Hmmmm...the solution reaches a contradiction..but even I am not getting any contradiction of that type..
I tried to check the sequential rationality for player 2 when beliefs at c = belief at d, I am getting that the beliefs at c and d should be less than 8/15 (for player 2 to choose r).
And your answer (with beliefs at c = beliefs at d = 0) seems to agree with my result.
I guess we could find a SE.
Hope this helps.
Riju
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I meant to say that "in the official solution, professor shows a contradiction"
"And I am NOT getiing that contradiction"
Oh..I guess I must have made some errors in my calculations.
I first equated u(c) = u(d) in the expected payoffs and then tried to find the condition for the below to be sequential rational. So I got my weird result.
I shouldn't have done that I guess. I should have first derived the relation between u(c) and u(d) that satisfied sequential rationality and then check sequential equilibrium.
That is a more coherent argument.
Thanks!
Oh..I guess I must have made some errors in my calculations.
I first equated u(c) = u(d) in the expected payoffs equation and then tried to find the condition for the r to be sequential rational. So I got my weird result.
I shouldn't have done that I guess. I should have first derived the relation between u(c) and u(d) that satisfied sequential rationality and then check sequential equilibrium.
That is a more coherent argument.
Thanks
Riju