a task for those opposed to abortion
Adrian Kent
I've followed the recent discussions in this group with interest. But I
think it's in danger of degenerating into a head-on clash of world-views.
Probably that's eventually inevitable, but maybe we can get further first.
I'm interested in whether the "pro-life" people out there can make a case
against abortion WITHOUT any religious premises. So your task is to produce an
argument framed in terms acceptable to an aetheist moral philosopher. Scriptural quotations are out, references to God are out, arguments starting
with (say) the Ten Commandments as axiomatic are out. For example, it's
fine for you to say that human beings come into existence at the moment of
conception. It's no good to proceed by saying "Killing human beings is wrong.
Therefore abortion is wrong. QED."
Of course, you may regard this as a hopeless task; in other words you may
believe that there's no reason why someone without a religious point of view
should oppose abortion. That at least ought to explain why we've reached an impasse.
regards,
ak
StanwyckDA
Just an equal challange in response: Can you make an argument against murder
(of adult humans) without resorting to a religious premise. Statements such
as "it isn't nice" or "it makes me feel bad" are not convincing. If the
argument is based on a moral statement, justify that moral statement.
--
________
( ) Don Stanwyck
@( o o )@ 303-538-5004
( || ) Cornet-374-5004
( \__/ ) [druxu|drutx]!stanwyck
(______) AT&T-IS @ Denver, CO
Adrian Kent
religious in nature. The following quote is in response to that.
In article <17...@druxu.UUCP> stan...@druxu.UUCP (StanwyckDA) writes:
>
>Just an equal challange in response: Can you make an argument against murder
>(of adult humans) without resorting to a religious premise. Statements such
>as "it isn't nice" or "it makes me feel bad" are not convincing. If the
>argument is based on a moral statement, justify that moral statement.
>
> Don Stanwyck
This seems a reasonable request. I certainly can't make an argument
against killing adult humans IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, because I don't believe
that's a tenable moral position. But I'll give you two arguments which suggest
that it's generally wrong to kill people. These aren't watertight demonstrations
(since, firstly, moral philosophy isn't mathematics and, secondly, I'm not a
moral philosopher), but sketches of some sort of moral position. (That's all
I'm asking for from anti-abortionists, in case that wasn't clear.) Here goes:
(1) I start from a position of utilitarianism, so that an action which is
intended to produce the greatest good for the greatest number is a moral action."Good" is a term which reflects my personal values, some of which will become
apparent. This is a likely source of controversy. If, for example, you maintain
that your values place the life of a member of homo sapiens above all else, you
will produce a consistent moral position against abortion. I would criticise
your values as arbitrary and speciesist, and would ask whether you really would
destroy a planet of intelligent, friendly, talented aliens rather than a single
human. But, if you steadfastly maintain your position, I certainly can't prove
that it's logically wrong. I expect, by the way, that people will be able to
persuade me that the values I profess aren't really quite what I mean, because
it's almost impossible to be completely satisfied with any moral system. For the
health of the net, perhaps you ought not to bother unless it's going to affect
the consequences of my arguments.
(2) First argument. Adult human beings tend to possess a variety of qualities
which I regard as valuable (for example, kindness, intelligence, creativity).
I'll refer to these qualities collectively as "character", emphasising that
they combine to produce a whole world-view and behaviour-pattern. Mostly,
people have characters which are on balance good. (Here and afterwards, it
should be understood that I'm using my values.) Corpses have no discernible
character, so people with good characters are better for the world than corpses,all else being equal. I therefore enjoin you not to kill people with good
character. This argument does not apply to abortion, since the character of a
foetus is little-developed. It is true that abortion removes the potential for
an adult to develop, but no more than contraception does. If the human race
were close to extinction, I might regard either as wrong, but the situation
doesn't presently arise.
(3) Second argument. A society in which each member evaluated the character of
her sisters and brothers, and felt free to kill those she regarded as bad,
would be a less pleasant society than one in which adult human life was generally protected. It is therefore moral for each of us to try to uphold
respect for adult life, and immoral to diminish such respect (again, all else
being equal). Killing people, of whatever character, tends to diminish the
general respect for adult life. Some might (and do) argue that this establishes
the immorality of abortion: that the lack of respect for human life shown by
society's tolerance of abortion has wider social consequences. This is an
empirical rather than a moral question: if I were persuaded of its truth then
I would alter my views on abortion. However, I am not presently convinced.
I believe that a clearly-established social contract is in effect,
under which it is permissible to kill foetuses in certain circumstances, and
this is understood to have no implications beyond birth. An absolutely firm
dividing line, such as birth, is necessary to avoid the individual decisions
about human worth which I argued above were deleterious. So, though I was
asked to consider only adults, the same argument suggests that killing children
is wrong.
regards,
ak
" Salome, dear, NOT in the fridge."
John Woolley
>I'm interested in whether the "pro-life" people out there can make a case
>against abortion WITHOUT any religious premises. So your task is to produce an
>argument framed in terms acceptable to an aetheist moral philosopher.
>Scriptural quotations are out, references to God are out, arguments starting
>with (say) the Ten Commandments as axiomatic are out. For example, it's
>fine for you to say that human beings come into existence at the moment of
>conception. It's no good to proceed by saying "Killing human beings is wrong.
>Therefore abortion is wrong. QED."
This is an interesting challenge, and likely to be fun to talk about, but
I think it may be a little beside the point, and I'll try to say why. We
(that is, most pro-Life people) think abortion is a type of murder, and
because all murder is wrong, then abortion in particular is wrong. Now
you've asked us to come to the same conclusion without the premise that
murder is wrong. Fair question.
Well, you could make lots of arguments one way and another about the
morality of murder, some based on religious principles and some not. But
the ultimate point is this -- can you make a convincing case against
murder in general "WITHOUT any religious premises, in terms acceptable to
an atheist moral philosopher?" (I don't think it can be done -- I'm not
sure.) And yet you are (presumably) opposed to murder. So whatever line
of reasoning you've used to get to your anti-murder position, the same
line of reasoning leads to an equally strong anti-abortion position.
Whatever answers to your challenge we come up with, the case for permitting
abortion is no weaker and no stronger than the case permitting the killing
of any other innocent person.
But I'm willing to give it a try. Perhaps your side could do the same.
Do you believe murder is immoral? (If not, I'm not sure we can even
discuss questions like this with any remote prospect of success.) And
if so, what logic did you use to get to the conclusion, since (according
to your rules) you mustn't take as given that "Killing people is wrong"?
This might be a very fruitful line of discussion.
But a word of caution -- please, everybody, let's try to be mroe careful
than we've been in the past to answer what the opponents really say, and
not to make silly things up and attribute them to our opponents. It's
much more satisfying, and infinitely more illuminating, to joust with
real enemies than with ridiculous straw men.
--
Peace and Good!,
Fr. John Woolley
"The heart has its reasons that the mind does not know." -- Blaise Pascal
w...@milano.uucp
some of his reasoning (not religiously-based) as to why one ought not to
murder adult human beings. This is something which is quite difficult to do,
and Adrian makes several mistakes. Lines beginning with > are from Adrian.
> ... I'll give you two arguments which suggest that it's generally wrong to
> kill people.
> (1) I start from a position of utilitarianism, so that an action which is
> intended to produce the greatest good for the greatest number is a moral
> action.
Unfortunately, Adrian is starting from a position of *global* utilitarianism;
that is, he feels that the principles of ut. are applicable by him to others.
This is a very weak position, the reasons for which are better suited to
net.philosophy. Let me give just one example, from real life, indicating some
of the problems: In Jamaica, there are Rastafarians who use ganja in their
religion and in their everyday lives. They believe that it increases their
abilities, intellect, etc. They tried quite hard to convice me that I was
somehow incomplete because I didn't want to smoke it. Now, if they held to the
principle above, they would believe that it was moral for them to force me to
smoke it. Adrian can use his principle only because the large majority of his
readers have very similar ideas of what is `the good.'
>
> (2) First argument. Adult human beings tend to possess a variety of qualities
> which I regard as valuable (for example, kindness, intelligence, creativity).
> I'll refer to these qualities collectively as "character" ...
> Corpses have no discernible character, so people with good characters are
> better for the world than corpses, all else being equal. I therefore enjoin
> you not to kill people with good character. This argument does not apply to
> abortion, since the character of a foetus is little-developed.
Leaving aside the argument about the goodness of humans, I must point out that
here, as elsewhere, you equate fetus with human. This is clearly a fallacy,
as debate here and elsewhere (including before the Supreme Court) has
indicated that there is no way to `prove' when these two become the same.
> Second argument. A society in which each member evaluated the character of
> her sisters and brothers, and felt free to kill those she regarded as bad,
> would be a less pleasant society than one in which adult human life was
> generally protected.
I would like to point out that this, too, is an unsupported claim.
> Killing people, of whatever character, tends to diminish the general respect
> for adult life.
Again, no support for this is given. As a counter-example, consider the
Vietnam conflict. A great deal of opposition to the war could be traced to the
daily body counts, augmented by grisly pictures every night on our TV screens.
For years after (maybe even today) Americans were sensitive to when and where
our troops were used. Carter was quite proud of the fact that no American
soldier was killed during his administration.
I'm sorry Adrian, but I don't see that you have advanced any argument against
killing adult humans. If you'd like to try, I think we ought to move this to
net.phil.
--Alan Wexelblat
--
W...@MCC.ARPA
...ut-sally!im4u!milano!wex
Kathy Salazar
Non-Religious Discussion...
Initially, when I am trying to analyze an ethical dilemma, I try to reverse
the situation to see if it still holds true.
In reversing the abortion issue...
you would have abortion forced on people!
This obviously is silly and unreasonable since it would be forcing an operation
(like removing a kidney) on people who don't want it. They have something
like this in the movie "The Meaning of Life", it is a comedy!!!
If abortion is illegal...
what do you do with someone who is set on having one...arrest them?
My husband is a deputy in a county jail, they put prisoners who are
set on 'hurting' themselves in solitary confinement. Not a nice place,
You have no light, no clothes, two mattresses and a hole in the floor.
Would you have wanted to have a mother live like this until the baby was
born...regardless of whether it were put up for adoption?
Fact 1;
There will be abortions, legal or not, there always have been. There is no
possible way to enforce the illegality of abortion. Just make them safer.
Fact 2;
It is a moral issue and only individuals make that decision. You can't
force morality on people who don't want it.
Fact 3;
The world is not the same place as 2000 years ago, or even 100 years ago.
The population is increasing too fast, look at China, learn a lesson.
Fact 4;
Knowledge is needed to make your own decision, for or against abortion.
FINAL WORDS:
The morality of a society might best be defined by the way the poor
are treated. Let's give more choices to people, encourage everyone to think
for themselves and do the 'right' thing.
Kathy Salazar
Oleg Kiselev
>Let me give just one example, from real life, indicating some
>of the problems: In Jamaica, there are Rastafarians who use ganja in their
>religion and in their everyday lives. They believe that it increases their
>abilities, intellect, etc. They tried quite hard to convice me that I was
>somehow incomplete because I didn't want to smoke it. Now, if they held to the
>principle above, they would believe that it was moral for them to force me to
>smoke it. Adrian can use his principle only because the large majority of his
>readers have very similar ideas of what is `the good.'
*IF* they forced you! PRO-LIFE movement is in favor of FORCIN women NOT to have
abortins. Pro-choice argument is that women should have a choice. You argument
is invalid. Only if PRO-CHOICE side were to FORCE MANDATORY abortions on ALL
women, would your example be of any merit.
--
Disclamer: I don't work here anymore - so they are not responsible for me.
+-------------------------------+ Don't bother, I'll find the door!
| STAY ALERT! TRUST NO ONE! | Oleg Kiselev.
| KEEP YOUR LASER HANDY! |...!{trwrb|scgvaxd}!felix!birtch!oleg
--------------------------------+...!{ihnp4|randvax}!ucla-cs!uclapic!oac6!oleg
Adrian Kent
>some of his reasoning (not religiously-based) as to why one ought not to
>murder adult human beings. This is something which is quite difficult to do,
>and Adrian makes several mistakes. Lines beginning with > are from Adrian.
I disagree with the ensuing analysis. Anyone who's interested can find
the reasons in net.philosophy.
ak
John Woolley
>Initially, when I am trying to analyze an ethical dilemma, I try to reverse
>the situation to see if it still holds true.
>
>In reversing the abortion issue...
>you would have abortion forced on people!
>This obviously is silly and unreasonable since it would be forcing an operation
>(like removing a kidney) on people who don't want it.
I don't think I understand your point. It would seem that, if anything,
you're arguing against abortion here. By the same logic, we could invest-
igate whether murder (of adults) should be permitted -- we reverse the
question and ask whether people should be forced to commit murders. Clearly
not. But I don't think we've proven anything one way or the other.
>If abortion is illegal...
>what do you do with someone who is set on having one...arrest them?
>My husband is a deputy in a county jail, they put prisoners who are
>set on 'hurting' themselves in solitary confinement. Not a nice place,
>You have no light, no clothes, two mattresses and a hole in the floor.
>Would you have wanted to have a mother live like this until the baby was
>born...regardless of whether it were put up for adoption?
I don't think *anyone*, *ever*, suggested this.
I'd prefer penalties against abortionists, who rack up substantial
incomes from their killing.
As an aside, notice that even pro-choice people refer to the pregnant
women as "mothers". If that's not a person in there, just what is it
that they're "mothers" of?
>Fact 1;
>There will be abortions, legal or not, there always have been. There is no
>possible way to enforce the illegality of abortion. Just make them safer.
The same applies to murder of anyone else -- "There will be murders,
legal or not; there always have been." A law does not prevent the
evil entirely; nobody ever thought it did. But a law can certainly
discourage and reduce the incidence of evil, as can be plainly seen
from the *huge* increase in the number of abortions done each year
in the U. S. since 1972.
>Fact 2;
>It is a moral issue and only individuals make that decision. You can't
>force morality on people who don't want it.
And again, so is murder a moral issue. If some Nazi actually thinks it's
okay to go around shooting Jews, I'm not going to argue that he should
be allowed to because, after all, you can't force morality on people
who don't want it. I don't care whether the Nazi *wants* to be subject
to my morality -- I'm going to do the best I can to impose it on him and
thereby protect his victims.
>Fact 3;
>The world is not the same place as 2000 years ago, or even 100 years ago.
>The population is increasing too fast, look at China, learn a lesson.
Many countries are now reproducing at far below "replacement" rates, the
U. S. at just slightly above. And you beg the question. Suppose you're
entirely right, suppose there are "too many" people (whatever we mean
by that) -- just how is it right to alleviate the problem by killing
some of them? ("Comrade, sometimes the individual must be sacrificed
for the good of the whole.")
>Fact 4;
>Knowledge is needed to make your own decision, for or against abortion.
No disagreement here at all between us.
>FINAL WORDS:
>The morality of a society might best be defined by the way the poor
>are treated. Let's give more choices to people, encourage everyone to think
>for themselves and do the 'right' thing.
And these foetuses, these children, who are being killed by abortions --
who are they, the rich? If they don't qualify as poor in the sense of
disenfranchised, ignored, voiceless, powerless, just who does?
"Let's give more choices to people". Okay. Let the kids get old enough
to decide, and then let them decide for themselves whether they want to
be killed. That way we wouldn't be *imposing* our choices on them. Now
*there's* a pro-Choice position I could endorse.
John Woolley
forbid the killing of adults but allow the killing of foetuses. But I
don't think his arguments against murder hold water.
In article <11...@oddjob.UUCP> ap...@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) writes:
> I certainly can't make an argument
>against killing adult humans IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, because I don't believe
>that's a tenable moral position. But I'll give you two arguments which suggest
>that it's generally wrong to kill people.
(Maybe we should limit the question to whether it is allowable ever to
kill an adult who is not trying to harm anyone, and is innocent of any
crime. This eliminates a couple of potential side-lines, but leaves
the analogy to abortion intact -- the child is *at worst* unintentionally
harming someone and is certainly guilty of nothing.)
>(1) I start from a position of utilitarianism, so that an action which is
>intended to produce the greatest good for the greatest number is a moral action."Good" is a term which reflects my personal values, some of which will become
>apparent. This is a likely source of controversy. If, for example, you maintain
>that your values place the life of a member of homo sapiens above all else, you
>will produce a consistent moral position against abortion. I would criticise
>your values as arbitrary and speciesist, and would ask whether you really would
>destroy a planet of intelligent, friendly, talented aliens rather than a single
>human. But, if you steadfastly maintain your position, I certainly can't prove
>that it's logically wrong.
First, I don't think I've ever heard anyone say that his value system
placed the lives of humans "above all else". I object on moral grounds
to killing humans, but I would have exactly the same objection to killing
any *person*, regardless of species. Angels being immortal and
extraterrestrials hypothetical, we're left with _homo_sapiens_.
Next, a general problem with utilitarianism. Dostoievski posed the
problem: Suppose there is a city, somewhere, whose inhabitants are happy
and prosperous and healthy. They have a high culture, universal peace,
and so on. The catch is this -- the whole thing depends on the existence
of a single child kept in a dungeon somewhere, starved, ignorant, neglected,
sick, tortured. And the whole city with its millions of inhabitants will
lose its magical peace and prosperity and happiness should this child ever
be released. Is it worth it? Can anything worth while be built on
deliberate cruelty and injustice? (Dostoievski and I say No.)
But utilitarianism -- "the greatest good of the greatest number" --
clearly would say Yes. So are you really a utilitarian? If so, what do
you say about the child in the dungeon? (Or the ones under the curette?)
>(2) First argument. Adult human beings tend to possess a variety of qualities
>which I regard as valuable (for example, kindness, intelligence, creativity).
>I'll refer to these qualities collectively as "character", emphasising that
>they combine to produce a whole world-view and behaviour-pattern. Mostly,
>people have characters which are on balance good. (Here and afterwards, it
>should be understood that I'm using my values.) Corpses have no discernible
>character, so people with good characters are better for the world than corpses,all else being equal. I therefore enjoin you not to kill people with good
>character. This argument does not apply to abortion, since the character of a
>foetus is little-developed.
The problem with this whole line is that it explains why *you* don't like
to kill adults, but it doesn't give you any ground on which to criticize
someone who *does* like to. It bases everything on your personal likes.
I happen to like and value the character of foetuses -- innocence, vast
but yet-untapped potential, smallness, complexity, rapid development. So
what?
>(3) Second argument. A society in which each member evaluated the character of
>her sisters and brothers, and felt free to kill those she regarded as bad,
>would be a less pleasant society than one in which adult human life was generally protected. It is therefore moral for each of us to try to uphold
>respect for adult life, and immoral to diminish such respect (again, all else
>being equal). Killing people, of whatever character, tends to diminish the
>general respect for adult life.
Notice how you keep having to (arbitrarily) specify "adult" life. What's
happened here is that you yourself have already "evaluated the character"
of certain of your brothers and sisters (the very young), and "felt free
to kill those" you regard as having "character" not up to *your* criteria.
And I agree, it makes for an unpleasant society. Killing people, of
whatever age, tends to diminish the respect for human life.
> Some might (and do) argue that this establishes
>the immorality of abortion: that the lack of respect for human life shown by
>society's tolerance of abortion has wider social consequences. This is an
>empirical rather than a moral question: if I were persuaded of its truth then
>I would alter my views on abortion. However, I am not presently convinced.
>I believe that a clearly-established social contract is in effect,
>under which it is permissible to kill foetuses in certain circumstances, and
>this is understood to have no implications beyond birth. An absolutely firm
>dividing line, such as birth, is necessary to avoid the individual decisions
>about human worth which I argued above were deleterious. So, though I was
>asked to consider only adults, the same argument suggests that killing children
>is wrong.
Remember back in the late sixties, all the pro-Life people were warning
that widespread abortion was bound to lead to infanticide and the killing
of senile adults, and so on? And all the liberals said pooh-pooh? Well,
we sure see it happening, now, don't we? Medical journals discuss "options
of non-treatment", not just for comatose, but for the "pleasantly senile".
Deformed babies are starved to death in hospitals, while courts uphold
the parents' "rights" to starve their babies if they want.
Your "absolutely firm dividing line" has been crossed an awful lot the
last few years, and the reason is that it's not really that firm. A
nine-month foetus, ready to be born, is obviously and clearly alive and
human, just as much as she is a month later -- the dividing line of
birth is, if anything, just a matter of arbitrary convenience. And,
like all such lines, when it becomes more convenient to violate it than
to observe it, it gets violated.
>" Salome, dear, NOT in the fridge."
My nomination for the funniest signature line on the whole net.
w...@milano.uucp
to my arguments against Adrian. He writes:
> *IF* they forced you! PRO-LIFE movement is in favor of FORCIN women NOT to
> have abortins. Pro-choice argument is that women should have a choice. You
> argument is invalid. Only if PRO-CHOICE side were to FORCE MANDATORY
> abortions on ALL women, would your example be of any merit.
Relax, Oleg. You are striking at shadows.
My example was meant to show Adrian that he ought not to use global
utilitarianism as a starting point for his argument(s) against killing adult
humans. That argument has moved to net.philosophy, and you are welcome to
join us there.
I am quite familiar with both sides of the abortion issue. I prefer not to
publicize my position here and now. I have yet to make a statement (pro or
con) about abortion. It strikes me as interesting, though, that you think
forcing someone NOT to do something is similar to forcing someone to DO
something.
--Alan Wexelblat
--
ARPA: W...@MCC.ARPA
UUCP: ...ut-sally!im4u!milano!wex
c...@ucla-cs.uucp
>In article <3...@cisden.UUCP> sal...@cisden.UUCP (Kathy Salazar) writes:
>>In reversing the abortion issue...
>>you would have abortion forced on people!
>>This obviously is silly and unreasonable since it would be forcing an operation
>>(like removing a kidney) on people who don't want it.
>
>I don't think I understand your point.
I am not surprized... Logical experiment is beyond you. Sarcasm is foreign to
you. I wonder about you, Fr.....
>>If abortion is illegal...
>
>I don't think *anyone*, *ever*, suggested this.
>I'd prefer penalties against abortionists, who rack up substantial
>incomes from their killing.
OK. What if the abortions are "free"? There is a new non-hormonal medication
currently in research that stirred up a lot of controversy : it is used to
regulate menstruation in women -- even if they happen to be pregnant. An induced
abortion of sorts happens. Woman might not even KNOW if she is or is not
pregnant. The medication has no known side effects. It's effects are painles and
quick. And it needs to be taken once a month around the time of the period.
So, Fr. Woolley, the incomes the manufacturers of this drug will rack up will
derive from REGULATION of the menstrual periods, NOT abortions wich will be a
side effect. Is THAT type of abortion OK with you, my good Fr.?
>But a law can certainly
>discourage and reduce the incidence of evil, as can be plainly seen
>from the *huge* increase in the number of abortions done each year
>in the U. S. since 1972.
You have statistics on the number of ILLEGAL abortions in US BEFORE 1972
and the fatality rate of those abortions? Compare the number of fatalities to
the those of the LEGAL abortions!
>>Fact 2;
>>It is a moral issue and only individuals make that decision. You can't
>>force morality on people who don't want it.
The good Fr. responce was again based on equating abortion to murder and to Nazi
attitude toward Jews. Why, Fr. Woolley? Why do you insist on clouding the issue
with evoking an emotional responce to an unrelated subject? Is it because you
can't think of any REAL argument?
>>Fact 4;
>>Knowledge is needed to make your own decision, for or against abortion.
>
>No disagreement here at all between us.
>
>>FINAL WORDS:
>>The morality of a society might best be defined by the way the poor
>>are treated. Let's give more choices to people, encourage everyone to think
>>for themselves and do the 'right' thing.
>
>And these foetuses, these children, who are being killed by abortions --
>who are they, the rich? If they don't qualify as poor in the sense of
>disenfranchised, ignored, voiceless, powerless, just who does?
>
>"Let's give more choices to people". Okay. Let the kids get old enough
>to decide, and then let them decide for themselves whether they want to
>be killed. That way we wouldn't be *imposing* our choices on them. Now
>*there's* a pro-Choice position I could endorse.
Mean while let them starve, pull their parents into poverty, grow up in the
streets and join the gangs. That way they will choose the option to be killed
by themselves ( and take a few of their friend along!). Is that what you are
saying, Fr.?
Fr., if I find out that any of my friends is pregnant I'll try to stop them
from having an abortion - IF YOU, Fr. Woolley, promise to SUPPORT FINANCIALLY
and MORALLY that friend of mine for the period of the pregnancy and for the NEXT
18 years. NO???? Well, I gues it's abortions for the lot of them.....
================================================================================
From the steam tunnels of UCLA - Oleg Kiselev (....!ucla-cs!oac6.oleg)
Dave Suess
>okay to go around shooting Jews, I'm not going to argue that he should
>be allowed to because, after all, you can't force morality on people
>who don't want it. I don't care whether the Nazi *wants* to be subject
>to my morality -- I'm going to do the best I can to impose it on him and
>thereby protect his victims.
Every year, I ask that the Nazis be left out of arguments (since it lends
an air of emotionalism based on what is often a side issue). Here, even
though the subject is murder (in a general sense), there is an analogy where
1) pro-choice-for-abortion equates with "Nazi", and 2) foetus equates with
"Jew". Murder in general is quite different than a racist variant, and
using Nazis and Jews would seem, as usual, inappropriate. Nobody mentioned
aborting just Jewish foetuses, after all.
There is a place for Nazis-Jews references here, but the context should be
ideologies of Nazis and Jews as they pertain to abortion. And recall that
the Nazis were very much anti-abortion (for German-Aryans), expressing the
opinion that, for the good of the state, women should be making more and
more German-Aryans (more soldiers, and more soldier-mothers, presumably).
[See how easy it is? My comments equate anti-abortion with "Nazi" now,
when really I should have left it at the "good of society" argument, without
painting it with the emotion of "Nazis!" Hence, my above paragraph is
specious, and should never be cited as an argument on these issues.]
Dave Suess
Adrian Kent
There's been a lot of interesting followup to my original question (should
an atheist moral philosopher oppose abortion?) and subsequent arguments (which
suggested that a reasonable, consistent moral position exists that distinguishesbetween the killing of adults and of foetuses). Some of it's come by private mail. At the moment, I'm having (machine) trouble replying to that, so I'll try
to respond here. Quotes are from John Woolley's article: I apologise for any
misquotation or misattribution of other people's points.
(> John Woolley >> Adrian Kent)
In article <3...@cisden.UUCP> jo...@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes:
>>(1) I start from a position of utilitarianism, so that an action which is
>>intended to produce the greatest good for the greatest number is a moral action."Good" is a term which reflects my personal values, some of which will become
>>apparent. This is a likely source of controversy. If, for example, you maintain
>>that your values place the life of a member of homo sapiens above all else, you
>>will produce a consistent moral position against abortion. I would criticise
>>your values as arbitrary and speciesist, and would ask whether you really would
>>destroy a planet of intelligent, friendly, talented aliens rather than a single
>>human. But, if you steadfastly maintain your position, I certainly can't prove
>>that it's logically wrong.
>
>First, I don't think I've ever heard anyone say that his value system
>placed the lives of humans "above all else". I object on moral grounds
>to killing humans, but I would have exactly the same objection to killing
>any *person*, regardless of species. Angels being immortal and
>extraterrestrials hypothetical, we're left with _homo_sapiens_.
The point I'm tryng to make is that a creature ought to be treated
according to its attributes, not its species. Extraterrestrials may be
hypothetical, but they're very useful in analysing someone's moral position.
I'd like to know how you recognise a "person". What qualities does a race
have to possess in order to qualify? And is it possible for only some members
of a race to qualify, or do you have to judge the question species by species?
I think these are crucial questions of principle, and lie at the root of
our differing conclusions.
>Next, a general problem with utilitarianism. Dostoievski posed the
>problem: Suppose there is a city, somewhere, whose inhabitants are happy
>and prosperous and healthy. They have a high culture, universal peace,
>and so on. The catch is this -- the whole thing depends on the existence
>of a single child kept in a dungeon somewhere, starved, ignorant, neglected,
>sick, tortured. And the whole city with its millions of inhabitants will
>lose its magical peace and prosperity and happiness should this child ever
>be released. Is it worth it? [ .... ] (Dostoievski and I say No.)
>But utilitarianism -- "the greatest good of the greatest number" --
>clearly would say Yes. So are you really a utilitarian? If so, what do
>you say about the child in the dungeon? (Or the ones under the curette?)
Firstly, I don't agree with the unequivocal claim that utilitarianism
would say Yes. I need to know more about the hypothesis. If, when the child
is released, at least one other child within the city will incur equivalent
suffering AND lots of good things will be lost, then you're right about the
utilitarian conclusion. I agree with that conclusion: it seems like common
sense. On the other hand, if the only consequence of releasing the child is
that lots of good things will be lost, then a utilitarian's moral opinion
will depend on her values. So I'll assume the latter hypothesis, which probably
interests you more. I think that, if enough good things are lost, there comes
a point at which I would not release the child. Suppose, for instance, the
alternative is that everyone in the city loses all interest in everything
except basic human needs: that empathy, art, curiosity all vanish. That seems
worse to me than the child's suffering. Take another example (from "Country of
the Kind", author forgotten). Suppose that the human disposition to violence
can completely be removed, but that in the process all artistic ability and
appreciation is lost. Is the suffering saved worth the cost?
So, am I really a utilitarian? As I've said elsewhere, I think
utilitarianism has flaws, but it's a good rule of thumb. What do I say about
the child in the dungeon? That, if I knew that after making my moral choice
I would be randomly assigned a role in society (P(AK=child)=0.000001,
P(AK=city-dweller)=0.999999), I would make the same choice.
I see no analogy with the children/foetuses under the curette, either
in terms of suffering or in terms of personal loss; you can't take away freedom
from someone who doesn't have it.
>
>>(2) First argument. Adult human beings tend to possess a variety of qualities
>>which I regard as valuable (for example, kindness, intelligence, creativity).
>>I'll refer to these qualities collectively as "character", emphasising that
>>they combine to produce a whole world-view and behaviour-pattern. Mostly,
>>people have characters which are on balance good. (Here and afterwards, it
>>should be understood that I'm using my values.) Corpses have no discernible
>>character, so people with good characters are better for the world than
>>corpses. This argument does not apply to abortion, since the character of a
>>foetus is little-developed.
>
>The problem with this whole line is that it explains why *you* don't like
>to kill adults, but it doesn't give you any ground on which to criticize
>someone who *does* like to. It bases everything on your personal likes.
It's certainly true that moral philosophy is value-dependent. Whether
that's a problem is debatable: I think it's simply a recognition of the fact
that there are no absolute moral truths. It's also true that I have no grounds
(other than what are essentially aesthetic ones) for criticizing someone who
likes killing adults, as long as she doesn't actually do it. And ultimately,
if she sincerely believes that killing and being killed are both good things,
I may have to concede that, under her consistent moral system, she is justified
in killing. That doesn't stop me from preventing her from doing so, of course.
So yes, though one can argue over the reasonableness of a set of values,
one can not necessarily prove a set of values to be wrong. But what normally
happens is that people's stated values prove to be incoherent, or inconsistently
applied. That's why moral debates can be useful.
>
>I happen to like and value the character of foetuses -- innocence, vast
>but yet-untapped potential, smallness, complexity, rapid development. So
>what?
Well, if those are seriously meant to be the primary reasons why you value
foetuses (which I doubt), then it seems to follow that you ought to value
a sperm and unfertilised egg (together) at least as much. So the general
pattern is: X states values, Y draws conclusions, X accepts conclusions or
refines values, .... I don't know whether you consider that a good pastime,
but at least it keeps moral philosophers off the street.
[There follows a section in which I give a second argument against killing,
which John Woolley comments on. I've omitted it to save space; see his article.]
>
>Remember back in the late sixties, all the pro-Life people were warning
>that widespread abortion was bound to lead to infanticide and the killing
>of senile adults, and so on? And all the liberals said pooh-pooh? Well,
>we sure see it happening, now, don't we? Medical journals discuss "options
>of non-treatment", not just for comatose, but for the "pleasantly senile".
>Deformed babies are starved to death in hospitals, while courts uphold
>the parents' "rights" to starve their babies if they want.
>
>Your "absolutely firm dividing line" has been crossed an awful lot the
>last few years, and the reason is that it's not really that firm. A
>nine-month foetus, ready to be born, is obviously and clearly alive and
>human, just as much as she is a month later -- the dividing line of
>birth is, if anything, just a matter of arbitrary convenience. And,
>like all such lines, when it becomes more convenient to violate it than
>to observe it, it gets violated.
Similar points were made to me in private mail by Charli Phillips, for
which I'm grateful. I agree that this part of my previous argument doesn't
stand up. I'll come back to this question in a later posting, if and when
I think I have anything sensible to say about it.
>>" Salome, dear, NOT in the fridge."
>My nomination for the funniest signature line on the whole net.
> Fr. John Woolley
Credit to Marion Hill, who supplied this in a 1957 New Statesman competition
for gruesome one-liners.
regards,
ak
Pete Zakel
> (of adult humans) without resorting to a religious premise. Statements such
> as "it isn't nice" or "it makes me feel bad" are not convincing. If the
> argument is based on a moral statement, justify that moral statement.
> --
Certainly, if you murder adult humans, you will be seen as a murderer by
other adult humans, and subject to being "removed" yourself. (Definition
of "removed": Killed, jailed, or otherwise having your freedom to kill
other human beings taken away).
-Pete Zakel (..!{hplabs,amd,pyramid,ihnp4}!pesnta!valid!pete)
Adrian Kent
discussion pure and simple. But later postings have (for example) argued
that there should be a law against murder, on the grounds that society is
better off with such a law than without. I just want to point out that this
is an interesting and relevant but separate question. One can argue that there
should be a law against X without believing X to be wrong, and conversely.
(In particular, I think it's much harder to argue that killing is wrong than
to argue that it should be outlawed.)
regards,
ak
John Woolley
>Certainly, if you murder adult humans, you will be seen as a murderer by
>other adult humans, and subject to being "removed" yourself. (Definition
>of "removed": Killed, jailed, or otherwise having your freedom to kill
>other human beings taken away).
All this argument shows is that, in general, it's imprudent and unwise
to murder adults. But if you were *certain* that nobody would ever find
out about some proposed murder, or that some legal loophole would get you
off scot free, your argument wouldn't apply. And yet the murder would
still be wrong.
It's not the possibility of punishment that makes an action wrong.
--
Peace and Good!,
Fr. John Woolley
"Compared to what I have seen, all that I have written is straw." -- St. Thomas
John Woolley
mother, all my friends, everyone who ever knew me, are *all* amazed.
In article <83...@ucla-cs.ARPA> c...@ucla-cs.UUCP (Oleg Kiselev) writes:
>In article <3...@cisden.UUCP> jo...@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes:
>>In article <3...@cisden.UUCP> sal...@cisden.UUCP (Kathy Salazar) writes:
>>>In reversing the abortion issue...
>>>you would have abortion forced on people!
>>>This obviously is silly and unreasonable since it would be forcing an operation
>>>(like removing a kidney) on people who don't want it.
>>
>>I don't think I understand your point.
>
>I am not surprized... Logical experiment is beyond you. Sarcasm is foreign to
>you. I wonder about you, Fr.....
Wow, this is weird. I didn't understand Kathy's point. (She had made an
argument -- Oleg leaves it all out of his posting -- which seems to be of
the form "It is wrong to force people to do X. Therefore it is wrong to
forbid people to do X." This is clearly absurd, as I pointed out. Oleg
prudently omitted that, too. [Sarcasm.]) Now I know Kathy a little, and
I know she's not a bit dumb, so I assumed I'd misunderstood something, or
she'd left something out. I asked for clarification, and Oleg Kiselev
accuses me of stupidity and *!*lack of sarcasm*!*.
>>>If abortion is illegal...
>>
>>I don't think *anyone*, *ever*, suggested this.
The above three lines are taken verbatim from Oleg's posting. Unless you
remember my original, you'd think that I said nobody wanted abortion to be
illegal, which is absurd. In fact, he's left out a bunch of stuff, and
the juxtaposition of these two lines gives a grossly misleading impression.
Careful about included quotes, folks, please. We can't quote everything,
but try to be honest. (Or is honesty in debate another of those traditional
values I so disingenuously propound? [Sarcasm.])
>So, Fr. Woolley, the incomes the manufacturers of this drug will rack up will
>derive from REGULATION of the menstrual periods, NOT abortions wich will be a
>side effect. Is THAT type of abortion OK with you, my good Fr.?
Of course not, and you know not. If the intention is to abort, and the
effect is to abort, it's a little disingenuous (read "dishonest") to pretend
you're just "regulating". Killing is killing, even if it's painless and
inexpensive.
Responding to my paralleling an argument for abortion with a hypothetical
Nazi argument for the licity of killing Jews, Oleg writes:
>The good Fr. responce was again based on equating abortion to murder and to Nazi
>attitude toward Jews. Why, Fr. Woolley? Why do you insist on clouding the issue
>with evoking an emotional responce to an unrelated subject? Is it because you
>can't think of any REAL argument?
(Patiently) No, Oleg. I was, in fact, engaging in "logical experimentation".
Didn't you recognize it? [Sarcasm.] Can't you follow a "REAL argument"?
[Sarcasm.] I argued thus:
1. Argument A based on logical structure X yields conclusion M.
2. I construct Argument B also based on logical structure X which
yields conclusion N.
3. We have reason (from other considerations) to believe that N is
false.
4. We therefore conclude (and this is a good conclusion) that
logical structure X is flawed. (We *do not* conclude that M
is false -- showing the invalidity of an argument for M is not
to show that M is false. Kinda tricky, huh, Oleg? [Sarcasm.])
X here is the structure of Kathy's argument (step 1) concluding that abortion
should not be illegal (conclusion M). Step 2 is my exactly parallel argument
concluding that killing Jews should not be illegal (conclusion N). We all
agree that N is false (step 3) -- that's why it's a handy test case. (No
emotion needed.) I therefore conclude *not* that abortion should be illegal,
but that the argument X is incorrect, and so Kathy hasn't shown that abortion
should be legal.
That's logic, Oleg. Kind of unfamiliar? [Sarcasm.]
--
Peace and Good!,
Fr. John Woolley
John Woolley
In article <83...@ucla-cs.ARPA> c...@ucla-cs.UUCP (Oleg Kiselev) writes:
>Fr., if I find out that any of my friends is pregnant I'll try to stop them
>from having an abortion - IF YOU, Fr. Woolley, promise to SUPPORT FINANCIALLY
>and MORALLY that friend of mine for the period of the pregnancy and for the NEXT
>18 years. NO???? Well, I gues it's abortions for the lot of them.....
Don't assume a NO answer, bucko. In fact, yes. Anyone who needs financial
or moral support in order to avoid an abortion, even if the support involved
is likely to have to go on for years, is welcome to stay with me. (Guests
of course are expected to act civilized, help with housework, etc. And long-
term guests should be willing to do what they can to help with bills and
things. But if they can't, that's okay.) If staying in my house doesn't
suit you, I've got all sorts of other resources available -- other friends,
family, and so on, who are all eager to help (or will be when their arms
are twisted :-) ).
My address is 6672 S. Pearl St., Littleton, Colo. 80121 (suburb of Denver),
or St. Mary's Church, 2290 S. Clayton St., Denver, Colo. 80210. You can
reach me at home at 303-797-3237, or often during the day at this office,
303-798-1802.
That's a promise, not just to Oleg's friends, but to anybody. And welcome
to the ranks of the pro-Lifers, Oleg.
--
Peace and Good!,
Fr. John Woolley
John Woolley
in recent postings.
1. I did not say (and certainly did not mean to imply) that
pro-choice people have the same moral qualities as Nazis.
2. I did not refer to Nazis as some sort of emotional trick,
or as part of an _argumentum_ad_hominem_.
The main reason for referring to Nazis in a rational discussion of abortion
is this, that they believed that killing innocent people in some instances
was morally okay, but that all civilized people (and everyone in this
discussion) agree that they were murderers, i.e. that their morality was
*wrong*. (I'll cheerfully use some other example if you suggest a similar
one.) This example is potentially illuminating for two reasons:
1. It might possibly give pro-choice folks some insight into
us their opposition to realize that we *really believe* that
what they advocate and practice is morally indistinguishable
from what the Nazis advocated and practiced. (The people
involved are certainly distinguishable -- don't say I
called you a Nazi!) We're not just out to interfere with
other people, or foist religion on the unwilling, or any
such thing. We want to stop people killing other people.
Whether you agree or not is one thing, but you'll understand
us a lot better if you know and can feel a little of why
we're opposed to you.
2. Many (not all) of the arguments that are used in favour of
abortion have logical flaws in them. (This is of course true
of many arguments on our side, too.) Often these logical
flaws can be exposed by showing that the same line of logic
can be used to conclude that the Nazis' killing of Jews was
morally licit. If this can be done (and it often can) it
shows *not* that abortion is always wrong, but that the
particular pro-abortion argument being paralleled was
illogical. (This kind of proof is called _reductio_ad_
absurdum_.) And the Nazis are a particularly handy group to
use for this purpose not because of any emotions involved,
but simply because the immorality of their doctrine is one of
the few things we can all agree on without much discussion.
So in article <2...@aero.ARPA> ze...@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) has apparently
misunderstood what I was getting at. He writes, at first quoting me:
>>And again, so is murder a moral issue. If some Nazi actually thinks it's
>>okay to go around shooting Jews, I'm not going to argue that he should
>>be allowed to because, after all, you can't force morality on people
>>who don't want it. I don't care whether the Nazi *wants* to be subject
>>to my morality -- I'm going to do the best I can to impose it on him and
>>thereby protect his victims.
>
>Every year, I ask that the Nazis be left out of arguments (since it lends
>an air of emotionalism based on what is often a side issue). Here, even
>though the subject is murder (in a general sense), there is an analogy where
>1) pro-choice-for-abortion equates with "Nazi", and 2) foetus equates with
>"Jew". Murder in general is quite different than a racist variant, and
>using Nazis and Jews would seem, as usual, inappropriate. Nobody mentioned
>aborting just Jewish foetuses, after all.
What I wrote wasn't meant to be emotional. It's a _reductio_ad_absurdum_
using precisely the same logic as the argument it refutes, but reaching a
conclusion we all agree is false.
>There is a place for Nazis-Jews references here, but the context should be
>ideologies of Nazis and Jews as they pertain to abortion. And recall that
>the Nazis were very much anti-abortion (for German-Aryans), expressing the
>opinion that, for the good of the state, women should be making more and
>more German-Aryans (more soldiers, and more soldier-mothers, presumably).
>
>[See how easy it is? My comments equate anti-abortion with "Nazi" now,
>when really I should have left it at the "good of society" argument, without
>painting it with the emotion of "Nazis!" Hence, my above paragraph is
>specious, and should never be cited as an argument on these issues.]
Yes, I agree. Your argument is an _argumentum_ad_hominem_, saying (falsely,
by the way) that the Nazis were anti-abortion, and implying a connection
with today's anti-abortion forces. As you point out, this is illogical,
specious even. But it's not what I did.
--
Peace and Good!,
Fr. John Woolley
cs11...@ucla-cs.uucp
resources us, mere mortals don't! (18 years of support and no religious
nonsence?! You BETTER be serious!)
In article <4...@cisden.UUCP> jo...@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes:
>
>I'm deadly serious about this, so pay attention, Oleg.
>
>[Fr. gives a promise of long-term support and financial assistance]
>[and his address]
Well, Fr. I am not the one to back down on my word and I have saved your address
and phone #. It IS long-distance, but I am sure you have some friends in LA as
well.
>That's a promise, not just to Oleg's friends, but to anybody. And welcome
>to the ranks of the pro-Lifers, Oleg.
Fr., you are being presumptious! I will suggest to any friend of mine who is
considering having an abortion that she give you a call first and consider
having you help her iff she decides NOT to have an abortion. THIS, however,
in no way points to ME approving that OR joining the ranks of PRO-LIFERS....
May be you just CAN'T UNDERSTAND, Fr.! I'll try (again!!!) explaining it:
MY position is irrelevant as far as any INDIVIDUAL woman is concerned.
I DON'T insist that ABORTION is the best contraceptive. ON THE CONTRARY,
I view ABORTION as a VERY SERIOUS ACT OF INTERVENTION into a woman's
body which MAY (and DOES all TOO OFTEN) result in DAMAGE and LASTING
PHYSICAL HARM to the woman.
I DON'T consider it my right to dictate MY views to any one, much less
condemn them for making a decision I might find unwise. There for I
call myself a PRO-CHOICER : I support each and every woman's right to
CHOOSE what she is going to do with her body and her life.
As for your offer vs. my position : NOTHING is changed! I am glad that
a woman who would like to give birth to a child and can't afford to
(for many reasons!) has some one to turn to for support and assistance.
I STILL would advise a woman in such situation to consider all the long
term implications of her decision -- and make her CHOICE.
CHOICE, Fr.!!! CHOICE!!! NOT an inforcement of some one's moral code on others
but a FREEDOM to MAKE OWN DECISIONS!
***Try to understand, Fr.!!!*** VERY FEW WOMEN IN THEIR RIGHT MINDS WOULD WANT
TO UNDERGO AN ABORTION. VERY FEW WOMEN IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD WANT TO GET
PREGNANT *BY ACCIDENT*, WHEN THEY ***CAN'T*** AFFORD (for whatever reason!) TO
GET PREGNANT!!! VERY FEW WOMEN IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD ADVOCATE ABORTION AS
A SOLUTION TO EVERY PREGNANCY!
So don't hole up in your convenient and comfortable dogma, Fr.! Face it!
I am in favor of CHOICE, you are against it. Forget this nonsence with PRO-LIFE
lable - there is no such thing! There is PRO-CHOICE and ANTI-CHOICE.
And leave moral decisions to the mothers who are the ones to carry the burden...
Dave Suess
>
> 1. Argument A based on logical structure X yields conclusion M.
> 2. I construct Argument B also based on logical structure X which
> yields conclusion N.
> 3. We have reason (from other considerations) to believe that N is
> false.
> 4. We therefore conclude (and this is a good conclusion) that
> logical structure X is flawed. (We *do not* conclude that M
> is false -- showing the invalidity of an argument for M is not
> to show that M is false. Kinda tricky, huh, Oleg? [Sarcasm.])
HOLD ON! I claim that the form of the argument is valid: the logical structure
is NOT flawed. There is a hidden premise to the syllogism offered that makes
it a bit tricky (ok, everyone, look up "enthymematics"), and it is that hidden
premise that makes the conclusion unjustified. The argument was:
laws against abortion are an imposing of one's morality on others
(imposing one's morality on others is a "bad thing")
THEREFORE: laws against abortion are a bad thing.
The logical form of the argument is then
All A are B
All B are C
-----------
All A are C
This holds for BOTH arguments, original and attempted refutation. The argument
is VALID, but is not SOUND (and the conclusions can't be said to follow, as
a result). The problem is the (hidden) premise that imposing one's morality
on others is a "bad thing." This hidden premise exists in the refutation, as
well, but the conclusion that laws against murder are a bad thing follows
because of the flawed second premise, not because the syllogism has faulty
logic.
>
>X here is the structure of Kathy's argument (step 1) concluding that abortion
>should not be illegal (conclusion M). Step 2 is my exactly parallel argument
>concluding that killing Jews should not be illegal (conclusion N). We all
>agree that N is false (step 3) -- that's why it's a handy test case. (No
>emotion needed.) I therefore conclude *not* that abortion should be illegal,
>but that the argument X is incorrect, and so Kathy hasn't shown that abortion
>should be legal.
Again, to recap: the structure of the original argument IS valid; it is the
second premise that is at fault. Agreed, the argument hasn't shown that
abortion should be legal (it hasn't shown what it purported to show, either:
that abortion should not be illegal). "We all agree that N is false" is
also specious, ad populum, etc., since we can find (elsewhere on the net, if
he's still there) neo-nazis today, regrettably. "(No emotion needed)" indeed!
We don't need Nazis and Jews to refute the premise that "all impositions of
morality are 'bad things'" and to include them is an appeal to emotions or
to pity. It is perfectly legitimate to appeal to emotions, but it is not
legitimate to do so and claim to be dealing with formal arguments that are
valid. Arguing by analogy is a weak course in any debate, since it is usually
the differences that highlight the argument truly at hand (especially here,
where that difference involves post-birth Jews and pre-birth foetuses).
There are many citations of the Nazi analogy in anti-abortion literature, but
they are no more legitimate than the analogy made in Fr. Wooley's argument. A
well-known anti-abortion advocate, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, has written:
"As a Jew, I cannot remain silent at this facile use of the
Nazi analogy, though I realize that some anti-abortion Jews
use it. If this argument is so compelling, why do Jews
remain generally favorable toward abortion?"
So, since we don't need the Nazis to refute polite arguments, why don't we
leave them out of what is an already cluttered debate? That way, at least,
no one can claim, as I do, that the only reason to include them is to
appeal to the emotions, and only in misleading or improper arguments.
Dave Suess ze...@aero2.arpa
Dave Suess
>is this, that they believed that killing innocent people in some instances
>was morally okay, but that all civilized people (and everyone in this
>discussion) agree that they were murderers, i.e. that their morality was
>*wrong*. (I'll cheerfully use some other example if you suggest a similar
>one.)
1. I think Nazis did *not* believe in killing innocent people; rather, their
ignoble morality classified Jews as non-innocent, non-people.
2. "all civilized people" sounds suspiciously ad populum, and to say that
the Nazis' morality was "wrong" begs the question of right and wrong in the
context of moral systems.
3. As I have pointed out elsewhere, the "rational" (say, non-emotional)
refutation of the original argument (that since anti-abortion laws impose
one's morality on others, so anti-abortion laws are a "bad thing") does
NOT require an example with Nazis and Jews, it merely requires a counter-
example that refutes the hidden premise (all impositions of one's morality
on others are a "bad thing"). So, another example is NOT needed. If a
*rational* argument is to be pursued, one can use the *general* case of
murder, and leave out an example that has historically been used to
evoke emotional responses.
> This example is potentially illuminating for two reasons:
> ...
>
> 2. Many (not all) of the arguments that are used in favour of
> abortion have logical flaws in them. (This is of course true
> of many arguments on our side, too.) Often these logical
> flaws can be exposed by showing that the same line of logic
> can be used to conclude that the Nazis' killing of Jews was
> morally licit. If this can be done (and it often can) it
> shows *not* that abortion is always wrong, but that the
> particular pro-abortion argument being paralleled was
> illogical. (This kind of proof is called _reductio_ad_
> absurdum_.) And the Nazis are a particularly handy group to
> use for this purpose not because of any emotions involved,
> but simply because the immorality of their doctrine is one of
> the few things we can all agree on without much discussion.
But, as I claim, the argument was not illogical, it suffered from an
incorrect premise. The reductio_ad_absurdum is difficult to see here, if
the same form of argument is assumed:
p1: all anti-murder laws are impositions of one's morality on others
p2: all such impositions are "bad things"
C: all anti-murder laws are "bad things"
Where is it required that Nazis and Jews appear in this attempt? All that
is required is to show that the second premise is faulty, and the conclusion
no longer holds. I claim that using Nazis and Jews is an argument by
analogy and an appeal to emotions: Nazis and Jews are *not* required to
refute the original argument. The attempted refutation uses guilt by
association and tacitly includes the assumption that the Nazis' doctrine
is *immoral* (at least, that is what is claimed above: not so tacit, I guess).
>
>So in article <2...@aero.ARPA> ze...@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) has apparently
>misunderstood what I was getting at. He writes, at first quoting me:
Now we're getting somewhere. THIS looks like argumentum_ad_hominem (abusive).
Let me claim that I understood what you were getting at, but that I didn't
agree with *how* you got to where you were getting at.
>
>>>And again, so is murder a moral issue. If some Nazi actually thinks it's
>>>okay to go around shooting Jews, I'm not going to argue that he should
>>>be allowed to because, after all, you can't force morality on people
>>>who don't want it. I don't care whether the Nazi *wants* to be subject
>>>to my morality -- I'm going to do the best I can to impose it on him and
>>>thereby protect his victims.
>>
>>Every year, I ask that the Nazis be left out of arguments (since it lends
>>an air of emotionalism based on what is often a side issue). Here, even
>>though the subject is murder (in a general sense), there is an analogy where
>>1) pro-choice-for-abortion equates with "Nazi", and 2) foetus equates with
>>"Jew". Murder in general is quite different than a racist variant, and
>>using Nazis and Jews would seem, as usual, inappropriate. Nobody mentioned
>>aborting just Jewish foetuses, after all.
>
>What I wrote wasn't meant to be emotional. It's a _reductio_ad_absurdum_
>using precisely the same logic as the argument it refutes, but reaching a
>conclusion we all agree is false.
>
But, as I can claim, the argument is logically valid, it is one premise that
needs to be refuted, not the form of the argument. The conclusion cannot
be reached with an incorrect premise, so it is *not* proved false. We (I
speak of the rational parallel here, that anti-murder laws are "bad") agree
that the conclusion is "false", but it is not due to the argument advanced
or its refutation. Whether the use of Nazis and Jews was meant to be
emotional or not is not at issue here; rather, I claim that, regardless of
intent, the use of Nazis and Jews in this argument is superfluous and
*does* appeal to the emotions.
>>There is a place for Nazis-Jews references here, but the context should be
>>ideologies of Nazis and Jews as they pertain to abortion. And recall that
>>the Nazis were very much anti-abortion (for German-Aryans), expressing the
>>opinion that, for the good of the state, women should be making more and
>>more German-Aryans (more soldiers, and more soldier-mothers, presumably).
>>
>>[See how easy it is? My comments equate anti-abortion with "Nazi" now,
>>when really I should have left it at the "good of society" argument, without
>>painting it with the emotion of "Nazis!" Hence, my above paragraph is
>>specious, and should never be cited as an argument on these issues.]
>
>Yes, I agree. Your argument is an _argumentum_ad_hominem_, saying (falsely,
>by the way) that the Nazis were anti-abortion, and implying a connection
>with today's anti-abortion forces. As you point out, this is illogical,
>specious even. But it's not what I did.
Well, my example was *not* an argument: I didn't advance any conclusions
(if I did, they would probably have been guilt by association). I claim
that what you did was to use Nazis and Jews for no necessary reason; I
claim further that use of Nazis and Jews for no necessary reason is most
likely an appeal to the emotions. I dispute your classification of an
ad_hominem here: I didn't use an argument, and the example I gave was
directed at no one else in the argument (no one at all, really).
Almost finally, it is easy for you to assert that my statement about the
Nazis' stand on abortion is false, but I have evidence to the contrary.
Hitler closed the birth-control clinics, the Nazis were adamantly
anti-feminist, anti-abortion, anti-birth-control, anti-homosexual (for
German-Aryans only, of course). I might ask you to back up your throw-
away comment, but the point is this:
rational argument does not need Nazis and Jews
the views of Nazis on abortion are irrelevant
So, again, I appeal to the net: leave out emotional Nazi-Jews side-issues
or any claim to rational argument can be attacked as specious when they
are used by analogy to abortion. It shouldn't be so hard: if the Nazis
and Jews aren't being used as appeals to emotion, then a sufficient
number of legitimate, non-emotional arguments can be substituted.
Dave (not falsely, by the way) Suess ze...@aero2.arpa
Mike Huybensz
> out about some proposed murder, or that some legal loophole would get you
> off scot free, your argument wouldn't apply.
Not necessarily: human "certainty" is subjective. I might be "certain" but
wrong. Thus, the possibility of error argues strongly that "don't murder
even if you think you can get away with it" is still a good heuristic.
> And yet the murder would still be wrong.
> It's not the possibility of punishment that makes an action wrong.
Is this fallacy "suggestion by repeated affirmation" or "suggestion by use
of a confident manner"? I certainly see no other argument here. Why don't
you simply tell us why you think murder is wrong?
--
Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
John Woolley
lot here. It shouldn't be too opaque if you've been reading the discussion.
And may I once again remark how nice it is to have some civilised debate
going on around here?
In article <11...@oddjob.UUCP> ap...@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) writes:
>I'd like to know how you recognise a "person". What qualities does a race
>have to possess in order to qualify? And is it possible for only some members
>of a race to qualify, or do you have to judge the question species by species?
>I think these are crucial questions of principle, and lie at the root of
>our differing conclusions.
I use the ancient definition of "person":
"An individual substance of a rational nature".
From there, I answer that a race is "personal" if it is rational, if it
can think and reason. (Realizing that these terms aren't strictly defined,
we can agree anyway that humans are persons in this sense.) And, no, not
"only some members" qualify. The question is whether the "nature" is
rational, not the degree of rationality exhibited by the particular
individual substance. So if we discover intelligent Martians (or whatever)
I would object to killing them just the same as I object to killing humans.
In response to my example of the child tortured to provide the good of the
community:
> Firstly, I don't agree with the unequivocal claim that utilitarianism
>would say Yes. I need to know more about the hypothesis. If, when the child
>is released, at least one other child within the city will incur equivalent
>suffering AND lots of good things will be lost, then you're right about the
>utilitarian conclusion. I agree with that conclusion: it seems like common
>sense. [...] I think that, if enough good things are lost, there comes
>a point at which I would not release the child.
That's exactly the point of our disagreement. I and most traditional
moralists, including every moralist I know of before about 1800, would
say that deliberately inflicted injustice is always wrong, no matter what
the perceived benefits might be. It is wrong to steal a dollar from
somebody even though by doing so you can somehow give a dollar to each
of a hundred other people. It is wrong to inflict suffering on the child
in the example in order to benefit the society.
So I think we really do disagree on this. But Western (Christian or
liberal) legal and moral tradition is pretty much all on my side.
> What do I say about
>the child in the dungeon? That, if I knew that after making my moral choice
>I would be randomly assigned a role in society (P(AK=child)=0.000001,
>P(AK=city-dweller)=0.999999), I would make the same choice.
Maybe I don't understand you here. I think you're saying that your
willingness to take the one-in-a-million chance of being the one to suffer
somehow justifies your choice. (Or makes it less unjust?) But I'm sure
the average mugger willingly takes a greater chance than .000001 of being
hurt or killed when he mugs, but we don't think his willingness to undergo
the risk makes his violence any less inexcusable. Am I being dense?
> It's certainly true that moral philosophy is value-dependent. Whether
>that's a problem is debatable: I think it's simply a recognition of the fact
>that there are no absolute moral truths.
I don't object to moral philosophy's being value-dependent. But you seem
to make it taste-dependent, which is another story. Values can be shared,
debated, and so on. De gustibus, on the other hand, non disputandum est.
(Ain't no 'countin' fer taste.) So if your big objection to murder is that
you don't like it, well, I say you haven't done much philosophy.
"FACT that there are no absolute moral truths"??? (Including this one...)
All theists and "transcendentalists" say there are absolutes.
Referring to my listing of several features of a foetus' character that
I like (and I really do, by the way):
> Well, if those are seriously meant to be the primary reasons why you value
>foetuses (which I doubt), then it seems to follow that you ought to value
>a sperm and unfertilised egg (together) at least as much.
My point was that my tastes as to people's character don't have a lot to
do with whether it should be legal to murder them.
> So the general
>pattern is: X states values, Y draws conclusions, X accepts conclusions or
>refines values, .... I don't know whether you consider that a good pastime,
>but at least it keeps moral philosophers off the street.
It's fun, cheap, and doesn't rot your teeth.
About the hazards of assuming that a firm artificial dividing line between
human and non-human (e.g. birth) will hold up under fire:
> Similar points were made to me in private mail by Charli Phillips, for
>which I'm grateful. I agree that this part of my previous argument doesn't
>stand up. I'll come back to this question in a later posting, if and when
>I think I have anything sensible to say about it.
Do. It's an important point.
--
Peace and Good!,
Fr. John Woolley
Pete Zakel
I believe the question was to give a reason for not murdering that doesn't
rely on a moral stand (I'm sorry, but I don't have a copy of the original
task request). My response basically was showing why the Golden Rule is
a good rule to follow. If you help other people, and don't show yourself
to be a threat, you are likely to be well-treated and protected by people
around you. I, personally, believe murder to be wrong - partly for moral
and religious reasons - but the request was for a non-religious and non-moral
stance. I believe I gave a valid stance.
I also believe it is possible for a moral person to murder someone else
and STILL be moral, it would require much thinking, reasoning, and planning
and the person would have to live with himself afterward. Also, women
who have abortions also have to live with themselves. Although I do not
believe abortion to be murder, it must be very difficult for a woman NOT
to think of it that way. But as long as the fetus is part of that woman,
dependent on her for sustenance, and incapable of living on its own, I
believe she, AND SHE ALONE, has the right to decide whether that fetus
should continue on toward birth or be aborted.
-- People not interested in religious arguments may go on to the next
article now --
My religious stance is that I do not believe a soul enters the child till
just prior to birth. I do believe in reincarnation (I also believe
Christ's "born again" references REFER to reincarnation) and I also believe
that the soul will have another chance in another child and does not suffer
from abortion. BUT, my religious stance should have no bearing on the law
concerning abortions. I also believe in STRICT separation of church and
state, ESPECIALLY in reference to abortion legislation. A person from
one church has no right to legislate that church's position into law.
Government arbitrates Man's laws. God (or whatever higher power you wish
to ascribe to) arbitrates God's laws. Atheists must rely on The Golden Rule.
Please don't respond to my religious views in this newsgroup, I will be happy
to argue them in net.religion if anyone is interested.
Love and Peace be with you all.
John Woolley
the propriety of referring to Nazis in arguments about abortion, as I did.
My feeling is that this discussion is interesting but has gotten a little
off the point. I tried with not a lot of success to be brief.
In article <2...@aero.ARPA> ze...@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) finds fault with
my defence of one of my arguments as a _reductio_ad_absurdum_, arguing
correctly that what I was doing was not (as I had written) showing a flaw
in the logic of the argument I was criticising, but rather showing a flaw
in the premises of that argument. He's right, but it's beside the point --
my argument stands even though my analysis of my argument was flawed. The
technique of building a parallel argument and deriving an absurdity will
work whether the flaw in the original was in logic or in premise. In either
case, it's a _reductio_ad_absurdum_; the _res_absurda_ isn't the same though.
As Dave writes (and I agree entirely):
> The problem is the (hidden) premise that imposing one's morality
>on others is a "bad thing." This hidden premise exists in the refutation, as
>well, but the conclusion that laws against murder are a bad thing follows
>because of the flawed second premise, not because the syllogism has faulty
>logic.
My reference to Nazis was meant as an illustration of the falsity of the
premise (which wasn't all that hidden, after all) that "imposing our
morality on other people is always bad".
>> Step 2 is my exactly parallel argument
>>concluding that killing Jews should not be illegal (conclusion N). We all
>>agree that N is false (step 3) -- that's why it's a handy test case.
>[...]
> "We all agree that N is false" is
>also specious, ad populum, etc., since we can find (elsewhere on the net, if
>he's still there) neo-nazis today, regrettably.
Here I have to disagree with Dave.
1. I didn't say "Our agreement that N is false proves that N is
false" -- as he says, that would have been _ad_populum_;
although I'm not sure it even has enough appearance of
accuracy to call it specious.
2. If we wait to accept something as true until not only all the
participants in the discussion accept it as true, but until
all possible hypothetical participants can be anticipated to
accept it, we'll absolutely *never* get *anywhere*. None
of the people in this discussion question my assertion "that
killing Jews should not be illegal" is false. If someone who
actually thought Jew-killing was okay were participating, I'd
debate the point. But nobody is. So why can't we accept it
as true and get on to other things?
>We don't need Nazis and Jews to refute the premise that "all impositions of
>morality are 'bad things'" and to include them is an appeal to emotions or
>to pity.
It's true. We don't *need* the example. I could have said, simply, "You
don't really believe your own premise that imposing morality is always
wrong." But it's a whole lot more satisfying to demonstrate that they don't
believe the premise by illustrating with a case in which they in fact don't
believe it, and will see that they don't.
A counterexample to a general assertion is, bar none, the strongest way
to dispute it.
>A well-known anti-abortion advocate, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, has written:
> "As a Jew, I cannot remain silent at this facile use of the
> Nazi analogy, though I realize that some anti-abortion Jews
> use it. If this argument is so compelling, why do Jews
> remain generally favorable toward abortion?"
Did you intend this to illustrate the fallacy of _argumentum_ad_populum_?
It's a pretty pure example of it, don't you think?
In article <2...@aero.ARPA> ze...@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) writes, quoting me:
>>The main reason for referring to Nazis in a rational discussion of abortion
>>is this, that they believed that killing innocent people in some instances
>>was morally okay, but that all civilized people (and everyone in this
>>discussion) agree that they were murderers, i.e. that their morality was
>>*wrong*. (I'll cheerfully use some other example if you suggest a similar
>>one.)
>
>1. I think Nazis did *not* believe in killing innocent people; rather, their
>ignoble morality classified Jews as non-innocent, non-people.
But this makes the parallel even more exact. My opponents in the abortion
debate don't believe they're advocating the killing of innocent people
either. I think they are, just as we all think the Nazis were. And again,
the whole point was that in such a case, *even the opponents* agree that
there's nothing inherently wrong with the guy who thinks it *is* murder
using force or law to stop the guy who thinks it *isn't*. I ask again, can
you think of a better real-life case to use as a parallel, where group A
thought that killing a member of group C was okay, and group B thought the
same act was murder?
>2. "all civilized people" sounds suspiciously ad populum, and to say that
>the Nazis' morality was "wrong" begs the question of right and wrong in the
>context of moral systems.
I answered this earlier. And I have no qualms at all about asserting Nazi
morality to be wrong. You called it "ignoble" yourself. What's the point?
>3. As I have pointed out elsewhere, the "rational" (say, non-emotional)
>refutation of the original argument (that since anti-abortion laws impose
>one's morality on others, so anti-abortion laws are a "bad thing") does
>NOT require an example with Nazis and Jews, it merely requires a counter-
>example that refutes the hidden premise (all impositions of one's morality
>on others are a "bad thing"). So, another example is NOT needed. If a
>*rational* argument is to be pursued, one can use the *general* case of
>murder, and leave out an example that has historically been used to
>evoke emotional responses.
The "*general* case of murder" doesn't work, because it can be easily, and
fairly sensibly, argued that most murderers don't really think what they
do is right. The Nazis really seem to have thought they were doing good
by slaughtering people, though. You need a specific example where someone
thought it was permissible to kill.
> I claim that using Nazis and Jews is an argument by
>analogy and an appeal to emotions: Nazis and Jews are *not* required to
>refute the original argument.
An argument by analogy would have said
1. Foetuses and Jews are similar (in some relevant way).
2. It is wrong to kill Jews.
3. Therefore it is wrong to kill foetuses.
I didn't do anything like that at all!
>>So in article <2...@aero.ARPA> ze...@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) has apparently
>>misunderstood what I was getting at. He writes, at first quoting me:
>
>Now we're getting somewhere. THIS looks like argumentum_ad_hominem (abusive).
Look up _ad_hominem_. Saying that *apparently* somebody misunderstood
something has *nothing* in common with _argumentum_ad_hominem_, and can
only be classed as abusive by grossly indulging your sensitivity to insult.
I didn't abuse; I tried to correct what I thought was a failure on your
part to grasp what I meant. If I'm wrong, I'm sorry. But _ad_hominem_?
>Almost finally, it is easy for you to assert that my statement about the
>Nazis' stand on abortion is false, but I have evidence to the contrary.
I'll get back to you on this.
John Woolley
>> And yet the murder would still be wrong.
>
>> It's not the possibility of punishment that makes an action wrong.
>
>Is this fallacy "suggestion by repeated affirmation" or "suggestion by use
>of a confident manner"? I certainly see no other argument here.
First, I didn't suggest anything -- I stated it.
Second, has anyone disputed the statement? I said, essentially, "Murder is
wrong even if there's no chance you'll get caught." If anyone wants to
dispute that, go ahead. But nobody has, and it doesn't strike me as likely
that anyone will. I regarded the statements as non-controversial, an
appeal to shared values to illustrate a point I was making.
We do share this value, don't we? Or does anyone believe that murder is
morally okay as long as there's no way it can be punished?
You don't see another argument because I didn't think anyone disagreed.
Mike Huybensz
> >> And yet the murder would still be wrong.
> >
> >> It's not the possibility of punishment that makes an action wrong.
> >
> >Is this fallacy "suggestion by repeated affirmation" or "suggestion by use
> >of a confident manner"? I certainly see no other argument here.
>
> First, I didn't suggest anything -- I stated it.
Check out the definitions of suggestion in a dictionary. I was referring
to two common fallacies of argument (see "How To Think Staight" by Thouless
or other books on informal fallacies of argument).
> Second, has anyone disputed the statement? I said, essentially, "Murder is
> wrong even if there's no chance you'll get caught." If anyone wants to
> dispute that, go ahead. But nobody has, and it doesn't strike me as likely
> that anyone will. I regarded the statements as non-controversial, an
> appeal to shared values to illustrate a point I was making.
Ah, the argument ad populum. Well, perhaps I wasn't explicit enough
when I wrote (and you "cleverly" deleted):
> > ... the possibility of error argues strongly that "don't murder
> > even if you think you can get away with it" is still a good heuristic.
Simply, I don't believe in right or wrong as absolutes: you are reifying
cultural norms. This is obvious, since different cultures have different
definitions of murder. What is perhaps justified killing in one culture
(self-defense or adultery perhaps) may be murder in another (perhaps a
pacifistic sect such as the Mennonites.)
> We do share this value, don't we? Or does anyone believe that murder is
> morally okay as long as there's no way it can be punished?
While we may individually share the value that murder is wrong, our
philosophical basis for it is entirely different. Mine recognizes the
Machievellian facts of life: there are people who behave precisely as
if they believe murder is morally ok as long as they aren't punished.
Those people have nothing to gain by professing such beliefs.
> You don't see another argument because I didn't think anyone disagreed.
Pollyanna.
--
Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
Dave Suess
>> The problem is the (hidden) premise that imposing one's morality
>>on others is a "bad thing." This hidden premise exists in the refutation, as
>>well, but the conclusion that laws against murder are a bad thing follows
>>because of the flawed second premise, not because the syllogism has faulty
>>logic.
>
>My reference to Nazis was meant as an illustration of the falsity of the
>premise (which wasn't all that hidden, after all) that "imposing our
>morality on other people is always bad".
And my complaint remains: using the Nazis tugs at the emotions in what
otherwise purports to be a rational discussion. "Nazis" certainly aren't
needed to illustrate that the premise doesn't hold.
> ...
>>We don't need Nazis and Jews to refute the premise that "all impositions of
>>morality are 'bad things'" and to include them is an appeal to emotions or
>>to pity.
>
>It's true. We don't *need* the example. I could have said, simply, "You
>don't really believe your own premise that imposing morality is always
>wrong." But it's a whole lot more satisfying to demonstrate that they don't
>believe the premise by illustrating with a case in which they in fact don't
>believe it, and will see that they don't.
>
>A counterexample to a general assertion is, bar none, the strongest way
>to dispute it.
Again, my point: since the example you chose wasn't *needed*, why lay an
argument open to the claim that since it uses an emotion-charged example
rather than bland hypotheticals, the argument has no validity in a rational
discussion? Or the claim that the example was chosen to deliberately
manipulate the emotions in the way that the presenter of the argument wants
them manipulated? I agree that a counterexample is a strong tactic; but
why not use words like "A society that holds that some people, because of
their genetic backgrounds, are inferior and may be executed at will"
instead of "Nazis and Jews"?
>>A well-known anti-abortion advocate, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, has written:
>>...
>Did you intend this to illustrate the fallacy of _argumentum_ad_populum_?
>It's a pretty pure example of it, don't you think?
>
Oops. Mea maxima culpa. (Perhaps I meant it as a snappy yet apropos quote
to end that posting, to jazz up my empty signature space. Perhaps I was
anxious to show that I'm not the first to point out that references to
Nazis in abortion arguments are specious, or that it is not a point made
just by anti-anti-abortionists. Probably I screwed up, especially if it
distracted from the legitimate points I was trying to make.)
>... I ask again, can
>you think of a better real-life case to use as a parallel, where group A
>thought that killing a member of group C was okay, and group B thought the
>same act was murder?
>
But why is it necessary to use a "real-life" case? To appeal to the
emotions? I find it hard to justify any other answer.
Anyway, it doesn't take much imagination to come up with more examples that
are not the typical "Nazis" analogy. Try Charlie Manson and Family for group
A, the Tates and LaBiancas (or any affluent "pigs") for group C, and the
state of California for group B. Or try considering group C as the current
inhabitants of Death Rows in the US, group A as the citizens of the US, and
group B as a shocked group of foreign anti-capital-punishment activists. Or
try group C as the people of Jericho (Rahab and her house excepted), group B
as their neighbors in Ai and other Canaanites, and group A as Joshua and the
tribes of Israel! Emotions abound for manipulation in that bunch of examples,
but I thought this was *rational* discussion.
> ...
>> I claim that using Nazis and Jews is an argument by
>>analogy and an appeal to emotions: Nazis and Jews are *not* required to
>>refute the original argument.
>
>An argument by analogy would have said
> 1. Foetuses and Jews are similar (in some relevant way).
> 2. It is wrong to kill Jews.
> 3. Therefore it is wrong to kill foetuses.
>I didn't do anything like that at all!
True; but what *I* would have put for the aforementioned argument by analogy
would be
1. Nazis thought it was okay to kill Jews.
2. Pro-abortion people think it is okay to kill foetuses.
3. Foetuses and Jews are similar (they are both unfairly killed)
4. Nazis and pro-abortion people are similar (they both have
philosophies that justify unfair killings).
5. Everybody knows Nazis were damned wrong, so ...
6. Everybody should know the pro-choice position is damned wrong.
Please note that this is *not* what you wrote (ever); it is what *can be*
inferred from using the "Nazis" example, with little difficulty. Your
analogy (please notice) left out the Nazis, and could have *easily* left out
the Jews (and substituted "adults" or "birthed people"). Emotions get
evoked: one camp can be self-righteously stroked, while another camp can get
irritated that their arguments are being dragged through unnecessary mud.
My final comment on the subject: if an argument is so weak that it depends
on emotional responses, then it is better left out of a purported rational
discussion and reserved for rabble-rousing. Otherwise, its inclusion in
rational debate appears contrived, inappropriate, and the mark of a losing
argument.
Dave Suess ze...@aero2.arpa
John Woolley
>Why don't you simply tell us why you think murder is wrong?
Okay, I'll give it a shot. I oppose murder and abortion for three reasons
primarily (although these overlap a lot). First, I'm a humanist; second, a
civilised man; third (in order but not importance) a Christian.
As to the first. I claim to be a humanist, by which I mean that I believe,
without needing to inquire really deeply into the reasons for the belief and
without any formal proof asked or given, that human things are good. I
believe that people are valuable and, yes, inherently dignified; and that
this value and dignity do not depend on my or anyone else's perception, but
are a real aspect of what people *are*. Further, that nothing ever can
remove this human dignity from someone, and that any treatment of people
that devalues them or treats them as less than human, as not valuable, is
wrong; not wrong in some relative or utilitarian sense, but wrong absolutely.
Second, I am civilised, a part of Western civilisation, the tradition of
Moses, Aristotle, Cicero, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Dante, Shakespeare,
Pascal, Mozart, Dickens. (To name only a very few.) It seems to me that
one of the greatest "themes", if you will, of that civilisation is our
gradually coming to realize that individuals are to be protected and
nurtured by society, and that individual weakness is not an excuse for
exploitation, but the exact opposite, a just claim for protection. And
that life, liberty, and property are to be guaranteed by society as far as
possible.
Third, I am Christian, and believe therefore that all our race has been
created after the image of the eternal God, that in our very nature we
have the stamp and likeness of eternity. And further, that the Word has
become flesh, has taken our nature into His own, and therefore that all
flesh is holy, human-ness taken up into God and filled with His perfect
love and joy. And therefore, that to kill or injure a person is not only
inhuman, not only unjust, not only imprudent and uncivilised, but an act
of blasphemy, a declaration of enmity with love Himself, an attempted
violence against Reality.
That's why I think murder is wrong. The third reason will appeal mostly
to Christians (and in part to Jews); but the first and second seem to me
to be pretty universal among what used to be called "people of good will".
Richard Byrd
>As to the first. I claim to be a humanist, by which I mean that I believe,
>without needing to inquire really deeply into the reasons for the belief and
>without any formal proof asked or given, that human things are good. I
>believe that people are valuable and, yes, inherently dignified; and that
>this value and dignity do not depend on my or anyone else's perception, but
>are a real aspect of what people *are*. ...
I think most all reasonable moral people agree with these sentiments
but they are too vague too be useful in the present context.
For most purposes it is perhaps not necessary to inquire into the reasons
for your belief. However, when agreement as to who is human is lacking
it is necessary to say what properties of a human make human life valuable in
order to determine whether a given entity deserves the respect accorded humans.
If you cannot do this you are reduced to arguing about the definition of
"human" which is purely a matter of semantic convention and not necessarily
related to the value and goodness of humans.