Laws of Libertaria
ja...@inmet.uucp
[Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh]
>> >How do "laws" get passed in a libertarian society? What coerces
>> >someone into responding to a lawsuit or paying judgements aginst him?
>> A very good question. There is an extensive literature on that.
>> Defining one scheme as *the* libertarian solution would be wrong.
>> The way I see it, laws would be contractual obligations.
>> Enforcement would be private.
>Please tell us more about the way you see it.
OK, though you would do better with someone who has spent more
time figuring out these things. Let me second Nat Howard in
recommending "The Machinery of Freedom" by David Friedman. The
following answers are mine but his are likely to be better.
(You realize it is not a matter of true vs. false but of a better
or worse solution to a practical problem). Those I give are *not
known (by me) not to work* - and this is all I claim.
>Who do you contract with for laws? Everybody you meet? A private law
>maker/judge/enforcer?
You shop around. Let's call an organization that performs all or
some of these functions, a *jurisdiction*. It may be commercial,
or cooperative, or a republic, or a cult, or a dukedom. You
choose a jurisdiction (or several of them) to your taste and con-
tract with them, as you do now with your phone company, or health
plan, or insurance agency. Come to think of it, *crime protec-
tion* could be usefully combined with *crime insurance* and
*health care* with *health insurance*.
At present people *also* belong to different jurisdictions;
you enter one as you move to a town, county, state or country.
>Why do you contract for laws? Are you fair game for anyone otherwise?
Not entirely; the operation of other people's laws will give
you some protection; but your rights may be reduced and you
don't get the choice of laws. The first disadvantage is similar
to the situation of an individual without a citizenship in
a world of states. The second is the lot of everyone now.
>What happens to someone who cannot afford to contract for laws?
Partially answered above; but to do better than that:
They can either cooperate and help themselves - or be helped by
someone else.
Cooperative jurisdictions are quite feasible.
And it is strongly to the interest of everyone in a society that
everyone have some orderly protection and some access to justice.
Anything less is too dangerous. The problem is to channel that
self-interest. The present system in USA, at least, does it *so*
badly that any change is likely to be an improvement.
I see a plethora of anarcho-libertarian solutions for the protec-
tion of the poor. Protection agencies accepting non-paying cus-
tomers in the area where they operate (the better to protect
their paying customers); or accepting payment in kind (e.g. pa-
trol duty); Guardian Angels; charity patrols. If all else failed
(and it seems unlikely), protection vouchers could be issued, by
whatever welfare system is in existence (welfare problem has to
be solved anyway).
Legal and judicial services can be similarly arranged.
Jan Wasilewsky
ja...@inmet.uucp
[Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh]
>> You are quite right that arbitration doesn't work when one of
>> the parties is powerless. This is a point that needed to be made.
>Not generally powerless: powerless with respect to one party at one
>particular time is all that is necessary.
Sure: but, in an interdependent society, one kind of power at one
place can be negotiated into another kind of power in another
place. I once wrote a senator about a dissident friend of mine in
Russia, and got a very helpful reply. The point of this is, he
wasn't a senator from *my* state; and certainly not a senator
from Russia; there are hardly any Soviet immigrants in his state,
too. But being helpful *may* help him indirectly, some day.
This is how it works in democracy, for which I have two cheers.
>So then how does an aggreived but "powerless" party get satisfac-
>tion in your libertaria?
Two sides should be discerned in this question: the *mechanisms*
of getting satisfaction; and the *motive force* activating
these mechanisms. E.g., in our society, the Congress, the press,
the lobbies etc. are the machinery through which the *interests*
of, say, polluters and anti-polluters work.
What you need to get satisfaction is a *coalition* of interests;
and you need *structure* so that the interests can coalesce. The
*kind* of structure can vary. Libertaria is not supposed to be
structureless. It would have its institutions.
The difference between it and status quo is that no institution
has an artificial *monopoly* on the functions it is supposed
to serve. The advantages are many. Competition is an incentive
for the institution to *really* serve the supposed function. Thus, even
where de facto there is a monopoly (a natural monopoly)
it works better and is sensitive to customers.
Old institutions that don't fit new needs (and societal
change is likely to accelerate dramatically, led by technology),
will disappear with little fuss .
Completely new institutions can be invented and implemented
with no permission from anyone.
Where no natural monopoly exists, variety of needs will be
met by variety of institutions.
The monopoly that existing structures of government exercise
takes two forms: they forcibly *preempt* resourses of society, so
that it cannot afford an alternative set of institutions; and
they forcibly *prevent* these institutions from functioning.
Funding of public schools and licencing of teachers are the ex-
amples of these two sides of monopoly.
In justice and police protection, it is much more complete.
Back to your question: seemingly powerless people get satisfac-
tion, in democracy *or* Libertaria, by being members of coali-
tions. *That* is not the difference between the two social orders.
The *mechanisms* the coalitions use *would* be different. They
would be more flexible and diverse.
Jan Wasilewsky
ja...@inmet.uucp
[Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh]
>> Other relevant points are:
>> - Moral power is a kind of power too, and often proves decisive.
>> - No large group of people is powerless.
>> In particular, pollution victims, if numerous, have both numbers and
>> moral high ground. They have *many* ways to compel attention.
>Fine. I'm Joe Miner And Smelter Owner, the major polluter of your valley.
>My products are sold primarily outside the range I pollute. Go ahead,
>how are you gonna compell me? I laugh at your "moral high ground", and
>if you try to coerce me, I'll righteously set my rent-a-cops on you.
Sorry, Joe. Mike is giving you some terrible advice. Never laugh
at moral high ground. (Mike is smart, but I suspect he simply
doesn't like tycoons like you). When reporters ask you about a
deformed baby born last month in Toxic Valley, *don't* snicker.
Mumble something about statistical deviation and that you have
funded a commission of inquiry, etc. Play for time, Joe, but
don't expect too much - it won't blow away, the Valley people
won't let it. Use the time for negotiation. Other tycoons spend
billions on their image, Joe. Don't blow yours with a smirk.
Moral power got Britain out of India and Jim Crow out of America.
It is to be taken very seriously. The reason is this: it
is a *catalyst of coalition*. Power is a coalition game.
Coalitions can be built slowly with diplomacy and bargaining.
These are fragile things and need to be constantly maintained.
But much stronger coalitions arise much faster over a moral
issue, sometimes one little case (Watergate, Dreyfus affair).
People in Toxic Valley may not be among Joe Smelter's customers
or suppliers or neighbors or anyone he deals with directly. But
pollution is a world-wide problem, and there *is* a powerful
coalition around it. Combination of interests is the reason the
Valley dwellers get any justice *now*. What else is there ?
Their vote ? Nation wide, not very important, and Joe's senator
is not theirs. And how did they get the vote in the first place ?
Why did territories become states; why votes for women, the
poor, the blacks, the immigrants? Because people have power *be-
fore* they have vote; better have them inside the system than
outside. Also because some people inside the system want them in.
Both factors don't arise from political institutions: they *pre-
cede* and *shape* these institutions.
Joe Smelter is better off right now - he can point to a regulato-
ry body and refuse to deal with anyone else. Until his enemies
*prove* he controls his regulators (a hard thing to do), all the
forces of government are on his side. He does not *need* rent-a-
cop, he's rented the whole police force.
The only way he can mine and smelter undisturbed in Libertaria is
under protection of a law respected by others. In practice that
means agreeing to some arbitration procedure.
Jan Wasilewsky
Mike Huybensz
> >Why do you contract for laws? Are you fair game for anyone otherwise?
> Not entirely; the operation of other people's laws will give
> you some protection; but your rights may be reduced and you
> don't get the choice of laws. The first disadvantage is similar
> to the situation of an individual without a citizenship in
> a world of states. The second is the lot of everyone now.
If each of the suppliers of "law" is competing against the others in
the market, then obviously they are going to attempt to maximize
their income. Why shouldn't they simply proclaim that everybody
must obey their laws and pay for them? What's to stop this positive
feedback back into feudalism?
There's a game whose name I can't remember, where the players start out
equal in a legislative system with a constitution. They can make any
ammendments to the constitution by the procedures in the constitution.
The winner is the one who achieves absolute power. I gather the game
tends to end in that state. (Anyone remember the name or a better
description? Mail please, unless in a response to the rest of this note.)
--
Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
Mike Huybensz
>
> >> You are quite right that arbitration doesn't work when one of
> >> the parties is powerless. This is a point that needed to be made.
>
> >Not generally powerless: powerless with respect to one party at one
> >particular time is all that is necessary.
>
> Sure: but, in an interdependent society, one kind of power at one
> place can be negotiated into another kind of power in another
> place. I once wrote a senator about a dissident friend of mine in
> Russia, and got a very helpful reply.
Where was the exercise of power: did anything change in Russia?
> The point of this is, he
> wasn't a senator from *my* state; and certainly not a senator
> from Russia; there are hardly any Soviet immigrants in his state,
> too. But being helpful *may* help him indirectly, some day.
> This is how it works in democracy, for which I have two cheers.
Words are cheap. Power isn't. I'm not real impressed by the negotiation
of words at one time for a possible vote later: at least not as an
example of negotiating power in one place into power in another.
> >So then how does an aggreived but "powerless" party get satisfac-
> >tion in your libertaria?
>
> Two sides should be discerned in this question: the *mechanisms*
> of getting satisfaction; and the *motive force* activating
> these mechanisms. E.g., in our society, the Congress, the press,
> the lobbies etc. are the machinery through which the *interests*
> of, say, polluters and anti-polluters work.
You also need to consider the efficiency of the machinery for
transmitting power. That's a strong point of one government, and a
weak point between governments.
> The difference between [Libertaria] and status quo is that no institution
> has an artificial *monopoly* on the functions it is supposed
> to serve. The advantages are many. Competition is an incentive
> for the institution to *really* serve the supposed function. Thus, even
> where de facto there is a monopoly (a natural monopoly)
> it works better and is sensitive to customers.
By the definition of a natural monopoly, it is uneconomic for anyone to
compete. So why would there be efficiency and responsiveness?
For that matter, what do you think is an example of a natural monopoly,
and why aren't governments natural monopolies by that standard?
--
Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
Mike Huybensz
>
> >> Other relevant points are:
> >> - Moral power is a kind of power too, and often proves decisive.
> >> - No large group of people is powerless.
> >> In particular, pollution victims, if numerous, have both numbers and
> >> moral high ground. They have *many* ways to compel attention.
>
> >Fine. I'm Joe Miner And Smelter Owner, the major polluter of your valley.
> >My products are sold primarily outside the range I pollute. Go ahead,
> >how are you gonna compell me? I laugh at your "moral high ground", and
> >if you try to coerce me, I'll righteously set my rent-a-cops on you.
>
> Sorry, Joe. Mike is giving you some terrible advice. Never laugh
> at moral high ground. (Mike is smart, but I suspect he simply
> doesn't like tycoons like you). When reporters ask you about a
> deformed baby born last month in Toxic Valley, *don't* snicker.
> Mumble something about statistical deviation and that you have
> funded a commission of inquiry, etc. Play for time, Joe, but
> don't expect too much - it won't blow away, the Valley people
> won't let it. Use the time for negotiation. Other tycoons spend
> billions on their image, Joe. Don't blow yours with a smirk.
Jan, you've just cut your own argument out from under yourself. Of
course Joe Owner is going to lie through his teeth and defuse the
"moral high ground" while laughing behind everybody's back. There's
no lack of actual examples of that sort of behavior: and it works.
So much for moral high ground.
> Moral power got Britain out of India and Jim Crow out of America.
> It is to be taken very seriously. The reason is this: it
> is a *catalyst of coalition*. Power is a coalition game.
> Coalitions can be built slowly with diplomacy and bargaining.
> These are fragile things and need to be constantly maintained.
In an earlier note you made the distinction between power and
mechanisms for transmission of power. "Moral power" is actually an
exceedingly inefficient mechanism for transmitting numerical power.
It worked in India because of the absurd ratio of British to Indians.
It wasn't responsable for the abolition of Jim Crow: that was due to
a VERY FEW politicians making the very efficient mechanism of the
federal government enforce the majority opinion upon a quite large
minority.
> Joe Smelter is better off right now - he can point to a regulato-
> ry body and refuse to deal with anyone else. Until his enemies
> *prove* he controls his regulators (a hard thing to do), all the
> forces of government are on his side. He does not *need* rent-a-
> cop, he's rented the whole police force.
If there is a regulatory body, Joe Smelter has to worry about who really
controls it. In our current system, one community can make an awful
stink about a regulatory agency not performing its job correctly.
In Libertaria, Joe would belong to the Industrialist's Government, while
the people in the valley might belong to the Environmentalist Government
(among others.) Why should the Industrialists negotiate with the
Environmentalists when they are sitting pretty? The industrialists
would have more money because only people actually worried about
suffering from pollution would pay the environmentalists. It would
make sense for the industrialists to break the credibility of the
environmentalists so that they never have to negotiate. Make them
look helpless by not negotiating, and smash them if they try anything
physical. If the startup costs for a powerful organization are large,
a stitch in time will save nine. This is the same principle by which
unions were often denied entry into industries until the federal government
intervened.
> The only way he can mine and smelter undisturbed in Libertaria is
> under protection of a law respected by others. In practice that
> means agreeing to some arbitration procedure.
No, he simply needs to be more powerful than they. Then he writes his own
law.
--
Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
Frank Adams
>time figuring out these things. Let me second Nat Howard in
>recommending "The Machinery of Freedom" by David Friedman. The
>following answers are mine but his are likely to be better.
>(You realize it is not a matter of true vs. false but of a better
>or worse solution to a practical problem). Those I give are *not
>known (by me) not to work* - and this is all I claim.
>
>>Who do you contract with for laws? Everybody you meet? A private law
>>maker/judge/enforcer?
>
>You shop around. Let's call an organization that performs all or
>some of these functions, a *jurisdiction*. It may be commercial,
>or cooperative, or a republic, or a cult, or a dukedom. You
>choose a jurisdiction (or several of them) to your taste and con-
>tract with them, as you do now with your phone company, or health
>plan, or insurance agency. Come to think of it, *crime protec-
>tion* could be usefully combined with *crime insurance* and
>*health care* with *health insurance*.
>
>At present people *also* belong to different jurisdictions;
>you enter one as you move to a town, county, state or country.
There is a difference. To a fair approximation, all the jurisdictions
recognize each other. If I commit a crime in Peoria, I can't get
away with it by coming back to East Hartford. Or even (for serious
crimes) by going to France. I can probably get away if I go to Albania,
but this is (1) difficult, and (2) a penalty in itself.
So if you don't have geographical districts, how do you decide what
company has jurisdiction in a case? Suppose, for example, that I want
to play my stereo loudly in the middle of the night. The company I
contract for for laws says this is perfectly legitimate. My next door
neighbor, however, objects, and the company he contracts with has
passed a law against this. His company tries to compel me to stop,
and I turn to my company to protect me. Is it shootout time?
I assume not. I assume it's time to go to court. But what court? He
and his company have contractual arrangements with one court, which will
doubtless uphold their point of view. My company and I have contractual
arrangements with another court, which will doubtless uphold our point
of view. (We wouldn't have selected them if they didn't agree with us.)
How do we decide which court to use? Is it shootout time yet?
Perhaps I am misreading you. Perhaps your jurisdictions are meant to be
geographical. But then they will need extradiction treaties and/or barriers
to movement. To be precise, each jurisdiction must ensure that there are
barriers to movement to *any* other jurisdiction with which it does not
have an extradition treaty. This means that if there is any jurisdiction
which is not willing to sign a general extradition treaty, and any
neighbor of such a jurisdiction does not impose adequate controls on
movement to that jurisdiction, then every jurisdiction must control all
of its own borders. (If the jurisdiction is selected by the property owner,
this gets even worse. In this case, barriers to movement are impossible,
and the only way to deal with a non-cooperating jurisdiction is force.
This also provides no possible solution for my neighbor who is complaining
about my stereo.)
Even if the above-described intolerable limitation to free movement is
avoided, people are faced with the problem of dealing with potentially
different laws in the variety of jurisdictions they must deal with.
This entails either extraordinary effort to keep up with all of them,
or the risk of falling foul of some unexpected law. (This risk is
present now, but I think it would be much worse with a large number
of independent jurisdictions to deal with.)
>And it is strongly to the interest of everyone in a society that
>everyone have some orderly protection and some access to justice.
>Anything less is too dangerous. The problem is to channel that
>self-interest. The present system in USA, at least, does it *so*
>badly that any change is likely to be an improvement.
The historical evidence is all against you here. The present system
in the USA does a better job than almost all other existing or
historical systems. I would say, on the contrary, that any change
which is not very carefully thought out is likely to be worse.
Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
n...@inmet.uucp
>/* Written 4:39 pm Jan 23, 1986 by mrh@cybvax0 in inmet:net.politics.t */
>In article <2820...@inmet.UUCP> ja...@inmet.UUCP writes:
>> Not entirely; the operation of other people's laws will give
>> you some protection; but your rights may be reduced and you
>> don't get the choice of laws. The first disadvantage is similar
>> to the situation of an individual without a citizenship in
>> a world of states. The second is the lot of everyone now.
>
>the market, then obviously they are going to attempt to maximize
>their income. Why shouldn't they simply proclaim that everybody
>must obey their laws and pay for them? What's to stop this positive
>feedback back into feudalism?
If I remember right, positive feedback is when you have an action, the
reaction to which encourages further action of that type. Let us examine,
for a moment what happens: Jurisdiction "A" says: "Okay, everybody
must obey our laws and pay for them."
Jurisdictions "B" through "Z", "1" through "9", and one more for each of the
other ascii characters :-) say: "Oh Yeah? -- that's EXACTLY the sort of
thing our clients hired us to prevent. Beat it". This is not called
positive feedback....
By the way, were it really true that one justice system could make
such a play, we would now have a world government. The current large
number of states what you might think of as a degenerate libertarian
society, where the "protectors" have indeed become the jailers. Lest
you think this inevitable, let me concede immediately that yes, a
libertarian society *could* degenerate (as could anything but a
perfect totalitarian society), but consider: it would degenerate into
what we already have. Trying to make what we already have MORE
libertarian is moving things the other way!
n...@inmet.uucp
Pardon me, Jan and Mike, for butting in, but....
>/* Written 5:15 pm Jan 23, 1986 by mrh@cybvax0 in inmet:net.politics.t */
>In article <2820...@inmet.UUCP> ja...@inmet.UUCP writes:
>
>> Two sides should be discerned in this question: the *mechanisms*
>> of getting satisfaction; and the *motive force* activating
>> these mechanisms. E.g., in our society, the Congress, the press,
>> the lobbies etc. are the machinery through which the *interests*
>> of, say, polluters and anti-polluters work.
>
>You also need to consider the efficiency of the machinery for
>transmitting power. That's a strong point of one government, and a
>weak point between governments.
Indeed. Of course, one doesn't want too strong a mechanism for this,
any more than one wants too "strong" a dollar! The problem with
a SINGLE mechanism is that you can't simply imbue it with fairness:
you can't create a court and say: "This court's decisions will be fair"
and make it stick. Thus we're left with a choice between multiple
conflicting authorities and a single one, neither of which (in this
imperfect world) will work properly.
The best answer I've heard to the "Who will Watch the Watchers" is:
"The other watchers!". One is too few, and I'd rather have an
inefficient government at its own throat than an efficient government
at mine.
>> The difference between [Libertaria] and status quo is that no institution
>> has an artificial *monopoly* on the functions it is supposed
>> to serve. The advantages are many. Competition is an incentive
>> for the institution to *really* serve the supposed function. Thus, even
>> where de facto there is a monopoly (a natural monopoly)
>> it works better and is sensitive to customers.
>
>By the definition of a natural monopoly, it is uneconomic for anyone to
>compete. So why would there be efficiency and responsiveness?
I suggest you call someone who knows economics and whom you trust,
but briefly: A "natural monopoly" is a situation in which a the
greater the size of the firm, the lower its production costs. Given
such a situation, one has positive feedback -- the largest firm, in
the absence of regulation-threat, may lower its prices (because its
costs are lower) and still make money while charging less than the
others. Having lowered its prices, it finds that it has gotten a
larger share of the market, thus lowering its costs still further, and
so on until it has captured the whole market, and, since its costs are
lower than those of any likely new firm it may prevent any new firm
from entering the market by either keeping its prices low, or making
it clear that it could lower the prices should someone try to enter
the market. An entering firm would, the argument goes, be unable to
match the low costs, and hence the potential low prices offered by the
old firm, hence the monopoly position is stable.
In my economics class, electric power provision was offered as an example
of natural monopoly.
Now, here's the surprise: ANY company, natural monopoly or not,
is trying to make more money. It can do this, in the case of
natural monopoly, by charging a price that causes the most profit.
It turns out that this is not simply "the highest price the market
will bear" -- but rather a price calculated on (as I recall) the
average cost of production.
Let us say, for example, that the electric power provider finds himself
a monopoly. He does NOT then raise the price of electricity to
$100,000 per kilowatt-hour. Why? Because he would lose customers.
fewer customers mean less money. Instead he charges something like
his average cost, calculating a maximum (price*unit-sales)-costs.
He also remains responsive to customers, in order to keep them
from switching to substitutes (steam power, private generation)
and to make greater use of electric power (and thus more profit,
given the declining cost of providing power). The power company
does this not as efficiently as if he had competition, but
not as inefficiently as if he were guaranteed buyers (electric
power demand is elastic, that is, responsive to changes in price).
I think it was Ben Franklin who applied this logic to the US
postal system of his time, LOWERED the price of services, and
increased revenue.
Second surprise: such monopolies are not stable. In OUR society they
tend to be regulated immediately by government, or threatened with
such regulation. Often, the firm accepts this as a way of cementing
its monopoly. In a free society monopolies would be unstable for
several reasons. Besides the more obvious ones of innovation (no good
to have a monopoly on rubber trees if someone invents a cheap
synthetic rubber), and substitution: (no good to have a monopoly on
firewood if people find they can burn coal) there is my current
favorite instability: to the need of a large monopoly to lower its
prices all over the country to match any upstart that comes along.
If, for example, I decide to go into kumquat production, and form
"Little Kumquats Inc", it is true that "Big Kumquats Inc" may cut its
prices to match mine, but if I cut mine still further, so that I'm
LOSING money, then Big Kumquats must do the same, and not just in my
area -- but ALL OVER -- wherever my Kumquats may reach.
They lose $1 billion a day, I lose $1000. Neither of us LIKES it, but
they'll like it less than I do. I can thus threaten Big Kumquats into
NOT trying to undersell me.
I can hear you objecting already, Mike: "But things like that
don't happen in the Real World". Wrong. This same drama
was enacted between Standard Oil (Big Kumquats) and Cornplanter
Refineries (Little Kumquats) with the only interesting variation
being that Cornplanter had been in the refining business for a while.
You can read about it in "Machinery of Freedom"'s chapters titled
"Monopoly -- How to Lose Your Shirt".
>For that matter, what do you think is an example of a natural monopoly,
>and why aren't governments natural monopolies by that standard?
This was for Jan, but I'll answer it anyhow (and hope Jan
has a chance to answer it also).
Because smaller areas (to a point) are disproportionately easy to
govern compared to large ones. If you doubt this, compare your
federal tax cost (oh, go ahead, take out national defense) to
your city and state taxes.
ja...@inmet.uucp
[Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh]
>> >> You are quite right that arbitration doesn't work when one of
>> >> the parties is powerless. This is a point that needed to be made.
>> >Not generally powerless: powerless with respect to one party at one
>> >particular time is all that is necessary.
>> Sure: but, in an interdependent society, one kind of power at one
>> place can be negotiated into another kind of power in another
>> place. I once wrote a senator about a dissident friend of mine in
>> Russia, and got a very helpful reply.
Where was the exercise of power: did anything change in Russia?
Well, he did send a telegram to Chebrikov, the KGB chief, and the
harassment of my friend did abate. The causal connection is not
certain. More generally, if you doubt a VIP here has some pull
behind the iron curtain, then you are wrong. In some cases, even
the family of a defector has been extricated from there, and that
is really hard. Interdependence at work: Russia, like everyone
else, has a lobby in Washington.
>> >So then how does an aggreived but "powerless" party get satisfac-
>> >tion in your libertaria?
>> Two sides should be discerned in this question: the *mechanisms*
>> of getting satisfaction; and the *motive force* activating
>> these mechanisms. E.g., in our society, the Congress, the press,
>> the lobbies etc. are the machinery through which the *interests*
>> of, say, polluters and anti-polluters work.
>You also need to consider the efficiency of the machinery for
>transmitting power. That's a strong point of one government, and a
>weak point between governments.
In a complicated, civilized society, everyone needs everyone,
directly or indirectly. When the flow of goods, favors, and in-
formation is intense enough, the problem is no more that of too
weak power transmission mechanisms but (as Nat pointed out), of
too strong ones. Delete the government, there is still more than
enough. Consider North America, or Western Europe. They work as
holistic systems without a super-government.
>> The difference between [Libertaria] and status quo is that no institution
>> has an artificial *monopoly* on the functions it is supposed
>> to serve. The advantages are many. Competition is an incentive
>> for the institution to *really* serve the supposed function. Thus, even
>> where de facto there is a monopoly (a natural monopoly)
>> it works better and is sensitive to customers.
>By the definition of a natural monopoly, it is uneconomic for anyone to
>compete. So why would there be efficiency and responsiveness?
It is only uneconomic as long as the monopoly behaves. It has to
keep undercutting *potential* competition. Coercive monopoly
doesn't.
Suppose the cost of a unit of service is $10 for the natural
monopoly (being already there); but $15 for any newcomer. The
monopoly charges $14 and makes a nice profit. If it tries to get
$20, it loses the market, and loses it for good. If it gets arro-
gant and insensitive, or fails to make use of new cost-reducing
technology, it comes to the same thing.
>For that matter, what do you think is an example of a natural monopoly,
>and why aren't governments natural monopolies by that standard?
(1)Utilities. (2)They may well be, with respect to some of their
functions. This is part of my argument.
Jan Wasilewsky