Proof That Reason And Force Are Opposites
R.STUBBLEFIELD
Anatomy of a Socialist's Defense of Force
I have mixed emotions about Tim Sevener's response to my essay showing that
reason is the opposite of force. On the one hand, it's nice to know that
someone took the time to read it and reply; but on the other hand, it is not
pleasant to sort out irrelevant insults from substantive objections.
The hostile tone he exhibited in his note is not conducive to
intellectual discourse and is uncalled for in a public discussion.
Although he deserves no reply, I feel compelled to correct the misstatements
in his response.
"Mr. Stubblefield has certainly presented an elaborate opus of the
foundations of his moral philosophy."
The whole point of my essay was not a moral point but a factual one: that
the aspects of reality identified by the concepts of reason and force (in the
aspect of reality where those two concepts are commensurate--social interaction)
are opposites. It was not until I reread his response that I associated
condescension with his use of "Mr." and "certainly." But "elaborate opus" is
a rather obvious term of derision for a 213-line article.
[I refer any reader interested in the foundations of an objective moral
philosophy to a 110-page essay on a theory of concepts in *Introduction to
Objectivist Epistemology* and a 21-page essay in *The Virtue of Selfishness*--
both by Ayn Rand. Both books should be available in most libraries and
bookstores. They can also be ordered from Palo Alto Book Service,
200 California Ave, Palo Alto, CA 94306 (415) 327-7781 or Second Renaissance
Book Service, 8608 Old Dominion Court, Indianapolis, Ind 46251 (317) 243-8048.]
"He and other Libertarians would certainly be enlightened by a study
of philosophy, economics and society beyond the narrow circle of
Ayn Rand and her cohorts."
This statement is insulting on at least five counts.
1. I am not a Libertarian. I care too much for the precision of language
to want anyone to identify me as such.
[Libertarianism is anti-philosophical. In terms of fundamentals, Libertarianism
has much more in common with socialism than it does with my political views--
capitalism. Why this is so would be yet another "elaborate opus." I refer
anyone who cannot wait until I get around to giving my explanation to
"Libertarianism: The Perversion of Liberty," by Peter Schwartz, now available
as a 64-page pamphlet for $4.95 from The Intellectual Activist,
131 Fifth Avenue, Suite 101, New York, NY 10003.]
2. The implication that I am not widely read is irrelevant and false. His
easy assertion of a statement so obviously false to anyone who knows me makes
me wonder how much he values his own credibility.
3. Someone who associates Ayn Rand with Libertarians is either trying to smear
her or has little understanding of either. Someone who speaks down to others
for not being widely read should demonstrate having some understanding of those
people he implies he has read.
4. There is an implication that Ayn Rand's knowledge of philosophy, economics,
and society was narrow. He has as much justification for this claim
as his claim about me. Since Rand's books have sold tens of millions, my
estimate of the value he places on his own credibility approaches zero.
(Does he want only the gullible to read him a second time?)
5. His use of the term "cohorts" is consistent with his insulting tone
and message.
"Mr. Stubblefield makes a number of basic confusions which were pointed
out by other philosophers a long time ago."
This generalization would not bother me if it were backed up by concretes.
If he were able to clarify my confusions (without insults and misrepresen-
tations), I would be quite happy to read his comments.
"For one thing his whole *moral* philosophy (and Ayn Rand's) is based
on a number of assumptions which make no sense in reality."
Except for the fact that my essay did not present any of my moral
philosophy (nor Ayn Rand's--nor any way for him to tell if these are the
same or different) and except for the fact that the validity of neither my
essay nor Ayn Rand's philosophy is based on assumptions, this last sentence
holds out hope that discussion is possible. It implies that a standard of
agreement is that things should make "sense in reality." I am for reason and
reality. If he were too, we could communicate.
"The deification of Individualistic `Reason' is merely a variation of
Hegel's grand theories of Zeitgeist and the progress of the Ideal
in history with which Hegel made such grand apologies for the social
order of aristocratic rule by the few in his own day."
Any hope for a common base for discussion was false. What is "Individualistic
`reason'" and how does it differ from reason as the faculty that identifies and
integrates sensory material? If the charge is that I think reason is a faculty
of an individual human consciousness, I confess that I cannot see any
evidence in reality for an alternative view.
And what does it mean to deify reason? If the charge is that my reason is my
highest value, that is true--but irrelevant to the question of fact about
reason and force. His charge does lead me to wonder what values he
places above his own means of being in contact with reality.
The association of my (or Ayn Rand's) views with those of Hegel is a monumental
distortion. To name the most fundamental difference, I believe in an objective
reality, the existence of which is not dependent on consciousness--neither mine,
society's, nor God's. Hegel is one of the most explicit advocates of the
primacy of consciousness--incidentally, of the collectivist variety.
"Marx said then that he would `turn Hegel on his head' and he did."
This statement implies that there is a vast difference in the the ideas of
Marx and Hegel. It is true that they took opposite sides of a false
alternative. (Hegel's Idealism dispenses with existence and Marx's economic
determinism dispenses with consciousness.) But what is the difference in
practice of the totalitarian state of the Hegelians (Nazi Germany) and the
totalitarian states of the Marxists?
"Let us now see how we can do so for this argument.
Very late in his elaborate exposition Mr. Stubblefield admits:
> All the aspects of reason discussed thus far apply in society or
> in a desert island environment--i.e., for a single human in isolation.
In the first place we must recognize that `reason' is not some dis-
embodied innate ability but something culturally learned and intimately
connected with language. We have no evidence whatsoever that an infant
left on a desert island will learn language - indeed it will not survive
at all without human care."
There is a confusion here in the mind of the one who wanted to straighten out
my "confusions." In particular he confuses the process of reason with results
of reason. Reason is the process that an individual human mind must carry out
to maintain its contact with reality. Language is a particular creation of acts
of reason by many individuals over generations. It is reason that makes
language possible--not the other way around. The fact that my powers of reason
can be greatly expanded by using concepts others teach me says that society is
valuable to me; but society does not do my reasoning for me.
"Moreover as Piaget has shown even learning
such elementary principles as conservation of mass requires activity
*within* the world."
The misleading and insulting implication is that I believe otherwise.
"This was what Marx meant when he spoke of `turning
Hegel on his head.' Not to speak of some abstract supernatural `Reason'
independent of our material and social existence but to realize that
ideology itself is transmitted through physical means - the electrons
on this terminal for example, printing in books, vocal expression,etc."
I disagree with Hegel, who thought existence was unreal, and Marx, who thought
consciousness was irrelevant. There was nothing in my essay to justify the
insulting implication that I think reason is supernatural.
"Even our most basic perception, sight, is to some extent *learned* -
people who have been blind and suddenly gain their sight must learn
how to focus, how to distinguish objects, etc.
Piaget's studies show how children must physically interact with the
world to learn the most reasonable physical principles."
I don't know which of my formulations could have given anyone the false
impression that I think people gain knowledge passively or are born with it.
I am offended by someone who misrepresents an article by me as holding
views I disagree with.
"Vygotsky's studies in `Mind and Society' go further and show how
conceptual thinking is intimately connected with language via
`inner speech.' And that such `inner speech' is socially learned.
...
So `reason' itself is no socially isolated absolute."
Since I believe words are used in reasoning and most words someone uses
are learned from others, what is it that he objects to? I think an individual
on a desert island must and can use reason. The only principle I can see
consistent with Sevener's views is that reason is an attribute of society and
would be impossible for an isolated individual. If he believes that people
cannot think except in the society of others, he should state that as a
principle and check it out by applying to himself.
"But this same problem plagues another part of Mr. Stubblefield's
argument when he says:
>Reason is the only process of consciousness that produces abstractions
> consistent with reality. To do this, it must meet two essential
> criteria. First, to qualify as reasoning, a process must deal in
> abstractions ultimately based on the evidence of the senses. Second,
> it must integrate new conclusions non-contradictorily with all
> previous knowledge of the reasoner.
Does scientific knowledge really depend upon my own personal evidence
of the senses?"
The formulation of this question is vague. Why does he introduce the adjective
"scientific" when the issue is how does one know anything at all? Does the
question imply that scientific knowledge exists in society apart from its
existence in the minds of individuals in the society? The examples he uses
seem to mean that the actual question in his mind is: "Does everything I
know depend on evidence from my own senses?"
"Of course not, it cannot be so dependent or else we
would spend all our lives trying to discover *anything*. I have
never seen Betelguese and yet I have every confidence that it is there.
I have never seen the Galapagos turtles or finches with my own eyes
and yet I believe they are there as well as the mountains of evidence
supporting the theory of evolution. I have gained this `knowledge'
not directly through my own senses, for that would be impossible,
but through the reports of others in books, articles, etc. In other
words through *social communication* and through trust that others
will accurately report what they have seen, heard, or perceived.
Again, then we find that even scientific knowledge, which strives to
be as objective as possible, is still based upon social interaction."
I stated an epistemological principle that knowledge starts with sensory
evidence. He gives some examples where I agree that people can learn some
identifications of reality from others. The epistemological issues involved
in what your individual mind needs in order to classify something someone else
tells you as knowledge are complex. Before you can know what to believe on
indirect evidence, you should grasp how to form conceptual knowledge from
direct sensory evidence. But Sevener jumps to a conclusion that is
ridiculous when stated as a principle: the base of knowledge is what others
tell you. How do you know what they tell you is true? Which others
do you believe? Instead of basing what he claims as knowledge on reason
and reality, such a mentality will take the word of whoever's ideas he feels
are right.
"If reason and scientific knowledge cannot be divorced from social
interaction then *how* can the problems of ethics?"
Ethics gives a guide for human action. There is an implicit premise in this
question that a man on a desert island needs no guide for his actions.
"this will be continued later .......
tim sevener whuxn!orb"
Notice that Sevener's opposition to my proof that force and reason are
opposites reduces to the notion that reason is an attribute of a collective
rather than of the individual. Your guess is as good as mine as to whether
this is done out of respect for reason or from a desire to have force used
to get his way.
What kind of political system is consistent with reason?
One that initiates force against individuals to accomplish what those in
power deem to be for the "good of society"--i.e., collectivism?
Or one that protects individual rights by preventing members of society from
initiating force--i.e., capitalism?
--
Bob Stubblefield ihnp4!hound!rwsh 201-949-2846
SEVENER
>
> Anatomy of a Socialist's Defense of Force
article referred to is Bob's individualizing of the whole process
of reason. Contrary to Bob's comments that such individualization
is not important, such an assumption is profoundly important in
affecting the whole of one's later conclusions.
If you do not wish to call yourself a libertarian or an objectivist
but some other species of the same genera is not important.
The point of your elaborate but confused argument was the conclusion
stated in both your original article and your reply:
> Or one that protects individual rights by preventing members of society from
> initiating force--i.e., capitalism?
>
I have pointed out in previous articles in this newsgroup, as has
Richard Carnes and others, that it is quite simply *false* to
contend that capitalism and private property involve no force.
To claim a piece of property in capitalism means that one can
force others off it and prevent their use. Thus in the fabled
desert island example (which one notes could never last as a *society*
because there are no women and no family to reproduce such a society)
as soon as somebody else comes onto Robinson Crusoe's island than
s/he may be summarily forced to leave under the rights of private
property. To do so *requires the use of force*!!
It was exactly such force which led to expansion of feudal fiefs
in the Middle Ages, it was such force which led to the white settlement
of Indian lands (which had previously suffered under no exploitation or
from the exclusions and restrictions and control of private property)
in which whole Indian tribes were practically wiped out to make room
for private property, it was exactly such force which led to
the slaughter of workers trying to start a union so they could have
redress from exploitative bosses and foremen.
How are you to maintain your right of private property on your
desert island? Kindly ask the intruder (who may see no reason
whatsoever why this work of nature should be *controlled* by
anyone) to leave? And what then?
What then is the force which has been applied in the interests
of private property throughout the ages.
tim sevener whuxn!orb
T. Dave Hudson
> precision of language to want anyone to identify me as such.
I could say, "I am not a Republican. I care too much for
the precision of language to want anyone to identify me as
such." I could, but I wouldn't. I wouldn't because it
would be crass, not to mention unjustifiably supercilious
and transparently ludicrous.
> [Libertarianism is anti-philosophical. In terms of
> fundamentals, Libertarianism has much more in common with
> socialism than it does with my political views --
> capitalism. Why this is so would be yet another "elaborate
> opus." I refer anyone who cannot wait until I get around to
> giving my explanation to "Libertarianism: The Perversion of
> Liberty," by Peter Schwartz, now available as a 64-page
> pamphlet for $4.95 from The Intellectual Activist, 131 Fifth
> Avenue, Suite 101, New York, NY 10003.]
Last year I posted a huge list of gross distortions
appearing in the first part of the article that led to the
pamphlet. If the pamphlet did nothing to correct that
stupidity, then Stubblefield lacks probity and his claim to
cherish linguistic precision is insincere. In any case, it
betrays a shallow exposure to "libertarianism" for
Stubblefield to identify it as a philosophy, and willful
blindness to continue to do so. (He is not merely relating
political movements because of his contrasting them with a
particular political philosophy and comparing different
types of contrast.)
> 3. Someone who associates Ayn Rand with Libertarians is
> either trying to smear her or has little understanding of
> either.
That is an accurate statement, if taken as associating Rand
with all libertarians. In fact, she once said that
libertarians were a "random collection of emotional
hippies-of-the-right who seek to play at politics without
philosophy". "Random collection" is fair; there is great
diversity among libertarians. "Emotional", when compared
with the characteristics of the rest of the population, does
not differentiate libertarians, except in a contrary sense.
I never knew any "hippies', but the dictionary definition of
that slang term does not fit libertarians even when modified
by "-of-the-right", which is only partly true. As to the
charge of "without philosophy", we are generally willing to
acknowledge agreement on specific points, without requiring
of our association that our agreement be complete, without
forgetting that we have differences, and without yielding
any individual philosophical integrity. Which is a lot like
living in society.
But for only $4.95 (Only $4.95?) you, too, can have a
fetish.
David Hudson
a.reed
> > I refer anyone who cannot wait until I get around to
> > giving my explanation to "Libertarianism: The Perversion of
> > Liberty," by Peter Schwartz, now available as a 64-page
> > pamphlet for $4.95 from The Intellectual Activist, 131 Fifth
> > Avenue, Suite 101, New York, NY 10003.]
>
> Last year I posted a huge list of gross distortions
> appearing in the first part of the article that led to the
> pamphlet. If the pamphlet did nothing to correct that
> stupidity, then Stubblefield lacks probity and his claim to
> cherish linguistic precision is insincere.
After reading the first two parts of Schwartz's article, my impression
was identical to David's. After reading part 3, I changed my mind.
The article is very badly written, at least from the viewpoint of someone
who starts to read it with an open mind, but it makes a valid point.
Unfortunately, while this point is not made until the middle of the
third installment, the first 5/6ths of the article consist of
documentation selected to demonstrate it. A reader who does not already
know why Schwartz selects those particular documents is certain to
experience the collection as biased to the point of mendacity. Which is
a pity, because Schwartz's argument is a valid one.
Schwartz argues that Libertarianism is a political movement whose
members have no common philosophical ground from which to derive a
consistent set of political goals. The nominal objective of eliminating
coercion is not enough, since different groups of Libertarians hold
philosophical positions leading to widely different, and mutually
inconsistent, definitions of coercion. But a political movement without
clearly - that is, philosophically - defined goals is likely to
degenerate in a direction consonant with the culturally dominant ideas
of its time. The documentation in the first 5/6ths of the article is
there to demonstrate that this process has already started and, whatever
my differences with Schwartz's evaluation of specific trends within the
Libertarian movement, I think that he has demonstrated the applicability
of his thesis beyond a reasonable doubt.
I would like to add something Schwartz has not said, but I think follows
from his argument. The Libertarian movement is repeating the history of
the Liberal movement. In the time of "Classical Liberalism", Liberals
were advocates of liberty, but they lacked a sound philosophical base
from which either to derive an exact definition of what they meant by
Liberty, or to demonstrate why liberty was desirable. What Schwartz has
done is to identify the mechanism by which the Liberal movement
inexorably devolved into that loathsome antithesis of classical liberal
ideas which goes by the name of "liberalism" today.
So I shall not call myself a Libertarian any more. I shall have to
identify myself in philosophy as a Randian, and in politics as an
advocate of Capitalism. And I'll keep on wishing Peter Schwartz knew how
to write.
Adam Reed (ihnp4!npois!adam)
ja...@inmet.uucp
[ Adam Reed (ihnp4!npois!adam)]
>Schwartz argues that Libertarianism is a political movement whose
>members have no common philosophical ground from which to derive a
>consistent set of political goals.
Agreed. The operative word is *common*.
>The nominal objective of eliminating
>coercion is not enough, since different groups of Libertarians hold
>philosophical positions leading to widely different, and mutually
>inconsistent, definitions of coercion.
Premise granted, conclusion does not follow. Precisely identical
objectives are unnecessary for an alliance to be beneficial to
all the allies. It is enough that objectives overlap.
>But a political movement without clearly - that is, philosophi-
>cally - defined goals is likely to degenerate in a direction con-
>sonant with the culturally dominant ideas of its time.
Not at all clear. Imagine an idealized picture: an alliance of
*several* movements, each *with* a clearly, philosophically de-
fined goal - all different. Why should each strand degenerate ?
And if not, why should the alliance (if it serves some purpose)?
Degenerate is loaded language. You sound like a saint who doesn't
want to have anything to do with this evil world.
A political movement is not for saving souls in isolation: it is
a part of the culture of its time - a *different* part if it's
any use; but it can gain from dialogue with other parts.
Ayn Rand was predicting, for decades, degeneration and decay of
the whole nation and the world for exactly the same reason: no
coherent philosophy. Not only didn't it occur, but the tide in
many areas has turned in *her* direction. My explanation: the
world isn't run by professional philosophers, as she thought.
Grass roots matter more.
>The documentation in the first 5/6ths of the article is
>there to demonstrate that this process has already started and, whatever
>my differences with Schwartz's evaluation of specific trends within the
>Libertarian movement, I think that he has demonstrated the applicability
>of his thesis beyond a reasonable doubt.
You keep using capital L. What about libertarian trends in
society at large ? They seem to be on the increase.
>I would like to add something Schwartz has not said, but I think follows
>from his argument. The Libertarian movement is repeating the history of
>the Liberal movement. In the time of "Classical Liberalism", Liberals
>were advocates of liberty, but they lacked a sound philosophical base
>from which either to derive an exact definition of what they meant by
>Liberty, or to demonstrate why liberty was desirable. What Schwartz has
>done is to identify the mechanism by which the Liberal movement
>inexorably devolved into that loathsome antithesis of classical liberal
>ideas which goes by the name of "liberalism" today.
A decline of classical liberalism is indisputable. New liberalism
usurped its name; libertarianism (with a small l) is much the
same thing as old liberalism - but weaker.
However, the attribution of old liberalism's decline to the lack
of "a sound philosophical base" is unsubstantiated. It even seems
implausible: how do you explain the *rise* of old liberalism ?
And what *is* a sound philosophical base - do you mean *a* philo-
sophy or *the* correct philosophy ? Was it really lacking in the
declining movements more than in the rising ones ?
My own explanation is quasi-Marxist: between the 19th and the
20th century, society became less atomic; more people became *em-
ployees* in hierarchical organizations, small cogs in large
machines. Consequently, individualism waned and collectivism
waxed.
The bureaucratization process has not run its course yet, but a
counter-current is already felt. Centralized hierarchical struc-
tures are less efficient in new conditions. In the economy, small
companies are multiplying. Stultifying assembly-line jobs are
disappearing. A new, semi-independent professional class is grow-
ing. (They are mostly employees, too, but in a seller's market
of labor). Individuals feel less crushed by the giant anthill
Look at the net: the cocky self-assurance of so many people is
a pleasure to observe. Consider the Yuppie phenomenon.
Look at the new political agenda - *which* part of the Leviathan
to cut. Look at private space industry; at Sliva (of Guardian
Angels); at Marva Collins (of that ghetto school in Chicago); at
the list of intellectual best-sellers (compare to past decades);
at discredited European Socialism, at libertarian, anticommunist
French intelligentsia (brought up on Sartre). Look at the
newly-rich, capitalist 3d-world countries, and at winds of change
in poor countries - including China and India. Does it still look
as if we are moving towards the world of Atlas Shrugged? No, de-
generation or decline of a *party* is always possible, but this
is a minor matter, it's the small "l" that looms large.
Jan Wasilewsky
a.reed
>[Jan Wasilewsky (decvax!inmet!janw)]
[Adam Reed again:]
>>Schwartz argues that Libertarianism is a political movement whose
>>members have no common philosophical ground from which to derive a
>>consistent set of political goals.
>Agreed. The operative word is *common*.
>>The nominal objective of eliminating
>>coercion is not enough, since different groups of Libertarians hold
>>philosophical positions leading to widely different, and mutually
>>inconsistent, definitions of coercion.
>Premise granted, conclusion does not follow.
If Schwartz had a syllogistic proof, there would be no reason to
devote 5/6ths of the article to documentation. The argument is
hypothetico-deductive: hypothesis, mechanism, evidence.
>Precisely identical objectives are unnecessary for an alliance to be
>beneficial to all the allies. It is enough that objectives overlap.
Schwartz documents the fact that the primary objectives of the
various factions within the Libertarian movement do not overlap.
>>But a political movement without clearly - that is, philosophi-
>>cally - defined goals is likely to degenerate in a direction con-
>>sonant with the culturally dominant ideas of its time.
>Not at all clear. Imagine an idealized picture: an alliance of
>*several* movements, each *with* a clearly, philosophically de-
>fined goal - all different. Why should each strand degenerate ?
>And if not, why should the alliance (if it serves some purpose)?
The objection assumes enough integrity in the component movements
to identify with some precision what goals each expects the
alliance to help achieve, and to dissociate itself from the
alliance if/when the alliance becomes counterproductive to these
goals. Schwartz's documentation shows that this assumption does
not apply to any group within the Libertarian political movement.
>Degenerate is loaded language.
*degenerate* vi .... 5: to evolve or develop into a less autonomous
or less functionally active form (Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary, G & C Merriam Co., 1981). I am using the word precisely.
>You sound like a saint who doesn't
>want to have anything to do with this evil world.
I do not regard the world today as evil, merely suboptimal. This
is why I would rather change the world than accomodate to it.
>A political movement is not for saving souls in isolation: it is
>a part of the culture of its time - a *different* part if it's
>any use; but it can gain from dialogue with other parts.
True, but I distinguish between dialogue and compromise.
>>The documentation in the first 5/6ths of the article is
>>there to demonstrate that this process has already started and,
>>whatever my differences with Schwartz's evaluation of specific
>>trends within the Libertarian movement, I think that he has
>>demonstrated the applicability of his thesis beyond a reasonable
>>doubt.
>You keep using capital L. What about libertarian trends in
>society at large ? They seem to be on the increase.
This is because I would rather not give the Libertarian (with a
capital L) movement credit for trends it had no part in.
Adam Reed (ihnp4!npois!adam)
a.reed
>[Jan Wasilewsky (decvax!inmet!janw)]
[Adam Reed again:]
>>I would like to add something Schwartz has not said, but I think follows
>>from his argument. The Libertarian movement is repeating the history of
>>the Liberal movement. In the time of "Classical Liberalism", Liberals
>>were advocates of liberty, but they lacked a sound philosophical base
>>from which either to derive an exact definition of what they meant by
>>Liberty, or to demonstrate why liberty was desirable. What Schwartz has
>>done is to identify the mechanism by which the Liberal movement
>>inexorably devolved into that loathsome antithesis of classical liberal
>>ideas which goes by the name of "liberalism" today.
>A decline of classical liberalism is indisputable. New liberalism
>usurped its name; libertarianism (with a small l) is much the
>same thing as old liberalism - but weaker.
The problem is that there never was a discernible, discrete shift
from "old liberalism" to "new liberalism". The meaning of "Liberalism"
just drifted, gradually and continuously (just as "Libertarianism" is
already drifting) until it wound up meaning the opposite of what it
originally purported to mean. Need one add that those who ignore
history are in the process of repeating it?
>However, the attribution of old liberalism's decline to the lack
>of "a sound philosophical base" is unsubstantiated. It even seems
>implausible: how do you explain the *rise* of old liberalism ?
As I said, "old liberalism" never "declined" - it just metastatized
into "new liberalism", growing rather than declining (in count of
followers and in political influence) at every point in its drift
toward the current form. Early Liberalism got its start from the more
Aristotelian "worldly philosophers" of the enlightenment,
particularly Adam Smith and Thomas Paine. It drifted because its
intellectual precursors did not give to metaphysics, epistemology and
ethics the thought they gave to economics and politics. For a
demonstration of the link between lack of a philosophical base
and the gradual drift toward statism, just read John Stuart Mill
on compulsory education.
Adam Reed (ihnp4!npois!mtuxo)
a.reed
>[Jan Wasilewsky (decvax!inmet!janw)]
[Adam Reed again:]
>And what *is* a sound philosophical base - do you mean *a* philo-
>sophy or *the* correct philosophy ? Was it really lacking in the
>declining movements more than in the rising ones ?
I think that political criteria - declining movements versus falling
ones - are inappropriate in evaluating the success of *ideological*
movements. An ideological movement is successful when it disappears,
as a movement, because it *becomes* the culture: when its ideas become
culturally dominant. For example, the goal of the Abolitionist
movement was not a world with many Abolitionists, but rather a
world in which (private) slavery would cease to be acceptable.
When the Abolitonist movement was successful, it disappeared.
The Liberal movement, on the other hand, grew in numbers and influence,
yet remains, among ideological movements, the paradigm of failure:
its ideas never made a visible dent in the dominant culture, which
remained a morass of authoritarianism, obscurantism, and collectivism.
An ideological movement fails when it "rises" to the point of becoming
popular among people who do not understand its ideology.
I don't know of a single ideological movement that succeeded without
adhering to *a* consistent philosophy. Having the correct philosophy
may prove to be helpful, but the evidence of the past shows that it
definitely is *not* necessary for the existential success of an
ideological movement.
Adam Reed (ihnp4!npois!mtuxo)
a.reed
>[Jan Wasilewsky (decvax!inmet!janw)]
[Adam Reed again:]
>Ayn Rand was predicting, for decades, degeneration and decay of
>the whole nation and the world for exactly the same reason: no
>coherent philosophy. Not only didn't it occur, but the tide in
>many areas has turned in *her* direction. My explanation: the
>world isn't run by professional philosophers, as she thought.
>Grass roots matter more. (....)
I agree with Rand on the importance of "culturally dominant"
ideas. Until a few years ago, her predictions, for the most part,
were being borne out. The turn-around is due largely to a factor
that did not become evident until close to her death: the influence
of technology on the "implicit ideology" permeating the culture.
Culturally dominant ideas need not come from explicitly intellectual
communication. One should not ignore the common use of *metaphors
drawn from the environment* as everyday cognitive tools. A technology
which changes the everyday environment can give currency to new
metaphors, and thus change the way people think. I think that the
tide was turned by the spread of computer technology. The computer
is just a machine for consistent application of Aristotelian logic.
Thus, Aristotelian logic has penetrated the "implicit ideology" of
our time through the "computer metaphor". This "computer metaphor" was
the driving force behind the rise of Cognitivism and the decline of
Behaviorism in the human and social sciences. If one applies Rand's
insights to a situation in which man's view of himself and of his
society is increasingly founded on (implicitly) Aristotelian ideas,
the current resurgence of individualism is not hard to predict.
>My own explanation is quasi-Marxist: between the 19th and the
>20th century, society became less atomic; more people became *em-
>ployees* in hierarchical organizations, small cogs in large
>machines. Consequently, individualism waned and collectivism waxed.
My experience tends to the opposite. I have worked for enterprises
ranging from a two-person garage to AT&T, and lived in communities
ranging from a Kibbutz to New York City. In my experience, big cities
and big companies are far more congenial to individualism then
isolated villages and small partnerships. AT&T is the largest outfit
I have ever worked for, and also the most individualistic. I
exchange specified services for specified salary and benefits.
Nothing else is required or expected. This environment is much
farther from collectivism then the typical small partnership, which
expects both allegience and conformity as conditions of membership.
>The bureaucratization process has not run its course yet, but a
>counter-current is already felt. Centralized hierarchical struc-
>tures are less efficient in new conditions. In the economy, small
>companies are multiplying. Stultifying assembly-line jobs are
>disappearing. A new, semi-independent professional class is grow-
>ing. (They are mostly employees, too, but in a seller's market
>of labor). Individuals feel less crushed by the giant anthill
>Look at the net: the cocky self-assurance of so many people is
>a pleasure to observe. Consider the Yuppie phenomenon.
>Look at the new political agenda - *which* part of the Leviathan
>to cut. Look at private space industry; at Sliva (of Guardian
>Angels); at Marva Collins (of that ghetto school in Chicago); at
>the list of intellectual best-sellers (compare to past decades);
>at discredited European Socialism, at libertarian, anticommunist
>French intelligentsia (brought up on Sartre). Look at the
>newly-rich, capitalist 3d-world countries, and at winds of change
>in poor countries - including China and India. Does it still look
>as if we are moving towards the world of Atlas Shrugged? No, de-
>generation or decline of a *party* is always possible, but this
>is a minor matter, it's the small "l" that looms large.
All to the good, but does "big L" Libertarianism deserve credit for
any of the above? And if not, why call the good stuff "libertarianism"?
Adam Reed (ihnp4!npois!adam)