Stumbled across this, thought it may be of interest:
Simple, effective countermeasures to P300-based tests of detection of
concealed information.
Rosenfeld JP, Soskins M, Bosh G, Ryan A.
Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
60208, USA.
jp-ros...@northwestern.edu
We found countermeasures to protocols using P300 in concealed
information tests. One, the "six-probe" protocol, in Experiment 1,
uses six different crime details in one run. The countermeasure:
generate covert responses to irrelevant stimuli for each probe
category. Hit rates were 82% in the guilty group; 18% in the
countermeasure group. The average reaction time (RT) distinguished
these two groups, but with overlap in RT distributions. The "one-
probe" protocol, in the second experiment, uses one crime detail as a
probe. Here, one group was run in 3 weeks as a guilty group, a
countermeasure group, and again as in Week 1. COUNTERMEASURE: Covert
responses to irrelevant stimuli. In Week 1, hit rate was 92%. In Week
2, it was 50%. In Week 3, 58%. There was no overlap in the irrelevant
RT distribution in Week 2: Countermeasure use was detectable. However,
in Week 3, the RT distributions resembled those of Week 1; test-
beaters could not be caught. These studies have shown that tests of
deception detection based on P300 amplitude as a recognition index may
be readily defeated with simple countermeasures that can be easily
learned.
Psychophysiology. 2004 Mar;41(2):205-19.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15032986?dopt=Abstract
Via a blog about the psychology of deception:
http://deception.crimepsychblog.com/