary conflicts demonstrate no such apparent
threats to carriers, they also involve state adversaries without
advanced conventional naval weapons.

Hezbollah's effective use of a C802 ASCM against an Israeli warship in
2006, however, illustrates that state order of battle calculations
alone cannot provide a total picture of enemy capabilities. Although
most Navy leaders avow carrier invulnerability, then-Pacific Fleet
Commander Admiral Timothy Keating admitted that the ability to defend
against such advanced threats is uncertain.3 While it is beyond the
scope of this article to cite specifics, a quick scan of any recent
DOD global threat assessment reveals a plethora of emerging weapon
systems of concern.4

A corollary to the expanding advanced conventional weapons threat
could change the fundamental calculus of the carrier's value. Simply
put, increasing adversary offensive threats to carriers require
concomitant carrier and strike group defenses to mitigate them. For
instance, if the security environment changes such that carriers are
threatened with new, better weapons, but in much the same way they
were during the Cold War, the brunt of the carrier air wing will again
be needed for strike group defense.

The resultant reduction in offensive carrier strike capability-not to
mention the significant shift in aircraft/weapons mix and
predeployment air wing and ship defensive training-may diminish the
carriers' primary role of power projection. Similarly, increased
defensive tasking to strike group escorts would limit their support
for the myriad regional non-combat missions espoused in the current
maritime strategy. Indeed, the reliable provision of air power from an
unchallenged carrier witnessed during Operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom may well not be the future norm.
Asymmetric Challenges Loom

Conventional threats notwithstanding, carriers are also vulnerable to
unconventional or asymmetric threats.5 These potentially include
terrorism, sabotage, infiltration, denial and subterfuge (information
operations [IO], including cyber and psychological operations),
interdiction, and homeport or logistics hub attacks, among others.
While many admirals discount such threats outright, again, one need
only recall the shock and confusion following the 9/11 attacks.

One reason these threats make military leaders uncomfortable is that
they are vague and indiscriminate. Another is that few weapons in the
Carrier Strike Group arsenal can directly address them. Indeed, the
strike group's inherent capabilities are usually irrelevant against
asymmetric threats. Finally, since an unconventional adversary may
seek any of these means-and perhaps yet unknown methods-to achieve a
mission kill (i.e., not necessarily a catastrophic kill), leaders
often swear off as impractical the vouchsafing of every potential
carrier vulnerability.

Just as operational art demands a rigorous assessment of adversary
center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, one cannot assume away
the enemy's ability to do the same. The 2006 Israeli experience in
Lebanon is a recent example of a hybrid conflict, wherein an
unconventional enemy knew its opponent well, exploited technology to
defeat its armor, directed a sophisticated IO campaign to manage
perceptions, and threatened the homeland with incessant rocket and
missile barrages.

Gone are the days when the most serious unconventional threats were
ignorant, lightly armed fanatics conducting improvised attacks on
hardened targets. As such, it is a relatively simple task with readily
available information to evaluate the carrier as a system, with
critical elements of varying dependency, many of which could degrade
mission capability if assailed. Admittedly, adversaries require global
reach and significant capability to threaten some elements over the
longer-term, but a creative opponent could still seriously limit a
carrier's effectiveness, at least temporarily.

Any neophyte can generate a basic list of forward-deployed military
unit vulnerability: communications, logistics/lines of communication,
crew readiness/morale, mobility, etc. Because the CSG cannot protect
everything, the aggressor has the advantage in target selection and
surprise.
Pondering the Unthinkable

Carrier proponents typically fail to mention such vulnerabilities.
Instead they promote the carriers' inherent ability to operate
unfettered off an enemy coast-a virtual fortress at sea. In fairness
to the carrier admirals, when threat assessments on the future
operating environment present only shadowy non-state actors with
undefined or unpredictable capabilities, it is easy to see how some
would prefer to focus on the black and white conventional threats.
Listing a few hypothetical examples might help demonstrate potential
asymmetric carrier threats:

* A carrier operating with only a single escort on an OEF no-fly
day, far separated from other strike group warships, is approached by
a small team of highly trained, well-armed saboteurs in a low-profile,
fast boat at night in international waters. They gain access via a
lowered elevator when the ship is in low readiness conditions for a
quick surprise attack with satchel charges in the hangar and flight
decks to destroy most carrier air wing aircraft before the ship
musters a response.
* An adversary state about to seize several small islands in the
Persian Gulf directs a small team of special forces to commandeer a
large container ship, which veers into the path of a CVN exiting the
southern Suez Canal in a restricted waterway. The resultant collision
and carrier grounding causes enough damage to limit the carrier to ten
knots, preventing most fixed-wing flight operations indefinitely.
* An extremist group targeted by carrier air wing operations
identifies the less protected fleet auxiliaries providing carrier
strike group logistics in a forward theater and targets them
simultaneously with waterborne improvised explosive devices. Critical
fuel, food, and stores shortages severely limit air wing operations
for a period of weeks.

We Must Not Assume Away Threats

Instilling paranoia is not the intent of these examples; it is only to
present the art of the possible. So what can naval leaders do to
lessen the likelihood of asymmetric attacks focused on carrier mission
kills? First, they must admit that such attacks are possible. Then,
undertake a comprehensive assessment of carrier vulnerabilities, with
most likely and most dangerous scenarios addressed first for
prevention and mitigation plans. Next, naval war game and doctrine
developers should make a commitment to present warfighters and defense
leaders at war games and red team exercises with situations where
conventional, unconventional/asymmetric, and/or hybrid threats
marginalize or threaten CSGs.

This will force leaders to challenge traditional assumptions of
carrier invulnerability. Finally, leaders and strategists should
evaluate military plans and force capabilities in light of the fact
that asymmetric attacks may come from either conventional or
nontraditional adversaries.

Presuming carrier invulnerability is dangerous. It promotes
complacency, prevents a healthy degree of critical thinking, and
limits America's ability to prevent and respond to a completely new
class of threats. As a CATO Institute study amidst the post-Desert
Storm carrier debate related, "Carriers and their battle groups are
awesome instruments of war, but they are not juggernauts, as their
supporters claim. . . ."6

Pre-9/11 American society provided opportunity enough for a band of
radical Muslim brothers to shut down the United States temporarily.
Why then could peaceful international waters or territorial seas not
provide a similarly benign operating environment today? As defense
leaders prepare to make hard QDR decisions, it is high time to renew
the carrier vulnerability debate. As former President George W. Bush
was wont to state, "Bring it on."


1. The 2005 QDR endorsed an 11-carrier force, which has since been
supported by Congress (current plan for 12 in 2019), though the force
will drop to 10 upon the CVN-65 decommissioning in 2012.

2. Charles C. Petersen, "Aircraft Carriers in, Soviet Naval Theory
from 1960 to the Falklands War," Center for Naval Analyses,
Professional Paper 405, January 1984, p. 3.

3. David W. Wise, "Carrier culture shock: The Navy's maritime strategy
does not go far enough in reshaping the fleet," Armed Forces Journal,
June 2009, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/06/4034155.

4. See Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
"Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of
China, 2009," especially chapters 4 and 5.

5. Asymmetric attack/warfare is characterized by several properties:
difficult to detect/recognize, dissimilar in type, disproportional in
size and effect, avoids strengths and targets weaknesses, and has
significant shock value.

6. David Isenberg, "The Illusion of Power: Aircraft Carriers and U.S.
Military Strategy," CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 134,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa134.html.
Commander Patch is a faculty member at the U.S. Army War College and a
member of the U.S. Naval Institute Editorial Board. He is a retired
U.S. Navy surface warfare and intelligence officer and career
intelligence analyst. He served on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt
(CVN-71) from 2000 to 2002 during Operation Enduring Freedom.

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