the Goal of evolution
ba...@parcvax.uucp
> > ...
> >understanding; but perhaps not so bad compared to a cockroach's. I
> >have no problem ascribing goals to a cockroach.)
>
> DNA codes information, in a sense, but that seems to me about all you can
> say. Cockroaches probably have goals, but then they probably have
> (rudimentary) minds; DNA doesn't seem to be built the right way to have
> either. Also, a cockroach can compare its perceptions to its goals and
> figure out whether things are going the way it wants them to -- can DNA?
Anyone who has worked with insects would never say they had a mind.
As far as I can tell, they are nothing more than stimulus-response
machines; the response can be complicated, true, but nothing that
requires a mind.
Cockroaches, for instance, have no "brain" as we know it, but rather
SMALL clumps of neurons along their back. If you cut off a
cockroach's head (I did, in biology lab), it will live for days,
acting very much like a cockroach (crawling around, etc.). It
eventually dies of hunger. Same with praying mantis's (same
experiment, *sniff*).
I can't imagine a cockroach comparing perceptions to goals - the air
pressure changes suddenly, it scuttles. Small, enclosed space, it
slows down. Head toward stimulus of food and pheromones of opposite
sex. Etc, etc. There are a relatively limited number of these.
- rene
--
Rene P S (nee Steiner) Bane
bane@parcvax
Frank Adams
>
>In article <13...@mmintl.UUCP> fra...@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes:
>>Let me change the semantics here a bit. "Evolution" per se has no goals;
>>but I think it makes sense to say that the species which are evolving do
>>have a goal: to survive. (And the individuals of the species have the more
>>complex goal of perpetuating their genes.)
>
>> I am inclined to agree that
>>understanding is necessary in order to have goals; but I think
>>the genetic information in the DNA does constitute a rudimentary kind
>>of understanding. (Very rudimentary, if we compare it to a human's
>>understanding; but perhaps not so bad compared to a cockroach's. I
>>have no problem ascribing goals to a cockroach.)
>
>DNA codes information, in a sense, but that seems to me about all you can
>say. Cockroaches probably have goals, but then they probably have
>(rudimentary) minds; DNA doesn't seem to be built the right way to have
>either. Also, a cockroach can compare its perceptions to its goals and
>figure out whether things are going the way it wants them to -- can DNA?
I'm going to back off here a bit. I do not think that the kind of goals
associated with evolution (*not* goals *of* evolution) are quite the same
meaning of the word as we use for people and animals. I do think it is a
useful extension of that concept in some contexts. It may be confusing and
ambiguous, but other modes of expression are frequently very long-winded.
Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
fri...@psivax.uucp
>> Paul Torek >> Frank Adams
>
>>> "Evolution" per se has no goals;
>>>but I think it makes sense to say that the species which are evolving do
>>>have a goal: to survive. (And the individuals of the species have the more
>>>complex goal of perpetuating their genes.)
>>
>
> Are you seriously trying to tell us that most animals do not possess
> basic survival instincts?
>
I think you misunderstood him. I rather think he is denying
the stuff in the parentheses, namely he is saying that he and his cat
do not have the goal of perpetuating thier genes. Of course his cat
has the goal of surviving! But it may be doubted that it is
attempting to transmit its genes.
--
Sarima (Stanley Friesen)
UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen
ARPA: ??
Wayne Throop
> The existence of mind with conscious goals is a different question from
> whether goal-directness a scientifically respectable quality to
> attribute to biological entities.
Naturally, I agree. Goal-directedness is a good way to talk about
things that model the world, and which use these models to reach certain
preferred states of being (goals). Obviously, some biological entities
are among these things. *However*, the process of evolution itself is
*not* one of these things. It has no preferred states, and no model of
the world, (it *is* a model, it doesn't *have* a model) and thus has no
goal.
Note that the existance of commonly observed or even clearly preferred
states in a system is *not* enough to conclude that there is a
goal-directed mechanism at work. The use of a model of a relevant part
of the system to attain the preferred state is also required.
> By my account, the possession of "mind" is not a requirement of
> goal-directness; what counts is the possession of an internal program
> which is able to reference and attain potential real world states
> through self-monitoring and self-directing mechanisms, such as the
> teleomechanisms DNA employs to assure the development of an embryo,
> despite remarkable laboratory-induced disruptions that would never occur
> in nature.
I agree with this. However, it is *still* easy to mistake complicated
static construction mechanisms with goal-directed mechanisms. The DNA
example may in fact be such a confusion, since I don't know that it has
been shown that the DNA posesses a model of the embryo (It *is* this
model, again, it cannot *posess* this model).
I go rather further than Jim Balter in attributing purpose and goals to
systems. I'd say that when a system understands some aspect of the
world (in the Frank Adams sense of understanding), then that system can
be said to have goals and purpose. For example, a steam engine with a
centrifugal governer *might* accurately be said to have the "goal" of
running at a constant speed. But I agree with Jim completely when he
says (paraphrased) that in attributing goals to a system, it is crucial
to pin down what the preferred states are, and what entity has
understanding of these preferred states.
I still maintain that Darwinian evolution, as a process, has no goal.
The members (or perhaps in some cases, groups of members) of the
evolving species have the goal of survival, but the evolutionary process
does not.
--
Wayne Throop <the-known-world>!mcnc!rti-sel!dg_rtp!throopw
la...@hoptoad.uucp
>Anyone who has worked with insects would never say they had a mind.
>As far as I can tell, they are nothing more than stimulus-response
>machines; the response can be complicated, true, but nothing that
>requires a mind.
>
>Cockroaches, for instance, have no "brain" as we know it, but rather
>SMALL clumps of neurons along their back.
I think what we have here is a disagreement as to what constitutes a mind. I
think that you have demonstrated that cockroaches don't have a brain, but I
am not sure that all minds are found in brains. A cockroach has a pretty
boring mind, 'tis true, but it is better than a rock gets. I am still wondering
if it is better than what a complicated plant gets, though. (If you think of a
plant as a green rock, go see Stevie Wonder's *The Secret Lives of Plants*
someday. Yes, I know that the book was real hokey and bogus -- the movie is
beautiful. Slow motion photography of little sprouts growing tiny tendrils
and waving them in the wind until they find a post they can creep up. Plants
move as gracefully as cats -- but so slowly that we do not see them!)
--
Laura Creighton
ihnp4!hoptoad!laura utzoo!hoptoad!laura sun!hoptoad!laura
to...@lll-crg.arpa