Now we know the truth. The financial meltdown
wasn't a mistake - it was a con
Hiding behind the complexities of our financial
system, banks and other institutions are being accused of fraud and
deception, with Goldman Sachs just the latest in the spotlight. This
has become the most pressing election issue of all
The global financial crisis, it is now clear, was caused not
just
by the bankers' colossal mismanagement. No, it
was due also
to the new financial complexity offering up the
opportunity for widespread, systemic fraud. Friday's announcement that
the world's most famous investment bank, Goldman Sachs, is
to
face civil charges for fraud brought by the
American regulator
is but the latest of a series of investigations
that have been launched, arrests made and charges made against
financial institutions around the world. Big Finance in the 21st
century turns out to have been Big Fraud. Yet Britain, centre of
the
world financial system, has not yet levelled
charges against any bank; all that we've seen is the allegation of a
high-level insider dealing ring which, embarrassingly, involves a
banker advising the government. We have to live with the fiction that
our banks and bankers are whiter than white, and any attempt to
investigate them and their institutions will lead to a mass exodus to
the mountains of Switzerland. The politicians of the Labour
and
Tory party alike are Bambis amid the wolves.
Just consider the roll call beyond Goldman Sachs. In
Ireland
Sean FitzPatrick, the ex-chair of the Anglo Irish
bank was arrested last month and questioned over alleged fraud.
In
Iceland last week a dossier assembled by its
parliament on
the Icelandic banks - huge lenders in Britain -
was handed to
its public prosecution service. A court-appointed
examiner
found that collapsed investment bank Lehman
knowingly manipulated its balance sheet to make it look stronger
than
it was - accounts originally audited by the
British firm Ernst
and Young and given the legal green light by the
British firm Linklaters. In Switzerland UBS has been defending itself
from the US's Internal Revenue Service for allegedly running 17,000
offshore accounts to evade tax. Be sure there are more
revelations to come - except in saintly
Britain.
Beneath the complexity, the charges are all rooted in the same
phenomenon - deception. Somebody, somewhere, was
knowingly fooled by banks and bankers -
sometimes governments over tax, sometimes regulators and
investors
over the probity of balance sheets and profits
and sometimes,
as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
says in Goldman's case, by creating a scheme to enrich one favoured
investor at the expense of others - including, via RBS,
the
British taxpayer. Along the way there is a long
list of so-called "entrepreneurs" and "innovators"
who were offered loans that should never have been made. Lloyd
Blankfein, Goldman's
CEO, remarked only semi-ironically that his bank
was doing God's work. He must wake up every day bitterly regretting
the words ever emerged from his mouth.
For the Goldmans case is in some ways the most damaging.
The Icelandic banks, Anglo Irish bank and Lehman
were all involved in opaque deals and rank bad lending decisions -
but Goldman allegedly went one step further, according to the SEC
actively creating a financial instrument that transferred
wealth
to one favoured client from others less favoured.
If the Securities and Exchange Commission's case is proved - and it
is aggressively rebutted by Goldman - the charge is that Goldman's
vice-president Fabrice Tourre created a dud financial instrument
packed with valueless sub- prime mortgages at the
instruction
of hedge fund client Paulson, sold it to
investors knowing it was valueless, and then allowed Paulson to profit
from the dud financial instrument. Goldman says the buyers were
"among
the most sophisticated mortgage investors"
in the world. But
this is a used car salesman flogging a broken car
he's got from some wide-boy pal to some driver who can't get access to
the log-book. Except it was lionised as financial innovation.
The investors who bought the collateralised debt obligation (CDO) were
not complete innocents. They had asked for the
bond to be validated by an independent expert
into residential mortgage-backed securities - a company called ACA
management. ACA gave the bond the thumbs-up on the understanding from
Fabrice Tourre that the hedge fund Paulson were investing in it. But
the SEC says Tourre misled them, a pivotal claim that Goldman denies.
The reality was that Paulson was frantically buying credit default
swaps in the CDO that would go up in price the more valueless it
became - a trade that would make more than $1 billion. Worse,
Paulson had identified some of the dud sub-prime mortgages that he
wanted Tourre to put into the CDO. If the SEC case is true, this was a
scam - nothing more, nothing less.
Tourre could see what was coming. In one email in January 2007 he
wrote: "More and more leverage in the system. The whole building
is about to collapse anytime now only potential survivor, the
fabulous Fab[rice Tourre] .. standing in the middle of all these
complex highly leveraged exotic trades he created without necessarily
understanding all of the implications of those monstrosities".
Fabulous Fab, like his boss, will not be feeling very fab today.
The cases not only have a lot in common - using financial complexity
allegedly to deceive and then using so-called independent experts to
validate the deception (lawyers, accountants, credit rating agencies,
"portfolio selection agents," etc etc ) - but they also
show how interconnected the financial system is. In Iceland Citigroup
and Deutsche Bank covered the margin calls of distressed Icelandic
business borrowers, deepening the crisis. Lehman uses the lightly
regulated London markets and two independent British experts to
validate that their "Repo 105s" were "genuine"
trades and not their own in-house liability. The American authorities
pursued a Swiss bank over aiding and abetting US nationals to evade
tax.
Bankers will complain these cases all involve one or two misguided
individuals, but that most banking is above board and was just the
victim of irrational exuberance, misguided belief in free market
economics and faulty risk management techniques. Obviously that is
true - but, sadly, there is much more to the crisis. Andrew Haldane,
executive director of the Bank of England, highlights the remarkable
reduction in the risk weighting of bank assets between 1997 and 2007.
Put simply, Europe's and the US's large banks exploited the weak
international agreement on bank capital requirements in the so-called
Basel agreement in 2004 to reclassify the risk of their loans and
trading instruments. They did not just reduce the risk by 5 or 10%.
Breathtakingly, they claimed their new risk management techniques were
so wonderful that the riskiness of their assets was up to half of what
it had been - despite property and share prices cresting to new
all-time highs.
Brutally, the banks knowingly gamed the system to grow their balance
sheets ever faster and with even less capital underpinning them in the
full knowledge that everything rested on the bogus claim that their
lending was now much less risky. That was not all they were doing. As
Michael Lewis describes in The Big Short, credit default swaps had
been deliberately created as an asset class by the big investment
banks to allow hedge funds to speculate against collateralised debt
obligations. The banks were gaming the regulators and investors alike
- and they knew full well what they were doing. Simon Johnson's 13
Bankers shows how the major American banks deployed vast political
lobbying power and money to create the relaxed regulatory environment
in which all this could take place. In Britain no money changed hands.
Gordon Brown offered light-touch regulation for free - egged on by
the Tories, who wanted to go further.
This was the context in which Goldman's Fabulous Fab created the
disputed CDOs, Sean FitzPatrick allegedly moved loans between banks
and Lehman created its Repo 105s along with the entire "debt
mule" structure revealed this weekend of inter-related companies
to shuffle debt around its empire. London and New York had become the
centre of an international financial system in which the purpose of
banking became making money from money - and where the complexity of
the "innovations" allowed extensive fraud and deception.
Now it has all collapsed, to be bailed out by western taxpayers. The
banks are resisting reform - and want to cling on to the business
practices and business model that has so appallingly failed. It is
obvious why: it makes them very rich. The politicians tread carefully,
only proposing what the bankers say is congruent with their definition
of what banking should be. Labour and Tories alike are united in
opposing improved EU regulation of hedge funds, buying the propaganda
those operations had nothing to do with the crisis. Perhaps Paulson's
trades at Goldman, and the hedge funds' appetite for speculating in
credit default swaps, may disabuse them.
It is time to reframe the question. Banks and financial institutions
should do what economy and society want them to do - support
enterprise, direct credit to where it is needed and be part of the
system that generates investment and innovation. Andrew Haldane -
and the governor of the Bank of England - are right. We need to
break up our banks, limit their capacity to speculate and bring them
back to earth. Britain should also launch an official investigation
into what went wrong - and hand the findings to the Serious Fraud
Office. This needs to become this election campaign's number one issue
- not one which either a compromised Labour party or a temporising
Conservative party will relish. The Lib Dems, the fiercest critics of
the banks, have begun to get very lucky.
Crisis timetable
September 2007 Funding problems at Northern Rock triggers the first
run on a British bank. It is nationalised in February 2008.
April 2008 Bear Stern faces bankruptcy after a run on the company
wipes out cash reserves in less than two days. Backed by the Federal
Reserve, JPMorgan buys up shares at far below market value.
September 2008 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy protection,
becoming the first major bank to collapse since the start of the
credit crisis.
December 2008 Bernard Madoff arrested for operating the largest Ponzi
scheme in history.
January 2009 The Bank of England launches £200bn quantitative
easing.
March 2010 Former chairman of Anglo Irish bank Sean Fitzpatrick is
arrested in Dublin after failing to disclose details of loans worth
millions from the bank.
April 2010 Northern Rock former directors, David Baker and Richard
Barclay, are fined £504,000 and £140,000 for deliberately
misleading analysts prior to nationalisation.
April 2010 The US Securities and Exchange Commission accuses Goldman
Sachs of "defrauding investors by misstating and omitting key
facts".
Joanna Aniel Bidar
* This article was amended on Monday 19 April and Tuesday 20 April.
A reference to Anglo Irish looking after the Post Office's financial
services was removed. Bank of Ireland is the Post Office's financial
services provider. The original also referred to the US Inland Revenue
Service. This has been corrected.
guardian.co.uk © Guardian News and Media Limited 2010
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