I know discussion here has been quiet, but in light of other threads going
on, I actually want to say I'm very supportive of GlobalSign's plan here,
and surprised they didn't call more attention to it, because it's something
to be proud of.
As I understand it, and happy to be corrected if I've made a mistake here,
GlobalSign is actively working to transition their hierarchy to one that
reflects a modern, good practice implementation. That's something they
should be proud of, and something all CAs should take note of. In
particular, they're transitioning to single-purpose roots (e.g. all TLS,
all e-mail), in order to reduce the risk to relying parties from roots that
You're absolutely correct for calling out GlobalSign's past incidents, and
I don't want to appear to be suggesting that simply spinning up new roots
wipes the old slate clean, but this is a huge step in the right direction,
and does reflect good practice. I will disclose that GlobalSign reached
out, as have several other CAs (PKIoverheid, Sectigo, DigiCert), to invite
feedback in their design and discuss some of their challenges, and I think
that's also the kind of positive, proactive behavior worth encouraging.
Within the context of the incident reports, I do want to also acknowledge
that GlobalSign has consistently improved the quality of their reports. As
the OCSP issue shows, the level of detail and clarity in their
communications, and their providing artifacts, has been a huge help in
addressing and assuaging concerns. Rather than purely looking at the number
of incidents, and instead looking at how the incident reports are handled,
this is good progress. While some bugs did feel like they dragged out (e.g.
1575880), even then, GlobalSign was proactive in communicating both the
completion of past actions as well as next steps, with clear timetables.
GlobalSign has already proactively addressed some of the other things one
might expect from a "modern" CA - for example, supporting and enabling
automation for their customers, both "retail" and "managed CA/Enterprise"
(via AEG), and so I do see a positive trend in addressing some of the
systemic issues here.
That's not to say things are perfect: for example, the mixing of TLS
profiles (DV, OV, EV) in a single hierarchy means that there are still a
number of systemic risks which we've seen as patterns, both from GlobalSign
and other CAs, in terms of audit and audit scopes and proper validation of
information, but I do think this is trending closer to what would be good
for all CAs to think about.
The sooner we can get to sunsetting GlobalSign's legacy roots, the better,
and so I definitely think it would be encouraging to see them help migrate
customers sooner than waiting on natural expiration alone, just like I
think continuing to shorten lifetimes would be another very positive sign.
However, I understand and recognize there are complexities here that may
prevent that, but I didn't want folks to think this was "as good as it
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