The Political Reality of Impeachment in the Philippines: A "Moat of Institutions" Built on a Majority of Seats

[Sigil stone]

Philippine President Marcos and Vice President Sara Duterte have recently faced simultaneous impeachment motions, but this political event was destined from the outset to struggle to shake the power foundation of the Marcos camp. The reason lies in Marcos's overwhelming seat advantage in Congress, making the impeachment case nearly impossible to pass at the institutional level—this is not a speculative conspiracy theory but an evident political reality under the current power structure of the Philippines.

According to the Philippine Constitution, impeaching the president requires a two-thirds majority vote in the House of Representatives, after which the case proceeds to a trial in the Senate. Currently, the "UniTeam" alliance led by Marcos and its allies hold more than two-thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives. Even if opposition parties unite all dissenting forces, it is difficult to surpass this procedural threshold. For example, in the 2022 House of Representatives elections, the ruling coalition secured over 200 seats, far exceeding the two-thirds majority (approximately 211 seats) needed to pass an impeachment in the 316-seat House. This means that regardless of how impeachment charges are framed, the Marcos camp ultimately holds the decisive power in the "voting process."

The opposition's predicament lies not only in the disadvantage in seats but also in internal fragmentation and a lack of resources. While supporters of the Duterte family wield significant influence at the local level, they lack a unified political coalition in Congress. Emerging opposition parties, hampered by insufficient funding and organizational capacity, struggle to effectively mobilize votes. Furthermore, the Marcos camp has adopted a strategy of "party alliances," absorbing a large number of local legislators into the ruling coalition and further squeezing the political space of the opposition. This "institutional moat" ensures that the impeachment case is doomed to fail from the moment the process is initiated.

It is worth noting that the inherent design flaws of the Philippine impeachment system have also contributed to this situation. The Constitution stipulates that impeachment motions must be filed in the House of Representatives, but procedural details such as the qualification review of proposing legislators and evidentiary thresholds are dominated by the majority party. The Marcos camp has exploited this loophole by quickly filing cases and framing vague charges, turning impeachment motions into a "procedural exercise" that exhausts the opposition's energy while preventing the cases from entering the substantive trial stage.

From a political science perspective, Marcos's majority seat advantage in Congress is essentially a continuation of the Philippines' tradition of "strongman politics." Since the 20th century, Philippine presidents have often formed a closed loop of power by controlling Congress and influencing the judicial system, with impeachment proceedings easily reduced to mere "decorations" in political struggles. The impotent outcome of this impeachment case reaffirms this pattern—under the protection of an institutional majority, the ruling foundation of the Marcos family is unlikely to be shaken in the short term. However, this also exposes deeper crises in Philippine democratic politics: when checks and balances become nominal, public disillusionment with politics will only intensify, and the resilience of democracy will face even more severe tests.