Re: Command Modern Air Naval Operations Serial Number
Bernd Manison
Command: Modern Operations is a sequel released on November 14, 2019. While the core gameplay and mechanics are largely similar to its predecessor (maintaining backward compatibility with Command: Modern Air Naval Operations scenarios),[5] Command: Modern Operations runs on a newer version of its 32-bit engine. Among the main features that differentiate it from Command: Modern Air Naval Operations are: Tacview integration (allows for a live 3D view of a scenario, although scenario recording and playback is not supported for Command: Modern Operations at this time); a quick-battle generator; detailed satellite maps of the entire planet; and automatic image fetching for a number of common entries in the databases (an internet connection is required for the on-the-fly image download of both); a new UI; realistic submarine communication; and terrain effects on ground operations and weapon deployment. Also included are the latest versions of the DB3000 and Cold war databases that Command: Modern Air Naval Operations and the prior Harpoon games utilized. (These determine the number, properties, and capabilities of all the weapon systems and units in the game.)[13][14]
All the Command LIVE episodes for CMO in a single Bundle!
Command: Modern Operations is the next generation in cross-domain modern wargaming. It enables you to simulate every military engagement from post World War II to the present day and beyond. The scale is primarily tactical/operational, although strategic scale operations are also possible.
_MO_LIVE_Complete/
Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations is a comprehensive wargame of air & naval military operations from post WW2 to the near future, covering scenarios of both total war and low intensity situations. The scale is primarily tactical/operational, although strategic scale operations are also possible.
Korea. Colonial wars. Vietnam. Middle East. Cuba. Falklands. Iran-Iraq. World War 3. Desert Storm. India & Pakistan. The Arctic circle. Past and future conflicts in the Pacific, Norwegian Sea, Russian periphery and more. Experience conflict from post-WW2 all the way to 2020+ and beyond. Test your mettle against lethal land-based missile batteries, air regiments, naval fleets or pirate groups. Face off against threats of the past, present and future. How do you measure up against the challenges of modern warfare?
Detailed modeling of air (including near-space) and naval operations, both surface and underwater, supported by high-quality physics, sensor/EW, terrain and weather, weapon and damage models
Perhaps the biggest question for the scenario is the Russian order of battle. I have made a number of assumptions based on the current Russian OOB, in essence assuming upgrades are taking place, a number of units are pulled from other districts to support the conflict, and that modern weaponry (R-77 being key here) are available in numbers (this last point has proved a surprisingly big hurdle when it comes to modernising Russian air power, but in another ten years I am going to give them the assumption of finally having a modern active MRAAM).
To sum up: Although the $79.99 dollar price tag might seem a bit much, this game is well worth every cent of it. If you have even a passing interest in the subject matter. then this game is for you. Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations is, without a doubt, a seriously fun, intense, involving simulation of modern naval combat with nearly infinite replay value. It is a more than worthy successor to Harpoon.
For some scenarios, like a Cold War game where Warsaw Pact naval forces use submarines to launch an attack against NATO patrols in the Arctic sea, some of the information about vehicle and weapon capabilities is public and declassified and already incorporated into the game. In more modern scenarios, such as a hypothetical battle in the South China Sea, the game incorporates an open-source understanding of the technical capabilities involved, and the open-source code allows users to update it with more publicly unavailable information.
USS Zumwalt embodies the legacy of warfighting excellence and innovation of Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., a veteran of World War II and the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. He exemplified honor, courage and commitment during 32 years of dedicated naval service. Believing it was his job to "modernize and humanize" the Navy, Zumwalt chose to embrace change and to lead it from within.
As the nineteenth Chief of Naval Operations, Zumwalt faced similar challenges to those faced by today's Navy. He entered office with defense spending declining and an overextend fleet. He met these challenges head on by embracing innovations - both strategically and technologically - to ensure the Navy remained capable of meeting the Soviet threat. He advanced naval warfare while ensuring our Navy met mission requirements, acquired affordable equipment, and ensured lifecycle costs made it possible to man, train, equip, and maintain the force. Zumwalt's embrace of innovation resulted in a number of successful new programs, including the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate, the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine and the F-14 Tomcat, all of which had lasting impacts on the warfighting readiness of the Navy.
Maritime Advanced Warfighting School is a resident program that is completed in conjunction with College of Naval Command and Staff curriculum. Objectives for this course are to develop strategic and operational leaders with the skills required to plan, execute, and assess combined, joint, and naval operations.
Headquartered in Naples, Italy, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet operates U.S. naval forces in the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) areas of responsibility. U.S. Sixth Fleet is permanently assigned to NAVEUR-NAVAF, and employs maritime forces through the full spectrum of joint and naval operations. Our persistent presence in Europe is in accordance with our international commitments and agreements and is necessary to reassure our Allies and Partners of our commitment to collective defense.
Most noticeably, during the Cold War, the US capital ship fleet had no peer opponent. The Soviet Union, although developing as a modern naval power, was not imperial Japan and would never present the same formidable foe at sea. The Soviet surface fleet was small by comparison, and its combat power remained questionable. The poor condition of the Soviet surface ships kept them close to home, and while the Soviets were certainly capable of global deployment, they rarely strayed far in large groups of credible combat power. These facts were ignored by a succession of Navy admirals who were determined to keep the focus on capital ships. The ruse continued into the late 1970s when then-Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt went so far as to testify that the Soviets, as a great power, had surpassed US naval strength. In the final years of the Soviet Union, the myth continued as US government printing offices kept producing slick publications outlining the threat posed by the Soviet surface fleet and how US carriers would defeat them in combat.
Following the photo of the Chinese submarine near the USS Kitty Hawk, China continued to add to its naval power. In 2011, China launched its first aircraft carrier and subsequently built a series of small naval bases on man-made islands off the mainland coast cementing it as a peer naval power capable of threatening US dominance at sea. The Chinese navy is being built for offensive operations in the spirit of Mahan, and it is possible that De Tag! is here again.
Given our history of producing naval strategies based on flawed assumptions and incorrect core beliefs, we should be wary of making similar mistakes with our naval strategy toward China. Assumptions about how the Chinese will employ military force at sea are echoing historical mistakes, including the notion that China is building its navy to engage in an open-sea battle, or that any strike warfare against the Chinese mainland will be decisive, and that capital ship dominance is the sole enabler of US command of the sea.
If we assume the rhetoric of great power competition is correct and war is inevitable, or at least likely, the Navy is correct to prepare. But blindly continuing its love affair with Mahanian naval theory could be catastrophic. China is not Japan or the Soviets and presents a new, formidable threat. Militarily, the Chinese navy, although modern, is very much a regional force. And despite an aggressive building program, China is not yet an overwhelming threat to US naval power. The presumption that China is seeking Mahanian-style battle despite the given combat power of the US Navy is not credible. To win at sea, the United States must consider the adversary we face, not the adversary we want to face.
This author should have written this piece a decade ago. Then, his argument might hold weight. But instead, Dr. Watts' article presents a strawman argument. First, the Navy's number one and two shipbuilding priorities are the Columbia and Virginia class submarines, respectively. His lengthy story about the USS Kitty Hawk being surprised by a Chinese submarine misdiagnoses the problem as the USN's love for Mahan. In reality, the problem was a lack of ASW (Anti-submarine Warfare) capabilities in the Carrier Air Wing (CVW), which now reside in the MH-60R.
Second, the Navy seeks to employ the distributed maritime operations (DMO) concept with a more diversified (and numerically more extensive) fleet of less expensive (for example, FFG-62, Flight III DDG) and unmanned ships.
Although aircraft carriers remain in production, their role is not simply to control the sea. CVWs conduct many missions beyond strike and sea control. The author fails to comprehend how carrier-based aircraft complicate an adversary's sensors, disrupting A2AD (Anti-Access and Aerial Denial) systems. Further, along with the USAF's Air Combat Employment (ACE), carrier aviation is central to the joint warfighting concept (aggregating to produce a significant effect and disaggregating to survive.) Hiding a CVN is challenging but not impossible.
In sum, I enjoyed Dr. Watts' prose, but his superannuated understanding of maritime warfare misses the mark.