Imac Mid 2011 Ssd Fan Control

[Skye Severy]

Whyis Control Center on Monterey listening to port 5000 and port 7000? I have used these ports for years for local development, but now find them in use by Control Center. Is this worth filling a Feedback about?

The Remote Audio Output Protocol, AKA AirTunes, AKA AirPlay, has been using port 5000 since the year 2004. This is nothing new. All AirPlay receivers including AirPort Express and Apple TV use port 5000. If you've ever used Airfoil on your Mac (Airfoil Speakers was released in 2008), that also uses 5000 for the same reason. AirPlay receiving is new to macOS Monterey, but AirPlay itself is very old, predating Flask and these other web development environments. No, Apple is not trying to make web development difficult.

It seems that port number 5000 was never officially registered with IANA, and has many more conflicts.Can we kindly ask Apple to register their service ports and use IANA assigned ports in the future? _of_TCP_and_UDP_port_numbers

Unfortunately port 7000 was used to hack my iMac Apple Silicon 2 days ago, to control over my app, updated Xcode from unknown source and also changed Viber messenger. The hack thing was almost invisible, performed via previously hacked wifi router. So I decided to restore my system. I performed power button holding to enter my system options. I erased whole ssd and tried to load fresh new system. Well it does not go well, as the update server was unreachable - strange seemed to me. Than I realized that hackers have done something to my system options to force me not to revive or restore whole MacOS. I had to perform terminal destroy disk keys operation, ( terminal> xartutil --erase-all ) than I have found my iMac like diskless/bricked. I used Apple Configurator 2 to get my system back online and here I'm restored and healthy. Port 7000 is definitively dangerous to listen on while bad guys nearby... I almost forgot - my MacOS firewall was set to "blocking all incoming connections". So it seems there is still a way how to enter my MacOS.

This answered two of my questions on port usage, A, but and B, why my Control Center had been receiving incoming connections. However, I like Digitec have tried resetting my mac due to a previously hacked router issue, and just end up setting up another OS in a different partition somehow, and I am not new to this by any means. Files I can't access and the directory is a mess. So, Digitec, what can I do to avoid bricking and having to use the Apple Configurator 2 to revive? Any options there to make this a little easier and less time-consuming?

Back to the Port Issue, I don't understand why this Airplay Feature would use an insecure port AND have control center access on as a privacy setting by default. I've never seen this in my Preferences pane, which made me think that hackers could also access my accessibility settings which have never been set up in this version of OS on my Macbook, but I see now that there are enough options pre-set for a hacker to control my computer right there from the control center, and it's allowing incoming connections by default. Is this a design flaw we think?

On the right you'll see TCP *:5000 (LISTEN) usually listed once for each IP version, and on the left is the name of the program that's sucking on the port, which is ControlCe if its AirPlay. If nothing is using that port, then it won't be listed.

Funny thing just happened: I turned off AirPlay Receiver, started my service on port 5000, turned AirPlay Receiver back on, it is now happily listening on port 54842 in addition to port 7000 on which it was also listening before.

I've also captured traffic that is malformed coming into my brand new Mac Apple Silicon. Port 7000 was open and bound to ControlCenter. The traffic I've captured (PCAP) respembles the airplay protocol RTSP. using a blist00 tag followed by a payload.

Interestingly, the attack traffic (dport 7000) has TCP options set. They are 12 bytes. 0101 and then 10 more bytes for an array of two timestamps. I'm pretty sure this is part of the attack payload.

Plus one above. This is seriously stupid Apple on so many levels - firstly using a known developer port is dumber than a rock. Secondly constantly changing the setting locations under cryptic naming conventions is idiotic as well. Do your Product managers really have such a skewed sense of intuitive organizational structure? Here is an idea -> try alpha sorting by service and functional category (General has no meaning at all lose it). See: is an example

User PreferencesAccessibilityAppearanceControl Center (have the ability to alpha sort anything and everything and frankly create and or rename categories)FocusLogin PasswordPrivacy and SecurityScreentimeSiri & Spotlightetc.

I think you get the idea. This would be a meta organizational standard with a location design pattern, not some random organization stragegy that "seems" to make sense when in reality it does not, and also does not scale at all. the layout changes from OS iteration to OS iteration and makes solution finding nearly impossible as many search results are returned, one for each new change, that do not apply (as happened here). The fact that this is not more obvious a problem is unbelieveable and the same patteren repeats over and over with the Apple development model. C'mon folks do more research on optimal organizational construct logic, patterning, searchability, optimization, and scaling over time. And don't use known development ports for propietary service your users may or may not chose to use.

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I have 2 Macs, a 16" M1 MAX MacBook Pro and a 13" M1 MacBook Pro that previously worked utilizing Universal Control to control both machines. After updating both to Ventura 13.3 today, Universal control no longer works.

[ I was using universal control between my M1 MacBook Pro and iPad Pro. After I close the screen of MacBook and open again, the universal control was gone. I used to log-out & login my iCloud account to fix it, but this time I'd like to find an easier way. ]

I open System Settings and click my Apple ID at the top left corner. On the bottom of the right pane is Device which lists the devices bounded to my Apple ID. I click the iPad Pro and it will show the information of that device. Nothing to do here, except maybe just clicking the back arrow, and the universal control comes back quietly.

I opened a case with Apple to have this looked at. While discussing with an engineer, we weren't able to correct this. However, he suggested I create a new login on EACH computer, log in with these IDs and connect them to my AppleID. I did this and nothing changed. UC was enabled by default but not working. After a few minutes, I logged back in with my "regular" accounts.

I logged out of iCloud account (Apple ID) on both iPhone and MacBook, logged back into iCloud on MacBook first then did so on my iPhone. After logging back in on iPhone the MacBook then requested my Apple ID password again (notification in settings) to "finish setting up Apple services", also requested phone password. Once this was all done clipboard started working again.

After the update to 13.4, UC ceased to function for Apple (M) Chip devices. M Chips could then only connect to the iPad Pro, not to each other or the iMac. The iMac, however, COULD connect to each M Chip devices and the iPad Pro (ha!)..but then, it stopped too.

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