Prevent Violence in Montenegro, TFF
Christer Nylander
Christer
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On http://www.transnational.org from April 8, 2000
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T F F P r e s s I n f o # 9 1
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P R E V E N T V I O L E N C E I N M O N T E N E G R O
Lund, Sweden - April 8, 2000
"A fifth war in the Balkans can still be prevented. But whereas the
isolated leadership in Belgrade has plenty of time, Montenegro does
not, and the international community is so bogged down in Bosnia and in
Kosovo that it has little capacity to shape an effective
violence-prevention strategy for this tiny republic of 635.000
inhabitants. What we just heard during our fact-finding mission to
Podgorica," say Soren Sommelius and Jan Oberg of the TFF
conflict-mitigation team, "was frighteningly similar to what people
told us in Croatia in 1991 - in spite of all the differences between
the two cases."
"It was a bit surprising to listen to the level of verbal aggression in
Podgorica not only against Milosevic, but also against the Serb people
and the opposition and even the federal constitution that the Republic
signed as late as 1992 when a) it was fully aware of who Slobodan
Milosevic was, and b) had participated in the wars elsewhere as part of
the JNA, the Federal Yugoslav Army. It could hardly be argued that
people in Montenegro did not know who or what they federalized with.
Violence-preventive diplomacy by everyone is dearly needed now.
Patience and longterm policy for the Balkans as a whole, and
implemented with utmost caution, will be essential. Unfortunately, the
international community's policy in the region up till now is not
exactly helpful to Montenegro, whichever way it chooses," state
Sommelius and Oberg.^
THE BACKGROUND AND THE GAME
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
In contrast to other Balkan conflicts, this one can not be acted out
through ethnicity or religion. A 'real' Serb has Montenegrin roots and
there are probably more people of Montenegrin origin in Serbia than
Montenegrins in Montenegro where 62 % are Montenegrins, 9 % are Serbs,
14 % are Muslims and 7% are Albanians (1991 census). It now also hosts
some 50.000 refugees. In this republic there is much more inter-ethnic
cooperation and mixed government than elsewhere in ex-Yugoslavia -
which doesn't mean that there is no potential for ethnic tension,
especially in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. There is also more freedom
of the press, a quite relaxed social and political atmosphere. It's
difficult to define what 'nationalism' is in Montenegro and who is a
nationalist but there is a marked "Montenegroness" and national,
historical pride that should not be underestimated.
Relations between Belgrade and Podgorica are now virtually frozen.
Montenegrin MPs don't attend sessions in the federal parliament,
President Djukanovic is not called (or does not turn up) at National
Security Council meetings. Apart from the Yugoslav Army, there are no
signs of federal institutions in Montenegro. Many we met said they had
stopped going to Belgrade, some dared not because they had publicly
supported NATO's bombing.
The border between Serbia and Montenegro is one of the most guarded in
today's Europe. Virtually all trade in goods has stopped since Serbia
put up a blockade against Montenegro; it argues that the latter has
re-sold subsidised goods and food from Serbia with a profit. Montenegro
has had to import from the West, from Croatia and Slovenia in
particular, resulting in much higher prices for the consumers. The
Deutsch mark has been introduced as parallel currency and all state
employee salaries are paid in Deutsch mark. Nobody we met could explain
how this huge inflow of foreign currency had happened to a country not
exactly known for its financial stability.
In an attempt to get more tourists, Montenegro no longer requires a
visa for visitors, which means that travellers from Montenegro to
Serbia must show either their passports or their visas. The newly
established Montenegrin Airlines provide direct flights to Montengro -
not via Belgrade - from 15 places in Europe.
And there have been tolerance-testing incidences. Belgrade recently
stopped traffic to the airport in Tivat, allegedly because of NATO
activity in the air. In December the government of Montenegro attempted
to take over the Podgorica Airport which happens to belong to Yugoslav
Airlines, JAT, and is also an important military airport (partly hit by
NATO). Belgrade answered with a military take-over for a few hours.
Both sides accuse the other of having violated the federal
constitution; but both have. And a quick comparison between the federal
and the Montenegrin constitutions will provide the ground for numerous
conflicting interpretations. Neither Serbia nor Montenegro can be
characterised as societies founded on the rule of law. Both have
serious economic difficulties, both have substantial mafia and black
economy elements, and they are linked to each other. In Montenegro the
guesstimate for the 'informal' economy is 40-60%. ("Come to Montenegro
on holiday, your car is already here...")
Interestingly enough, President Milosevic stated around New Year that
Montenegro was welcome to seek independence. This statement was turned
down as deceptive by everyone in Podgorica. It could, however, have
some relevance. Milosevic has been President of Serbia and it is his
last term as president of FRY. It could be advantageous for him to let
Montenegro go, have the constitution revised and, in that process, make
other changes that would solidify his own power well into the future.
It's all a cat-and-mouse game. Steps are taken on both sides aimed to
provoke and test limits. We ask ourselves when these type of dangerous
chess or poker games acquire their own dynamics and spin out of
control. That's the moment when everybody will say - like four times
before and equally false: we did all we could to avoid war, but finally
that was the only option!
Montenegro's defence capacity is invested with its 20,000 police
personnel, many of which are equipped with heavy arms and, according to
some sources, trained by e.g. CIA and Mossad. The Yugoslav Army (VJ) in
the republic counts 14,000 plus some 900 pro-Milosevic troops in the
so-called 7th Military Police Battalion. That's more than enough to
create havoc here.
THE FUTURE REFERENDUM AND HOW TO AVOID CIVIL WAR
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
The official policy states that the question of independence shall be
decided by a referendum. According to the most recent opinion poll
figures (January 2000) published by CEDEM, the Center for Democracy and
Human Rights, the overall opinions are the following: 36 % think it
would be best for both Montenegro and Serbia to be independent,
sovereign states; 28 % think the best solution for Montenegrins and
Serbs is the Federation with Serbia; 23 % think the Federation should
be changed according to the Montenegrin Government's so-called Platform
proposal which aims towards a confederation, and 6 % think one unitary
state would be the best.
In other words, well over 50 % favour the federal idea or even a
unitary state with Serbia, but half of them are in favour of a looser
relations. So, there is a strong wish to keep some kind of formal ties
with Serbia, but the wish to remain in the present federation with
Serbia has fallen sharply since early 1998 when 52 % of the people
favoured that option. Complete independence is still a minority
opinion, but has grown to 36 % from 21 % in early 1998.
Given these figures it would be extremely counterproductive and
violence-promoting of the West to promote Montenegrin independence or
deliver security guarantees should it go for it. Referendums held in
other former Yugoslav republics showed 90% or more in favour of
independence - and still lead to violent struggle. Should Montenegro
declare itself independent with a smaller percentage in favour, the
risk is high that it will mark the beginning of civil war and
intervention by the VJ - after which the West will feel obliged to come
to the defence of Montenegro.
Thus, a massive pro-independence opinion throughout the Montenegrin
citizenry should be the sole criteria guiding Western support for
Montenegro's secession out of the federation.
INDEPENDENCE REQUIRES A STRATEGY AND A DIALOGUE
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Next, even with a solid pro-independence majority, there has to be a
strategy for a negotiated solution. When people have no ideas about the
political strategies or about the principles to be applied at a
negotiation table, the likelihood of war automatically increases. A
federation can not be dissolved and new relations of trust and
cooperation be established between the units unless there is a
willingness to employ principled policies, negotiations and compromise.
We met no politicians or advisers who had such a strategy. The response
we obtained from most were along the following lines:
'All we want is independence, to be a sovereign state and integrate
with Europe. We don't want war, for sure. But the decision to use
violence is not in our hands, it is solely in the hands of Mr.
Milosevic and he is a dictator. You simply can't talk with him. So, we
have to be patient and hope that the international community will
support us economically and, if need be, security-wise. But if we are
attacked by Milosevic, we are a strong people and not exactly unarmed,
we will fight for our freedom as we have throughout our history.'
This amounts to positioning rather than an exploration of needs and
interests.We have seen it lead to destructive processes from Slovenia
to Kosovo. It must be of the responsibility of the international
community to convince the Montenegrin leadership that it is not likely
to achieve its goals peacefully by throwing its hands up in the air and
saying that all future disasters will be the work of one man.
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS TO AVOID VIOLENCE
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
One way of overcoming such a policy of innocence-cum-blame coupled with
disclaiming one's own co-responsibility for the future ('we don't
decide about war and peace') would be for someone in the international
community to take the initiative to establish an orderly fact-finding,
conflict-analysis and then to promote dialogue and negotiation.
The countries that bombed Yugoslavia can't do that, because of the
indictment of President Milosevic, because of what is at stake with the
faltering Kosovo mission and because there is no minimum trust in
Belgrade. These countries have lost every chance of being seen as
impartial mediators.
Below follow some proposals to secure a negotiated solution. We
emphasize that they apply whether Montenegro stays with or becomes
independent of Serbia. We have no opinion about that. TFF's
professional approach deals with processes; we believe that conflicting
parties have a fundamental right to identify their goals as they are
the ones to live with the solutions.
o Expand the present, excellent OSCE mission considerably and let OSCE
set up a professional negotiating facility.
o Establish a small UN mission like the one in Skopje (UNPREDEP) but
consisting only of UN Civil Affairs, civil monitors, professional
mediators and negotiators and a few UN Civil Police.
o Increase the presence of international NGOs and promote all kinds of
meetings, roundtables, and seminars with people at various levels in
Serbia and neighbouring states. Without a comprehensive exploration of
regional issues, there will be no peaceful change.
o Help the parties themselves to do conduct shuttle diplomacy between
Podgorica and Belgrade.
o Various types of international economic support conditioned upon the
Montenegrin government taking measures to radically reduce the role of
the mafia in the country's economy.
o Stop every statement by Western politicians and military leaders that
could be interpreted by Montenegrin leaders to mean that it will be
risk-free to declare premature independence or take other steps
considered provocative in Belgrade. There are no short-cuts to a new
status.
THE WEST MAY NOT BE ABLE TO HELP MONTENEGRO
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
None of this would be easy. Indeed, we fear that the international
so-called community's leaders, due to their actions in Yugoslavia last
year, have radically reduced their ability to be helpful to Montenegro.
Western policies in Kosovo - or better "Chaosovo" - are a failure for
everyone to see and nobody has an exit strategy that can avoid either
producing violence or being extremely costly for the West over a decade
or two. Western decision-makers have not managed to weaken President
Milosevic' power a bit, but they repeat mechanically that no changes
can occur in the Balkans before he is out of the picture. None of the
larger economic pledges to the region have been honoured.
OSCE might be the best suited organisation to deal with Montenegro's
substantial problems. But with FRY's membership suspended for the last
9 years (the U.S. insisting) and with the CIA-infiltrated OSCE
Verifiers mission set up in Kosovo before NATO's bombing, it is
understandable if Belgrade would turn down a request for establishing
such a mission on what is still federal territory.
Most of those we met clearly told us that the Western idea of using
Montenegro as a leverage in democratizing Serbia was grossly
misconceived. They also told us that they felt caught in a Catch 22
situation: on the one hand, the West is telling them to take it easy
with independence, on the other hand they that they will not get any
substantial foreign aid because they are not an independent state.
The last thing Western politicians would wish at this point is another
military effort followed by a kind of protectorate. Unless, that is,
there is a longterm Western strategy to dissolve Yugoslavia by force.
That would mean instigating troubles in Sandjak, Voivodina - and
Montenegro. Southern Serbia is already a hot spot. The West is likely
to need some kind of formal settlement in Kosovo. Whatever it will be,
it will influence the future of Montenegro, but surprisingly many among
those we talked with seemed to see Kosovo as very far from Montenegro.
MONTENEGRO AS A PAWN IN SEVERAL GAMES?
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
All this will prove utterly problematic for Montenegro. If it wants to
become independent, it should develop a longterm strategy between the
present situation and that goal. Provocative moves on the chess board
are likely to be self-defeating, particularly when not based on an
overwhelming majority of pro-independence sentiment in the people.
It should also avoid getting trapped in some larger game between
Milosevic and the EU/the US. However different the cases, Montenegro
may do wise to draw some conclusions from the Kosovo quagmire. There is
no such thing as a free secession and dissolution from a federation.
But the costs can be minimized if the parties, before the divorce, have
been helped to define in advance what the post-federal relationship
would look like. But again, who can serve as the trusted councellor
with both sides? Not even the UN, given its operation in Kosovo.
Local elections will take place on June 11 in the cities of Podgorica
and Herceg Novi. They will be important indicators as to where the
Montenegrins are heading. Until then, let's ask: how genuine is the
wish for independence in and of itself? How much of this wish is based
on deep and understandable frustration with the Milosevic regime and
the bigger brother's sorry state of economy? How much of the wish for
independence has been induced into Montenegro by the West as part of a
possible longterm policy of destroying former and present Yugoslavia?
And how much, all said and done, can the Montenegrin government and
people do together not to end up being a pawn in everybody else's not
too noble games? We are afraid the answer is: not that much" - end Jan
Oberg and Soren Sommelius.
© TFF 2000
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Dr. Jan Oberg
Director, head of the TFF Conflict-Mitigation team
to the Balkans and Georgia
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Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research
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Phone +46-46-145909 (0900-1100)
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