the Goal of evolution
su...@hoptoad.uucp
> >>>Evolution is undirected: ie. it has no long-term goals.
> >
> It turns out that these are not brain-teasers. Since neither survival
> nor existence are goals of evolution, the questions are moot. An entity
> must have understanding to have goals. Evolution has no understanding,
> and hence is a goal-less process.
> (Naturally, this is not to say that evolutionists have no
> understanding or goals...)
Evolution has evolution as its goal. Evolution of spirit is reflected in
the evolution of physical life. By looking only at the physical world, you
see only the symptoms of the actual spiritual causative factors in action...
If you wish to understand creation or evolution you must eventually look on
the planes above the physical. The only known tool for this examination is
the human mind itself. All the answers are within. Seek enlightenment and
you find these answers. Denial will keep you confined within the walls of
your own construction.
Evolutionists and Creationists are not in conflict. They both misperceive
that they are examining the totality of existance, and therefore come up
with equally invalid explanations of a fraction of the universe. Both
creation and evolution are valid when understood in the correct context of
the physical world being only the lowest form of manifestation, on the
plane of effects, of those actions and forces acting from higher planes.
--
Sunny Kirsten
U.P.S.: 10329 Hilltop Rd.
U.S. Mail: P.O.B. 2025
Loch Lomond, CA 95426-2025
Voice Phone: (707) 928-5546, 987-2477
USENET: ...!{sun,ptsfa,well,lll-crg,ihnp4,ucsfcgl,nsc,frog}!hoptoad!sunny
Mike Huybensz
to get the author's intended sense. I think I disagree with you, Michael:
if I've misunderstood, I apologize in advance.
In article <2...@spar.UUCP> el...@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes:
> >>>>Evolution is undirected: ie. it has no long-term goals. [HUYBENSZ]
>
> >> Survival? Existence? [ELLIS]
>
> I guess I shouldn't be surprised that so many are quick to assert that
> Aristotle's `telos' (roughly `purpose, goal, or aim') has no place in
> scientific explanation. After all, physics and chemistry flourished only
> after purging all but efficient causes, yes?
Yes. Purpose and goals have no place in scientific theory about (literally)
brainless subjects because adding them to an explanation adds no more
predictive or descriptive ability. Thus Occam's Razor throws out "purpose"
and "goals" in favor of "function". (There are meanings of "function" that
do not imply purpose.)
> Viewed game-theoretically, the evolutionary payoff matrix has two
> results -- extinction or survival. I fail to see how to prevent
> evolution from becoming tautological unless it is seen as the rationale
> behind the first scientifically sanctified `goal'; appropriately, this
> goal is existence.
Wait a minute: who chose survival as a goal over extinction? While we may
personally prefer one over the otehr and pay more attention to it, there is
no reasonable argument that one or the other is a purpose or goal of
evolution. Both are phenomina associated with evolution.
> Sure -- we usually view biological teleology behavioristically -- one
> does not have to attribute conscious goals to genes, organs, species, or
> whatever, to speak of the `purpose' of that which is under analysis.
> The purpose of my heart is, after all, to pump blood, is it not?
Actually, "function" can serve quite as well, and without the burden of
excess meaning that "purpose" provides. The only thing I can say in favor
of the word "purpose" is that it makes explainations to most people (who are
most familiar with teleological explanations) simpler and more direct.
...
> Such teleological explanations are totally different from `real' causes
> as the gravitational attraction behind falling rocks; evolution, like
> entropy, operates on the level of information, not the level of raw
> matter itself.
I don't perceive any such "level of information". Evolution operates on
just plain matter like any other descriptive law. We make descriptive
abstractions like matter and species for our own convenience, where it
is simplest and most compact for us to describe and predict.
> Evolution, or any kind of feedback loop, is likewise unanalyzable viewed
> by discrete cause=>effect events, whereby causal explanations are
> reducible to primitive discrete interactions, such as described by
> Wesley Salmon in "Causal Structure of the World":
>
> chain fork junction collision
>
> before c1 c1 c1 c2 c1 c2
> | / \ \ / X
> after e1 e1 e2 e1 e1 e2
>
> There is no way to embed anything like feedback loops or evolution
> within such interactions as the above. Feedback loops require that a
> later event, such as a next-generation copy of (genetic) information,
> be identified with an earlier `instantiation' so that we `imagine' that
> the cause effects itself.
I disagree. Any time-based feedback loop can be unwound into chains of the
discrete structures you list above. The idea of loops is simply a shorthand
for long chains whose elements are extremely similar.
> As far as I can tell, evolution is the implicit rationale whereby
> teleological arguments (`the purpose of my heart is to
> pump blood') are supposedly reduced to `proper scientific causal'
> explanations (`hearts gradually evolved because pumping blood
> led to species more fit to survive').
I think here you are just noting that it is clumsier to speak in a non-
teleological fashion than otherwise. We are raised from infancy with
teleology embedded within our language, because human institutions are
teleological. The rest of the universe doesn't seem to operate that way.
Thus we're at a disadvantage because we are less practiced with non-
teleological modes of speech.
> What's so awful about `purpose', anyway? Goals imply that `information'
> exists which can refer to and cause potential future real world states
> of existence. Every text I have encountered on modern biological
> methodolology and epistemology embraces teleology in some form.
> (Re: Mayr's "Growth of Biological Thought" or Rosenberg's "The
> Structure of Biological Science"). There seems to be a metaphysical
> rebellion among biologists these days.
The answer to "what's so awful..." is the same as the answer to "what's the
benefit of Occam's Razor?"
"Purpose" is more comfortable for us to use, but less accurate. I don't
think you are identifying rebellion so much as convenience.
> I think it is clear that the natural teleology intrinsic in evolution
> explains WHY consciousness is intentional and goal-directed (rather
> than strictly rational) in the first place.
I think you are placing the cart before the horse. You are finding "natural
teleology" in evolution because that is the way your consciousness works
most conveniently.
--
Strephon: "Have you the heart to apply the prosaic rules of evidence to a
case brimming with such poetical emotion?"
Chancellor: "Distinctly."
From "Iolanthe", by Gilbert and Sullivan.
--
Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
William Ingogly
>... As far as I can tell, evolution is the implicit rationale whereby
> teleological arguments (`the purpose of my heart is to
> pump blood') are supposedly reduced to `proper scientific causal'
> explanations (`hearts gradually evolved because pumping blood
> led to species more fit to survive').
>
> What's so awful about `purpose', anyway? Goals imply that `information'
> exists which can refer to and cause potential future real world states
> of existence. ...
Perhaps I'm misreading what you've been saying here, but what most
people think about when they hear "goal" is the notion of a force
directing a process toward an ideal future state. Saying "I'm going to
direct everything in my life toward becoming a lighthouse keeper" is
different than saying "everything that's happened in my life makes it
possible that I'll be a lighthouse keeper some day." And this seems to
be implicit in your concept of information that somehow refers to
future real states. Suppose we have a dammed lake at the top of a
hill, and a valley below. If the dam is removed, does the lake's
flowing to a stable state in which all water resides in the valley
involve somehow the system's referring to future real states in which
the water either flows or doesn't flow downhill to the valley? And how
does information 'refer' to a system's potential future states? This
approach strikes me like the 'anthropic principles' certain cosmologists
are enamored of: a lot of fun to think about but ultimately not that
useful as models that can generate falsifiable hypotheses.
-- Cheers, Bill Ingogly
Wayne Throop
>>[...] An entity
>>must have understanding to have goals. Evolution has no understanding,
>>and hence is a goal-less process.
>>
>>(Naturally, this is not to say that evolutionists have no
>> understanding or goals...)
>
> Aristotle's `telos' (roughly `purpose, goal, or aim') has no place in
> scientific explanation. After all, physics and chemistry flourished only
> after purging all but efficient causes, yes?
Goodness gracious, am *I* supposed to be an example of someone who
asserts that goals have no place in scientific explanation? You get
this from the fact that I assert evolution to be goal-less? Quite an
extrapolation... "There exists a case where WT asserts goal-less-ness,
therefore WT asserts goals have no place in scientific explanation."
Gosh, what would Aristotle say to this sylogism?
To say that an anylysis of purpose and goal is inappropriate in science
is silly, and I never said it.
> Viewed game-theoretically, the evolutionary payoff matrix has two
> results -- extinction or survival. I fail to see how to prevent
> evolution from becoming tautological unless it is seen as the rationale
> behind the first scientifically sanctified `goal'; appropriately, this
> goal is existence.
Nonsense. To be viewed "game-theoretically", species playing the
evolution game must make a "play" and receive a "payoff". You have
defined no such plays made by species, and a large part of the idea
behind Darwinian evolution is to show how evolutionary change could
occur in the absence of such "plays" that species could "make", since
there seem, in fact, to be no such plays.
The point is that far from requiring a goal to escape tautologicality,
evolutionary theory was developed *specifically* to *avoid* goal-ism
while still explaining speciation, since goal-based explanations
require an ordering and directing mechanism, and such a mechanism was
not found. Again, Darwinian evolution was invented precisely because
goal-oriented explanations *failed* to explain evolution, because no
effective mechanism for the goal-tropic agent was found.
> Sure -- we usually view biological teleology behavioristically -- one
> does not have to attribute conscious goals to genes, organs, species, or
> whatever, to speak of the `purpose' of that which is under analysis.
> The purpose of my heart is, after all, to pump blood, is it not?
To you, yes. To a cannibal, the purpose of your heart might be to
provide courage. To a surgeon, the purpose of your heart might be to
display aquired skill. To an internist, the purpose of your heart might
be to get a publication of some sort. My point is not to bombard you
with disquieting images of unusual purposes for your internal organs.
The point is that "purpose" implies some entity with goals. Different
entities can see different purposes in the same thing. Objects per se
have no purpose. Purpose is attributed to objects by agents which use
them.
Thus, speaking of the "purpose of evolution" is like speaking of the
"purpose of the atlantic ocean". You can justify saying that the
purpose of the atlantic ocean is to allow delivery by supertanker of
oil to the United States, but that says more about the economy of the US
than it does about the AO itself. Similarly, saying that the purpose of
evolution is survival says much more about the aspirations of certain
members of the human species than it does about the process of
evolution.
> Why are so many species of female dominated social insects haplodiploid?
> Because females of such species shared more genetically with their
> sisters than their brothers or even their own offspring. But that's NOT
> a cause-and-effect explanation. In fact, it is amazingly close to saying
> why such insects `ought to have' such a `goal', conscious or otherwise.
> In fact, it IS a teleological explanation.
It is *not* teleological. In fact, it is the *opposite* of a
teleological argument. Certain insects are not haplodiploid because
they are female dominated, they are female-dominated because they are
haplodiploid. Or, a clearer case, tigers don't have claws because they
hunt, they hunt because they have claws.
Now, I will grant that it is easy to confuse evolutionary arguments with
similar teleological arguments. But this doesn't make Darwinian
evolution teleological, and never has.
> [...omitted causation diagrams...]
> There is no way to embed anything like feedback loops or evolution
> within such interactions as the above. Feedback loops require that a
> later event, such as a next-generation copy of (genetic) information,
> be identified with an earlier `instantiation' so that we `imagine' that
> the cause effects itself.
Uh.... what does this have to do with evolution? Natural selection
doesn't involve contra-temporal feedback.
> As far as I can tell, evolution is the implicit rationale whereby
> teleological arguments (`the purpose of my heart is to
> pump blood') are supposedly reduced to `proper scientific causal'
> explanations (`hearts gradually evolved because pumping blood
> led to species more fit to survive').
And what do you want me to conclude? The fact that you apparently can't
tell the difference between these two arguments means evolution is
teleological?
> What's so awful about `purpose', anyway? Goals imply that `information'
> exists which can refer to and cause potential future real world states
> of existence. Every text I have encountered on modern biological
> methodolology and epistemology embraces teleology in some form.
> (Re: Mayr's "Growth of Biological Thought" or Rosenberg's "The
> Structure of Biological Science"). There seems to be a metaphysical
> rebellion among biologists these days.
>
> I think it is clear that the natural teleology intrinsic in evolution
> explains WHY consciousness is intentional and goal-directed (rather
> than strictly rational) in the first place.
Sigh. There isn't anything awful about purpose. It merely isn't
present in Darwinian evolutionary theory. Your assertions about the
teleological nature of evolution don't make it so. I haven't read the
books you mention, but the ones I have read do *not* use teleological
explanations, any more than the insect example you used was
teleological. And evolution cannot explain why consciouisness is
intentional by virtue of evolution's intrinsic teleology, since
teleology is not intrinsic in Darwinian evolution and never was.
> -michael
--
Wayne Throop <the-known-world>!mcnc!rti-sel!dg_rtp!throopw
man...@umcp-cs.uucp
>> I guess I shouldn't be surprised that so many are quick to assert that
>> Aristotle's `telos' (roughly `purpose, goal, or aim') has no place in
>> scientific explanation. After all, physics and chemistry flourished only
>> after purging all but efficient causes, yes?
>Yes. Purpose and goals have no place in scientific theory about (literally)
>brainless subjects because adding them to an explanation adds no more
>predictive or descriptive ability. Thus Occam's Razor throws out "purpose"
>and "goals" in favor of "function". (There are meanings of "function" that
>do not imply purpose.)
Actually, the reason for the rejection of "purposes" is much simpler: the
notion of purpose is inherently subjective.
>Wait a minute: who chose survival as a goal over extinction? While we may
>personally prefer one over the otehr and pay more attention to it, there is
>no reasonable argument that one or the other is a purpose or goal of
>evolution. Both are phenomina associated with evolution.
Well, I prefer an intermediate position: that evolution enforces survival as
a goal of organism systems/genotypes. The goal is there, but by the
subjective nature of the thing, it is associated with individuals with
respect to themselves.
> Evolution operates on
>just plain matter like any other descriptive law. We make descriptive
>abstractions like matter and species for our own convenience, where it
>is simplest and most compact for us to describe and predict.
I'm note convinced by this last line anymore. The decriptive abstractions
are backed up by real phenomenological differences, after all.
The question of whether there is goal-oriented evolution is not moot, and it
simply isn't a question of semantics either. The "punctuated evolution"
school, in its descriptive explanation, begs the question of why certain
morphological changes seem to happen almost instantaneously. I would
suggest that it is possible that there is some impetus which actively seeks
the completion of the transformation. THis is rather different from an
explanation which argues that the dispersive force is simply mutation, and
that the favorable changes are simply the ones which persist. The second is
a more orthodox explanation, but orthodoxy is no guarantee of truth in
science.
C. Wingate
Mike Huybensz
> Mike Huybensz writes: [replying to Michael Ellis]
> >brainless subjects because adding them to an explanation adds no more
> >predictive or descriptive ability. Thus Occam's Razor throws out "purpose"
> >and "goals" in favor of "function". (There are meanings of "function" that
> >do not imply purpose.)
>
> Actually, the reason for the rejection of "purposes" is much simpler: the
> notion of purpose is inherently subjective.
The only reason I'd disagree is because when studying people the subjective
analysis (including purposes) still gives results that are hard to rival in
a more scientific manner. But yes, I agree that "purposes" in the inanimate
are subjective, as subjective and meaningless as gender in the inanimate
(which numerous languages saddle us with.)
> >Wait a minute: who chose survival as a goal over extinction? While we may
> >personally prefer one over the other and pay more attention to it, there is
> >no reasonable argument that one or the other is a purpose or goal of
> >evolution. Both are phenomina associated with evolution.
>
> Well, I prefer an intermediate position: that evolution enforces survival as
> a goal of organism systems/genotypes. The goal is there, but by the
> subjective nature of the thing, it is associated with individuals with
> respect to themselves.
Sorry, but an intermediate between two goals is still a goal, and I don't
see how non-thinkers and abstractions can be said to have goals. Do gaseous
molecules have pressure as their goal? Does quantum mechanics have a goal?
Of course, I could (*shudder*) get us started on whether thinkers have
purposes, goals, souls, free will, or whatever. But PLEASE, let's not start
that again. Let's just work on agreeing about the non-thinking and
abstractions such as evolution.
> > Evolution operates on
> >just plain matter like any other descriptive law. We make descriptive
> >abstractions like matter and species for our own convenience, where it
> >is simplest and most compact for us to describe and predict.
>
> I'm not convinced by this last line anymore. The descriptive abstractions
> are backed up by real phenomenological differences, after all.
Natural phenomina, no matter how real, don't imply any purpose.
> The question of whether there is goal-oriented evolution is not moot, and it
> simply isn't a question of semantics either. The "punctuated evolution"
> school, in its descriptive explanation, begs the question of why certain
> morphological changes seem to happen almost instantaneously. I would
> suggest that it is possible that there is some impetus which actively seeks
> the completion of the transformation. THis is rather different from an
> explanation which argues that the dispersive force is simply mutation, and
> that the favorable changes are simply the ones which persist. The second is
> a more orthodox explanation, but orthodoxy is no guarantee of truth in
> science.
If you had to explain the tunneling effect of electrons before quantum
mechanics was proposed, would you look for an impetus, a purpose of the
electrons? Why must you try to find purpose when you don't know something?
That's exactly the cause of "god of the gaps" syndromes. Are you a closet
supporter of Fr. Teilhard de Chardin? :-) (This last sentence.)
--
Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
Mike Huybensz
> `rigorous' causal statements. What I do not see is why such reduction
> necessarily invalidates teleological explanation.
Teleological explanations aren't really invalidated by reductionism: they are
still valid in that they still work, still have explanatory power.
But by more stringent criteria, such as Occam's Razor, they can be considered
invalidated. The reason they are invalidated by Occam's Razor is that
essentially teleological explanations involve hidden men to explain function
as behavior. And how do we explain the behavior of humans and the hidden
men? Obviously they have hidden men in their heads too... ad nauseum.
Much like those 17th century drawings of homunculi inside the heads of sperm.
--
Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
Dr.Schlesinger
Doesn't the very word **purpose** connote a consciousness, most
likely but not necessarily human, which wills a particular
cause/effect sequence. It seems to me that the discussion of any
process, e.g. evolution, which presumably is not so **willed** can
be related to **purpose** only in a sense in which that word means
nothing more than cause and effect. Whatchathink?
Tom Schlesinger, Plymouth State College, Plymouth, N.H. 03264
uucp: decvax!dartvax!psc70!psc90!tos
Frank Adams
>>>[...] An entity
>>>must have understanding to have goals. Evolution has no understanding,
>>>and hence is a goal-less process.
Let me change the semantics here a bit. "Evolution" per se has no goals;
but I think it makes sense to say that the species which are evolving do
have a goal: to survive. (And the individuals of the species have the more
complex goal of perpetuating their genes.) I am inclined to agree that
understanding is necessary in order to have goals; but I think
the genetic information in the DNA does constitute a rudimentary kind
of understanding. (Very rudimentary, if we compare it to a human's
understanding; but perhaps not so bad compared to a cockroach's. I
have no problem ascribing goals to a cockroach.)
>> Viewed game-theoretically, the evolutionary payoff matrix has two
>> results -- extinction or survival. I fail to see how to prevent
>> evolution from becoming tautological unless it is seen as the rationale
>> behind the first scientifically sanctified `goal'; appropriately, this
>> goal is existence.
>
>Nonsense. To be viewed "game-theoretically", species playing the
>evolution game must make a "play" and receive a "payoff". You have
>defined no such plays made by species, and a large part of the idea
>behind Darwinian evolution is to show how evolutionary change could
>occur in the absence of such "plays" that species could "make", since
>there seem, in fact, to be no such plays.
More accurately, the "plays" that the species makes are individuals, and
the "payoff matrix" has a potentially infinite number of results: zero
offspring, one offspring, etc.
>> Sure -- we usually view biological teleology behavioristically -- one
>> does not have to attribute conscious goals to genes, organs, species, or
>> whatever, to speak of the `purpose' of that which is under analysis.
>> The purpose of my heart is, after all, to pump blood, is it not?
>
>To you, yes. [...]
>The point is that "purpose" implies some entity with goals. Different
>entities can see different purposes in the same thing. Objects per se
>have no purpose. Purpose is attributed to objects by agents which use
>them.
There is a real sense in which the evolutionary purpose of your heart is
to pump blood. It would not exist if it did not perform that function.
>Thus, speaking of the "purpose of evolution" is like speaking of the
>"purpose of the atlantic ocean".
Here I agree with you. Evolution, as a whole, has no purpose.
>Or, a clearer case, tigers don't have claws because they
>hunt, they hunt because they have claws.
Not so clear. The first ancestors of the modern tiger which hunted probably
had claws of some sort. But because they hunted, those claws became adapted
to hunting. It certain is true that tigers have claws well adapted to
hunting because they hunted.
>Uh.... what does this have to do with evolution? Natural selection
>doesn't involve contra-temporal feedback.
Michael's feedback loops actually are a useful way to think about natural
selection, as long as you remember that they don't *really* represent
contra-temporal feedback. Each cycle through the feedback loop is another
generation.
>And evolution cannot explain why consciouisness is
>intentional by virtue of evolution's intrinsic teleology, since
>teleology is not intrinsic in Darwinian evolution and never was.
Agreed. This conclusion depends on evolution itself having purpose, which
it does not.
>> -michael
>--
>Wayne Throop <the-known-world>!mcnc!rti-sel!dg_rtp!throopw
Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
Mike Huybensz
> >>brainless subjects because adding them to an explanation adds no more
> >>predictive or descriptive ability. Thus Occam's Razor throws out "purpose"
> >>and "goals" in favor of "function". (There are meanings of "function" that
> >>do not imply purpose.)
>
> pending a clear definition from anybody on just what a "function" is in
> this context. To me, this word is tied too strongly to its mathematical
> and computer science sense.
Aiiiieee! Did you ever see the Saturday Night Live sketches with Gilda
Radner as Emily Litella?
Emily: "What's all this about <garbled subject>? [Long, silly monolog.]"
Jane Curtin: "Emily, it's <correct subject>, not <garbled subject>."
Emily: "Ohhhhh. That's different! Never mind. (Bitch!)"
Simply, the definition of "function" I had in mind is "what something does".
I am making a distinction between purpose and function where the former
is prescriptive and implies an entity wanting a result, and the latter is
descriptive and does not imply outside entities.
My intended distinction was crucial to my argument. I should have made it
more clear. (Sometimes I think that 90% of argument in philosophy, etc.
could be eliminated if newly coined terms were used, eliminating the
overloading and ambiguity problems of English.)
Now let's see what's left for you to complain about.
> If "function" as you use the word here means "direction towards a
> desirable future state of affairs", especially where desirable means
> "serving to maintain or increase fitness", then we are merely arguing
> over which label to call it. That's no different from Aristotle's
> "telos", or "purpose" cloaked in the clinically sterile "function".
Clearly not, because my "function" is descriptive, not prescriptive.
> And the determination of such "telea" or "purposes" is most definitely
> something that is of interest to biology. They OUGHT to be distinguished
> from the direct material and efficient causes of physics or chemistry
> because they are totally unlike anything occurring at the push-pull
> level of immediate physical causality -- their real origins lie not
> in the immediate past but are have stupendously convoluted roots buried
> deep in the distant evolutionary past.
Determination of "telea" would be of interest in any field, if theer were some
evidence of it. But I don't see any such evidence in either physics or
biology. Nor do I see any problems with biology being as strictly causal
as physics: just more complicated.
> Concerning your use of Occam's razor, a recent quote from C. Dyke:
>
> Occam's razor depends always on a criterion internal to a particular
> theory. The simplest explanations for the phenomena we like to
> explain by evolutionary theory are those preferred by some freshmen:
> God made it that way..
>
> [One sequel of this argument] involves spelling out the
> metaphysical commitments underlying the two opposing views. No
> matter how the dialog unfolds, the invocation of Occam's razor must
> be absolutely question-begging..
Yes. Occam's razor does beg the question. It is a standard heuristic for
doing so, and thus (hopefully) directing energies into the most directly
productive channels.
> [The other sequel] consists of the teacher leveling the charge of
> unscientificness against the student. But this is a dangerous
> move, for the student must be sufficiently impressed by the wonders
> of science if the charge is to have any persuasive power. Only when
> .. the student's dependence on the fruits of scientifically grounded
> technology is established.. can Occam's razor be invoked. But the
> key move is not the razor stroke. The key is the entrapment of the
> student in an internal commitment to science..
Yes, this is a fallacy of argument unless the student accepts the premises
of science already or becomes convinced of them in a valid manner.
> One-dimensional selection models seem simple to selectionists, but
> dressed up in qualifying caveats until only their own mother could
> recognize them, their simplicity is far from obvious to the
> unfaithful.. The real issue is which models, handled with which
> epistemological strategies, are the better ones.. as explainers and
> research generators. None of the sides between in a dsipute between
> theories can insist on the a priori authoritative stance that would
> be required in order for Occam's razor to have an persuasive force.
I can't really make head or tail of the argument in the above paragraph.
It looks like several condensed into one. Could you explain it more clearly?
> I notice that you occasionally use mentalisms like "purpose" and
> "intent" in your articles. In fact, I do not see how it is possible to
> extricate human understanding, including all scientific epistemologies,
> from the basic fabric of our mentalisms, teleological or otherwise.
> Science itself has an internal commitment to anthropocentrism: it
> explains reality to humans.
Science is no more anthropocentric than human minds, perhaps less so since
the humans involved make conscious attempts to divorce themselves from
normal anthropocentric viewpoints. Mentalisms are particulary inapt for
describing the inanimate and non-sentient world because they generate too
many incorrect predictions. Indeed, that's probably one of the reasons why
we have the traditional idea of "inanimate" with resulting simpler models.
> If teleological explanations have the power to reliably predict or
> describe, they are as useful as any other kinds of explanations. If they
> can eventually be reduced to immediate push-pull forces upon atoms in
> the void, so much the better for everybody, teleologists and
> reductionists alike.
The problem with teleological explanations is that they make more than just
correct or useful predictions: they make a whole bunch of incorrect
predictions as well that descriptive and theoretic explanations don't.
For example, thinking of animals as people. You immediately start to run
into all sorts of questions about why animals don't do this that and the
other thing, which requires so many explanatory notes that the search for a
non-teleological description becomes worthwhile. (At least in our culture.)
> Eliminative reductionism strikes me as saying "We have the binary to a
> program, consequently, we can throw away the high level code, comments,
> and documentation". In a sense, you're right -- all those other things
> can be re-generated from the object given enormous effort. But is a
> bunch of numbers the same as understanding how the program really works?
> I'd rather have the high-level code with plenty of teleological comments.
No, it's saying "We have the binary for the program (reality), let's make
the shortest and most accurate manual page we can." There is no high-level
code with comments that we know of: all we have are other people's attempts
at manual pages.
> >Actually, the reason for the rejection of "purposes" is much simpler: the
> >notion of purpose is inherently subjective.
>
> That's begging the question at hand: What is "objective"?
No, it's not in the sense I intend. Let's say several people see me driving
around the town. An objective description that all might agree to is that
I'm driving. Subjective descriptions might be that I'm driving to relax,
that I'm driving to get somewhere, that I'm driving to waste fuel. There is
likely to be little agreement over a purpose even if I make a statement.
> If biological entities truly possess goal-oriented behavior, then is
> our so-called "anthropomorphic" tendency to see purpose in living things
> not a reflection of nature as it really is?
It's a reflection of our nature, and our environment of other human beings.
Not necessarily anything else. Much like "The man with a hammer sees all
problems as nails."
> In the past, we were not able to understand how there could be
> mechanisms behind purposeful behavior. That is not the case today.
> I can easily write a computer program that behaves as though it had a
> purpose, say, to win a game. If you were to analyze its behavior
> teleologically, your description in intentional terms would be perfectly
> useful for a hacker to subsequently to reduce this high-level
> description to an equivalent program, or, alternatively, to synthesize a
> rigorous functional explanation of its disassembled code into a form
> usable by humans.
The program doesn't have a purpose of it's own: you have a purpose for the
program. The program is just an automaton. (And my personal feeling is that
people are just automatons, and that purpose is a meaningless term recited by
some of us automatons to describe function that is too complex for us to
manipulate competently. But let's not get into the free-will/determinism
debate in this note.)
> Is there such a thing as THE objective description of anything?
> By my account, "objective" means "sanctified by some scientific
> methodology". Period.
That's all I'm looking for. A standard upon which people agree. Such as the
normal functioning of our senses.
--
Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
Stanley Friesen
>
> By my account, "objective" means "sanctified by some scientific
> methodology". Period.
>
when performed by different people", or to put it another way, it
means "the result does *not* depend on *who* is performing the
activity, only on *how* it is performed".
I do agree, however, that some things may have objective
explanations at different levels.
--
Sarima (Stanley Friesen)
UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen
ARPA: ??
Pete Zakel
> >>>[...] An entity
> >>>must have understanding to have goals. Evolution has no understanding,
> >>>and hence is a goal-less process.
>
> Let me change the semantics here a bit. "Evolution" per se has no goals;
> but I think it makes sense to say that the species which are evolving do
> have a goal: to survive. (And the individuals of the species have the more
> complex goal of perpetuating their genes.)
>
I wish to disagree with this statement. Survival is not a goal, it is a
process. DNA that survives gives rise to DNA that is good at surviving.
Species that survive and perpetuate their genes give rise to species that
are good at surviving and perpetuating their genes. Their is no "goal".
When conditions change such that a certain survival process does not work,
species depending on that process die out. Species that use a survival
process that works under both set of conditions survive. This is called
"natural selection" and is the basis of evolution.
Describing a process as goal oriented makes explanation easier, but the
explanation should not be confused with the reality. This type of confusion
is what gave rise to Lamarck's (spelling?) theories (you know: if you cut
off the tails of enough mice, eventually you will breed tail-less mice).
--
-Pete Zakel (..!{hplabs,amd,pyramid,ihnp4}!pesnta!valid!pete)
fri...@psivax.uucp
>
>The problem with teleological explanations is that they make more than just
>correct or useful predictions: they make a whole bunch of incorrect
>predictions as well that descriptive and theoretic explanations don't.
>For example, thinking of animals as people. You immediately start to run
>into all sorts of questions about why animals don't do this that and the
>other thing, which requires so many explanatory notes that the search for a
>non-teleological description becomes worthwhile.
You seem to be assuming that ascribing purpose necessarily
implies human-like reasoning falculties. I consider this false.
>
>> If biological entities truly possess goal-oriented behavior, then is
>> our so-called "anthropomorphic" tendency to see purpose in living things
>> not a reflection of nature as it really is?
>
>It's a reflection of our nature, and our environment of other human beings.
>Not necessarily anything else. Much like "The man with a hammer sees all
>problems as nails."
I disagree here also. You seem to be working with a very
restrictive definition of the term purpose! And a very anthropocentric
one at that. I would say that the definition of purpose would be
something like: "The activity/behavior of the system is contingent
upon the current state of the world in such a way that the final state
tends to approach a *predetermined* state". Or at least some variant on
this. That is I *define* purpose as "producing goal-directed behavior".
Thus an animal *can* show purpose under this definition, and in
a non-anthropocentric way.
>
>The program doesn't have a purpose of it's own: you have a purpose for the
>program. The program is just an automaton. (And my personal feeling is that
>people are just automatons, and that purpose is a meaningless term recited by
>some of us automatons to describe function that is too complex for us to
>manipulate competently.
I would say that if the program has sufficient flexibility it
may be said to have purpose, where the purpose comes from does not
matter! It does not matter in this sense whether people are automatons
or not, if they show "goal-directed behavior" they have purpose, by
definition.