On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 at 4:27 AM, Will Riley <
hapti...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Right now I'm working on a sandbox library for node.js. I'd most likely be
> using vm.runInNewContext to prevent any unwanted methods (eg process.kill)
> from becoming accessible, and the untrusted code would run in a different
> node process.
>
> I'm looking into the possibility of enabling code to call a wrapped
> 'require()' for loading a restricted set of modules (eg 'crypto' or 'util'),
> or even exposing wrapped versions of 'net' or 'fs' that restrict their use
> to certain paths/addresses. This is mainly for performance reasons,
> otherwise I'd do I/O in the main process.
>
> I'm a bit concerned that somehow, 'process.binding()' is going to become
> accessible to the untrusted code if I expose a module to it. Is this an
> irrational concern, or would it be more secure to wrap process.binding in
> the global scope of my sandbox before running the untrusted code?
>
> Thanks again!
The vm module is *not* for running untrusted code. A sandbox != secure jail.
We warn about it in the docs but maybe we have to be more explicit
about it because questions like yours come up often.