Looks okay kind of... let us review the rules of the pirates once
again (in order of priority):
"Pirates base their decisions on three factors. First of all, each
pirate wants to survive. Secondly, each pirate wants to maximize the
number of gold coins he receives. Thirdly, each pirate would prefer to
throw another overboard, if all other results would otherwise be
equal."
Why wouldn't B, C and D vote against A in the distribution of
98,0,0,1,1? .. keeping in mind the third condition above?
For others, here is how Siddharth is probably coming to the solution:
if all except D and E have been thrown overboard, D proposes 100 for
himself and 0 for E. He has the casting vote, and so this is the
allocation... His answer is nearly correct.
Regards,
Jyoti
On May 12, 12:03 pm, siddharth agrawal <
4u.siddha...@gmail.com> wrote:
> how about this:
> A B C D E
> 98 0 0 1 1
>
> Regards,
> Siddharth
>