Unity International Trading Co. Ltd

[Maya Malbon]

Panjiva provides over a billion trade records from 21 countries: United States, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam. These government-issued records provide verified and up-to-date insight into products and companies involved in international trade.\n \n U.S. Customs Data\n U.S. Customs data is the backbone of Panjiva. Individual shipment records are updated on the site every week, and are digested and organized into comprehensive company profiles covering all the companies that ship goods into, and out of the United States. Learn More... \n South American Data\n Over 137 million shipments from Central and South America, including ocean, air, and truck shipments. Available as a data add-on. Learn More... \n Chinese Trade Data\n Over 400,000 Chinese companies are covered in our China data, aggregated and processed for macro-level level viewing of trade trends. Try the tool for yourself and view China\'s trading relationships. Learn More... \n\n'); }//]]> U.S. Customs records organized by company 1 U.S. shipment available for Ningbo Unity International Trading Co., Ltd., updated weekly since 2007 Date Supplier Customer Details 43 more fields 2021-06-12 Ningbo Unity International Trading Co., Ltd. Gbs Enterprises, LLC XXXXXXXXX XXXXXX Bill of lading Shipment data shows what products a company is trading and more. Learn more Cleaned and organized South American shipments 3 South American shipments available for Ningbo Unity International Trading Co., Ltd. Date Data Source Customer Details 2023-04-11 Costa Rica Imports HEROKA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA XXXXXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXXX Shipment data shows what products a company is trading and more. Learn more Explore trading relationships hidden in supply chain data Supply chain map See all 10 customers of Ningbo Unity International Trading Co., Ltd. Contact information for Ningbo Unity International Trading Co., Ltd. Address ZHEJIANG PROVINCE Top products

• protector pillow

Top HS Codes

• HS 63 - Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags
• HS 59 - Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or laminated; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use
• HS 60 - Fabrics; knitted or crocheted
• HS 39 - Plastics and articles thereof
• HS 48 - Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or paperboard

See more goods shipped on Panjiva Sample Bill of Lading 57 shipment records available Date 2021-06-12 Shipper Name Ningbo Unity Int?L Trading Company Shipper Address LIMITED BLOCKA TIANRUN BUSINESS BLDG NO.737 ZHONGXING RD NINGBO NINGBO CN Consignee Name Gbs Enterprises, Llc Consignee Address 9240 PROTOTYPE DRIVE RENO NV 89521 US Notify Party Name Gbs Enterprises, Llc Notify Party Address 9240 PROTOTYPE DRIVE, RENO,NV 89521, RENO NV 89521 US Weight 4666 Weight Unit K Weight in KG 4666.0 Quantity 477 Quantity Unit CTN Shipment Origin China Details 4,666.0 kg
From port: Shanghai, China
To port: Port of Oakland, Oakland, California Place of Receipt Shanghai Foreign Port of Lading Shanghai, China U.S. Port of Unlading Port of Oakland, Oakland, California U.S. Destination Port Port of Oakland, Oakland, California Commodity XXXXXXXXX XXXXXX Container FCIU7265207 Carrier Name DT LOGISTICS (HK) LTD Vessel Name APL FLORIDA Voyage Number 0GX0R Bill of Lading Number DLHTSHSE2107376 Master Bill of Lading Number CMDUCNDN035959 HTS Codes HTS 6302.10 Suppliers similar to Ningbo Unity International Trading Co., Ltd.

Massive evidence of war crimes in northern and eastern Ukraine is reshuffling the deck and putting pressure on EU countries to wean themselves off Russian energy. On 8 April, the EU adopted its fifth package of sanctions against Russia including a ban on coal and solid fossil fuels. Should we go further in the embargo and extend it to Russian gas and oil? This issue is being debated as part of a new sanctions package that divides the EU27. The reluctance to impose an embargo on Russian energy is based on the idea that there would be no alternative to Russian energy for firms and households. This lack of substitution would result in a very high cost for the EU and potentially higher than that borne by Russia. This extreme view, which has already been criticised by Bachmann et al. (2022a, 2022b), neglects the possibilities of substitution at the different stages of economic activity, and would result in a decrease in production strictly equal to the amount of forgone energy. Fortunately, the reality is less simplistic: energy substitutes can be found by firms, or intermediate goods that do not use energy (or are less energy intensive) can also be offered by new suppliers. In addition, consumer demand can move towards other goods if this energy-based good becomes too expensive or no longer meets needs. History is full of examples in which such substitution mechanisms are put in place (Bachmann et al. 2022a, 2022b).

Notes: This figure presents the cost for Russia of international trade restrictions under six different scenarios as a percentage of Gross National Expenditure (GNE). (I) trade restrictions are for imports only; (I&E) trade restrictions are for both imports and exports. For example, World - [China, India] (I&E) indicates that trade restrictions are taken at the world level excluding China and India and concern both imports and exports.

Thus, when the sanctions concern only imports and are taken at the level of the EU, the GNE decreases by 2.27%, whereas when they concern both imports and exports and when international coordination is perfect, national expenditure decreases by 33%. The cost for Russia is thus 14 times larger. This last scenario is obviously unrealistic but shows that international coordination is very important. In the more restricted and politically realistic framework where Russia is excluded from international trade with the exception of China and India, the drop in GNE is still of a considerable magnitude and would be about -28%. This shows that there is strength in unity. Finally, in the more realistic case where restrictions are coordinated at the level of unfriendly states, the loss is -11.29%, five times greater than when the EU acts in isolation.

The European Commission, which is in charge of drafting a new set of sanctions, is seeking to further restrict imports from Russia, especially for oil and gas. Some countries, including Germany and Austria, are opposed to this new round of sanctions on the grounds that they would be too costly because of their heavy dependence on Russian energy. Figure 2 represents the cost for the EU of trade restrictions for the six scenarios.

Notes: This figure presents cost for the EU of international trade restrictions as a percentage of Gross National Expenditure (GNE). (I) trade restrictions are for imports only; (I&E) trade restrictions are for both imports and exports. For example, World - [China, India] (I&E) indicates that trade restrictions are taken at the world level excluding China and India and concern both imports and exports.

It appears that the costs borne by the EU are significantly smaller than those borne by Russia, whatever the scenario. Moreover, these costs are globally stable and represent an average loss of 0.77% in GNE. Thus, the international coordination of sanctions implies a much higher cost for Russia, but more importantly, it implies almost the same (and affordable) cost for the EU. Table 1 summarises the results of our simulations.

Notes: This table presents costs for Russia and the EU of international trade restrictions as a percentage of Gross National Expenditure (GNE). EU and UC stand, respectively, for European Union and Unfriendly Countries.

The relative cost of sanctions increases significantly as international coordination strengthens. Bachman et al. (2022a, 2022b) correctly point out that the estimated costs of the embargo based on the Baqaee and Fahri (2021) methodology may be underestimated, in part because of price rigidity or the omission of some factor reallocation costs. However, to the extent that these additional costs are common to all countries, there is no reason to believe that they would substantially affect the relative costs of an embargo. In the most restrictive scenario, an embargo would cost Russia three times as much as it would cost the EU, while in the most extreme scenario it would cost Russia 41 times as much. Finally, in the more realistic case of coordination at the level of unfriendly states, the cost would be 13 times higher for Russia.

As the European Commission discusses a sixth round of sanctions, will the democracies decide on an embargo on Russian oil and gas? While the US seems to favour this option, disagreements are more pronounced within the EU because of greater energy dependence. Based on the most recent developments in international macroeconomics, our evaluations show that the losses for Russia are more important and out of proportion to those for the EU, which remain manageable in relation to the stakes. More importantly, our results show that the effectiveness of sanctions depends crucially on international coordination. The adage that there is strength in unity has never been more relevant.

1 According to the TASS agency, the list of countries unfriendly to Russia includes the US, Canada, the EU states, the UK, Ukraine, Montenegro, Switzerland, Albania, Andorra, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, North Macedonia, and also Japan, South Korea, Australia, Micronesia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan. For further details see

The response by Western states has been one of complete and total support for the State of Israel, without even a cursory nod towards international law. This has amplified Israel impunity, giving it carte blanche to carry out its genocidal war without limit. Beyond diplomatic support, Western states are supplying Israel with armament, sanctioning the operation of Israeli weapons companies within their borders.

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