Liberalism, Part IV
Richard Carnes
______________
I said that the conservative holds one among a number of possible
alternatives to the liberal conception of equality. Each of these
alternatives shares the opinion that treating a person with respect
requires treating him as the good man would wish to be treated. The
conservative supposes that the good man would wish to be treated in
accordance with the principles of a special sort of society, which I
shall call the virtuous society....
Suppose a conservative is asked to draft a constitution for a society
generally like ours, which he believes to be virtuous. Like the
liberal, he will see great merit in the familiar institutions of
political democracy and an economic market. The appeal of these
institutions will be very different for the conservative, however.
The economic market, in practice, assigns greater rewards to those
who, because they have the virtues of talent and industry, supply
more of what is wanted by the other members of the virtuous society;
and that is, for the conservative, the paradigm of fairness in
distribution. Political democracy distributes opportunities, through
the provisions of civil and criminal law, as the citizens of a
virtuous society wish [them] to be distributed....
The liberal, as I said, finds the market defective principally
because it allows morally irrelevant differences to affect
distribution.... But the conservative prizes just the feature of the
market that puts a premium on talents prized by the community,
because these are, in a virtuous community, virtues. So he will find
no genuine merit, but only expediency, in the idea of redistribution.
He will allow room, of course, for the virtue of charity, for it is a
virtue that is part of the public catalogue; but he will prefer
private charity to public, because it is a purer expression of that
virtue....
The economic market distributes rewards for talents valued in the
virtuous society, but since these talents are unequally distributed,
wealth will be concentrated, and the wealthy will be at the mercy of
an envious political majority anxious to take by law what it cannot
take by talent.... [Instead of restricting the franchise] the
conservative will find more appeal in the different, and politically
much more feasible, idea of rights to property.
These rights have the same force, though of course radically
different content, as the liberal's civil rights. The liberal will,
for his own purposes, accept some right to property, because he will
count some sovereignty over a range of personal possessions essential
to dignity. But the conservative will strive for rights to property
of a very different order; he will want rights that protect, not some
minimum dominion over a range of possessions independently shown to
be desirable, but an unlimited dominion over whatever has been
acquired through an institution that defines and rewards talent....
The distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of
result is crucial to the conservative: the institutions of the
economic market and representative democracy cannot achieve what he
supposes they do unless each citizen has an equal opportunity to
capitalize on his genuine talents and other virtues in the contest
these institutions provide. But since the conservative knows that
these virtues are unequally distributed, he also knows that equality
of opportunity must have been denied if the outcome of the contest is
equality of result....
[The conservative] will steadily oppose any form of `affirmative
action' that offers special opportunities, like places in medical
school or jobs, on criteria other than some proper conception of the
virtue appropriate to the reward....
Liberalism cannot be based on scepticism. Its constitutive morality
provides that human beings must be treated as equals by their
government, not because there is no right and wrong in political
morality, but because that is what is right. Liberalism does not
rest on any special theory of personality, nor does it deny that most
human beings will think that what is good for them is that they be
active in society. Liberalism is not self-contradictory: the
liberal conception of equality is a principle of political
organization that is required by justice, not a way of life for
individuals....
[But another objection, that liberalism denies to political society
its highest function and ultimate justification, which is that
society must help its members to achieve what is in fact good] cannot
so easily be set aside. There is no easy way to demonstrate the
proper role in institutions that have a monopoly of power over the
lives of others; reasonable and moral men will disagree. The issue
is at bottom the issue I identified: what is the content of the
respect that is necessary to dignity and independence?
That raises problems in moral philosophy and in the philosophy of
mind that are fundamental for political theory though not discussed
here; but this essay does bear on one issue sometime thought to be
relevant. It is sometimes said that liberalism must be wrong because
it assumes that the opinions people have about the sort of lives they
want are self-generated, whereas these opinions are in fact that
products of the economic system or other aspects of the society in
which they live.... Liberalism responds to the claim, that
preferences are caused by systems of distribution, with the sensible
answer that in that case it is all the more important that
distribution be fair in itself, not as tested by the preferences it
produces. --Ronald Dworkin
--
Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
Laura Creighton
>Continuing with the excerpts from "Liberalism" by Ronald Dworkin:
>______________
By and large I think that Dworkin describes what is today called
``conservatism'' well. But is is worth noting that what he is
describing used to be called liberalism, and indeed is part of what
Milton Freidman still calls liberalism.
>I said that the conservative holds one among a number of possible
>alternatives to the liberal conception of equality. Each of these
>alternatives shares the opinion that treating a person with respect
>requires treating him as the good man would wish to be treated. The
>conservative supposes that the good man would wish to be treated in
>accordance with the principles of a special sort of society, which I
>shall call the virtuous society....
Here I think that Dworkin misses it; the statment is right but the
perspective is wrong. The conservative does not believe that virtue
is defined by the virtuous society, but rather that virtuous men
create a virtuous society through the expression of their own virtue.
The purpose of society, thus, to the extent that a conservative can
say that society has a purpose is to *promote virtue*. And one of the
many ways it promotes virtue is by rewarding it.
>Suppose a conservative is asked to draft a constitution for a society
>generally like ours, which he believes to be virtuous.
Phrased that way, the conservative will give up in disgust. However,
a conservative can be asked to draft a consitution for a society which
is virtuous (or promotes virtue) and will come up with a society
generally like ours.
>[But another objection, that liberalism denies to political society
>its highest function and ultimate justification, which is that
>society must help its members to achieve what is in fact good] cannot
>so easily be set aside. There is no easy way to demonstrate the
>proper role in institutions that have a monopoly of power over the
>lives of others; reasonable and moral men will disagree. The issue
>is at bottom the issue I identified: what is the content of the
>respect that is necessary to dignity and independence?
If Dworkin is truly interested in dignity and independence, doesn't he
see a strong conflict between monopoly of power and independence?
Why does this not lead him to conclude that few if any institutions should
have a monopoly of power, simply because that decreases independence?
I think that a fundamental distiction which Dworkin misses out on in this
essay is the objective or subjective nature of ``the good''. Dworkin
keeps on plugging for ``a conservative believes that a virtuous society
determines the good'' (which is moral subjectivism) whereas all the
conservatives I know are moral objectivists. This trait is shared
even though there is strong disagreement between conservatives as to
what is the basis of this moral standard -- God, human nature, evolutionary
pressure, or a simple ``but that is the way it is''.
--
Laura Creighton
ihnp4!hoptoad!laura utzoo!hoptoad!laura sun!hoptoad!laura
to...@lll-crg.arpa
Frank Adams
>In article <3...@gargoyle.UUCP> car...@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) writes:
>>Continuing with the excerpts from "Liberalism" by Ronald Dworkin:
>
>``conservatism'' well. But is is worth noting that what he is
>describing used to be called liberalism, and indeed is part of what
>Milton Freidman still calls liberalism.
I think it is more accurate to say that traditional liberalism has become
the standard in Western democracies, and that mainstream liberalism and
mainstream conservatism are both derived from it.
Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
David desJardins
>
>essay is the objective or subjective nature of ``the good''. Dworkin
>keeps on plugging for ``a conservative believes that a virtuous society
>determines the good'' (which is moral subjectivism) whereas all the
>conservatives I know are moral objectivists.
How is it even possible to discuss political theory with a "moral
objectivist" (and by the way what is wrong with the symbol " which
everyone on the net seems to avoid)? You seem to know more than I do
(i.e. any) so maybe you can explain it to me. If you start out with a
characterization of what is good, then it seems you just end up with
whatever society has been predefined as good, and little room for debate.
I think Dworkin is just trying to characterize these beliefs in a
logically consistent way, although I think he still fails to avoid
circularity (maybe I will reread the posting and examine this point
later). As you note even the moral objectivists are not quite sure
where their beliefs really come from. Obviously in reality (whether
they attribute them to divine revelation or whatever) they are somehow
a product of the supposed "virtuous society" in which they live, right?
-- David desJardins
ja...@inmet.uucp
[ Adam Reed (ihnp4!npois!adam)]
>Of the other two names on the list - Hobbes and Spinoza - neither
>qualifies as a Liberal.
Right about Hobbes. I must really object on behalf of Spinoza,
not to nitpick, but because he is one of my favorites.
>Spinoza held that individual will, and thus individual freedom,
>was an illusion.
A very simplistic view of Spinoza's determinism. Suffice it here
to say that his whole teaching was on how to *achieve* individual
freedom.
>His pantheistic metaphysics led to an ethics based on the premise
>that "Whatever exists is God". The political corrolary of this
>view is acquiescence in whatever exists.
It certainly was not for him. He discussed at length which
forms of government are preferable to others.
>The Panglossian secularization of the above ("All is for the best in
>the best of all possible worlds") was the intellectual foundation of
>early conservatism, and was mercilessly ridiculed, from an
>uncompromising classical Liberal perspective, by Voltaire.
Pangloss was, of course, a caricature of Leibnitz's philosophy,
not Spinoza's. (To whom the quote above belongs). Voltaire had a
high opinion of Spinoza (without really understanding him).
>While Spinoza's refusal of a royal pension from Louis XIV tells
>us a great deal about his personal integrity, the fact that the
>pension was offered tells us even more about the political uses
>and implications of his philosophy.
No such uses were, of course, made.
Louis's interests in Holland had nothing to do with philosophy.
He made, however, a show of encouraging culture. The pension was
on condition of Spinoza dedicating a book to the king. It may
have also had to do with party politics in Holland, in which Spi-
noza was, for a while, involved. In that case - the pension offer
was an attempt to neutralize an *opponent*.
There is absolutely no doubt that had someone explained to Louis
XIV the contents of *any* of Spinoza's books, the ultra-catholic
Sun King would forthwith become his enemy.
In philosophy, Spinoza was a proponent of free inquiry, of indi-
vidualism, of rational self-interest, and of reason as the
supreme vurtue.
In political theory, he was an advocate of democracy based
on freedom of opinion.
In practical politics, he was a friend and supporter of De Witt,
the leader of the liberal, republican party.
(None of the above purports to explain Spinoza's philosophy,
just to defend his liberal reputation).
Jan Wasilewsky
ja...@inmet.uucp
Correcting a misleading phrase:
>>The Panglossian secularization of the above ("All is for the best in
>>the best of all possible worlds") was the intellectual foundation of
>>early conservatism, and was mercilessly ridiculed, from an
>>uncompromising classical Liberal perspective, by Voltaire.
[me]
>Pangloss was, of course, a caricature of Leibnitz's philosophy,
>not Spinoza's. (To whom the quote above belongs). Voltaire had a
>high opinion of Spinoza (without really understanding him).
I meant that the quote is of Leibnitz, not Spinoza. Spinoza be-
lieved all exists that is possible, not just the "best".
Laura Creighton
> How is it even possible to discuss political theory with a "moral
>objectivist" (and by the way what is wrong with the symbol " which
>everyone on the net seems to avoid)? You seem to know more than I do
>(i.e. any) so maybe you can explain it to me. If you start out with a
>characterization of what is good, then it seems you just end up with
>whatever society has been predefined as good, and little room for debate.
The second question is the easiest. One of the things which I used to do
is typeset books. And I am a troff hacker. In the world of typesetting
there is no ``"'' character. You want nicely balanced parenthesis. So
it would never occur to me to type ``"'' -- I had to look to see where the
key was again -- since it is not what I want. I didn't realise that the
majority of people on the net also do not use it.
But you seem to believe that for the conservative ``what society is''
determines ``what is good''. This is exactly backwards. The
conservative already knows what is good -- his problem is to create a
society which promotes these virtues. And since the society will always
fall short of an ideal society, there is constant room for speculation --
but of a very different sort than that engaged by other political groups.
For instance, you could probably get all conservatives to agree that
justice and mercy are both virtues. Now, how should you create a judicial
system which is both just and merciful? There is usually a trede off
between one and the other. So the conservative has an interesting problem.
>
> I think Dworkin is just trying to characterize these beliefs in a
>logically consistent way, although I think he still fails to avoid
>circularity (maybe I will reread the posting and examine this point
>later). As you note even the moral objectivists are not quite sure
>where their beliefs really come from. Obviously in reality (whether
>they attribute them to divine revelation or whatever) they are somehow
>a product of the supposed "virtuous society" in which they live, right?
No. There are two things here. First of all, most people do not know
where their beliefs really come from -- I did not mean to single out the
conservatives as being particularily deficient in this respect. And,
secondly, the virtues in which the conservative believes are not considered
to be a product of any society, rather they are believed to be *independent*
of any society -- this is what makes political theory difficult. You
attempt to create a society which reflects known virtues, rather than
deciding that what is a virtue is what exists in society. If the latter
was the case then political theory would be easy -- create a society, and
then, whatever is -- is good.