Collateral damage is any death, injury, or other damage inflicted that is an incidental result of an activity. Originally coined by military operations,[1] it is now also used in non-military contexts.[2][3]
Critics of use of the term "collateral damage" see it as a euphemism that dehumanizes non-combatants killed or injured during combat, used to reduce the perceived culpability of military leadership in failing to prevent non-combatant casualties.[5][6][7][8]
Collateral damage does not include civilian casualties caused by military operations that are intended to terrorize or kill enemy civilians (e.g., the bombing of Chongqing during World War II).[9][10][11][12]
The word "collateral" comes from medieval Latin word collateralis, from col-, "together with" + lateralis (from latus, later-, "side" ) and is otherwise mainly used as a synonym for "parallel" or "additional" in certain expressions (e.g. "collateral veins" meaning veins running parallel to each other, or "collateral security" meaning security additional to the main obligation in a contract).[citation needed]
The oldest known usage of the term "collateral damage" in this context occurred in an article written in May 1961 by T. C. Schelling entitled "DISPERSAL, DETERRENCE, AND DAMAGE".[13] The term "collateral damage" likely originated as a euphemism during the Vietnam War referring to friendly fire or to the intentional killing of non-combatants and destruction of their property.[14]
In 1999, "collateral damage" (German: Kollateralschaden) was named the German Un-Word of the Year by a jury of linguistic scholars. With this choice, it was criticized that the term had been used by NATO forces to describe civilian casualties during the Kosovo War, which the jury considered to be an inhuman euphemism.[16]
Military necessity, along with distinction and proportionality, are three important principles of international humanitarian law, governing the legal use of force in an armed conflict. Offensives causing collateral damage are not automatically classed as a war crimes. They are war crimes when the objective is excessively or solely collateral damage.
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) criminalizes intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
The USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide defines the term as the "unintentional damage or incidental damage affecting facilities, equipment, or personnel, occurring as a result of military actions directed against targeted enemy forces or facilities",[19] stating that "[s]uch damage can occur to friendly, neutral, and even enemy forces". Another United States Department of Defense document uses "[u]nintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time",[20] which also states that "[s]uch damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the attack".
While not actually invented by the military,[22] this has been common. However, the term has since been widely adopted for non-military cases, and in particular, the COVID-19 pandemic. A large number of medical,[23] government sources[24] and media[25] use this term widely in relation to deaths caused indirectly as a result of government policy such as lockdowns, and not directly by the virus itself. Significant debate on the pandemic strategy has ensued, with some advocating restrictions such as lockdowns to save lives, where others claim the 'collateral damage' caused by enforced lockdowns, masks and distancing may in fact cause more deaths over a longer term. An example is the Great Barrington Declaration, purportedly signed by 3500 medical and other professionals (and mentioned in UK parliament[26] and media[27]) has a FAQ page titled 'Lockdowns and collateral damage',[28] and refers to this phrase several times.
The related term collateral mortality is also becoming prevalent, and probably derives from the term collateral damage. It has been applied to other spheres in addition to a military context. Fisheries are an example of this, where bycatch of species such as dolphins are called collateral mortality; they are species that die in the pursuit of the legal death of fishing targets, such as tuna.[29]
Like the failed Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), US and European banks and financial institutions have long gorged on government and corporate bonds issued at very low rates of interest. Investors (think Silicon Valley billionaires, asset managers, hedge funds, private equity etc.,) acquired these assets and used them as sound collateral to leverage higher borrowing.
Now this does not matter if bonds are held to maturity, and there is no pressure to sell. With time future rates might fall, and bond prices rise. But if bonds have been used as collateral - then lenders will notice the borrower\u2019s collateral has fallen in value and will demand more collateral to shore up (often huge) outstanding debts. There will then be a scramble to sell, or to mobilise more capital to satisfy creditors.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency room visits have drastically decreased for non-COVID conditions such as appendicitis, heart attack, and stroke. Patients may be avoiding seeking medical attention for fear of catching the deadly condition or as an unintended consequence of stay-at-home orders. This delay in seeking care can lead to increased morbidity and mortality, which has not been figured in the assessment of the extent of damage caused by this pandemic. This case illustrates an example of "collateral damage" caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. What would have been a standard ST-elevation myocardial infarction treated with timely and successful stenting of a dominant right coronary artery occlusion, became a much more dangerous postinfarction ventricular septal defect; all because of a 2-day delay in seeking medical attention by an unsuspecting patient.
A7.1.1. When a commander is planning strikes near his own forces, there is always some element of risk. Usually, conservative calculations will be prepared (except under emergency conditions) and will lead to minimal risks to friendly forces. Planning may also lead to maximizing collateral damage to enemy facilities near struck targets. A7.2. Risk. A planner may accept different levels of risk when weapons are to be used near friendly forces. Risk levels are: negligible, moderate, or high (emergency). A7. 2.1. At a negligible risk distance, troops are fairly safe. Such a risk would be considered if nuclear weapons were to be used near friendly troops. Any greater risk would be accepted only when significant advantages could be gained. A7.2.2. At a moderate risk distance, anticipated damage levels are tolerable, or at worst a minor nui-sance. Moderate risk might be considered acceptable in close air support operations. A7.2. 3. At an emergency risk distance, some injuries and fatalities may occur. An emergency risk should be accepted only when absolutely necessary and be exceeded only in extremely rare situations. A7.3. Safe Distances for Friendly Troops (Conventional Weapons). When computing nonnuclear damage to enemy forces, the effectiveness index lethal area is used. Lethal area is sometimes incorrectly assumed to be a circle, and attempts are made to determine the resulting lethal radius. This cannot be done because the lethal area is not a physical area but instead an integrated probability over the area of effectiveness. A7.3.1. Some agencies have been provided safe distances using damage criteria developed for deter-mining effectiveness against enemy soldiers, such as the 5- minute casualty criterion. These distances are much larger than the lethal radii discussed above but are still not considered suitable for the safety of friendly troops. For friendly troops, a much more stringent criterion for safety has been estab-lished. Effectiveness indices (EI) have been established to provide numerical values to establish the relationship between the target, weapon, and operational factors that influence the weapon's effective-ness. The effective target dimensions (length X width) cannot be used to determine a minimum safe distance from the impact point. Refer to the separate JMEM document Risk Estimates for Friendly Troops, 61A1- 3- 9. This document contains information pertaining to safe distances and provides esti-mates as to the percentage of casualties that could be expected to friendly troops by the delivery of 180180 Page 181182181
A7. 4.2. 1. Areas of fallout contamination from surface bursts may preclude or interfere with friendly force use of, or passage through, these areas. A7.4.2.2. A reasonable margin of safety must be provided for military and civilian populations of friendly and neutral countries in accordance with the area commander's weapons restraint policy. A7.4.2.3. Temporary dazzle during daylight conditions, loss of night visual adaptation, or retinal burns may handicap friendly forces if they are not warned to protect their eyes at the time of deto-nation. A7.4.3. In addition to degrees of risk, one of the following three conditions of personnel vulnerability can be expected at the time of burst: unwarned, exposed; warned, exposed; or warned, protected. A7.4.3.1. Unwarned, exposed troops are assumed to be standing in the open at burst time but to have dropped to a prone position by the time the blast wave arrives. They are expected to have areas of bare skin exposed to direct thermal radiation, and some personnel may suffer temporary dazzle. For example, this condition can be expected in an offensive situation where the majority of the attacking infantry are in the open and cannot be warned of the burst. A7.4.3.2. Warned, exposed troops are assumed to be prone on open ground, with all skin areas covered, and with overall thermal protection equal to that provided by a two- layer summer uni-form. For example, such a condition is expected to prevail when a nuclear weapon is detonated over a target at a prearranged time during an attack when troops are expecting the burst but do not have time to prepare foxholes. A7.4.3.3. Warned, protected troops are assumed to be "buttoned up" in tanks or crouching in foxholes with improvised overhead thermal shielding. For example, such a condition is expected to prevail when nuclear weapons are used in support of an attack by our armored forces. A7. 4. 4. The predicted ranges for thermal radiation and initial nuclear radiation are provided in the DIA manual, Physical Vulnerability Handbook-- Nuclear Weapons, AP- 550- 1- 2- INT. A7.4.5. Troop safety distance calculations are usually based on a high assurance of not exceeding a certain criterion for safety. Aircraft and guided missile- delivered weapons require a horizontal buffer distance (d ) of 2 CEP for a very, very high safety assurance (0.99 for a straight line troop disposi-tion; 2.3 CEP for a very high assurance (0.95) for either a half- circular or a circular troop disposition. A7.4.6. A weapon set to burst at a fallout- safe height of burst has a 0.50 probability of being below the "selected" burst height on detonation. Therefore, to achieve an assurance of no fallout (of military significance), a vertical buffer distance must be added to the HOB. These distances can be obtained from figures in the Physical Vulnerability Handbook-- Nuclear Weapons, AP- 550- 1- 2- INT. A7. 4.7. For a very high assurance that friendly troops will not be exposed to any weapons effects greater than those considered acceptable, add 2 CEP to the radius of safety (RS) to obtain the mini-mum safe distance (MSD), and add 3.5 Probable Error in Height (peh) to the fallout- safe height of burst (HOBfS). A7.5. Macro Models for Computing Collateral Damage . Standard models are available in conven-tional and nuclear weaponeering manuals for use in determining expected collateral damage involving 182182 Page 183184183
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