ST: Many paths to a new Barisan Nasional
Soh Yi Da
Many paths to a new Barisan Nasional
ON WEDNESDAY, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak unveiled his new Cabinet. Absent for the first time in the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition's history were representatives from the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), a BN founding member. The party had kept to its word that it will not accept any Cabinet position - because it had performed poorly in the May 5 general election.
Instead, Mr Paul Low, president of Transparency International Malaysia , was appointed Minister in the PM's Department. He is not a member of any political party. Are we seeing the start of the BN's reform process?
BN's structure was conceived by Datuk Seri Najib's father, Tun Abdul Razak, in 1973. In the aftermath of the 1969 racial riots, Tun Razak sought to restructure Malaysian politics. He invited all political parties to join a coalition, the Barisan Nasional, a government of national unity of sorts.
Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) joined but the Democratic Action Party (DAP) chose to stay in the opposition. Almost all the major parties from East Malaysia joined BN, leading to a coalition of about a dozen political parties.
The rules of BN, then and now, were simple: the United Malays National Organisation (Umno) was first among equals. Minority rights were, to a large extent, protected because each of BN's component parties were guaranteed seats in the Cabinet. The BN system heralded in nearly four decades of political stability.
It lost its two-thirds majority in 2008 and the popular vote in the recent polls. So what went wrong for BN? Corruption and Umno's perceived superciliousness.
From the 1980s onwards, BN became a byword for "money politics". Umno's high-handed approach to pro-bumiputera policies meant that the Chinese and Indian communities felt politically marginalised.
Since they could not make or influence public policy, non-Malay component parties such as MCA, Gerakan and Sarawak United Peoples' Party began to gain political legitimacy by way of grassroots services. Such services included help in writing application letters to government departments and representing constituents in disputes with regulatory authorities.
This worked remarkably well because all local municipal councillors are appointed by the government and they had direct access to the bureaucracy. They also spend a lot of time looking after vernacular education, from fund raising to applying for vernacular school licences, and sponsoring cultural events.
After decades of such services, the non-Malay polity no longer see parties such as MCA and Gerakan as political parties but as Umno apologists.
The poor showing of MCA and the Malaysian Indian Congress in the last two elections (2008 and 2013) has led to calls for a rethinking of the BN model.
It is fairly obvious that the urban polity - some 71 per cent of Malaysia's population - wants BN to relook its racial approach of treating Umno as first among equals and to eradicate money politics. There are several ways being floated to reform BN.
These include collapsing all component parties into one entity; allowing direct membership into BN; giving real power to non-Malay BN parties; adopting a US-style Cabinet secretary system; and creating a new coalition.
The easiest way to deal with the racial question is to collapse all 13 current BN parties into a single party simply called BN. The Malays need not worry about losing political power since numerically they will be the largest group in the single BN. The major difference will be the tone of the new entity which cannot merely reflect one ethnic group's voice.
A second option is to give some real political power to non-Malay BN parties. This will allow them to formulate public policy and regain credibility. A third option is to allow new Chinese and Indian parties into BN.
Corruption will be much harder to tackle. The money-politics culture is so entrenched in Umno that any leader who tries to reform this system will find himself isolated. All the recent Umno party elections suggest that money was extensively used to buy delegates' support. It is no exaggeration to say the majority of Malay businessmen who joined Umno hope to expand their business.
Given the realities, I do not expect BN to collapse into a single party or deal seriously with corruption. There is simply no political will to do both.
One single BN party will not become a reality because the hardliners in Umno will not allow non-Malays to "dilute" their party. When Umno expanded to Sabah, many non-Malay Muslims and Sabah bumiputera joined the party and this altered its power structure. In the 2012 Umno general assembly, Sabah had the largest number of delegates.
There is, however, political will to let people join BN directly. It will not get rid of ethnic-based parties in BN, but the hope is that in the long run, direct entry will allow BN to form a single party.
Some BN leaders think many Chinese and Indians are willing to join BN directly but will not join its discredited non-Malay component parties. BN may then recover some of the Chinese ground.
There is also political will to look at a new model for non-Malay representation in government. Rather than relying on existing political parties, BN may look outside for technocrats, similar to the US Cabinet's secretary system. Mr Low's appointment is an example of such a move.
The last option is to create a new coalition. Tun Razak replaced The Alliance with the BN and there is no reason why Mr Najib cannot bring about a completely new coalition. This is favoured by a small group in BN.
No matter what are the reforms, Umno believes deeply in the "big tent" approach, that is, many ethnic groups and classes being represented. Umno's core leadership does not believe in Umno - or Malay-alone government.
Although the Chinese rejected BN on May 5, Mr Najib still appointed two Chinese ministers (Mr Low, and Ms Mary Yap from Parti Bersatu Sabah) and he is holding out for a Chinese to take up the Transport portfolio at a later date. This is the most positive aspect of the BN coalition. Whatever choices Mr Najib makes, he has to do it now. It is only 60 months to the next election.
The writer is a senior visiting research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.