Microsec managed the CISCO VPN certificates separately from the TLS certificates.
Microsec issued the CISCO VPN server certificates from a separate CA which is not used to issue TLS certificates.
Microsec used separate policy for CISCO VPN server certificates and it was not clear that we shall follow the BR or not, because the BR says:
"1.2. DOCUMENT NAME AND IDENTIFICATION
This certificate policy (CP) contains the requirements for the issuance and management of publicly-trusted SSL certificates, as adopted by the CA/Browser Forum."
The CISCO VPN server certificate is very similar to the TLS certificate but they are not the same. It was not clear for us that the CISCO VPN server certificates shall be treated as SSL/TLS certificate.
The CISCO VPN server policy was not changed in March when we changed the TLS policies to reduce the lifetime of the TLS certificates to 2 years.
The issued certificates were checked but to the old policy which allowed the issuance for 3 years, so the problem could not been detected.
I could not find the third misissued certificate on the crt.sh, so I copy the certificate here:
> > Explanation about how and why the mistakes were made or bugs introduced,
> > and how they avoided detection until now.
> > Microsec manages the CISCO VPN cerver certificates separately from the TLS
> > certificates. The policy of the CISCO VPN servers was not changed when the
> > validity of the TLS certificates changed from 3 years to 2 years in March
> > 2018.
> Why wasn't the policy for Cisco VPN servers updated? This points to a
> deeper failure to properly manage all of the profiles used to issue
> certificates that chain to publicly-trusted roots, and I would like to
> better understand what went wrong and how it will be prevented in the
As I wrote above it was not clear for us that the CISCO VPN server certificates shall be managed as TLS certificates or not because there is no specific requirement for that.
> Microsec issues only a very few CISCO VPN server certificates and these
> > were the first issued certificates since the reduction of the allowed
> > validity time from 3 years to two years.
> > This response amounts to "we don't do this very often, so we're not
> capable of doing it correctly". What steps have been, or will in the future
> be taken to reduce this risk? For example, did you issue test certificates
> using this profile?
We have already modified our CISCO VPN server policy, reduced the lifetime to the certificates to 2 years.
We have also started a discussion to make it absolutely clear how to manage these type of certificates in the future.
> > 7./
> > List of steps your CA is taking to resolve the situation and ensure such
> > issuance will not be repeated in the future, accompanied with a timeline of
> > when your CA expects to accomplish these things.
> > Further actions made:
> > Microsec modified the CISCO VPN server policy to issue the
> > certificates only for two years in the future.
> > Microsec decided to discuss the situation of the CISCO VPN server
> > certificates and make the necessary modifications (if needed) to fully
> > comply with the BR requirements in case of CISCO VPN server certificates
> > too.
> > The reason of the problem is that Microsec couldn’t find clear instruction
> > or specifications about the requirements regarding the CISCO VPN server
> > certificates.
> > They are very similar to the TLS certificates, but they have slightly
> > different usage and different extended key usage values.
> > Because these certificate can be used for TLS, as far as Mozilla is
> concerned, they **are** TLS certificates, and all Mozilla policies for TLS
> certificates apply.
OK, we will do that in the future if we have the proper answers from CISCO.
> The main difference is that the CISCO VPN server certificates contain the
> > following EKU values which should not be present in the TLS certificates:
> > ipsecEndSystem (220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.5),
> > ipsecIntermediateSystem (22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.2)
> > The easiest way would be to manage the CISCO VPN server certificates as a
> > TLS certificate.
> Do you perform linting on certificates issued under the TLS profile?
Yes, we check all the issued TLS certificates with cablint before the publication. In case of any error message the certificate is revoked immediately and not published.
Microsec supports the Certificate Transparency and all the TLS precertificates are sent to 3 CT log servers bedfore the issuance, but it did not happen with the CISCO VPN server certificates
These questions shall be asked from CISCO