Accessdata Password Recovery Toolkit Crack
Rosette Allaband
Optional Device Decryption Add-on unlocks, decrypts, and recovers passwords for Western Digital My Passport drives and disks for Macs with Apple T2 Security Chips, including ones protected with EFI firmware password. Available for law enforcement and other types of government organizations. Contact sales for additional information.
Analyzes live memory images and hibernation files and extracts encryption keys for hard disks and passwords for Windows & Mac accounts. Passware Bootable Memory Imager acquires memory of Windows, Linux, and Mac computers.
Analyzes memory images and hibernation files and extracts encryption keys for hard disks and files and passwords for Windows/Mac accounts and websites. Acquires memory of Windows, Linux, and Mac computers.
Support for distributed password recovery for Windows, Linux, Amazon EC2, and Microsoft Azure. The Linux version runs a portable Passware Kit Agent from a bootable Linux USB drive. Remote management of network Agents directly from the PKF.
Decrypts or recovers passwords for APFS, Apple DMG, BitLocker, Dell, FileVault2, LUKS/LUKS2, McAfee, PGP, Steganos, Symantec, and TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt containers and disk images. Optional Device Decryption Add-on recovers passwords for Macs with T2 chip and WD My Passport drives.
It runs on Windows and Linux 64-bit and has linear performance scalability. Each computer running Passware Kit Agent supports multiple CPUs and GPUs simultaneously. Passware Kit Forensic comes with 5 agents included with ability to purchase more separately as needed. All the Agents can be managed remotely directly from the PKF.
The Password Recovery Toolkit is a software pack that can help recover passwords for Windows NT; Lotus 1-2-3; and Microsoft Excel, Word, Outlook, Mail, Organizer, Schedule, Access, Backup, VBA, and Money. A Windows NT password recovery module is available to reset password protection and/or secure boot options when the password or key disk is lost. Simply drag and drop files to the program window, and the Toolkit can recover passwords for opens, write reservations, workbooks and worksheets, templates and documents, Personal Folders files, form designs, and databases. This version features new password recovery modules for Quicken and ACT files, and an updated VBA module now handles MS Office 2000 files. Only partial passwords can be recovered using this trial version.
So if you want your password to be hard to guess, you should choose something not on any of the root or appendage lists. You should mix upper and lowercase in the middle of your root. You should add numbers and symbols in the middle of your root, not as common substitutions. Or drop your appendage in the middle of your root. Or use two roots with an appendage in the middle.
Great Essay Bruce! However, most of the focus of your article seems to be on password complexity, opposed to password length. I had read that passwords created from easy to remember phrases of 32 characters or longer are much more difficult to crack.
I do not know about OS X (and Windows), but I do know that Linux keeps its swap on a special partition. Seems rather trivial to make sure this is purged at system boot or shutdown, and for added security, it can be encrypted.
In a previous life, I was an admin for a Lotus Notes environment. One of its features was a profoundly simple solution to a brute force attack: Each attempt to login was delayed by (some unknown algorithm) longer than the time between the previous two. By about 4 or 5 login/PW attempts, the delay was many seconds and profoundly irritating.
One issue not addressed above is how often to change passwords. Some of the systems I use force changes as often as every two weeks, and forbid the use of the previous five passwords. My solution is to come up with a very strong password to begin with, then use: cycle1, cycle2, cycle3, cycle4, and cycle5 as temporary passwords to let me reset it to where it was.
For the physically or mathematically-minded, they can be very easy to remember. They also make it easy to involve symbols (memorably). And since the notation for terms can have a very broad variation, they are probably not easy to search efficiently. And, there are a lot of them, many of which are quite obscure.
Considering the possible variations (ydot instead of dy/dt, Heisenberg evolution with commutators, replace y by a Greek letter like Psi, subtract the RHS from both sides, many more) it seems like a losing game to try to create a stereotype search for these. And in this case, obscurity does aid security.
Someone mentioned it but for linux encrypted swaps and tmp take care of a lot of this problems. I think ssh also avoids the swap issue by marking any allocated memory where the key may be as non-swapable. Also there is a LOT of security knowledgeable people looking at it to make sure holes like that are not left out but it is so easy to leave holes. For example some of those password wallets may not be that good at cleaning their left overs. I for example have a list of passwords in a text file that I use pgp to encrypt. If I do forget to erase it then the text file then it goes into a backup tape (oops). Also at that point a non-security conscious program is being used (to read the text file). It is not an easy task.
Typically, the performance degradation is rather low. In many cases, when booting the OS or swapping to disk, the bottleneck is not CPU power but harddisk transfer bandwidth, so the the CPU is mostly idle anyway. Why not let it do some encryption?
There is no free lunch, however ?
The only consolation is that like with real PINs for credit cards etc., you only have a limited number of tries before the system locks you out until you get in touch with them to have your account unlocked again.
It seems to me that a requirement to make a password too strong and change it frequently can be counter-productive. Any process that means you have to write the password down instead of remembering it is going to be less safe.
The secure virtual memory option of OS X can offer protection against a password being found in the memory swapfile, but not against it being found in other un-encrypted temp files which may have been created by other applications.
As for File Vault, it only encrypts your Home directory, so various system files and temporary files are not encrypted at all. (Full Disk encryption would be needed for that and there is no FDE available for Mac OS X boot volumes).
Be careful with long passwords. There are some fsckingstupid** systems out there that will accept passwords of any length during account setup but will only allow entry of notably shorter passwords at login.
It helps in two ways: First, it allows you to choose different passwords for different services. Not many among us can remember 40 distinct passwords; we either have to write them down or re-use the same passwords over and over again, which becomes a nightmare with the different password choice and lifetime policies out there.
They can just give you a crack in the jaw and beat the password out of you. Cheaper, quicker, higher rate of password recovery.
And if your a tough guy, maybe they just beat your wife or kids until you crack.
The function mlock() causes those whole pages containing any part of the address space of the process starting at address addr and continuing for len bytes to be memory resident until unlocked or until the process exits or execs another process image. The implementation may require that addr be a multiple of PAGESIZE
Techniques for generating obscure passwords and possibly mnemonics for them are pretty useless in the world I inhabit. I have currently about 30 passworded accounts. Many of these accounts require changing one or more times per year. Ignoring changes, there are 900 combinations of accounts and passwords that I must distinguish, not just 30. I need to recall that for a specific, given account I (last!) used a specific, given password.
I have a hard time remembering arbitrary, albeit mnemonic, strings six to nine months after I last used one. Yet, some of my accounts are accessed only a few times a year (E.g. I change the period on a 12 month CD to take advantage of changing interest rates.).
In particular, I have been locked out because I used the password for account A when trying to access account B. I remembered the password perfectly. It was just the wrong one. I cannot not have my accounts and passwords written down just because there are times when I confuse password and account combination. And the pain of not getting it right by the third try can be unbearable.
It has been said that a password can be written to the disk in the form of a memory dump file. After a severe software error, a memory dump file may be automatically generated in some cases. See -dump-files.php
For some items of software, a technical report is generated in response to a severe error. The user may be given the option to transmit the report to the software manufacturer for diagnostic and quality improvement purposes. A report of this kind may contain memory contents (and therefore possibly passwords) from the affected software. This issue is mentioned in a security bulletin at -005.shtml
Now since Word and Excel encryption do not use salt, we have been able
to create rainbow tables for cracking of those documents. By default the
password is hashed (with salt), truncated to 40 bit, hashed again (with
no salt) and used for RC4 encryption. By using some known plaintext in
Word and Excel documents we are able to crack any password in 5
minutes with 4GB worth of tables and 99.7% success.
After a bit of sniffing around the web, I came across an open source tool called Eraser that claims to erase file cluster tips and overwrite the deleted file metadata with useless rubbish as well as many other useful disk erasing capabilities. The ability to overwrite cluster tips and old file system metadata seems to be fairly unusual, even among the commercial offerings.
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