How Opposite are Reason and Force?
B.KORT
an irrational behavior, we are nevertheless left with the reality that some
alloplastic agents in our society do habitually embrace force as a means
of attaining their goals. The dilemma of the rationalist is how to
protect his interests without returning violence for violence. This
dilemma vexed even Einstein, an avowed pacifist who later urged (and
then regretted) the use of atomic weapons. It is easier to learn war
than to learn peace. Until we learn how to teach peace, we will have
more knowledge of combative behavior than of cooperative behavior.
--Barry Kort
ja...@inmet.uucp
[--Paul V. Torek torek@umich]
>>[Bob Stubblefield]
>>To say that in normal circumstances the initiation of force to
>>gain values is irrational, is not to say force is irrational in
>>all contexts. [examples]. Stealing a loaf of bread in Marie
>>Antoinette's day may have been rational. It is certainly possible
>>for man to devise political systems that make it difficult to
>>distinguish the rational from the irrational.
>I have an important question here: is stealing a loaf of bread in Marie
>Antoinette's day an example of *initiating* force? If so, you have
>already conceded that it is sometimes rational to initiate force. And
>in that case, why isn't it rational to support certain laws (say, laws
>that authorize taxation to pay for national defense, for example)?
Bob makes an important distinction between *normal* and *abnor-
mal* circumstances. What you are saying is that the circumstance
of a state having external enemies is abnormal enough to *insti-
tutionalize* the initiation of force against *own* citizens. This
means *giving up* normality (in Bob's sense) for good. The price
is clearly too high to be rationally paid because you are giving
up what you are trying to save.
However, if the taxes are emergency levies and are not likely to
become permanent, then I can see how someone rationally opposed
to initiation of force in general would make an exception in ex-
traodinary circumstances. There is a moral difference between,
say, an anti-Nazi resistance fighter sequestering a private
weapon *against all law*, and Congress voting that, from now on,
any part of a person's income they want to take, is theirs. The
difference here is entirely in favor of the law-breaker, and
against the lawmaker.
It is like all other intolerable moral choices. A starving
peasant family might intentionally let one of the children die to
save the others and keep the seed grain. Would you proceed from
this observation to, say, a constitutional amendment institu-
tionalizing children-killing to save on food resources ? The con-
clusion from an abnormal situation should rather be, to concen-
trate on discovering ways to prevent its recurrence.
Jan Wasilewsky
Paul V. Torek
>>>To say that in normal circumstances the initiation of force to
>>>gain values is irrational, is not to say force is irrational in
>>>all contexts. [examples]. Stealing a loaf of bread in Marie
>>>Antoinette's day may have been rational. It is certainly possible
>>>for man to devise political systems that make it difficult to
>
>>I have an important question here: is stealing a loaf of bread in Marie
>>Antoinette's day an example of *initiating* force? If so, you have
>>already conceded that it is sometimes rational to initiate force. And
>>in that case, why isn't it rational to support certain laws (say, laws
>>that authorize taxation to pay for national defense, for example)?
>
>Bob makes an important distinction between *normal* and *abnor-
>mal* circumstances. What you are saying is that the circumstance
>of a state having external enemies is abnormal enough to *insti-
>tutionalize* the initiation of force against *own* citizens.
No, that's not my point. What I'm wondering is what separates "normal"
from "abnormal" circumstances, and whether "abnormal" ones are really
abnormal at all. Maybe they aren't -- maybe the very circumstances
we live in and can expect to live in for quite a while (those of having
external enemies) justify the use of force in taxation? To put it
differently, what is the difference between stealing the loaf of bread
in Antoinette's day on the one hand, and taxation for defense today on
the other, that makes the first OK but the second wrong?
--Paul Torek torek@umich
Richard Carnes
force" (alternatively "initiation of coercion"). Would someone
please post a definition of this term so that I can follow the
discussion. What conditions are necessary and sufficient for an
event to be considered an initiation of force?
--
Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes